NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/alt/philosop/objectiv/880

Text File | 1993-01-22 | 3.9 KB | 86 lines

Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!sunic!aun.uninett.no!nuug!nntp.uio.no!smaug!solan
From: [e-mail] (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Subject: Meaning and Sentence (Was: Premises of "objectivism?")
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Mr News)
Nntp-Posting-Host: smaug.uio.no
Reply-To: [e-mail] (Svein Olav G. Nyberg)
Organization: University of Oslo, Norway
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1993 10:28:12 GMT
Lines: 72

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Keith
Ramsay) writes:
|> In article <[e-mail]>
|> [e-mail] (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
|> |The sentence is not meaningless because it is paradoxical, but because
|> |it is not constructive, i.e. built from elements already possessing
|> |meaning. Paradoxical sentences just happen to be non-constructive, and
|> |therefore meaningless. It is because they are meaningless that they
|> |can appear to be paradoxical. If I recognize your name right, you are
|> |a mathematician (from Sweden), so you should know this.
|>
|> I suspect there is some element of truth in what you are saying, but
|> it is difficult to state exactly what "constructive" can really be
|> taken to mean here, or what kind of "building from elements" is
|> involved.
|>
|> Consider, for example,
|>
|>  (*) If X and Y are true sentences, then (X and Y) is a true sentence.

I am not speaking of building new sentences from old sentences, and
just that. I am speaking of the elements, i.e. the concepts and
symbols, that they must have meaning _before_ the sentence can be
said to have meaning.

|> If reference to the truth of a sentence makes that other sentence
|> being referred to part of the "construction" of the sentence, then it
|> is hard to see how we can affirm a claim like (*); it can only be
|> "constructed" after all true sentences have been constructed. So a

This is not Objectivist concept theory. Using O concept theory,
which does NOT state that a concept are all its referents, the
dilemma is solvable. The dilemma has risen here because you want
a concept to equal all its referents, _and_just_that_. I am here
assuming at least SOME familiarity with Objectivist concept theory,
as this after all is a newsgroup devoted to the discussion of
Objectivism.

|> simple-minded implementation of the idea, that the problem with
|> paradoxical sentences lies in the impossibility of building them up
|> from the sentences to which they refer, cuts much too deeply into our
|> ability to discuss truth and logic in general. Your claim
|>
|>    "Paradoxical sentences just happen to be non-constructive, and
|>    therefore meaningless."
|>
|> is an example of the kind of assertion which can easily fall into the
|> "not constructive" category in such a scheme.

My sentence referred to is a recognition of an abstract fact, and
when you claim it falls for "self-reference", you are making the
same mistake as when someone claims that the concept "concept" falls
because of "self-reference".

I won't throw books at you, but the one book that IS fundamental to
understanding Objectivism is Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology", and I think you ought to read that before commenting
on what you BELIEVE are the problems with Objectivism.

This is actually written by one who is not himself an Objectivist,
but still considers it a worthy and interesting object of study.

|> The point is that the paradoxes pose a non-trivial obstacle for a
|> person who wants to produce a comprehensive account of language and
|> meaning. I know of no easy solution, and doubt one is known. I think
|> we've established now at least that a simple application of the law of
|> identity does not suffice.

"Construction" can hardly be called "a simple application of the LoI".


Solan