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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!newsgate.watson.ibm.com!yktnews!admin!wo0z!lwloen
- From: lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com (Larry Loen)
- Subject: Re: Multiple-round DES
- Sender: news@rchland.ibm.com
- Message-ID: <1992Dec16.205932.21909@rchland.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1992 20:59:32 GMT
- Reply-To: lwloen@rchland.vnet.ibm.com
- Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
- References: <6703@tuegate.tue.nl>
- Nntp-Posting-Host: wo0z.rchland.ibm.com
- Organization: IBM Rochester
- Lines: 55
-
- In article <6703@tuegate.tue.nl>, bartjan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl (Bartjan Wattel) writes:
- |> Hi,
- |>
- |> This question sort of belongs to my other question(s) in "Enlarging key size
- |> of the DES".
- |>
- |> Does anybody know publications about multiple-round DES and/or implementations
- |> of it ?
- |>
- |> If someone has other interesting info about multiple-round DES, all information
- |> is welcome !!
- |>
- |> Thanks in advance,
- |>
- |> Bartjan Wattel at Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands
- |> (Email: bartjan@blade.stack.urc.tue.nl)
- |> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- |>
- |> You may be insane, but you're not crazy.
-
- Merkle and Hellman are said to recommend the following:
-
- ciphertext = DESEncrypt(k1,DESDecrypt(k2,DESEncrypt(k3,plaintext)));
-
- and that this step be substituted wherever one does
-
- ciphertext = DESEncrypt(kx,plaintext);
-
- today.
-
- I don't know exactly how much additional security this gives. For instance,
- there are known problems with the obvious:
-
- DESEncrypt(k1,DESEncrypt(k2,plaintext))
-
- and claims of problems with:
-
- DESEncrypt(k1,DESDecrypt(k2,DESEncrypt(k1,plaintext)))
-
- (I say "claim" in the second case only because I haven't had time to read
- that particular literature :-) ). In the first case, at least, a table of
- 2 to the 67 bytes will keep the decryption in the range of 2 to the 55th
- average iterations.
-
- Based on those issues, I would guestimate that Merkle & Hellman's security
- is probably around 2 to the 112 iterations, assuming no shortcut is found
- for the underlying DES proper or for the joint cipher. Does anyone know
- how many iterations Merkle and Hellman claim for the scheme?
-
- This is the simplest approach to increasing DES key size I know of and it
- is "off the shelf" with a correct protocol in the implementation of it.
-
- --
- Larry W. Loen | My Opinions are decidedly my own, so please
- | do not attribute them to my employer
-