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- Xref: sparky alt.security:4028 sci.crypt:2757
- Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!uknet!acorn!eoe!ahaley
- From: ahaley@eoe.co.uk (Andrew Haley)
- Newsgroups: alt.security,sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: passwd security check
- Message-ID: <1345@eouk9.eoe.co.uk>
- Date: 28 Jul 92 12:16:04 GMT
- References: <12431@inews.intel.com>
- Organization: EO Europe Limited, Cambridge, UK
- Lines: 24
- X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL3
-
- adam@gomez.intel.com (Adam Margulies ~) writes:
- : DES has a theorectical weakness in that for any key there are exactly
- : 7 other keys that will crypt to the same string. I.E. if your password
- : is "batman!" there exist seven other keys which are not "batman!" that
- : will allow access to your account. Fortunately they are almost
- : certainly extremely strange strings like "@gW #s(u", and not likely to
- : match a human generated password.
-
- Not really. DES only uses 7 bits out of each byte of its key, but if
- we're assuming that the key is ASCII, there only are seven bits. DES
- assumes keys have odd parity. So its key length is 56 bits, all of
- which it uses for encryption.
-
- : Another interesting thing about DES is that there are 8 keys that
- : crypt to a string of all spaces and there are even keys that when
- : encrypted reproduce themselves in the crypted output. Weird.
-
- There are weak keys (e.g. 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01) which do no real
- scrambling at all, and some semi weak keys which do very little. In
- fact, these keys are very useful for testing DES implementations.
- You'd have to be pretty determined to get these into an ASCII
- terminal, though.
-
- Andrew.
-