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- Xref: sparky alt.security.pgp:85 sci.crypt:4492
- Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!sunic!lth.se!pollux.lu.se!magnus
- From: magnus@thep.lu.se (Magnus Olsson)
- Subject: PGP secret key on multiuser system (again) (was: Risks of keeping...)
- Message-ID: <1992Nov9.105706.7027@pollux.lu.se>
- Keywords: pgp 2.0
- Sender: news@pollux.lu.se (Owner of news files)
- Nntp-Posting-Host: dirac.thep.lu.se
- Organization: Theoretical Physics, Lund University, Sweden
- References: <1992Nov4.205137.25578@ulysses.att.com> <1992Nov5.034539.29366@ils.nwu.edu> <1992Nov8.142456.21795@ghost.dsi.unimi.it>
- Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1992 10:57:06 GMT
- Lines: 23
-
- OK, let me rephrase my question, since people seems to discuss
- everything but what I really wanted to know (not that the discussion
- hasn't been interesting - thanks for all the opinions):
-
-
- Suppose I only *store* my secret keyring on a multiuser system, but
- don't actually use it. The evil cracker Bob reads it.
-
- Now, obvoiusly, if I didn't have any pass phrase, Bob could start
- forging messages in my name.
-
- But suppose I do have a pass phrase, and that it's so complicated that
- Bob fails to guess it, even using automatic guessing programs. Can Bob
- do anything dangerous in this case?
-
- In short: How secure is the pass phrase mechanism of PGP 2.0?
-
-
- Magnus Olsson | \e+ /_
- Dept. of Theoretical Physics | \ Z / q
- University of Lund, Sweden | >----<
- Internet: magnus@thep.lu.se | / \===== g
- Bitnet: THEPMO@SELDC52 | /e- \q
-