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- Xref: sparky sci.crypt:3106 comp.security.misc:1156
- Path: sparky!uunet!destroyer!gatech!concert!duke!trt
- From: trt@duke.cs.duke.edu (Tom Truscott)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.security.misc
- Subject: Re: "Sneakers" -- action/adventure movie about Cryptography
- Message-ID: <715637499@romeo.cs.duke.edu>
- Date: 4 Sep 92 20:11:40 GMT
- References: <1992Sep1.060412.14956@fig.citib.com> <naran.715539174@sfu.ca> <1992Sep3.185207.29154@news.eng.convex.com>
- Followup-To: sci.crypt
- Organization: IBM RTP
- Lines: 11
-
- >>Anyways, one-time pads are really effective in short
- >>messages and are reasonably secure on larger documents.
-
- Arguably this is backwards. As suggested in "Codebreakers",
- if I suspect that a "yes" or "no" decision is forthcoming, and I
- intercept a 3 character long message, I can make a reasonable
- guess as to the message's contents.
-
- More generally, "traffic analysis" is still a threat. So some systems
- send continuously, just sending nulls or-ed with the pad
- (== the pad itself) when there is no real traffic.
-