NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #1/NN_1993_1.iso/spool/sci/space/18950

Internet Message Format | 1993-01-07 | 5.9 KB

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From: [e-mail] (Edward V. Wright)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Subject: Re: Marketing SSTO
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 7 Jan 93 21:07:53 GMT
References: <[e-mail]>
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In <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Nick Szabo) writes:

>Cleary, we do not want to do SSTO like we did STS.  I suggest
>SSTO strategy should be very different, almost the opposite
>of the strategy used for STS.  STS combined astronaut and
>satellite launching; there should be two very different SSTO
>vehicles for these very different markets.

Different vehicles, yes.  But different vehicles may mean
two versions of the same design, like the passenger and
cargo versions of the 747.

>Shuttle was designed and built by a commitee from NASA and the DoD
>for the vague, sweeping purpose of lowering launch costs;

No, it had a host of vague, sweeping purposes. :-) Lowering
launch costs was only one of them.  And, in the end, not
even the most important.


>SSTO should be designed not to lower launch costs for everybody, but
>to provide large service improvements to specific markets, for example
>reducing the cost and increasing the reliability of delivering
>satellites to orbit.

The problem is, we don't know what the markets are.  Rather, we
know what markets exist for payloads at $10,000 per pound, but
we don't know what the markets will be at $100 per pound.  If
you tie your design too closely to current satellites, you may
end up with a white elephant.  Better to design for a general
class of payloads.

>Shuttle was a single design centrally planned; SSTO should
>come in several competing varieties.

Agreed.  Although the first SSTO will be a single design,
by definition, if it's successor it will invite competition,
some of which may be better than the original.  Personally,
I think it unlikely (though not impossible) that Delta Clipper
will become the DC-3 of space.  More likely the Ford Trimotor.


>STS was an entire "system" that needed new launch pads

So were the first jetliners, which required every airport
in the US to be rebuilt.  (SSTO won't require anything on
that scale, however.)

>a satellite-launching SSTO should be designed around current
>comsat/upper stage pairs;

A risky strategy.  Not only are new markets likely to
develop when the costs drop, but old markets can evaporate
if current satellites/stages are changed or cancelled. A
better model is the military or civilian cargo plane.  It's
not designed to carry a certain type of truck (although a
need like that might determine its maximum payload).  It's
designed to carry any payload, generally, that meets certain
weight and volume limitations.  If a cargo requires special
accomodations -- such as refrigeration -- those are handled
by additional equipment, rather than the vehicle itself.


>Alas, currently the program is headed in direction of the
>swamp which bogged down the Shuttle, with strong lobbying
>for NASA to take over the project as a new Clinton start-up.

I haven't heard about this and hope it isn't true.

>This is great politically -- I came up with this idea well
>before the election, when it first looked like the Democrats
>had a fighting chance -- but it could be a disaster functionally,

If you substitute "would" for "could," you'd be right on.

>Astronauts either have better
>things to do, or nothing at all, in which case ferget 'em.

Even worse, if an astronaut gets killed, you have to shut
down everything for two years while you find Someone To
Blame.  Whatever you do, don't call the crewmembers astronauts!


>Which market should SSTO go for?  Clearly if there are several
>SSTOs for several different purposes, there is no one answer.
>So far, the replacement of STS has been a major goal.  However,
>the astronaut market has a serious drawback.

Not astronaut market, damn it, passenger.  Passenger.  If the
passengers happen to NASA employees, so what?  NASA employees
fly on business all the time.  That doesn't make them "aeronauts."

>For example, two competing astronaut SSTOs could provide commercial
>astronaut services to a wide variety of government space agencies,
>including many countries that currently have no access to spaceflight
>other than via government agencies of Russia or the U.S.

Why limit it to government space agencies?  If Hughes has
a satellite it wants to repair or salvage, who knows more
about the design, Hughes or NASA?  And if John Denver wants
to go into space, sell him a window ticket for a premium
and put the guy from NASA in the back. ;-)


>Given the vast market potential of large cost/lb. reductions,
>we should concentrate far more on making SSTO launch
>cost reduction a technical reality, and far less on add-ons
>such as satellite repair, astronaut capsules, etc.  The goal is to
>_reduce_ costs, not to drive up costs by adding on side paraphanalia.

If you're trying to convince a very skepical, conservative
investor, sure.  But realistically, if that's the only focus
of your business plan, you've missed the big picture, because
that's not the way markets work.  Airplanes made it possible
to build Las Vegas in the dessert.  You have to allow for
things like Las Vegas in space.  (Although it's a bad idea
for the airplane manufacturer to try to build its own Las
Vegas.  That was one of NASA's mistakes.)  And if you're
trying to build public support, you need to talk about flashy
things like Las Vegas, rather than mundane stuff like air mail.