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- Newsgroups: comp.sys.sun.admin
- Path: sparky!uunet!gatech!destroyer!ubc-cs!unixg.ubc.ca!ocgy.ubc.ca!laplante
- From: laplante@ocgy.ubc.ca (Denis Laplante)
- Subject: Re: creating restricted shell environments
- Message-ID: <1992Aug13.234317.21456@unixg.ubc.ca>
- Sender: news@unixg.ubc.ca (Usenet News Maintenance)
- Nntp-Posting-Host: nessie.ocgy.ubc.ca
- Organization: University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
- References: <1992Aug10.171606.11806@oakhill.sps.mot.com>
- Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1992 23:43:17 GMT
- Lines: 21
-
- simmons> I believe that Sun's Bourne shell implementation still follows the
- simmons> old rule that if the shell name starts with an 'r' it is restricted.
-
- guri> Thanks for the one restriction pointed out. Does someone have a
- guri> list of restrictions that are implemented by the Bourne Shell. I
- guri> am particularly interested in SunOS 4.1.1.
-
- By trial and error , and looking in other manuals, I found the following
- restrictions. They are rather inconveniences than security features.
-
- If the login shell is /usr/lib/rsh, the sh interpreter prevents you
- from running a program not on $PATH or modifying $PATH. There is no
- use of system call 'chroot' which would restrict access to files not in
- the home directory tree. For example if you make 'vi' available, the
- user can read any file, or execute programs using :!
-
- Even if all programs available are specially written to restrict
- access, it's possible, for example, to read any file with 'read others'
- permission.
-
- Denis Laplante <laplante@ocgy.ubc.ca>
-