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- Path: sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!Sirius.dfn.de!math.fu-berlin.de!news.netmbx.de!Germany.EU.net!news.uni-bielefeld.de!news
- From: (Michael Bruewer)mib@bio128.uni-bielefeld.de
- Subject: Re: Security leak or bug?
- Sender: news@unibi.uni-bielefeld.de (News Administrator)
- Message-ID: <1992Aug26.090053.28832@unibi.uni-bielefeld.de>
- Date: Wed, 26 Aug 92 09:00:53 GMT
- Reply-To: mib@bio128.uni-bielefeld.de
- References: <HARDY.92Aug24163755@golem.ps.uci.edu>
- Nntp-Posting-Host: bio131.uni-bielefeld.de
- Organization: Universitaet Bielefeld
- Lines: 61
-
- We ve had similar problems as Stefano Pagiola a while ago. Here s a summary of
- the responses I ve got, again. Some of the points are not useful in this
- special case, but of general interest, if you want to improve security.
- In our case a hacker probably used the rdist security whole.
-
-
- 1. Is your public sound port on?
-
- 2. Check the /etc/cron*
-
- 3. Check the lastcomm (/usr/adm/acct on my system) file.
- Before that you must do
- # accton /usr/adm/acct
- Then you can use "sa" to obtain a list of all commands and the user who
- ran it since then.
-
- 4. Are you aware of the rdist promlem?
- There is a security hole in rdist. A fixed version of rdist for NeXT is
- available at sonata.cc.purdue.edu.
- 'rsh' uses the .rhost file in a user's home directory or the global
- /etc/hosts.equiv file. If a remote user is allowed access via these files
- then no amount of password changing will stop them.
-
-
- 5. There are known methods of attack. finger, sendmail, old versions of
- emacs, ...
-
- 6. REMOVE any pd apps you received in binary form. NEVER AND I MEAN NEVER
- install pd binaries on ANY machine. If you can't get the source for the pd
- stuff then don't install it.
-
- 7. Give the machines a boot password. Anybody can bring a NeXT to single user
- mode and change password
-
- 8. Run Crack and COPS once a week. (Crack and COPS are available on
- ftp.uu.net)
-
- 9. Do "% /usr/etc/rpcinfo -p"
-
- If you see a line that begins with 100017 and ends with rexd,
- you have a gaping security hole that allows anyone to execute
- arbitrary commands as any non-root user (and with any group
- access, including wheel group) with essentially no logging.
-
- Fix: edit /etc/inetd.conf, find the line
-
- rexd/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root /usr/etc/rpc.rexd rpc.rexd
-
- and insert a # at the beginning. Then
-
- "# kill -HUP <inetd's pid>"
-
- (or reboot).
-
-
- _________________________________________________________________
- Michael Bruewer
-
- e-mail: mib@bio128.uni-bielefeld.de
-
- Universitaet Bielefeld
-