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- From: v462etnn@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (David L Anderson)
- Newsgroups: alt.folklore.urban
- Subject: Re: Car Crime
- Message-ID: <Bxz48n.Ep3@acsu.buffalo.edu>
- Date: 19 Nov 92 17:22:00 GMT
- References: <1eeumtINNes5@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu> <1992Nov19.150723.28540@bas-a.bcc.ac.uk>
- Sender: nntp@acsu.buffalo.edu
- Organization: University at Buffalo
- Lines: 44
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-
- In article <1992Nov19.150723.28540@bas-a.bcc.ac.uk>, ccaamrg@rs6-svr-2.cls-4.bcc.ac.uk (Mike Gahan) writes...
- >In article <1eeumtINNes5@usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu>, rxh6@po.CWRU.Edu (Randall Holt) writes:
- >|>
- >|> I don't know about confirming the existence of the rumor, but I can tell
- >|> you why this unlocking-device is not practical for nefarious purposes.
- >|> I have a similar device which (as the tech specs reveal) is based on a
- >|> specific sequence of 6 1-byte TTL pulses transmitted at some RF frequency
- >|> that is picked up by the reciever in the locking mechanism. That comes to
- >|> 256 to the 6th power possible combinations, or more than 2.81e14 combinations.
- >|>
- >|> If you were transmitting in the RF range, at maybe 50 miliion bits per
- >|> second, then you could run through maybe 1 million combinations per second,
- >|> and the maximum time to check all combinations would be 2e8 seconds or a
- >|> little more than 6 1/2 years. And then you still have to get the Club off
- >|> the steering wheel, and hot-wire the ignition.
- >|>
- >|> Add to this an additional security measure which exists in the unit on my
- >|> car, a 100 ms delay after a _wrong number_ has been transmitted at the
- >|> correct frequency. Now the delay time is up to greater than 90,000 years.
- >
- >The correspondent slightly misses my point, which is that the device
- >listens for the code broadcast by the car owner. The villain then knows
- >the correct code, and need only run through one combination to open
- >the vehicle.
- >
- Forgive me if this has been discussed already. The poster above
- indicates that a device listens for the code broadcast by the
- car owner's xmitr. This leads to several questions:
-
- How does the villian know the frequency used? Granted, only
- a given range might be used, but then the device must scan all
- available frequencies, lock onto the code at the start of
- transmission, and hope that the code is transmitted several
- times to ensure code is received properly.
-
- How does the device differentiate between spurious data and
- real signal?
-
- How does the device decode the signal? Ie determine bit-rate,
- method of modulation, etc.
-
- Seems like and *awful* lot of work, if you ask me.
-
- David Anderson
-