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- Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3253 alt.security:4373 comp.security.misc:1258
- Path: sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!dtix!relay!wcollin
- From: wcollin@relay.nswc.navy.mil (Dave Collins - E41)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,local.crypto
- Subject: Re: ATM fraud
- Message-ID: <1992Sep15.185901.15924@relay.nswc.navy.mil>
- Date: 15 Sep 92 18:59:01 GMT
- References: <1992Sep8.115050.8694@cl.cam.ac.uk> <1992Sep14.085441.28829@nessie.mcc.ac.uk> <unruh.716579030@physics.ubc.ca>
- Sender: news@relay.nswc.navy.mil
- Organization: Naval Surface Warfare Center
- Lines: 26
-
- In article <unruh.716579030@physics.ubc.ca>, unruh@physics.ubc.ca (William Unruh) writes:
- |> segr@nessie.mcc.ac.uk (Simon Read) writes:
- |>
- |> The design of the machine's keyboards makes it virtually impossible to
- |> prevent people from seeing you enter your PIN if they really want to.
-
- --
- As you can see below, I work for a place that has a lot of security measures
- in use. One of these is a keypad for entering PIN like identification numbers.
- You press a start button which randomly enumerates the keypad with a different
- sequence each time, thereby eliminating the over-the shoulder eavesdropper.
- You also have to be pretty much dirrectly in front of the keypad to view the
- numbers.
- I'm sure these are more costly than the standard telephone type keypads, but
- would not expect them to be cost prohibitive, if the ATM company wished to
- advertise this exceptionally good machine design.
-
- =======================================================================
- Wm David Collins BSEE, EMT-Cardiac, ACLS, KC4YYX, T191 SM
- Naval Surface Warfare Center
- Dahlgren Division
- Code E-41, Networks Branch
- Dahlgren, VA 22448-5000
- W(703) 663-8246, DSN 249-8246, H(703) 775-5627
- DDN mail: wcollin@relay.nswc.navy.mil
- =======================================================================
-