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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!spool.mu.edu!darwin.sura.net!mojo.eng.umd.edu!disney.src.umd.edu!tedwards
- From: tedwards@eng.umd.edu (Thomas Grant Edwards)
- Subject: Re: Chosen crypto-text attack on RSA
- Message-ID: <1992Dec13.150444.8941@src.umd.edu>
- Sender: news@src.umd.edu (C-News)
- Organization: Project GLUE, University of Maryland, College Park
- References: <1992Dec4.102242.25130@extropia.wimsey.bc.ca> <YSN9FVS@minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de>
- Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1992 15:04:44 GMT
- Lines: 17
-
- In article <YSN9FVS@minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de> pom@anke.imsd.uni-mainz.DE (Prof. Dr. Klaus Pommerening) writes:
- >Assume Alice has sent an encrypted message c, and Charles
- >(the eavesdropper) has got c and wants to know the
- >corresponding plaintext m. Let n be Alice's public
- >modulus, e the public exponent, and d the private exponent
- >(assume c < n); then m = c^d mod n.
- >2. Charles gets Alice to decrypt y (or to sign y, if the same
- > keys are used for signature). He gets u = y^d mod n.
- >3. Now Charles calculates
- > tu mod n = x^{-d}*y^d mod n = x^{-d}*x^d*c^d mod n = m.
- >Never sign a document that Charles presents to you!
-
- I wonder if PGP 2.2 will have this analysis feature!
-
- -Thomas
-
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-