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- From: karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: Anti-spoofing protocol?
- Message-ID: <1993Jan4.104051.23477@qualcomm.com>
- Date: 4 Jan 93 10:40:51 GMT
- References: <1993Jan4.090057.20269@netcom.com>
- Sender: news@qualcomm.com
- Organization: Qualcomm, Inc
- Lines: 16
- Nntp-Posting-Host: servo.qualcomm.com
-
- In article <1993Jan4.090057.20269@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
- >
- >The problem of detecting a spoof in between two ends of a
- >Diffie-Hellman exchange is unsolved, as far as I know, using any known
- >protocol.
-
- Why do you say that? You can detect the "ends against the middle"
- attack against DH if the parties sign their DH exchanges (using RSA or
- some other digital signature scheme) and verify them before using the
- DH-generated key to encrypt anything real.
-
- The most I think an active attacker could do against this scheme is to
- trick the parties into revealing their public key certificates, if
- that matters.
-
- Phil
-