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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: Quantum cryptography: a flawed premise?
- Message-ID: <a_rubin.718993123@dn66>
- From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin)
- Date: 13 Oct 92 16:18:43 GMT
- References: <141@lorien.OCF.LLNL.GOV> <TK.92Oct12131052@entropy.ai.mit.edu> <1992Oct12.184051.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu>
- Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc.
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- In <1992Oct12.184051.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> leichter@zodiac.rutgers.edu writes:
-
- >The attack against the *cryptosystem*, as opposed to the attack against QM,
- >goes like this: The eavesdropper clones the photons and SAVES them - he
- >makes no attempt to measure their polarization states yet. Later, when Alice
- >has revealed to Bob (and the eavesdropper) which "regime" (circular or linear)
- >each photon polarization is to be measured in, the eavesdropper can safely go
- >back and measure just that state. QM guarantees that he gets the same answers
- >Bob did, when Bob measured those same photons in Alice's "regime". (On the
- >ones where Bob chose the wrong "regime", both the eavesdropper and Bob get
- >random answers.) When Bob now tells Alice which photons he read in the
- >"right" regime, the eavesdropper learns which of his measurements to keep,
- >too.
-
- Even if you can clone photons with the same polarization (not obvious to
- me, but not theoretically impossible), this will change the photon count
- statistics Bob will get, which may be detectable.
-
-
- --
- Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea
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