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- From: holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
- Subject: Re: Extensionalism (was re: Russell's Paradox)
- Message-ID: <1992Nov17.162034.22328@guinness.idbsu.edu>
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- Organization: Boise State University
- References: <1992Nov14.012610.8929@tamsun.tamu.edu> <1992Nov15.215724.21897@guinness.idbsu.edu> <1992Nov16.220925.28271@tamsun.tamu.edu>
- Date: Tue, 17 Nov 1992 16:20:34 GMT
- Lines: 61
-
- In article <1992Nov16.220925.28271@tamsun.tamu.edu> cmenzel@tamsun.tamu.edu (Chris Menzel) writes:
- >In article <1992Nov15.215724.21897@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
- >>>>RH:
- >>>>_Contra_ Harter (miscellaneous quibbles):
- >>>>
- >>>>The Good Russell may have admitted the possibility of "intensions",
- >>>>but the Exalted Quine has liberated us from the influence of those
- >>>>"creatures of darkness". Extensions are adequate for all admissable
- >>>>purposes.
- >>>>
- >>>CM:
- >>>Really, Randall?! Could you then please give me an extensional
- >>>analysis of the sentences in the following arguments that explains why
- >>>the first is valid but the second is not:
- >>>
- >>>1) John believes there are spies.
- >>> Mary believes whatever John does.
- >>> Therefore, Mary believes there are spies.
- >>>
- >>>2) John believes that 2+3=5.
- >>> Necessarily, 2+3=5 iff first-order logic is undecidable.
- >>> Therefore, John believes that first-order logic is undecidable.
- >>>
- >>>Or is a purpose admissible just in case it is amenable to
- >>>extensionalist analysis?
- >
- >[Florian's response and lengthy intensional response in which
- >that-clauses are takent to denote propositions deleted.]
- >
- >>But the extensionalist does have a simple recourse; let proposition =
- >>sentence throughout.
- >
- >But *surely* this won't work; nothing in the first argument, for
- >example, presupposes that John and Mary even speak the same language.
- >But under those conditions that argument (or perhaps a similar one
- >where the beliefs under consideration don't include beliefs about
- >language) could still have true premises (hence a true conclusion as
- >well).
- >
- >Not to mention problems with ambiguity, anaphora, etc. that aren't
- >resolved at the level of sentences.
- >
- >--Chris Menzel
-
- I would then start talking about sentences in different languages and
- translation. If Mary speaks German but not English and believes that
- it will rain, then Mary believes a sentence in German which translates
- to a sentence in English which asserts that it will rain. Ambiguity
- and anaphora are taken into account by considering the effects on
- context on the interpretation of sentences, etc. It is a truly
- horrible program, but nothing is added to it by adding intensional
- objects (as a new kind of object; now there is a good case for
- constructing "intensional objects" by extensional techniques from
- sentences).
-
-
- --
- The opinions expressed | --Sincerely,
- above are not the "official" | M. Randall Holmes
- opinions of any person | Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
- or institution. | holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
-