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- Path: sparky!uunet!utcsri!dgp.toronto.edu!flaps
- Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
- From: flaps@dgp.toronto.edu (Alan J Rosenthal)
- Subject: Re: root-owned world-writable files
- Message-ID: <1992Jul22.153044.5242@jarvis.csri.toronto.edu>
- References: <62524@cup.portal.com> <1992Jul21.201056.662@newshost.lanl.gov> <14htt0INNiep@hilbert.math.ksu.edu>
- Date: 22 Jul 92 19:30:44 GMT
- Lines: 24
-
- VESOFT@cup.portal.com (Michael D Hensley) writes:
- >Agree/disagree/discussion: Any root-owned world-writable file should be
- >considered a potential security loophole.
-
- Strongly disagree. The only difference between it being owned by root and
- owned by someone else (discounting quotas) is that if it's owned by root,
- someone else can't chmod or chown it. This is an INCREASE in security.
- Especially in these days of NFS, where people can become anyone other than root
- with physical access to a workstation. (Well, they can become root, but then
- they're "nobody" over NFS.)
-
- You could argue that files shouldn't be world-writable, but I don't see how you
- can argue that given that a file is world-writable (but not set[ug]id), it's a
- danger to have it be owned by root rather than daemon or nobody or something.
-
- tar@math.ksu.edu (Tim Ramsey) writes:
- >How do you get a complete list of files that are trusted by root, or by
- >programs that root trusts (that is, are setuid root)?
- >
- >Much easier to simply not have world-writable files owned by root.
-
- Not having world-writable files owned by root has nothing to do with this. If
- root or a setuid-root program trusts a world-writable file, the fact that it is
- owned by someone else doesn't help you.
-