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- Path: sparky!uunet!cis.ohio-state.edu!ucbvax!WATSON.IBM.COM!copper
- From: copper@WATSON.IBM.COM ("Don Coppersmith")
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
- Message-ID: <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
- Date: 26 Aug 92 14:27:35 GMT
- Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
- Reply-To: COPPER@ibm.com
- Lines: 14
-
- Andrew Haley ( ahaley@eoe.co.uk ) writes:
-
- > There's no point in using any more
- > key bits, because differential cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in
- > 2**47 operations whatever the key length.
- ........----------
-
- The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
- not just that many operations. Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
- the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
- that many operations on your own machine. This respresents massive
- data that you've got to get out of your opponent's machine!
-
- Don Coppersmith
-