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- From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
- Subject: Timor: Military Trials and the Truth Behind Dili Massacre
- Message-ID: <1992Jul22.034544.9912@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Organization: PACH
- Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1992 03:45:44 GMT
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- /** reg.easttimor: 349.0 **/
- ** Topic: Another look at the courts martial **
- ** Written 7:27 am Jul 21, 1992 by gn:tapol in cdp:reg.easttimor **
- Another look at the courts martial
-
- The following is an article that will appear in TAPOL
- Bulletin No. 112, August 1992, which is due out in ten days time:
-
- THE MILITARY TRIALS AND THE TRUTH BEHIND THE DILLI MASSACRE
-
- Short sentences were meted out to soldiers by military
- courts in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre. A
- Timorese student at the trials felt sure they were held to
- satisfy foreign governments. They took only 8 days to
- complete. But more seriously, the question of which
- military unit fired first at the defenceless crowd is still
- unresolved.
-
- The military trials took place as a result of Suharto's
- decision to adopt several measures after the massacre. The
- installation of the DKM (Dewan Kehormatan Militer, Council
- of Military Honour) to investigate and take disciplinary
- action in the army was unprecedented in the 26 years of
- Suharto's rule. In the face of stinging criticism, Suharto
- realised he had lost his grip over the military, especially
- in East Timor. The DKM had to sort things out. Disciplining
- officers and punishing soldiers would impress foreign
- governments and restore Suharto's hold over the military.
- Suharto knew he could not take things into his own hands so
- needed the DKM as broker.
-
- Cleaning the stable
- It is no accident that Lt.General Feisal Tanjung was chosen
- to chair the DKM. Known as one of the few intellectuals
- among the today's generals, he is not loyal to General
- Benny Murdani in the Hankam group. A common feature of the
- members of this group are their interest in East Timor.
- Practically the entire top brass of ABRI has done combat
- duty in East Timor or won rapid promotion because of this.
- Some have retired from active army and hold senior posts.
- Lt.General Sugiarto is Minister of Transmigration, Major-
- General Sembiring Kami Meliala is a member of the People's
- Congress (MPR), Major-General Dading Kalbuadi is Inspector-
- General at the Defence Ministry. Lt.General Sahala Rajagu-
- kguk and Lt.General Harsudiono Hartas are top ranking
- officers at ABRI headquarters.
- The relative independent Feisal Tanjung is Dean of SESK-
- OAD (the Army Higher Staff School). The rather messy job of
- cleaning the stable (the army command in East Timor) needed
- to be done by someone outside headquarters.
- The DKM findings were spectacular: six officers disci-
- plined, three dismissed from the army and the three removed
- from their positions. The entire top echelon in East Timor
- was removed. On top of that, the DKM ordered the court
- martial of nine soldiers and a police officer. Suharto
- risked open revolt in the army. The DKM's proposals were
- devastating for the rank-and-file. Officer corps discontent
- bordered on the brink.
- To repair the damage, Suharto this month invited all 121
- battalion commanders to his private ranch in West Java
- after chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat, likely to
- become the next commander-in-chief, gave 11.2 billion
- rupiahs (about US$3.5m) to the commanders to improve
- conditions for the troops. President Suharto addressed the
- commanders as a father-figure, concerned with the economic
- welfare of the soldiers. To boost morale, Sudradjat told
- the officers: "The Dili incident should not make you afraid
- or hesitant in taking decisions".
-
- The military trials
- All the military trials were held at military courts in Den
- Pasar or the regional police headquarters. They were open
- to the public and British and Japanese embassy staff were
- present. Press reporting was extensive.
- The ten defendants can be divided into four groups. Three
- were NCO officers: Sergeants Udin Syukur, Aloysius Rani and
- Petrus Saul Mada and two were privates, Mateus Maya and
- Afonso de Jesus. The third group consisted of low-ranking
- officers: 2nd Lieutenant Mursanib, 2nd Lt. John Arlan
- Aritonang and Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo. The others, Lt
- Yohannes Alexander Penpada and Police Corporal Marthin Alau
- (see box) are the fourth group.
- The three sergeants had been assigned to stay at the
- subdistrict military command, KODIM 1627. According to
- their testimonies, they went into action on seeing their
- superior, Major Gerhan Lantara and his aide Private Domin-
- ggus carried in, bleeding, after being stabbed by demon-
- strators. They all admitted shooting at demonstrators. None
- was wearing full military dress when they rushed to the
- scene of the demonstration.
- The two privates were assigned to drive Major Lantara to
- the hospital and admitted shooting at random at
- demonstrators from the car.
- The three sergeants were in command of three platoons (72
- men) as riot control units for the demonstration. The front
- line was a Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit, while platoons II
- and III were from Battalion 303. At one point the two pla-
- toons moved forward, as instructed by Lt. Mursanib and
- after hearing shooting from other, unidentified forces,
- they also opened fire.
- The fourth group were assigned to monitor the
- demonstration. Lt Penpada, deputy intelligence officer at
- the district military command KOREM 164, after learning
- about the stabbing of Major Lantara, rushed to grab his
- pistol. He said he slapped demonstrators but denied using
- his gun.
- Marthin Alau was the only police officer put on trial
- (see Box).
- All were tried under Article 103 section 1, for dis-
- obeying orders, despite the fact that nine admitted
- shooting at the crowd.
-
- Frame-up?
- Till now, all the burning issues regarding the massacre
- remain unresolved. With the exception of the 19 graves, no
- other graves have been disclosed. The first official
- casualty figure of 19 dead was changed to 50 dead and 90
- missing but no names have been revealed. The KPN, the
- National Inquiry Commission, issued its final report which
- is yet to be made public by Suharto.
- There is every reason to be suspicious of the military
- trials. How were the ten defendants selected? Everybody in
- platoons II and III had fired at the demonstrators (93
- rounds). The defendants gave the impression of a chaotic,
- poorly disciplined Indonesian army. This reinforces the
- amok theory propagated by the army. Though admittedly, a
- demonstration of 5,000 high-spirited people can throw
- troops into a panic, the truth lies elsewhere.
-
- Portuguese Parliamentary Visit
- Preparations for the visit of the Portuguese MPs (PPD) were
- proceeding at a high pitch. Months in advance, fresh troops
- had arrived in East Timor as if a second invasion was under
- way. In 1991, a new intelligence operation, Operasi Elang
- (Operation Eagle) was installed to deal with the Frente
- Clandestine, the Clandestine Front of youth in the cities.
- From captured documents the aim was to expose clandestine
- networks in Dili, Baucau and elsewhere and discover the
- plans for the MPs' visit. The intelligence operations were
- coordinated by BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency) which
- had been created by Benny Murdani to consolidate his power
- base.
- Besides BAIS, there is the older BAKIN. But in East Timor
- things are even more complex as several lines of command
- exist side by side.
-
- Kolakops
- Unlike other territorial commands, East Timor has Kolakops
- interposed between KODAM, the Area Military Command, and
- KOREM, the Regional Military Command. With KOLAKOPS,
- territorial forces in East Timor can bring in
- reinforcements from other military commands. KOLAKOPS is
- both territorial and operational and divides East Timor
- into three regions - A in the east; B, centre and west; and
- C, Dili. East Timor is also classified into zones, 'red'
- zones where guerrillas are active, 'green' zones where
- guerrillas are less active, and 'yellow' zones where they
- are practically non-existent. The red zone, mostly in
- mountains, are battle zones where skirmishes take place.
- The yellow zones require a combination of territorial and
- combat operations. Military units in East Timor
- include troops from KODAM Udayana in Bali and units from
- other KODAMs. The battalions brought in are territorial or
- combat.
- In November 1991, the Dili Military Command, KOREM 164
- Wiradharma, was run by Colonel J.B.Sepang (since removed)
- with 6 territorial and 4 combat battalions, including Bat-
- talion 744 (mainly East Timorese) an Udayana battalion,
- Battalion 303 from West Java, and Battalion 700 from South
- Sulawesi. The latter are combat forces who were stationed
- in the red B zone but were transferred to Dili for the
- expected demonstrations. Battalion 303 is from KOSTRAD, the
- elite reserve troops. Together with Battalion 700 (an
- airborne battalion) they were given a 10-day crash course
- in riot control.
- Law and order are now taken care of by the police so Dili
- has well-trained Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit and anti-riot
- police squads.
-
- Who fired first?
- The trials of 2nd Lts Sugiman Mursanib (SM) and John
- Aritonang (JA) produced some far from conclusive bits of
- evidence. SM was in command of an anti-riot force
- consisting of Brimob platoon 5486 and platoons II and III
- from Battalion 303, in that order. His task was to monitor
- and report every move of the demonstration. JA was com-
- mander of platoon II. When they arrived at the cemetery,
- they faced thousands of demonstrators. SM told the court
- that, confronted by an uncontrollable crowd, he ordered the
- 303 platoons to ahead of the Brimob troops and claims that
- the first command to shoot did not come from him. As his
- troops neared the cemetery, they heard shots from the main
- gate. "There were unidentified troops. We only heard the
- shots" [Editor, 13.06.1992]. SM said the order to go to the
- cemetery were so hasty, he had no time to dress properly.
- When Yorkshire's Cold Blood was shown on TV, Timorese
- refugees in Lisbon recognised SM, in a T-shirt, giving
- orders to troops around the cemetery. Former prisoner
- Donaciano Gomes told Channel Four News that SM had interro-
- gated and tortured him.
- Besides this shooting, a hail of bullets came from the
- southern side of the cemetery. JA confirms that shooting
- came from two directions and identified the troops as
- coming from A Company, Sector C of Battalion 303. He said
- some wore uniforms while others wore a variety of clothing.
- On hearing the shooting, the two 303 platoons joined in.
- People were falling to the ground but the shooting con-
- tinued, especially from the unidentified troops. The judges
- did not probe further. The unidentified pasukan liar
- (irregular troops), as the Indonesian press calls them,
- remained liar (the word also means 'wild').
-
- Provocation and amok theories
- The trials of Lt. Mursanib and Lt. Aritonang support the
- amok theory but ave many questions unanswered. Both spoke
- about the unidentified troops. The other defendants also
- stuck to the amok theory with no suggestion of provocation.
-
- The provocation theory suggests that the Santa Cruz
- massacre was premeditated murder, a traditional
- intelligence operation of letting the enemy (here, an
- unarmed crowd) come into the open so as to strike. The
- killings in Tanjung Priok in 1984 had the same ingredients.
- They give the military justification to hit hard. Another
- justification for the use of violence in Dili was the claim
- that the demonstrators were carrying weapons and started
- the shooting.
- The prosecution took care in the trials of the East
- Timorese to produce evidence to support this version. In
- Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha's trial, it was claimed that
- some demonstrators were carrying firearms and grenades.
- They dragged along Afonso Gomes, father of the murdered
- Sebastiao Gomes, to say this as a witness, though he was
- clearly under strain; one press report said that his words
- were scarcely audible.
- A hearing in Gregorio's trial was held at the police
- weapons depot to display the weapons which had been
- confiscated; when Gregorio asked for the Yorkshire film
- (where no-one is seen bearing weapons) to be shown the
- judge said it was not relevant.
- Mursanib claimed that there was shooting from the crowd.
- But the crucial point is not whether some demonstrators
- were carrying firearms, but whether they were genuine
- demonstrators or intelligence plants. Reliable sources
- insist that intelligence agents were in the crowd and
- behaved provocatively. The verdict against Gregorio listed
- firearms - Mauser and Garrand rifles, FN 46 and Colt 36
- pistols, Korean hand- grenades and ammunition - as having
- been confiscated; no evidence was produced about who from.
-
- What happened to Battalion 700?
- The missing link is Battalion 700, in particular because
- the trials pinned the blame squarely on Battalion 303. But
- this only reinforces the amok theory. It was shown that
- shooting came from from three directions; two from 303
- troop. But the crucial shooting, starting first and ending,
- last remain a mystery.
- The first version claimed that troops were infuriated on
- hearing that Major Gerhan Lantara had been stabbed, rushed
- to the scene and started firing at random. This can only be
- part of the story, as the shooting from the unidentified
- troops seems to have been less 'accidental'. The Timorese
- Battalion 744 was not on the spot, while Battalion 700 was
- on duty that day as confirmed by Brig.General Rudy Warouw
- who was then in charge of East Timor.
- Major Gerhan Lantara, deputy-commander of Battalion 700,
- is a very interesting figure. His battalion was sent to
- East Timor on special assignment to deal with the
- clandestine front. Unlike most soldiers who regard service
- in East Timor, Major Gerhan accepts his tours of duty in
- East Timor with missionary zeal. As a young cadet from the
- military academy, he spent time fighting the guerrillas.
- After graduation, he was assigned to East Timor and has
- altogether spent eight years there.
- During the demonstration Major Lantara got into a scuffle
- with demonstrators after taking out a camera to make
- photos, and was allegedly stabbed. Private Second Class
- Dominggus, who rushed to help him, was also hurt. The next
- day Lantara was rushed to the Army Hospital in Jakarta and
- was seen on the plane by some eyewitnesses. Four days after
- the massacre, Battalion 700 was quietly withdrawn from East
- Timor. Two weeks later, Battalion 303 left East Timor amid
- great fanfare. Why was Major Lantara never summoned as
- witness? Why were all the military defendants from 303? Why
- did Lantara and Battalion 700 disappear?
-
- The disputed 'opening up'
- A detective story always needs a motive. If Battalion 700
- was involved in the premeditated killings, what was the
- motive? To find the answer we must look at the conflict in
- Jakarta over military rule in East Timor between Suharto
- and his kitchen-cabinet and the HANKAM group.
- For external reasons Suharto was in favour of
- "keterbukaan" (opening up) in East Timor. Access to East
- Timor became easier but with negative consequences for the
- military. The flow of information from East Timor became
- easier, the clandestine movement became stronger and
- bolder. The visit of US ambassador John Monjo when a well-
- publicised demonstration took place, was an embarrassment
- for the security forces. The military knew that
- preparations were under way for a huge rally originally
- intended for the Portuguese MPs and replaced by the Santa
- Cruz demonstration, and used it to make their point. Their
- message to Suharto was: the people have become uncontrol-
- lable, we had to step in. What we do in East Timor is our
- business, don't let foreigners interfere.
- The final word has not yet been spoken. The several
- groups are still at odds and, as one Indonesian
- oppositionist says: "East Timor can become Indonesia's
- Mozambique".
-
- Further reading:
- Who gave the order?, FITUN no.6, Jan.1992, pp 1-8
- East Timor, the Courts-Martial, Asia Watch, vol.4 no.16.
- Whatever happened to Gerhan Lantara?, Tim Kell, Jan.1992
- ** End of text from cdp:reg.easttimor **
-
-