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- Path: sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!spool.mu.edu!yale.edu!ira.uka.de!uka!s_titz
- From: s_titz@ira.uka.de (Olaf Titz)
- Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
- Subject: Re: Security vs usefulness (was Re: reasons for disable fingerd)
- Date: 14 Dec 1992 11:47:47 GMT
- Organization: Fachschaft math/inf, Uni Karlsruhe, FRG
- Lines: 75
- Message-ID: <1ghs93INNl04@iraul1.ira.uka.de>
- References: <Byr9qE.24p@dscomsa.desy.de> <1fvngjINN297@iraul1.ira.uka.de> <WCS.92Dec13203554@rainier.ATT.COM>
- NNTP-Posting-Host: irau31.ira.uka.de
-
- In article <WCS.92Dec13203554@rainier.ATT.COM> wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (Bill Stewart +1-908-949-0705) writes:
- >
- >The main job of security is to say "NO".
- >The main job of Unix is to say "Yes".
-
- O.K., you agree in this point: The main job of Unix is to get the
- user's work done.
- The main job of security is to stop the user from getting his work
- done.
-
- => "Security" as defined such belongs on the crap heap and not in
- computers that are to be USED, imho.
-
- >The other main job of security is to keep track of who did what to what,
-
- To spy on the users.
-
- > so that if you decide the system *should* have said no, but didn't,
- > you know what got stolen.
-
- But then it is too late and you have caught a bug, perhaps, but not
- the intruder, according to your 'security' definition.
-
- (And, mentioning that word reminds me of the following: The sometimes
- arbitrary redefinition of an otherwise legitimate user as 'intruder'
- makes me at least raise an eyebrow.)
-
- >...
- >to fix if you *know* the identity of the real user,
- >and that sometimes it's genuinely hard to know who the real user is,
-
- Do you ever know who the 'real' user is...
-
- >especially across a network where you don't control the other end.
-
- ...even on your local machine?
-
- >One way to resolve the latter problem is to always trust the user;
-
- That from *you*? ;-)
-
- >another way is to never trust the user; a middle way is to work hard
- >and try to give you some control about how much trust you have.
- >
- >(Then of course, there are bugs and misfeatures, and the relative
- >quantities of these in Unix vs. other OS's is beyond the scope of this note :-)
-
- Simply that Unix doesn't have more bugs than other OSs does in no way
- invalidate the statement that it doesn't have as much *features* to
- stop legitimate use. Take VMS, for example. Maybe there are less bugs
- in it. (Yes, it has bugs, too.) But definitely there are features in
- it that serve nobody but paranoid system admins who want to control
- every key any user may press, at the expense of memory and CPU time
- that otherwise could serve the user. Now tell me what is better ;-)
-
- >But it is a lot easier to do security, and everything else,
-
- Security, as defined above, means unusability - for this I don't need
- any OS at all. I switch the machine off.
-
- >if your system has a clean model of reality behind its design.
-
- To define 'reality' is not that easy...
-
- >Tacked-on stuff never does as well, and many of the nice tools on Unix
- >really were afterthoughts.
-
- Many of the not-so-nice tools, too.
-
- Olaf
- --
- | Olaf Titz - comp.sc.student | o | uknf@dkauni2.bitnet | old address |
- | univ. of karlsruhe - germany | _>\ _ | s_titz@ira.uka.de | is still |
- | +49-721-60439 | (_)<(_) | praetorius@irc | valid |
- "My heart is human - my blood is boiling - my brain IBM" - Mr. Roboto
-