NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #18/NN_1992_18.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/5857

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From: [e-mail] (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: "Presumed Guilty, How & Why the W.C. Framed Lee Harvey Oswald" [7/11]
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Summary: A factual account based on the Commission's public & private documents
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Keywords: continued endemic denial of our true history consigns us to oblivion
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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 1992 21:27:40 GMT
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  __________________________________________________________________________



      PART III:


      THE ACCUSED










                              *  *  *  *  *  *  *




      6


      The Rifle in the Building




      The Mannlicher-Carcano C2766 rifle was brought into the Book
      Depository and taken to the sixth floor in some way at some time
      prior to 1:30 P.M., November 22, when it was found hidden in a
      stack of boxes near the sixth-floor stair landing.  For the "lone
      assassin-no conspiracy" theory to be valid, the only man who could
      have brought the rifle into the building is Lee Harvey Oswald.
         The Commission's conclusion that Oswald brought the rifle into
      the Depository demands premeditation of the murder. According to
      the Report, Oswald deliberately lied to co-worker Frazier about his
      reason for returning to Irving the day before the assassination and
      constructed a paper sack on or before Thursday, November 21, for
      the purpose of carrying his rifle into the building (R137).
         The prerequisite of premeditation in this case is prior
      knowledge of the motorcade route.  If Oswald did not know by
      Thursday morning that President Kennedy would pass his building, he
      obviously could not have planned to shoot the President.  The
      closest the Commission came to considering the question of prior
      knowledge was to assert that Oswald could have known the motorcade
      route as early as November 19, when it appeared in the Dallas
      papers (R40, 642).  It never established whether Oswald {did} know
      the route.
         Despite the Commission's assurances, on the basis of newspaper
      accounts neither Oswald nor any Dallas resident could have known
      the {exact} motorcade route, for conflicting accounts were
      published.  The problem, as stated by the Report in its
      "Speculations and Rumors" appendix, is this:

            {Speculation}. --The route shown in the newspaper took
         the motorcade through the Triple Underpass via Main Street,
         a block away from the Depository.  Therefore, Oswald could
         not have known that the motorcade would pass directly by the
         . . . Depository Building. (R643).

      The Report appears to dispel this speculation by asserting that the
      published route clearly indicated a turn-off from Main onto
      Houston, and Houston onto Elm, taking the President directly in
      front of the Depository as the procession approached the underpass.
      In dispelling this rumor, the Report quotes incompletely and
      dishonestly from the relevant Dallas papers.
         On November 16, the "Dallas Times Herald" reported that while
      the route had not yet been determined, "the presidential party
      apparently will loop through the downtown area, probably on Main
      Street" (22H613).  Both the "Dallas Morning News" and the "Times
      Herald" carried the release of the motorcade route on November 19,
      including the information about the turn onto Elm (22H614-15).  The
      next day, the "Morning News" carried another description of the
      route, saying the motorcade "will travel on Mockingbird Lane,
      Lemmon Avenue, Turtle Creek Boulevard, Cedar Springs, Harwood, Main
      and Stemmons Freeway," with mention of the Houston-to-Elm stretch
      omitted (22H616).  Not included in the Commission's evidence but
      discovered and printed by Harold Weisberg, is a map of the
      motorcade route that appeared on the front page of the "Morning
      News" of November 22, the day of the President's visit.  The map
      shows the route as taking Main down to Stemmons Freeway again,
      avoiding the cut-over to Elm.[1]
         The Report never quotes those press accounts which did not
      include the Elm Street stretch, leaving the impression that Oswald,
      in his premeditation, knew previously that the President would pass
      directly before him, and therefore present an easy target (R40).
      The distinction is not major, because either published route would
      have put the President within shooting range of the Depository.  It
      should be noted, however, that the Commission, in making its case,
      quoted selectively from the record.
         Before it can be stated that Oswald knew of {any} motorcade
      route, it must first be established that he had access to a medium
      by which he could have been so informed.  Roy Truly and Bonnie Ray
      Williams thought that Oswald occasionally read newspapers in the
      Depository (3H218, 164).  Mrs. Robert Reid saw Oswald in the
      building some five to ten times and recalled that "he was usually
      reading," although she did not specify what he read (3H279).
      Charles Givens provided the best detail on Oswald's reading habits
      during work.  He testified that Oswald would generally read the
      previous day's paper:  "Like if the day was Tuesday, he would read
      Monday's paper in the morning."  Givens was certain that the
      editions of the paper Oswald read, the "Dallas Morning News," were
      dated, for he usually looked at them after Oswald finished (6H352).
         Oswald's sufficient access to the electronic media is not
      definitely established.  Mrs. Earlene Roberts, the woman who rented
      Oswald his small room on North Beckley, testified that he rarely
      watched television:  "If someone in the other rooms had it on,
      maybe he would come and stand at the back of the couch--not over 5
      minutes and go to his room and shut the door" (6H437).  The police
      inventory of materials confiscated from Oswald's room reveals he
      had a "brown and yellow gold Russian make portable radio" (24H343),
      although there is no information as to whether the radio was
      usable, or used.
         Although the evidence of Oswald's accessibility to information
      relating to the motorcade route does not establish whether he
      {could} have known {anything} about the exact route, there are
      indications that he was, in fact, totally uninformed about and
      uninterested in the procession.  The narrative written by Marina
      Oswald when she was first put under protective custody leads one to
      believe that Oswald knew nothing of the President's trip.  "Only
      when I told him that Kennedy was coming the next day to Dallas and
      asked how I could see him--on television, of course--he answered
      that he did now know," Marina wrote of the night before the
      assassination (18H638).[2]
         More important information was provided by co-worker James
      Jarman, who met Oswald on the first floor of the Depository between
      9:30 and 10:00 on the morning of November 22.  According to Jarman,
      Oswald

         was standing up in the window and I went to the window also,
         and he asked me what were the people gathering around the
         corner for, and I told him that the President was supposed
         to pass that morning, and he asked me did I know which way
         he was coming, and I told him, yes;  he probably come down
         Main and turn on Houston and then back again on Elm.
            Then he said, "Oh, I see," and that was all. (3H201)

      Jarman first reported this incident on November 23, 1963, in his
      affidavit for the Dallas Police (24H213).
         Jarman's story is subject to two interpretations.  If Oswald
      spoke honestly, then he clearly revealed his ignorance of the day's
      events, knowing neither the reason for the crowds gathering around
      the building nor the route of the motorcade.  If Oswald knew the
      answers to the questions he posed to Jarman, it would seem that he
      was deliberately trying to "plant" false information to indicate
      his lack of interest in the motorcade, a good defense in case he
      was later apprehended in connection with the assassination.
      However, as Sylvia Meagher has pointed out, if Oswald deliberately
      dropped exculpatory hints to Jarman, why did he not later offer
      this to the police as part of the evidence in his favor?[3]  In all
      the pages of reports and testimony relating to Oswald's
      interrogation sessions, there is no indication that Oswald ever
      mentioned the early morning meeting with Jarman.
         Thus there is no basis for asserting that Oswald knew the exact
      motorcade route as of Thursday morning, November 21.  The
      newspapers, including the one Oswald normally saw a day late,
      carried conflicting versions of the route, varying at the crucial
      juncture--the turn-off on Houston Street.  While there is no way of
      knowing whether Oswald had seen any of the published information
      relevant to the motorcade, his actions indicate a total unawareness
      of the events surrounding the procession through Dallas.
         During October and November of 1963, Oswald lived in a Dallas
      rooming house while his wife, Marina, and two children lived in
      Irving at the home of Ruth Paine, some 15 miles from the
      Depository.  In the words of the Report, "Oswald traveled between
      Dallas and Irving on weekends in a car driven by a neighbor of the
      Paines, Buell Wesley Frazier, who also worked at the Depository.
      Oswald generally would go to Irving on Friday afternoon and return
      to Dallas Monday morning" (R129).  On November 21, the day before
      the assassination, Oswald asked Frazier whether he could ride home
      with him that afternoon to obtain "some curtain rods" for "an
      apartment."  Sinister implications are attached to this visit to
      Irving, which the Report would have us believe was unprecedented.
      Assuring us that the curtain-rod story was a fabrication, and
      asserting that "Oswald's" rifle was stored in the Paine garage, the
      Report lays ground for the ultimate assertion that Oswald returned
      to Irving to pick up his rifle and bring it to work the next day.
         The Report's explanation of Oswald's return to Irving hinges on
      the assumption that the C2766 rifle was stored in the Paine garage.
      Of this there is not a single shred of evidence.  The Commission
      had one tenuous item that could indicate the presence of {a} rifle
      wrapped in a blanket in the Paine garage;  Marina testified she
      once peeked into this blanket and saw the {stock} of a rifle
      (R128).  The other evidence indicates only that a bulky object was
      stored in the blanket.  Certainly no one saw the {specific} C2766
      rifle in the garage.  As Liebeler has pointed out, "that fact is
      that not one person alive today ever saw that rifle in the Paine
      garage in such a way that it could be identified as that rifle."[4]
         The Report recounts in dramatic detail the police search of the
      Paine garage on the afternoon of the assassination.  When asked
      that day if her husband owned a rifle, Marina pointed to the
      rolled-up blanket, which the officers proceeded to lift.  The
      blanket hung limp in an officer's hand;  it was empty (R131).
      Although there was no evidence that the rifle had ever been stored
      there, the Commission found the presence of the empty blanket on
      November 22 evidence that Oswald "removed the rifle from the
      blanket in the Paines' garage on Thursday evening" (R137).  Had the
      rifle been stored where the Commission assumed, {anyone} could have
      removed it at almost {any} time prior to the afternoon of the
      shooting.  The Paines apparently were not preoccupied with the
      security of their home, as indicated on Saturday, November 23.
      While the police were searching the Paine house that day, Mr.  and
      Mrs. Paine drove off, leaving the officers completely alone
      (7H193).
         With no evidence that Oswald ever removed the rifle from the
      Paine garage or that the rifle was even stored there, the
      Commission's case loses much of its substance, however
      circumstantial.  Further reducing the suspicion evoked by Oswald's
      return to Irving is the fact that this trip was {not} particularly
      unusual.  Despite the Commission's statement that he generally went
      home only on weekends, Oswald kept to no exact pattern for visiting
      his wife during the short time he was estranged from her.  On the
      contrary, Oswald frequently violated the assumed "pattern" of
      weekend visits.  He began his employment at the Depository on
      October 16.  That Friday, the 18th, he came to Irving but did not
      return to Dallas the following Monday because his wife had given
      birth to a second daughter that Sunday;  he visited Marina on
      Monday and spent the night at the Paines's.  The next weekend was
      "normal."  However, there are strong indications that Oswald
      returned to Irving the next {Thursday}, October 31.  During the
      weekend of November 8, Oswald again spent Monday with his wife in
      Irving, this time because it was Veteran's Day.  Furthermore,
      Oswald did not return at all the following weekend, and he fought
      over the telephone with his wife that Sunday about his use of an
      assumed name in registering at the roominghouse.  The following
      Thursday, the 21st, he returned to Irving (see R737-40).
         The Report does not include mention of a visit by Oswald to
      Irving on any Thursday other than November 21.  But there is strong
      evidence of another such return, as was brought out by Sylvia
      Meagher:

            It does not appear that Oswald's visit on Thursday
         evening without notice or invitation was unusual.  But it is
         not clear that it was unprecedented.  An FBI report dealing
         with quite another matter--Oswald's income and
         expenditures--strongly suggests that Oswald had cashed a
         check in a grocery store in Irving on Thursday evening,
         October 31, 1963 [CE 1165, p. 6];  the Warren Commission
         decided arbitrarily that the transaction took place on
         Friday, November 1 [R331].  Neither Oswald's wife nor Mrs.
         Ruth Paine, both of whom were questioned closely about the
         dates and times of Oswald's visits to Irving during October
         and November, suggested that he had ever come there--with or
         without prior notice--on a Thursday.  It is possible, though
         implausible, that Oswald came to Irving on Thursday, October
         31, 1963 solely to cash a check and then returned to Dallas
         without contacting his wife or visiting the Paine residence.
         More likely, Marina and Mrs.  Paine forgot that visit or,
         for reasons of their own, preferred not to mention it.
         Either way, it is clear that Oswald's visit to Irving on
         Thursday night, November 21, may not have been
         unprecedented.[5]

         Oswald's excuse for his return to Irving Thursday was that he
      intended to pick up curtain rods for "an apartment."  The Report
      attempts to vitiate this excuse by noting that (a) Oswald spoke
      with neither his wife, nor his landlady, nor Mrs. Paine about
      curtain rods, (b) Oswald's landlady testified that his room on
      North Beckley Avenue had curtains and rods, and (c) "No curtain
      rods were known to have been discovered in the Depository Building
      after the assassination" (R130).
         The source cited for the assertion that no curtain rods were
      found in the Depository after the assassination is CE 2640.  The
      Report neglects to mention that CE 2640 details an investigation
      conducted on September 21, 1964, ten months after the
      assassination, when only one person, Roy Truly, was questioned
      about curtain rods (25H899).  Truly was "certain" that no curtain
      rods had been found because "it would be customary for any
      discovery of curtain rods to immediately be called to his
      attention."  Aside from the ludicrous implication that the
      Depository had rules governing the discovery of curtain rods, this
      "inquiry" was too limited and too late to be of any significance.
         Apparently, the Commission's request for this inquiry calculated
      its worthlessness.  Rankin made this request of Hoover in a letter
      dated August 31, 1964.  The letter, which I obtained from the
      National Archives, leaves little doubt that the result of the
      inquiry was preconceived to be against Oswald.  Rankin ordered that
      Truly be interviewed "in order to establish that no curtain rods
      were found in the [Depository] following the assassination."[6]
      This phraseology seems to instruct Hoover {not} to conduct an
      objective investigation;  otherwise, the letter would have read "in
      order to establish {whether any} curtain rods were found."
         The Commission accepted without question the landlady's
      assurance that Oswald's room had curtain rods.  Had it conducted
      the least investigation, it could easily have determined that the
      room {did} need rods.  Black Star photographer Gene Daniels
      followed many of the events in Dallas on the weekend of the
      assassination.  On Saturday morning, November 23, he went to
      Oswald's rooming house and obtained a fascinating set of pictures.
      Daniels explained the circumstances to me:

            I went to the rooming house the following morning and
         requested permission to make the photograph from the
         landlady.  I'm not sure of her name but I don't think she
         was the owner.  We went into the room and she told me she
         preferred not to have me take any pictures until she put
         "the curtains back up."  She said that newsmen the evening
         before had disturbed the room and she didn't want anyone to
         see it messed up.  I agreed and stood in the room as she and
         her husband stood on the bed and hammered the curtain rods
         back into position.  While she did this, I photographed them
         or possibly just her I forget right now, up on the bed with
         the curtain rods etc.[7]

         It seems doubtful in the extreme that the activity of newsmen
      the night before could physically have removed curtain rods from
      the wall in Oswald's room.  A more reasonable possibility is that
      the rods had not been up at all until November 23, when Daniels
      witnessed and photographed the landlady and her husband hammering
      the rods into the wall.
         This renovating of Oswald's cubicle could not have come at a
      better time in the development of the Dallas police case against
      Oswald.  On the day of the assassination, Wesley Frazier filed an
      affadavit for the police that included information about the
      curtain-rod story (24H209).  At 10:30 on the morning of November
      23, police Captain Will Fritz asked Oswald if he had carried
      curtain rods to work the previous day.  According to Fritz, Oswald
      denied having told the curtain-rod story to Frazier (R604).  (This
      denial, in light of opposing testimony from Frazier and his sister,
      was apparently a falsehood.)
         Thus, the Commission is on shaky ground when it assumes Oswald's
      excuse for returning to Irving to have been false.  The inferences
      drawn from the premise of a spurious excuse are likewise weakened
      or disproved.  This Commission, which seems to have become a panel
      of amateur psychiatrists in conjuring up "motives" for Oswald,
      showed an appalling lack of sympathy and understanding in
      "evaluating" the "false excuse."

            In deciding whether Oswald carried a rifle to work in a
         long paper bag on November 22, the Commission gave weight to
         the fact that Oswald gave a false reason for returning home
         on November 21, and one which provided an excuse for the
         carrying of a bulky package the following morning. (R130)

            The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion
         that Lee Harvey Oswald . . . told the curtain rod story to
         Frazier to explain both the return to Irving on a Thursday
         and the obvious bulk of the package which he intended to
         bring to work the next day. (R137)

         The curtain-rod story may not have been false.  However, there
      are several possible explanations for Oswald's Irving visit other
      than the one that had such appeal to the Commission--that Oswald
      came to pick up his rifle.  As Leo Sauvage has pointed out, Ruth
      Paine and Marina had their own theory about Oswald's return.[8]  In
      the words of the Report:

            The women thought he had come to Irving because he felt
         badly about arguing with his wife about the use of the
         fictitious name.  He said that he was lonely, because he had
         not come the previous weekend, and told Marina that he
         "wanted to make his peace" with her. (R740)

         Sylvia Meagher, more understanding than the Commission, finds
      nothing suspicious in a man's trying to "make his peace" with his
      wife or visiting his two young daughters after not having seen them
      for two weeks.  She points out that if this were the reason for
      Oswald's visit, it is unlikely that he would have admitted it to
      Frazier, with whom he was not close.  Oswald could very innocently
      have lied about the curtain rods to Frazier to cover up a personal
      excuse, bringing a package the next morning to substantiate his
      story and avoid embarrassing questions.[9]  (The Paine garage,
      stuffed almost beyond capacity with the paraphernalia of two
      families, contained many packages that Oswald could have taken on
      the spur of the moment.)
         As the record now stands, Oswald's actions on November 21 could
      well have been perfectly innocent.  The fact is that we do not know
      why Lee Oswald returned to Irving that Thursday, but the trip is no
      more an indictment of Oswald than it is an element of his defense.
      However, official misrepresentations allowed unnecessary and unfair
      implications to become associated with the return.  There is no
      reason to believe that Oswald knew anything about the November 22
      motorcade.  His visit to Irving on a Thursday probably was not
      unprecedented.  Since there is no proof that the C2766 rifle was
      ever stored in the Paine garage, there is no basis for the theory
      that Oswald's return was for the purpose of obtaining that rifle.
      A number of innocent explanations for the visit present themselves
      as far more plausible than the incriminating and unsubstantiated
      notion of the Commission.


      {The Long and Bulky Package}

         At about 7:15 on the morning of the assassination, Oswald left
      the Paine home to walk to the residence of Mrs. Linnie Mae Randle,
      Buell Wesley Frazier's sister.  Mrs. Randle and Frazier were the
      only two people to see Oswald that morning before he arrived at the
      Depository;  they were likewise the only two people who saw the
      long package that Oswald had brought with him to work.  Their
      accounts are critical in the whole case and deserve close scrutiny.
         Standing at the kitchen window of her house, Mrs.  Randle saw
      Oswald approaching.  In his right hand he carried "a package in a
      sort of heavy brown bag," the top of which was folded down.  Mrs.
      Randle specified that Oswald gripped the package at the very top
      and that the bottom almost touched the ground (2H248).  When
      Commission Counsel Joseph Ball had Mrs. Randle demonstrate how
      Oswald held the package, he apparently tried to lead her into
      providing a false description for the record;  she corrected him:

            Mr. Ball:  And where was his hand gripping the {middle}
         of the package?
            Mrs. Randle:  No, sir;  the {top} with just a little bit
         sticking up.  You know just like you grab something like
         that.
            Mr. Ball:  And he was grabbing it with his right hand at
         the top of the package and the package almost touched the
         ground?
            Mrs. Randle:  Yes, sir.[10] (2H248;  emphasis added)

         Mrs. Randle estimated the length of this package as "a little
      more" than two feet.  When shown the 38-inch paper sack found near
      the alleged "assassin's" window, she was sure this was too long to
      have been the one carried by Oswald unless it had been folded down.
      In fact, she volunteered to fold the bag to its proper length;  the
      result was a 28 1/2-inch sack (2H249-50).  Furthermore, the FBI, in
      one of its interviews with Mrs. Randle, staged a "reconstruction"
      of Oswald's movements in which a replica sack was used and folded
      according to Mrs. Randle's memory.  "When the proper length of the
      sack was reached according to Mrs.  Randle's estimate," states the
      FBI report of this interview, "it was measured and found to be 27
      inches long" (24H408) .
         We must admire Mrs. Randle's consistency in estimating the
      length of Oswald's package despite severe questioning before the
      Commission.  Her recollection of the sack's length varied by only
      one and half inches in at least two reconstructions and one verbal
      estimate.  If we recall her specific description of the manner in
      which Oswald carried the sack (gripped at the {top} with the bottom
      almost touching the ground), it is obvious that the package {could
      not} have exceeded 29 inches in {maximum} length.  (Oswald was 5
      feet, 9 inches [24H7].)
         Frazier first noticed the package on the back seat of his car as
      he was about to leave for the Depository.  He estimated its length
      as "roughly about two feet long" (2H226).  From the parking lot at
      work, Oswald walked some 50 feet ahead of Frazier.  He held the
      package parallel to his body, one end under his right armpit, the
      other cupped in his right hand (2H228).  During his testimony
      before the Commission, Frazier, slightly over 6 feet tall compared
      to Oswald's 5 feet, 9 inches, held a package that contained the
      disassembled Carcano.  He cupped one end in his right hand;  the
      other end protruded over his shoulder to the level of his ear.  Had
      this been the case with Oswald's package, Frazier is sure he would
      have noticed the extra length (2H243).  Frazier's Commission
      testimony is buttressed by the original sworn affidavit he filed on
      November 22, 1963.  Here he estimated the length of the sack as
      "about two feet long," adding "I noticed that Lee had the package
      in his right hand under his arm . . . straight up and down"
      (24H209). Furthermore, during another "reconstruction," Frazier
      indicated for FBI agents the length occupied by the package on the
      back seat of his car;  that distance was measured to be 27 inches
      (24H409).  Again, if we take Frazier's description of how Oswald
      held the package in walking toward the Depository, the maximum
      length is fixed at 27 to 28 inches.
         Frazier and Mrs. Randle proved to be consistent, reliable
      witnesses.  Under rigorous questioning, through many
      reconstructions, their stories emerged unaltered and reinforced:
      the package carried by Oswald was 27 to 28 inches long.  Both
      witnesses provided ample means for verifying their estimates of
      length;  on each occasion their recollections proved accurate.
      Frazier and Mrs. Randle both independently described the package as
      slightly more than two feet long;  they both physically estimated
      the length of the package at what turned out to be from 27 to 28
      1/2 inches;  they both recalled Oswald's having carried his sack in
      a manner that would set the maximum length at about 28 inches.  One
      could hardly expect more credible testimony.  Perhaps it is true
      that the combined stories of Frazier and Mrs. Randle, persuasive as
      they are, do not prove that Oswald's package was 27 to 28 inches
      long.  However, no evidence has been put forth challenging their
      stories, and until such evidence can be produced, establishing a
      valid basis for doubt, we are forced to accept the 28-inch estimate
      as accurate.
         Not even the Commission could produce a single piece of evidence
      disputing Frazier and Mrs. Randle.  It merely believed what it
      wanted to believe and quoted what it wanted to quote, even to the
      point of self-contradiction.  Without comment as to the remarkably
      accurate aspects of Mrs. Randle's testimony, the Report dismisses
      her story entirely by asserting with no substantiation that she
      "saw the bag fleetingly."  It then quotes Frazier as saying he did
      not pay much attention to Oswald's package (R134).  This, however,
      was not the full extent of what Frazier had said, as the self-
      contradictory Report had previously quoted.  "Like I said, I
      remember I didn't look at the package very much," warned Frazier, "
      . . . {but when I did look at it he did have his hands on the
      package like that}" (R133-34).
         Accepting Frazier's and Mrs. Randle's stories would have aborted
      in its early stages the theory that Oswald killed the President
      unassisted.  The longest component of the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle
      {when disassembled} is 34.8-inches long (3H395).  The Commission's
      best and, in fact, {only} evidence on this point said the package
      carried to work by Oswald was too short to have contained the rifle
      in its shortest possible form, disassembled.  Obviously, a 35-inch
      package strains the limits imposed by the recollections of Frazier
      and Mrs. Randle.  Such a sack would have dragged on the ground when
      grasped at the top, protruded over Oswald's shoulder when cupped in
      his hand (as Frazier himself demonstrated), occupied more space on
      the back seat of Frazier's car, and been perceptibly longer than
      was consistently described by the two people who saw it.  There is
      just no reason to believe that the package was over 28 inches long,
      and every reason to believe that 28 inches was very close to its
      proper length.  The Commission could give no valid reason for
      rejecting that estimate;  it merely chose to disregard the stories
      of its only two witnesses.  Any alternative would have entailed
      admitting that Oswald did not carry the "assassination weapon" to
      work with him that morning.
         The Report plays up its rejection of the Frazier-Randle
      testimony as if, virtually torn between witness accounts and cold,
      hard, scientific fact, it gave in to the latter.  In the words of
      the Report:

            The Commission has weighed the visual recollection of
         Frazier and Mrs. Randle against the evidence here presented
         that the bag Oswald carried contained the assassination
         weapon and has concluded that Frazier and Randle are
         mistaken as to the length of the bag. (R134)

      What evidence was "presented that the bag . . . contained the
      assassination weapon"?
         "A [38-inch long] handmade bag of paper and tape was found in
      the southeast corner of the sixth floor alongside the window from
      which the shots were fired.  It was not a standard type bag which
      could be obtained in a store and it was presumably made for a
      particular purpose," says the Report (R134).  Before any evidence
      relevant to this bag is presented, the Report draws an important
      inference from its location;  "The presence of the bag in this
      corner is cogent evidence that it was used as the container for the
      rifle" (R135).  The Commission was unequivocal;  the evidence meant
      only what the Commission wanted it to mean--nothing more, nothing
      less.  To take issue with the inference read into the evidence:
      the presence of that bag in that corner is "cogent evidence" {only}
      that someone placed the bag in the corner.  Its location of
      discovery can not tell who made the bag, when it was made, or what
      it contained.  The Commission wanted it to have contained the
      rifle;  therefore, it must have.
         Having attached a significance to this bag (CE 142) "cogent"
      only for the Commission's predisposition toward Oswald's sole
      guilt, the Report presents what it labels "Scientific Evidence
      Linking Rifle and Oswald to Paper Bag."  There was no difficulty in
      linking Oswald to the bag;  his right palmprint and left index
      fingerprint were on it, proving that at some time, in some way, he
      had handled it.  Again, the Commission reads an improper inference
      into this evidence.  Because the palmprint was found at the bottom
      of the paper bag, says the Report, "it was consistent with the bag
      having contained a heavy or bulky object when [Oswald] handled it
      since a light object is usually held by the fingers" (R135).  Not
      mentioned is the fact that, as Oswald walked to Frazier's home, he
      grasped his package at the {top}, allowing it to hang freely,
      almost touching the ground.  According to the Commission's analysis
      of how people hold packages, it would seem unlikely that Oswald's
      bag contained anything "heavy or bulky."  Nor is there any proof
      that Oswald was holding CE 142 when he left prints on it.  Had it
      been lying on a hard, flat surface, Oswald could have leaned
      against or on it and left prints.
         The Report quotes questioned-documents experts to show that CE
      142 had been constructed from paper and tape taken from the
      Depository's shipping room, probably within three days of November
      22 (R135-36).  Here the Report explicitly states what it had been
      implying all along:  "One cannot estimate when, prior to November
      22, {Oswald} made the paper bag."  The bag was made from Depository
      materials;  at some time it was touched by Oswald.  This does not
      prove or so much as indicate that {Oswald} constructed the bag.
      The Commission {assumed} Oswald made it, offering no evidence in
      support of its notion.  It {could not} provide substantiation, for
      the evidence proves Oswald did {not} make CE 142.
         Troy Eugene West, a full-time mail wrapper at the Depository,
      worked at the same bench from which the materials for the paper
      sack were taken.  As Harold Weisberg points out in "Whitewash,"
      "West had been employed by the Book Depository for 16 years and was
      so attached to his place of work that he never left his bench, even
      to eat lunch.  His only separation from it, aside from the
      necessary functions of life [and this is presumed;  it is not in
      his testimony], was on arrival before work, to get water for
      coffee."[11]
         Although West was the one man who could know if Oswald had taken
      the materials used in constructing CE 142, he was never mentioned
      in the Report.  In his deposition, he virtually obviated the
      possibility that Oswald made the bag:

            Mr. Belin:  Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever help you wrap
         mail?
            Mr. West:  No, sir;  he never did.
            Mr. Belin:  Do you know whether or not he ever borrowed
         or used any wrapping paper for himself?
            Mr. West:  No, sir;  I don't.
            Mr. Belin:  You don't know?
            Mr. West:  No;  I don't.
            Mr. Belin:  Did you ever see him around these wrapper
         rolls or wrapper roll machine, or not?
            Mr. West:  No, sir;  I never noticed him being around.
         (6H360)

         West brought out another important piece of information.  Expert
      examination showed that one long strip of tape had been drawn from
      the Depository's dispenser and then torn into smaller pieces to
      assemble the bag (R579-80).  West told Counsel Belin that the
      dispensing machine was constructed so that the dried mucilage on
      the tape would be automatically moistened as tape was pulled out
      for use.  The only way one could obtain dry tape, he added, was if
      he removed the roll of tape from the machine and tore off the
      desired length (6H361).  However, the tape on CE 142 possessed
      marks that conclusively showed that it had been pulled through the
      dispenser (R580).  Thus, the tape used in making CE 142 was wet as
      soon as it left the dispenser;  it had to be used at that moment,
      demanding that the entire sack be constructed at West's bench.
         The fabricator of CE 142 had to remain at or near the bench long
      enough to assemble the entire bag.  West never saw Oswald around
      the dispensing machines, which indicates that Oswald did not make
      the bag.  This contention is supported by those who observed Oswald
      during his return to Irving on Thursday evening.  Frazier never saw
      Oswald take anything with him from work (2H141), despite the fact
      that, even folded, CE 142 would have been awkward to conceal.
      Likewise, neither Ruth Paine nor Marina ever saw Oswald with such a
      sack on or before November 21 (1H120;  3H49;  22H751).
         The Report thus far has done some rather fancy footwork with the
      paper sack, asserting without basis that Oswald was its fabricator
      when the evidence allows the conclusion only that Oswald once
      touched the bag.  Next in line was the "scientific evidence" that
      the Commission promised would link the "rifle . . . to paper bag."
         When FBI hair-and-fiber expert Paul Stombaugh examined CE 142 on
      November 23, he found that it contained a single, brown, delustered
      viscose fiber and "several" light-green cotton fibers (R136).  The
      Report does not mention Stombaugh's qualification of the word
      "several" as indicating only two or three fibers (4H80).  It seems
      that these few fibers matched some composing the blanket in which
      the rifle was allegedly stored, although Stombaugh could render no
      opinion as to whether the fibers had in fact come from that blanket
      (R136-37).  How does this relate the {rifle} to the paper bag when
      it does not conclusively relate even the {blanket} to the bag?  The
      Commission's theory is "that the rifle could have picked up fibers
      from the blanket and transferred them to the paper bag" (R137).
         Had the Commission not been such a victim of its bias, it could
      have seen that this fiber evidence had no value in relating
      anything.  The reason is simple:  the evidence indicates that the
      Dallas Police took no precautions to prevent the various articles
      of evidence from contacting each other {prior} to laboratory
      examination.  On Saturday morning, November 23, physical items such
      as the rifle, the blanket, the bag, and Oswald's shirt arrived in
      Washington, on loan from the police for FBI scrutiny.  It was then
      that Stombaugh found fibers in the bag (4H75).  Prior to Oswald's
      death, this evidence was returned to the police.  However, on
      November 26, the items remaining in police custody were again
      turned over to the FBI.  Before the second return, some of the
      items were photographed together on a table (4H273-74).  This
      photograph, CE 738, shows the open end of the paper bag to be in
      contact with the blanket.  Such overt carelessness by the police
      ruined the bag for any subsequent fiber examinations.  If this was
      any indication of how the evidence was handled by the police when
      {first} turned over to the FBI, {all} the fiber evidence becomes
      meaningless because the various specimens could have come in
      contact with each other {after} they were confiscated.
         There is ample evidence that CE 142 never contained the
      Mannlicher-Carcano.  James Cadigan, FBI questioned-documents
      expert, disclosed an important piece of information in his
      testimony concerning his examination of the paper sack:

            I was also requested . . . to examine the bag to
         determine if there were any significant markings or
         scratches or abrasions or {anything} by which it could be
         associated with the rifle, Commission Exhibit 139, that is,
         could I find {any} markings that I could tie to that
         rifle....And I couldn't find {any} such markings. (4H97;
         emphasis added)

      Cadigan added that he could not know the significance of the
      absence of marks (4H97-98).
         There is, however, great significance, due to circumstances
      unknown to Cadigan.  If Oswald placed the rifle into CE 142, he
      could have done so only between 8 and 9 P.M. on November 21;  he
      simply did not have time to do it the following morning before
      going to work.[12]  Had he removed the rifle immediately upon
      arriving at the Depository at 8 A.M., it would still have remained
      in the bag for at least 12 hours.  The bag likewise would have been
      handled by Oswald during a half-block walk to Frazier's house and a
      two-block walk from the parking lot to the Depository.  It is
      stretching the limits of credibility to assume that a rifle in
      {two} bulky parts (the 40-inch Carcano could have fit into the 38-
      inch bag {only} if disassembled) in a single layer of paper would
      fail to produce obvious marks after over 12 hours of storage and
      handling through two-and-a-half blocks of walking.  More
      significantly, Cadigan made no mention of oil stains having been
      found on the bag, but the rifle was described by FBI Director
      Hoover as "well-oiled" (26H455).  It is reasonable to conclude from
      the condition of CE 142 that this sack, even if Oswald had made it,
      never held "Oswald's" rifle.
         CE 142 may be significant in two ways.  Judging from the
      immediate impression received that this sack had been used to
      transport the rifle (despite the lack of evidence that it did), it
      is not impossible that it was made and left by the window with
      exactly that effect in mind, even for the purpose of incriminating
      Oswald.

     _____________________________________________________________________
     |               photograph of flat paper bag on top                 |
     |                                                                   |
     |              and disassembled rifle lying at bottom               |
     |                  (at least 9 discernable pieces)                  |
     |___________________________________________________________________|

      Fig. 6.  The Commission says that all these pieces of the
      disassembled Carcano were carried in this bag without leaving any
      identifiable marks or oil stains.  There is no crease in the bag
      where it would have been folded over had it contained the
      disassembled rifle.  Oswald's careless handling of his package is
      not consistent with its having contained so many loose parts.


      However, with all the trash scattered about the storage spaces in
      the building, it is conceivable that CE 142 had been made for some
      unknown purpose entirely unrelated to the shooting and merely
      discarded on the sixth floor.  The evidence that Oswald neither
      made 142 nor carried it home the evening of November 21 leads to
      the inference that the bag he {did} carry on the 22nd has never
      come to light subsequent to the assassination.  Likewise, it
      follows that the contents of Oswald's package may never have been
      found.  (There is evidence suggesting that Oswald, before entering
      the Depository, may actually have discarded his package in rubbish
      bins located in an enclosed loading dock at the rear of the
      building.  Employee Jack Dougherty saw Oswald arrive for work,
      entering through a back door.  At that time, Dougherty saw nothing
      in Oswald's hands [6H377].)
         There is not the slightest suggestion in any of the evidence
      that Oswald carried his rifle to work the morning of November 22.
      The indications are persuasive and consistent that Oswald carried
      almost anything {but} his rifle.  Oswald took little care with his
      package, hardly treating it as if it contained the apparatus with
      which he later intended efficiently to commit murder.  As he
      approached Frazier's house, he held the package at the top, "much
      like a right handed batter would pick up a baseball bat when
      approaching the plate" (24H408), certainly a peculiar and dangerous
      way for one to transport a package containing a rifle in two bulky
      parts.  Every indication of the length of Oswald's sack
      consistently precludes its having contained the disassembled rifle.
      Interestingly enough, Frazier had once worked in a department store
      uncrating packaged curtain rods.  Having seen the appearance of
      these, Frazier found nothing suspicious about Oswald's package
      which, he was informed, contained curtain rods (2H229).
         It is no longer sufficient to say, as I did in the first
      chapter, that there is no evidence that Oswald carried his rifle to
      work on the morning of the assassination.  There is, as the
      evidence indicates, no reason even to suspect that he did (based on
      the descriptions of the package he carried), that he would have
      (based on the indications that he knew nothing of the motorcade
      route), or that he could have (based on the total lack of proof
      that the C2766 rifle had been stored in the Paine garage).  The
      most reasonable conclusion--if any is to be drawn--is that Oswald
      did not carry his rifle to work that morning.



__________

 [1] Weisberg, "Whitewash," p. 23.

 [2] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

 [3] Meagher, pp. 37-38.

 [4] Liebeler 9/6/64 Memorandum, p. 4.

 [5] Meagher, p. 37.

 [6] Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated August 31,
     1964, found in the Truly "K.P." (Key Persons) file.

 [7] Letter to the author from Gene Daniels, received March 19, 1970.
     Quoted by permission.

 [8] Leo Sauvage, "The Oswald Affair" (Cleveland:  The World Publishing
     Co., 1965), pp. 363-67.

 [9] Meagher, p. 38.

[10] The first critical analysis of the questioning of witnesses Frazier
     and Randle appeared in Weisberg's "Whitewash," pp. 17-19.

[11] West's testimony was first noted by Harold Weisberg and published
     in "Whitewash," p. 21.

[12] According to Marina, Oswald overslept on the morning of the
     assassination and did not get up until 7:10, at which time he
     dressed and left (18H638-39).  Oswald arrived at Frazier's home at
     7:20 that morning (24H408).  Thus, he had only ten minutes to get
     ready for work and walk to Frazier's, which would not have allowed
     him time to disassemble the rifle, place it in the sack, and
     replace the blanket.







--
                                              daveus rattus

                                    yer friendly neighborhood ratman

                                KOYAANISQATSI

    ko.yaa.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
        in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.
          5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.