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- Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
- Path: sparky!uunet!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!christo
- From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
- Subject: Re: Minds, Computers and Searle
- Message-ID: <1993Jan22.181429.8759@psych.toronto.edu>
- Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
- References: <1993Jan14.172034.188@psych.toronto.edu> <1993Jan16.101540.1225@skynet.uucp> <8226@skye.ed.ac.uk>
- Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 18:14:29 GMT
- Lines: 25
-
- In article <8226@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
- >In article <1993Jan16.101540.1225@skynet.uucp> ice@skynet.uucp (Ice) writes:
- >
- >>Searle is whining like a spoilt child by pointing out that a computational
- >>metaphor for mind is "wrong," without offering a realistic alternative.
- >
- >You don't think it's useful to point out a mistake, even if you can't
- >offer a solution?
- >
- >I'm amazed that people working in AI spend so much time on these
- >issues when they're relevant to only a very small part of AI.
- >Even in Cog Sci most (I think) of what people do would still be
- >worth doing even if Searle were right.
- >
- To repeat for the 37,000th time, the CR -- right or wrong -- is directed
- at Strong AI only. The vast majority of cognitive scientists I deal with,
- in both psychology and AI, are not proponents of strong AI, and many find
- the idea somewhat ludicrous. The "targets" are McCarthy, Minsky, and
- Newell & Simon (as Searle himself states explicitly).
-
- --
- Christopher D. Green christo@psych.toronto.edu
- Psychology Department cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
- University of Toronto
- Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
-