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- Newsgroups: comp.protocols.tcp-ip
- Path: sparky!uunet!wupost!sdd.hp.com!mips!odin!fido!sgi!rhyolite!vjs
- From: vjs@rhyolite.wpd.sgi.com (Vernon Schryver)
- Subject: Re: Firewall usage (was: Re: ping works, but ftp/telnet get "no route)
- Message-ID: <nvi8dlo@rhyolite.wpd.sgi.com>
- Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc. Mountain View, CA
- References: <DRW.92Jul27143657@jordan.mit.edu> <17011@ulysses.att.com> <1992Jul31.000924.7528@decuac.dec.com>
- Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1992 05:11:55 GMT
- Lines: 39
-
- In article <1992Jul31.000924.7528@decuac.dec.com>, mjr@hussar.dco.dec.com (Marcus J. Ranum) writes:
- > drw@euclid.mit.edu (Dale R. Worley) writes:
- >
- > >I haven't studied the matter, but I believe that the more
- > >sophisticated firewalling routers actually *do* track connections.
- >
- > I prefer to use a somewhat different approach in general. First
- > you determine the services that your users have a clear business need
- > for. Then you develop an application gateway that "knows" that protocol
- > and can give you decent access control, logging, and piggy-back blocking.
- > This is much more secure (in my opinion) since you preserve the "that which
- > is not expressly permitted is prohibited" doctrine and you can incorporate
- > appropriate per-protocol authentication or authorization as needed.
-
-
- The meaning I infer for "piggy-back blockin" seems formally
- impossible. Does it mean preventing people from using permitted
- facilities for impermissible things? Such as piggy-backing a full
- featured "gateway" on top of rlogin?
-
- Consider the recent talk of running SLIP over email over UUCP over
- DECNET over x.25 over mirrors, or some such.
-
-
- There is code floating around that does what its name, "gateway,"
- implies with an rlogin or telnet session through a firewall. We
- recently encountered a version with a different name (it's trivial to
- write from scratch) that a "security expert" (sic) from a major network
- provided had "helped" a naive, trusting, related employee install. The
- thing let people from that network provider's network by pass the
- sgi.com firewall. The turkey could not understand why we considered
- him no different from any other bad guy who had tried to punch a hole
- through the firewall. He only admitted guilt in having his code
- go crazy and eat up all of the processes allowed "guest".
-
- Who will guard the guardians?
-
-
- Vernon Schryver, vjs@sgi.com
-