NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #1/NN_1993_1.iso/spool/sci/philosop/tech/4738

Text File | 1993-01-11 | 3.3 KB | 63 lines

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From: [e-mail] (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1993 15:52:46 GMT
References: <[e-mail]> <schiller.726487694@hpas5> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <schiller.726741489@hpas5> <[e-mail]>
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In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Gary Merrill) writes:
|>
|> In article <schiller.726741489@hpas5>, [e-mail] (schiller c) writes:
|> |> [e-mail] (Christopher Green) writes:
|> |>
|> |> >>In article <schiller.726487694@hpas5> [e-mail] (schiller c) writes:
|> |> >>>My position as a scientist is that facts, i.e. the  results of observation,
|> |> >>>are the basis of theories. There are no "well-known" flaws of this position.
|> |> >>>
|> |> >I'm afriad that this is simply ill-informed. The observation-theory distinction
|> |> >has long been a matter a controversy in philosophy of science. The best-known
|> |> >"flaws" are put forward in Putnam's "What theories are not."  The position
|> |> >outlined there is a little technical, but the central example is that one
|> |> >cannot establish, through obsevation, that a thing is red unless one has
|> |> >a conceptual scheme for colors that includes red in advance.
|> |>
|> |> You are right: one needs a concept of red. But a concept and a theory
|> |> are two different things. Red is a concept formed by children
|> |> before they are six months old, and it gives a name to certain class
|> |> of colours. When a child says: "it is red", it just says, "it has a similar
|> |> look than all the previous things I have observed, which I call red".
|> |> The statement "It is red" therefore just compares different observations.
|> |> Not much of theory there.
|> |>
|> |>             Christoph Schiller
|> |>
|>
|> You are right: one needs a concept of electron. But a concept and a theory
|> are two different things. Electron is a concept formed by physicists
|> before they are given degrees, and it gives a name to certain class
|> of particles. When a physicist says: "it is an electron", it just says, "it has a similar
|> look than all the previous things I have observed, which I call an electron".
|> The statement "It is an electron" therefore just compares different observations.
|> Not much of theory there.
|>
|> I wonder why the physicists need so much more funding than do the children.
|> Facts are facts?
|>

I originally posted this as a kind of reductio of Schiller's position.
However, given his latest posting I see that it will have little force
since he actually *embraces* this view.  There is definitely a problem
when you strive to reduce the other guy's position to an obviously absurd
one and he just says "Okay."  Back to the drawing board.
--
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / [phone]
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