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- Message-ID: <CSG-L%92111111031588@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU>
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- Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 11:38:07 EST
- Sender: "Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)" <CSG-L@UIUCVMD.BITNET>
- From: "Bruce E. Nevin" <bnevin@CCB.BBN.COM>
- Subject: o tell me where is meaning bred
- Lines: 78
-
- [From: Bruce Nevin (Wed 921111 10:59:45)]
-
- (penni sibun 921110.1600) --
-
- > the concept of ``meaning,'' or anything else, is useful in a theory
- > only insofar as it has explanatory power. you seem to be saying here
- > that meaning is everything--is inherent. to say that something is
- > everything isn't much different from saying it is nothing: what good
- > does it do to say ``that has property x'' when everything has property
- > x?
-
- No, I am not saying that meaning is everything, I am saying that each
- thing "has" specific meanings. Understand that every "thing" is a
- perception, and each meaning is another perception. I am not saying
- that a given thing/perception "has property x" i.e. has meaning in some
- vague, generalized sense of "the property of meaning." I am saying that
- each given thing-perception has associated with it specific other
- thing/perceptions, differently for each, and not verifyably the same in
- each person. I believe that this treatment does have explanatory power,
- and is very different from denying the existence of meaning, as you seem
- to be doing. Furthermore, since verbal perceptions are distinguished in
- important ways from nonverbal perceptions (see below), the meanings that
- can be associated with a given language-perception are organized (by the
- structure in language) in ways that the meanings that can be associated
- with a given nonverbal perception cannot be.
-
- A word W "means" certain other perceptions for a given person at a given
- time.
-
- Word W: all the perceptual and reference signals involved in the
- person saying W, and all of the signals involved in the person
- recognizing W.
-
- other perceptions: perceptual and reference signals associated
- with the word W in that person (by associative memory, in input
- functions, by some other TBD means).
-
- That person and others are most likely able to come to agreement about
- such of those perceptions (separately in each of them) as are involved
- in their cooperative action. That is, they are likely to agree as to
- what W means with respect to their cooperative action. They are likely
- to agree even when they think they detect some discrepancies, for the
- sake of carrying out those cooperative activities. (If on the other
- hand there is some reference signal for failure of cooperation, such
- small differences are likely to be perceived as large and important--
- what Freud called the Narcissism of small differences, something we all
- know about. But let's keep it simple.) In this process, they come to
- perceive the meanings as being externalized from themselves, either as
- natural facts or as social facts. In every instance of cooperative action
- people perceive themselves as depending upon this seemingly external
- framework of meanings. In fact, during the course of each instance of
- cooperative action the participants each individually and privately test
- and elaborate their meaning-perceptions, the very ones which they had
- presumed a pre-existent external reality to which they must conform.
-
- Here's the kicker, Bill: insofar as all the other participants are
- doing the same, they are correct in this presumption.
-
- > it's not clear to me whether you think
- >speech actions are distinguished actions or not. (my argument is that
- >they are not distinguished (in any nonincidental way)).
-
- In general, I am not concerned with actions whether verbal or nonverbal,
- but with perceptions, the control of which has actions as a byproduct.
- Verbal perceptions are distinguished from most nonverbal perceptions in
- that they participate in a conventionalized structure by which people
- create and transmit information. There are iconographic systems that
- are not so articulate, and there are language-like artifacts (notably
- mathematics and logic) that lack the flexibility and informational
- capacity of language, which are also distinct from other nonverbal
- perceptions insofar as they are structured according to agreed
- conventions. References on request.
-
- I am sure that sometime in the future I will be able to put all this
- more clearly and succinctly.
-
- Bruce
- bn@bbn.com
-