NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/sci/military/12957

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From: [e-mail] (Paul Griffiths)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Tornado F3 replacement
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 27 Jan 93 16:03:59 GMT
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From Paul Griffiths <[e-mail]>

[e-mail] (Brian) writes:
>>First off the RAF high command are probaly the biggest bunch of cheese heads
>>you will EVER meet. Taking that into account, let's see what kind of corner
>    Evidence for that, apart from your personal opinion?

The whole a/c policy since 1945!!

>>In the late 70's early 80's... There was a little bit of a political war
>>within the MOD (Ministry of Defense.)  The war was between the Fleet Air
>>(Navy air) & the RAF. (crabs)  It was an internal struggle for funding, power,
>>say so, and personal gain.  To shorten a long and boring story the RAF
>>came out on top.  The crux of their position was the following promise.

>    Made in light of a strategic paradigm which held that (a) the UK was
>_not_ going to deploy `East of Suez' _except_ under exceptional circumstances
>and (b) the Fleet was going to be used primarily in the North Atlantic, within
>_reasonable_ range of land based air assets and (c) that the nation could no
>longer _afford_ (in the opinion of the government of the day) enough
>carriers to make a credible force.  Of the three, it is usually the last which
>is overlooked by people who don't understand the relationship between defence
>and economics.

Of the three it's the last one which has the least relevance on any
decisions made by the MOD.  This is my beef!

>>The RAF will from this day forward be the responsible party for ALL
>>CAP operations worldwide. Therefore we will take full control of
>>all air operations, and there is no need for the Royal Navy to have
>>to build anymore of those rather expensive aircraft carriers. Believe
>>it or not, in their infinite wisdom this was backed up fully by the MOD.
>>The Royal Navy has now only a token fleet of outdated carriers, and a
>>number of Sea Harriers.  An interesting point that got overlooked,
>>was how the !@$#!@ the RAF was going to give CAP to say a fleet hanging
>>off the coast of New Guinea.  This called for a little rearranging of
>>the world map. Even assuming this could be done, the Time
>>to Target could be measured in days.

>    And how likely, in light of the decision to withdraw from `East of
>Suez' in the early 1960's, would that be to occur without an available
>"friendly power" to provide bases within range?

To further proof my points on the 'cheeseheads' in Whitehall.
The decision was not made based on 'withdrawing from East of the
Suez', nor availability of friendly powers that be. The RAF made
this claim, and convinced the 'fisheads' in the Whitehall to
gain only power, and monies.  The amount of inter-service rivalry
is really no secret, and has led to many BAD decisions for both
services.

>>A better example of this was found in the not so long ago war in
>>the Falklands.  The task force actually ended up being defended by
>>25 Sea Harriers based on both the Invincible and the Hermes. The
>>RAF came nowhere near bringing a CAP force forward.

>    What about the Squadron of Phantoms based at Ascension Island during
>the conflict?

They were located 3500 miles away and NEVER appeared on the scene.
Port Stanley runway is not long enough to support phantoms and
tornado's. So the RAF built a new airfield, which now can not only
support their F-4's and Tornado's...but also out of interest the
Argentine Airforce can now land it's Mirages, sky hawks and the
like should they decide to re-liberate the Falklands.
Also to be noted...the decision has been made to tone down defenses
in the Falklands...as it was a bit too expensive..

>    In addition, haven't you forgotten that by 1982 the mistakes in the
>decision taken in the early 1970's to finally retire the Fleet Carriers had
>been recognised and the Invincible Class were being built?

That is true, and I stand corrected on that. The MOD did allow for
the purchase of three invincible carriers, followed by a 'NO, you
you can't have three full air groups to go with them..' The reason
'because of the cost of modern aircraft'.  Ludicrous. Again, the
only thing that causes this kind of 'thinking' is the RAF saying
'We can do it for you!".

>>                                Indeed the
>>only time the lightblue crabs showed up was in a Vulcan (there
>>were three vulcan flights, each flight had to be refueled 10
>>times to make the long flight) and the only hit they got out
>>of the 30 or so bombs they dropped was a small corner of Port
>>Stanley airfield. If the task force had waited/expected the
>>RAF to supply CAP, as promised you can bet the damage to the
>>task force would have been much heavier than it was.

>    Which it was never intended to do.  Its amazing what a selective view
>you seem to have of events IMO.

This is not a selective view!  The RAF has and to this day DOES
say, we will protect the fleet!  Again this is no secret, nor
is it a 'personal observation'. It's a fact!

>>                             (aside:
>>Most of the damage that was done to the task force could also
>>have been avoided, if the Fleet commander knew what the hell
>>to do with CAP, and had some confidence in the Harrier...this
>>too is a long story..which I'll avoid but post if pressed)

>    Prey do tell.  I'd be interested to see how you could come up, in
>the space of time and with the forces _available_ to the Task Force Commander,
>a better plan to utilise his resources which would have _guaranteed_ (as
>you seem to be claiming) a 100% leakproof defence and could still have landed
>an adequate force on the islands.

You started answering the question yourself.  The Task Force Commander,
or Fleet didn't utilise his resources.  There is a long story behind
the trials of the Harrier...(suffice it to say the powers that be in
Whitehall had determined that the MAXIMUM useful range  of the BlueFox
radar was 10 miles.) the outcome of which was that the `tested and
true' range of the radar was 10-12 miles. Fleet was resident on the
H.M.S Hermes as was 800 squad. It just so happened that on the sister
ship H.M.S Invincible was based the 801 Squad...which had been pulled
together from the 899 squad. The 899 squadron had been testing the
BlueFox radar on their own and had established that they could easily
pick up another harrier at 23 miles...and a 747 at 60 miles.  Again
this didn't match the figures from Whitehall, and no amount of
explaining  from 899 squad helped. Fleet put out an order that
basically said.  'CAP aircraft should not transmit on the BlueFox radar
until ship's controllers had directed them to within 10 miles of
their target. And in NO circumstances should BlueFox be used
in the look-down mode, because it doesn't work".  The squad
leader of 801 was incensed...his squad had proven time and
time again the capabilities of the radar, indeed had made the
first kill using it. He immediately put together a report and
sent it off to the admiral...nothing came out of it.

Luckily for the task force both the Squadron C.O and Captain of
the Invincible acknowledged but refused to implement this order.
This led to 800 squadron. (the biggest of the two) flying VISUAL
CAP missions, unless directed elsewhere by ship controllers...
 As fleet was based on the Hermes, they wanted the 800 squad to
perform better, and so in-fighting started going on.  Though
this was particularly one sided as the 801 squad (on the
Hermes, had no such airs)

It was this 'visual' CAP order that caused the two aircraft flying
CAP over the Sheffield to be pulled away. The two aircraft (801)  had picked
up an intermittent fast moving blip on their radar and called it to
the radar picket and started intercept.  100 miles away on the Hermes'
the following message was transmitted to the two aircraft 'resume
CAP. Contact assessed as spurious'. Shortly after that one had gotten
away the two fighters were told 'Proceed to 120 miles south-west to
carry out a visual surface search for surface threats.  (Why not
fly about twenty miles and sanitise the area with radar?). This
left a big gap in the CAP defenses, and behind the hole lay......
(pause for effect.) the Sheffield. Not long after the hole was
opened up, in comes an Etendard and prosecuted an exocet attack.
BANG!  Whether or not the blip was the incoming aircraft is one
thing to debate..but leaving a hole like they did...well if nothing
it backs up what I said about not using their resources...

>>Anyway...I'm getting way off the thread.. Keeping this in mind,
>>realize that the RAF high ups rarely make good/logical decisions.

>    Again your opinion.  I suspect that most of their reasons are quite
>logical, if you take into account the factors that they know about (and you
>usually don't).

Hmmph! I can except bad reasoning if it's done for the right reason.
Decisions within the MOD are NOT done for the right reasons.

>>Not that the Tornado is a bad plane...far from it.
>>But the RAF has the logical plane to fill their needs right under
>>their bloomin noses.  The harrier!  Sure it could do with more
>>range...a little more power..and updated electronics...but as
>>demonstrated not only in the Falklands, but in 'topgun' type
>>exercises, the Harrier has proven itself over and over again
>>as a powerful interceptor...  It kicked the shit out of an
>>american based F-15 squad...did the same to the Navy when
>>they gave it a go...  The harrier has gained the respect of
>>a lot of adversaries...it's only the haughty sods in the
>>MOD who don't know what a great platform they've got.

>    Interesting.  If its so good, why then hasn't the USN adopted it?

This doesn't necessarily make things good or bad!

>Surely it would fulfill all their requirements?  Or is it case, as in the
>case of the abortive P1154 design that a "bigger, better Harrier" has more
>inherent problems than you might realise, including the ones found during
>the Gulf Conflict in the light of combat experience (ie its rather extreme
>vulnerability to heat seeking weapons due to location of probable hits
>near its exhausts).
I haven't heard of any AV-8 incidents during the war!?!  Do you have
any info?

I question whether an AV-8's heat signature is any bigger than say
a F-15's?! With multiple nozzles around the plane, I suppose should
an IR weapon lock into your nozzle the location of these nozzles would
make for a crippling hit.
At the same time, this displacing of heat can actually help it against
IR missles...  Not probaly from the ground...but it's IR signature from
both the top and back has got to be at least equal if not better than
the big name fighters.

>>>The AD Tornados were designed to defend & patrol the UK/Atlantic from Soviet
>>>bombers such at the BackFire, BlackJack etc..  There were not expecting
>>>to dog fight with the bombers.. so the dog fight requirement was not
>>>necessary for that role. The AD Tornados have the advantage of already
>>>being compatible with the FGR Tornados thus a saving (?) in spare parts
>>>etc could be made..

As I've said before I have nothing against the Tornado..it's a great
plane...my beef is only with the way in which the RAF has forced itself
into making this decision.

>>The harrier could easily fill the role of the Tornado...granted it could do
>>with a little more power..and can't carry quite the load of the tornado, but
>>at half the cost of the tornado, you just buy two of 'em.  The ability to
>>land anywhere they fucking well feel like, also kinda works around their
>>range problems.

>    Really?  How does that help you when your're on a 4-6 hour patrol over
>the North Sea, attempting to find possible high-speed, low altitude, threats?

Again...if the RAF had accepted that a necessary part of a multi layer
defense is not only the RAF, but the Royal Navy...this wouldn't be
a problem, and they could land in the north sea..(on carriers). With
a roundabout range of 400 miles, the harrier could do quite well.


>>          During the falklands the Sea Harriers were constantly
>>going from Low CAP to over 30000ft to intercept Mirage III's.  Pulling to
>>within 20 miles or so, before the Argentines broke away and turned off
>>target.

>    Yeas, but that was because the Argentines only had a few minutes fuel
>over the target zone.  The possible North Sea threat was going to be flying
>much faster, much harder and have plenty of fuel on board which would allow
>them to out maneauvre you.

The argentines had only a few minutes fuel because they were flying
in at high speed, and the Mirage III's had lost their centreline fuel
tanks...on the first day.  Hmm.. I question the plenty of fuel on
board...especially if they plan on burning in.  Where's the last
point they could refuel at?!

>>I could go on for hours about the Harrier...and what an effective fighter
>>it is...the only problem is the silly sods in Whitehall don't know their
>>head from their arse, when it comes to decisions like this, so you can rest
>>assured that if there is a wrong decision to make...THEY'LL make it.

>    Again we only have your opinion on that matter.  Sure they make some
>wrong decisions, but _all_ decisions?  No, I suspect not.

Well of course not _all_ their decisions...but they have made more
wrong decisions than right ones, and all for the wrong reasons.

I think if you were to read a couple of English flight magazines,
chat around in a few pubs, read up on the history of the MOD, and
british aviation in general, you'd probaly at least come to the
conclusion that it's not only my opinion, but has quite an
unerring ring of truth about it.

-Paul Griffiths
-Acuson Sonography