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- Newsgroups: comp.protocols.kerberos
- Path: sparky!uunet!stanford.edu!ulysses.att.com!smb
- From: smb@ulysses.att.com
- Subject: Re: New User Accounts
- Message-ID: <9209031516.AA09658@Athena.MIT.EDU>
- Sender: news@shelby.stanford.edu (USENET News System)
- Organization: Internet-USENET Gateway at Stanford University
- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 15:16:09 GMT
- Lines: 13
-
- Dictionary attacks can eb stopped using the protocls developed
- by li Gong et al, and by Bellovin & Merrit. Note that the
- latter necessitates the use of public-key, and both have
- (probably acceptable) an overhead.
-
- Both protocols require public key cryptosystems. One significant difference
- is that the Lomas/Gong/Needham/Saltzer protocol requires a known public
- key for the server, and the Bellovin/Merritt one does not. Both require
- high-quality random numbers. Bellovin/Merritt imposes some possibly-tricky
- constraints on what a public key can look like.
-
-
- --Steve Bellovin
-