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- Path: sparky!uunet!wupost!usc!rpi!newsserver.pixel.kodak.com!psinntp!psinntp!kepler1!andrew
- From: andrew@rentec.com (Andrew Mullhaupt)
- Newsgroups: sci.math
- Subject: Re: Proof of God's Existence
- Message-ID: <1228@kepler1.rentec.com>
- Date: 6 Sep 92 00:28:31 GMT
- References: <1992Sep1.215331.89956@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au>
- Organization: Renaissance Technologies Corp., Setauket, NY.
- Lines: 33
-
- In article <1992Sep1.215331.89956@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au> kevin@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au writes:
-
- [Doubts about the possibility of proving existence of God deleted...]
-
- >Asides from limitations in the expressive power of mathematics, the following
- >will show any proof of the ontic status of God futile.
- >1. It is possible to imagine a world, completely agreeing with the current one
- >on all sensory data, in which God exists.
-
- Although you got all the theists and agnostics on board with you here, the
- "hard atheists" are split on this issue. Some would assert that it is not
- possible to imagine this, since they hold that the existence of God would have
- certain consequences which are not observed.
-
- >2. It is possible to imagine a world, completely agreeing with the current one
- >on all sensory data, in which God doesn't exists.
-
- Symmetric with the first claim, there are theists who can't swallow this one...
-
- >Then the existence of these epistemically indistinguishable worlds proves that
- >any ontological statement about God is INDEPENDENT of any epistemically
- >knowable axioms on the real world.
-
- Now you get it from both sides - you claimed it was possible to imagine these
- worlds, but what you want to use is that they exist. It is hard to think of
- lots of people who can agree with this strong condition. Even so, if both
- of these worlds exist, then God exists, which contradicts undecidability.
-
- Your argument seems to be that there is no way to know which of these imaginable
- outcomes corresponds to reality. But this is your conclusions, too...
-
- Later,
- Andrew Mullhaupt
-