home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Path: sparky!uunet!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!news.sei.cmu.edu!drycas.club.cc.cmu.edu!cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!kck
- Newsgroups: alt.activism
- Subject: Re: What conservatives really mean when they talk about "original intent"
- Message-ID: <BxsrFt.Aq8.2@cs.cmu.edu>
- From: kck+@cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kluge)
- Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 06:59:52 GMT
- Sender: news@cs.cmu.edu (Usenet News System)
- Organization: School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon
- Nntp-Posting-Host: g.gp.cs.cmu.edu
- Lines: 59
-
- > From: mfriedma@uucp (Michael Friedman)
- > Subject: Re: What conservatives really mean when they talk abou...
- > Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 02:57:14 GMT
- >
- > In this post, Karl is either incredibly stupid or deliberately
- > misleading. Take your choice...
-
- Don't project your own intellectual inadequacies onto the rest of us.
-
- > In article <Bxr2wB.L49.2@cs.cmu.edu> kck+@cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kluge) writes:
- >
- > >Exactly, which is why the way people like Bork use the term "Framer's
- > >intent" is so obscene. For a prime example of psuedo-"Framer's intent" in
- > >all its glory, try reading Chief Justic Rehnquist's dissent in Planned
- > >Parenthood vs. Casey:
- >
- > >"We have held that a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause
- > >of the Fourteenth Amendment will be deemed fundamental if it is -implicit in
- > >the concept of ordered liberty.- Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325
- > >(1937). Three years earlier, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97
- > >(1934), we referred to a -principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
- > >and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.- Id., at 105;
- > >see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality
- > >opinion) (citing the language from Snyder). These expressions are
- > >admittedly not precise, but our decisions implementing this notion of
- > >-fundamental- rights do not afford any more elaborate basis on which to base
- > >such a classification."
- >
- > >It is difficult to imagine a right more clearly "implicit in the concept of
- > >ordered liberty" that the right to have sex with a consenting adult partner
- > >of one's choice, yet by appealing to the status of sodomy laws through
- > >history it was decided (in Bowers vs. Hardwick, a case the Chief Justice
- > >cites as precedent later in his dissent) that this was not the case.
- >
- > Of course. Note the phrase "principle of justice so rooted in the
- > traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
- > fundamental." Like it or not, the right to lynch homosexuals is much
- > more protected under this standard than the right to engage in
- > homosexual sex.
-
- The quote mentions two standards, the "implicit in the concept of order
- liberty" one and the "principle of justice..." one. Unless you want to take
- a shot at arguing that the right to lynch someone is "implicit in the
- concept of ordered liberty" or have evidence that lynching is a "principle
- of _justice_ so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
- be ranked fundamental" then your attempt at a counterexample is moronic at
- best.
-
- In any case, you miss the point, which is that the second standard is not
- always in accord with the first, and would (if followed consistently) lead
- to clearly unacceptable conclusions. Or do you wish to argue that the
- Supreme Court was wrong in its decision in Loving vs. Virginia, and that the
- states or federal government have a legitimate power to ban interracial
- marriage? If so, then on what basis?
-
- > I am not an official Oracle spokesman. I speak for myself and no one else.
-
- How fortunate for the rest of us.
-
-