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- Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!uknet!acorn!eoe!ahaley
- From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
- Message-ID: <1384@eouk9.eoe.co.uk>
- Date: 27 Aug 92 09:29:36 GMT
- References: <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
- Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
- Lines: 25
- X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3
-
- copper@WATSON.IBM.COM (Don Coppersmith) writes:
- : Andrew Haley ( ahaley@eoe.co.uk ) writes:
- :
- : > There's no point in using any more
- : > key bits, because differential cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in
- : > 2**47 operations whatever the key length.
- : ........----------
- :
- : The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
- : not just that many operations. Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
- : the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
- : that many operations on your own machine. This respresents massive
- : data that you've got to get out of your opponent's machine!
-
- Yes, I should have mentioned that, but as a design principle of
- cryptosystems I would have thought that there shouldn't be any
- possible chosen text attacks which involve less encryptions than
- exhaustive search. There should not be more key bits than needed to
- prevent the opponent's best atack, simply as a principle of economy.
-
- Anyway, my original point is still valid; DES is secure as far as any
- of us know (and I'm sure you know better than most) and dual key
- triple encryption usefully extends the key of DES for long term use.
-
- Andrew.
-