NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #31/NN_1992_31.iso/spool/bit/listserv/politics/20693

Text File | 1992-12-29 | 7.8 KB | 172 lines

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Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!darwin.sura.net!paladin.american.edu!auvm!UNC.OIT.UNC.EDU!UNCPJS
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Newsgroups: bit.listserv.politics
Date:         Tue, 29 Dec 1992 13:10:00 EST
Sender:       Forum for the Discussion of Politics <[e-mail]>
From:         "Peter J. Schledorn" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: <None>
Comments: To: Forum for the Discussion of Politics <[e-mail]>
Lines: 159

> >> No, it isn't.  Restrictions come from third parties.  Choices by
> >> participants are different.  For example, restrictions require
> >> enforcement while choices don't.
> >
> >No, restrictions come from others.  Whether they are second, third or
> >nth parties is irrelevant.  The relevant question is whether they are
> >violating the rights of the person restricted and, if so, that violation
> >is warranted by other important concerns.
>
> While Peter may want to gloss over this distinction, it allows us to
> avoid the absurdity of "Peter is violating my friend's right to have
> sex with a consenting adult by refusing to put out".  (Said friend is
> willing to travel, so Peter is free to propose a convenient time.)

Andy really likes this example.  His relentlessly binary mind fails to
see the difference between a private decision and a public offering.
I'm a little surprised that he doesn't claim that that I maintain that
his Ferrari dealership restricts his right to buy Fords by not stocking
them.

> >> Actually, we are trying to avoid "he can't afford that"
> >> "discrimination", which is why I used that example.  Why is "doesn't
> >> have enough money" acceptable when "wrong orientation/color" isn't?
> >> Why is "wrong orientation/color" acceptable from employees/customers,
> >> but not employers/sellers?
> >
> >Because both parties to the transaction have rights.
>
> Right, and we're trying to figure out the extent of those rights.  I
> note that buyers have the right of arbitrary refusal, usually.

Yep.  That's the contract--the seller makes an offering to the public
and waits for an interested buyer.  If he wants to redefine "public"
in a whimsical fashion that may cause some trouble.

> >The seller has the right to a fair price.
>
> Who decides that fair price?  Can the seller use non-monetary
> considerations?

That depends on what they are.  In general, the same terms have to be
offered to all comers.

> >The buyer has the right to the goods if that price is met.
>
> Another friend has sex with selected consenting adults for free.
> Obviously the agreed on price for said friend is "$0"; does this imply
> that anyone who comes up with $0 is entitled to a good time?

Sex, sex, sex!  Is that all you young people think about?

> >Furthermore, the employee or buyer has a limited ability to damage
> >the employer or seller--there is no dependency relationship, for the
> >most part.  The employer or seller has a greater ability to damage the
> >employee (job hunter) or buyer,
>
> How is the prospective employee damaged?  S\He has everything s\he had
> before.  That's just like a prospective, yet shunned, employer.

I will leave it as an exercise for Andy to figure out how he may be
damaged if all prospective employers within a certain area (say, North
America) decided that they had the right not to associate with Andy.
Or all prospective employers paying more than, say, five dollars an
hour.

For the rest of you, I will point out that the damage is not the loss
of a job, although that may have serious consequences down the road.
The damage is the loss of the right to compete equally with others for
a job, due to the prejudice of another party.

> I note that the Ferrari dealer "depends" on customers for sales, just
> as the customers depend on said dealer for Ferraris from that dealer.
> If anything, the dealer is more dependent.

Both are less dependent on the individual job or sale than the customer
or is dependent on the seller or the employee on the employer.  Again,
there is the question of what you do in public.  The decision to buy
or not to buy is a private one--you are under no obligation to buy from
a particular dealer.  But when you make a public offer to sell, you are
obligated to sell to anyone who meets your terms.

> >as Jim Crow should have proven pretty conclusively.
>
> Jim Crow is an illuminating example.  It demonstrates that Peter has
> difficulty distinguishing govt action (restrictions by my definition)
> from private choices.  The Jim Crow laws also demonstrate that Peter's
> approach doesn't have the "it always cuts the right way" feature he
> assumes.

Jim Crow was a set of laws and a group of social agreements.  The lunch
counter at the Woolworth's in Greensboro, NC wasn't prohibited from
serving blacks, they just preferred not to.  Andy supports that choice.
But is there any difference from the point of view of somebody who
wants to buy lunch at a public lunch counter?  No--they go hungry in
either case.  Are the rights of the hungry people being violated?  Yes,
because as members of the public they have attempted to take advantage
of the presence of this lunch counter and been shunned, while other
members of the public have not.  Is there an overwhelming social good
to be gained in allowing them to go hungry?  None has been demonstrated.

Now, if the cook at this lunch counter is obligated to cook for blacks
at work, is he or she equally obligated to serve blacks at home?  No,
both because he or she has made no public offer to serve foods at home,
and because the preservation of personal privacy is a demonstrable
public good.  Now, this cook is not obligated to serve all comers, even
if he or she has invited selected people over for dinner from time to
time, and not charged them.

Got it yet?

> >> We're going to have to require synagogues to hire Nazis and AAs to
> >> patronize Nazis, abandon this whole misguided endeavor, or prove that
> >> we're discriminating against "bad" politics.  Pick one.
> >
> >Considering the history of the Nazis, it is reasonable for a synagogue
> >to prefer that employees not be Nazis (or be Jews, which should have
> >the same result).
>
> We could show the same benefit from restrictive housing covenants,
> which Peter opposes.

If you can show that restrictive housing covenants meet the goal of
protecting a person or institution from a clear and substantial threat,
or are required to allow the free exercise of religion without damaging
the rights of others, I'd be perfectly willing to discuss it with you.
I know of no religion that requires its members to live in ghettoes,
though.

> >A business owned by Jews is another matter.
>
> I guess this is just one of those eggs.

It appears that the old literacy problem is kicking in again--I think
that a business owned by Jews can legitimately be forced to hire a
Nazi, as long as that Nazi is competent and not disruptive.  A person's
mere existence is not a threat.

When you're out in public you sometimes have to coexist with people
you find distasteful.  If you can't bring yourself to do that, stay
home, run a one-person business and sell by mail.

> >Andy seems to have some trouble with the concept that other people have
> >rights, too.
>
> I have no trouble with the idea that other people have the same rights
> that I want for myself.  They have a right to refuse to associate, the
> same right that I have.  Unlike Peter, I have no interest in sicing
> thugs on them to get them to interact.  Peter seems to think that
> every interaction should be monitored by the "is this good" police.  I
> prefer the judgement of the participants.

Andy seems to think that the rules of behavior in public should be the
same as the rules of behavior in his living room.  Sorry, Andy, they're
not.

Best,
Peter

> -andy