NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/sci/military/12839

Text File | 1993-01-25 | 8.1 KB | 176 lines

Newsgroups: sci.military
Path: sparky!uunet!pmafire!news.dell.com!swrinde!gatech!hubcap!ncrcae!ncrhub2!ciss!law7!military
From: [e-mail] (Brian)
Subject: Re: Tornado F3 replacement
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Sci.Military Login)
Organization: NCR Corporation -- Law Department
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 17:20:01 GMT
Approved: [e-mail]
Lines: 163


From [e-mail] (Brian)

In sci.military you write:


>From Paul Griffiths <[e-mail]>

>[e-mail] (r. oxbrow) writes:


>>From [e-mail] (r. oxbrow)

>>In article <[e-mail]> Arthur Hu <rad![e-mail]> writes:
>>>
>>>From Arthur Hu <rad![e-mail]>
>>>Let's see if I get this right - when the RAF picked the Tornado F3 over
>>>the F-14 and F-15, it was because the American radars weren't sophisticated
>>>enough to deal with jamming threats, and dogfighting was just not a
>>>requirement.
>>>
>>>Now the RAF says it needs the advanced European fighter as a replacement
>>>because the Tornado was never designed to dogfight.
>>>

>First off the RAF high command are probaly the biggest bunch of cheese heads
>you will EVER meet. Taking that into account, let's see what kind of corner

    Evidence for that, apart from your personal opinion?
>they've dug themselves into.

>In the late 70's early 80's... There was a little bit of a political war
>within the MOD (Ministry of Defense.)  The war was between the Fleet Air
>(Navy air) & the RAF. (crabs)  It was an internal struggle for funding, power,
>say so, and personal gain.  To shorten a long and boring story the RAF
>came out on top.  The crux of their position was the following promise.

    Made in light of a strategic paradigm which held that (a) the UK was
_not_ going to deploy `East of Suez' _except_ under exceptional circumstances
and (b) the Fleet was going to be used primarily in the North Atlantic, within
_reasonable_ range of land based air assets and (c) that the nation could no
longer _afford_ (in the opinion of the government of the day) enough
carriers to make a credible force.  Of the three, it is usually the last which
is overlooked by people who don't understand the relationship between defence
and economics.

>The RAF will from this day forward be the responsible party for ALL
>CAP operations worldwide. Therefore we will take full control of
>all air operations, and there is no need for the Royal Navy to have
>to build anymore of those rather expensive aircraft carriers. Believe
>it or not, in their infinite wisdom this was backed up fully by the MOD.
>The Royal Navy has now only a token fleet of outdated carriers, and a
>number of Sea Harriers.  An interesting point that got overlooked,
>was how the !@$#!@ the RAF was going to give CAP to say a fleet hanging
>off the coast of New Guinea.  This called for a little rearranging of
>the world map. Even assuming this could be done, the Time
>to Target could be measured in days.

    And how likely, in light of the decision to withdraw from `East of
Suez' in the early 1960's, would that be to occur without an available
"friendly power" to provide bases within range?

>A better example of this was found in the not so long ago war in
>the Falklands.  The task force actually ended up being defended by
>25 Sea Harriers based on both the Invincible and the Hermes. The
>RAF came nowhere near bringing a CAP force forward.

    What about the Squadron of Phantoms based at Ascension Island during
the conflict?
    In addition, haven't you forgotten that by 1982 the mistakes in the
decision taken in the early 1970's to finally retire the Fleet Carriers had
been recognised and the Invincible Class were being built?

>                                Indeed the
>only time the lightblue crabs showed up was in a Vulcan (there
>were three vulcan flights, each flight had to be refueled 10
>times to make the long flight) and the only hit they got out
>of the 30 or so bombs they dropped was a small corner of Port
>Stanley airfield. If the task force had waited/expected the
>RAF to supply CAP, as promised you can bet the damage to the
>task force would have been much heavier than it was.

    Which it was never intended to do.  Its amazing what a selective view
you seem to have of events IMO.

>                             (aside:
>Most of the damage that was done to the task force could also
>have been avoided, if the Fleet commander knew what the hell
>to do with CAP, and had some confidence in the Harrier...this
>too is a long story..which I'll avoid but post if pressed)

    Prey do tell.  I'd be interested to see how you could come up, in
the space of time and with the forces _available_ to the Task Force Commander,
a better plan to utilise his resources which would have _guaranteed_ (as
you seem to be claiming) a 100% leakproof defence and could still have landed
an adequate force on the islands.

>Anyway...I'm getting way off the thread.. Keeping this in mind,
>realize that the RAF high ups rarely make good/logical decisions.

    Again your opinion.  I suspect that most of their reasons are quite
logical, if you take into account the factors that they know about (and you
usually don't).

>Not that the Tornado is a bad plane...far from it.
>But the RAF has the logical plane to fill their needs right under
>their bloomin noses.  The harrier!  Sure it could do with more
>range...a little more power..and updated electronics...but as
>demonstrated not only in the Falklands, but in 'topgun' type
>exercises, the Harrier has proven itself over and over again
>as a powerful interceptor...  It kicked the shit out of an
>american based F-15 squad...did the same to the Navy when
>they gave it a go...  The harrier has gained the respect of
>a lot of adversaries...it's only the haughty sods in the
>MOD who don't know what a great platform they've got.

    Interesting.  If its so good, why then hasn't the USN adopted it?
Surely it would fulfill all their requirements?  Or is it case, as in the
case of the abortive P1154 design that a "bigger, better Harrier" has more
inherent problems than you might realise, including the ones found during
the Gulf Conflict in the light of combat experience (ie its rather extreme
vulnerability to heat seeking weapons due to location of probable hits
near its exhausts).

>>The AD Tornados were designed to defend & patrol the UK/Atlantic from Soviet
>>bombers such at the BackFire, BlackJack etc..  There were not expecting
>>to dog fight with the bombers.. so the dog fight requirement was not
>>necessary for that role. The AD Tornados have the advantage of already
>>being compatible with the FGR Tornados thus a saving (?) in spare parts
>>etc could be made..

[...]

>The harrier could easily fill the role of the Tornado...granted it could do
>with a little more power..and can't carry quite the load of the tornado, but
>at half the cost of the tornado, you just buy two of 'em.  The ability to
>land anywhere they fucking well feel like, also kinda works around their
>range problems.

    Really?  How does that help you when your're on a 4-6 hour patrol over
the North Sea, attempting to find possible high-speed, low altitude, threats?


>          During the falklands the Sea Harriers were constantly
>going from Low CAP to over 30000ft to intercept Mirage III's.  Pulling to
>within 20 miles or so, before the Argentines broke away and turned off
>target.

    Yeas, but that was because the Argentines only had a few minutes fuel
over the target zone.  The possible North Sea threat was going to be flying
much faster, much harder and have plenty of fuel on board which would allow
them to out maneauvre you.

>I could go on for hours about the Harrier...and what an effective fighter
>it is...the only problem is the silly sods in Whitehall don't know their
>head from their arse, when it comes to decisions like this, so you can rest
>assured that if there is a wrong decision to make...THEY'LL make it.

    Again we only have your opinion on that matter.  Sure they make some
wrong decisions, but _all_ decisions?  No, I suspect not.