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Line #1. . .Text begins on Line #220, blank lines are filler.
Production notes at line #8
Explanation of typographical conventions at line #29
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
NO TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY
Etext Production Notes
This public domain Etext edition of Lysander Spooner's No Treason: The
Constitution of no Authority was prepared by:
John Walker
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
No Treason
No. VI
The Constitution of No Authority
================================
by Lysander Spooner
Boston:
1870.
*
-----
I.
The Constitution has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no
authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and
man. And it does not so much as even purport to be a contract between
persons now existing. It purports, at most, to be only a contract
between persons living eighty years ago. And it can be supposed to
have been a contract then only between persons who had already come to
years of discretion, so as to be competent to make reasonable and
obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know, historically, that only a
small portion even of the people then existing were consulted on the
subject, or asked, or permitted to express either their consent or
dissent in any formal manner. Those persons, if any, who did give
their consent formally, are all dead now. Most of them have been dead
forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years. _And the Constitution, so far
as it was their contract, died with them_. They had no natural power
or right to make it obligatory upon their children. It is not only
plainly impossible, in the nature of things, that they _could_ bind
their posterity, but they did not even attempt to bind them. That is
to say, the instrument does not purport to be an agreement between any
body but "the people" then existing; nor does it, either expressly or
impliedly, assert any right, power, or disposition, on their part, to
bind anybody but themselves. Let us see. Its language is:
We, the people of the United States (that is, the people
_then existing_ in the United States), in order to form
a more perfect union, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves _and our posterity_, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.
It is plain, in the first place, that this language, _as an
agreement_, purports to be only what it at most really was, viz., a
contract between the people then existing; and, of necessity, binding,
as a contract, only upon those then existing. In the second place,
the language neither expresses nor implies that they had any intention
or desire, nor that they imagined they had any right or power, to bind
their "posterity" to live under it. It does not say that their
"posterity" will, shall, or must live under it. It only says, in
effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might
prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by
promoting their union, safety, tranquility, liberty, etc.
Suppose an agreement were entered into, in this form:
We, the people of Boston, agree to maintain a fort on Governor's
Island, to protect ourselves and our posterity against invasion.
This agreement, as an agreement, would clearly bind nobody but the
people then existing. Secondly, it would assert no right, power, or
disposition, on their part, to compel their "posterity" to maintain
such a fort. It would only indicate that the supposed welfare of
their posterity was one of the motives that induced the original
parties to enter into the agreement.
When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity,
he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of
binding them, nor is it to be inferred that he is so foolish as to
imagine that he has any right or power to bind them, to live in it.
So far as they are concerned, he only means to be understood as saying
that his hopes and motives, in building it, are that they, or at least
some of them, may find it for their happiness to live in it.
So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his
posterity, he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any
thought of compelling them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a
simpleton as to imagine that he has any right or power to compel them,
to eat the fruit. So far as they are concerned, he only means to say
that his hopes and motives, in planting the tree, are that its fruit
may be agreeable to them.
So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution.
Whatever may have been their personal intentions, the legal meaning of
their language, so far as their "posterity" was concerned, simply was,
that their hopes and motives, in entering into the agreement, were
that it might prove useful and acceptable to their posterity; that it
might promote their union, safety, tranquility, and welfare; and that
it might tend "to secure to them the blessings of liberty." The
language does not assert nor at all imply, any right, power, or
disposition, on the part of the original parties to the agreement, to
compel their "posterity" to live under it. If they had intended to
bind their posterity to live under it, they should have said that
their object was, not "to secure to them the blessings of liberty,"
but to make slaves of them; for if their "posterity" are bound to live
under it, they are nothing less than the slaves of their foolish,
tyrannical, and dead grandfathers.
It cannot be said that the Constitution formed "the people of
the United States," for all time, into a corporation. It does not speak
of "the people" as a corporation, but as individuals. A corporation
does not describe itself as "we," nor as "people," nor as "ourselves."
Nor does a corporation, in legal language, have any "posterity." It
supposes itself to have, and speaks of itself as having, perpetual
existence, as a single individuality.
Moreover, no body of men, existing at any one time, have the power to
create a perpetual corporation. A corporation can become practically
perpetual only by the voluntary accession of new members, as the old
ones die off. But for this voluntary accession of new members, the
corporation necessarily dies with the death of those who originally
composed it.
Legally speaking, therefore, there is, in the Constitution, nothing
that professes or attempts to bind the "posterity" of those who
established it.
If, then, those who established the Constitution, had no power to
bind, and did not attempt to bind, their posterity, the question
arises, whether their posterity have bound themselves. If they have
done so, they can have done so in only one or both of these two ways,
viz., by voting, and paying taxes.
II.
Let us consider these two matters, voting and tax paying, separately.
And first of voting.
All the voting that has ever taken place under the Constitution, has
been of such a kind that it not only did not pledge the whole people
to support the Constitution, but it did not even pledge any one of
them to do so, as the following considerations show.
1. In the very nature of things, the act of voting could bind nobody
but the actual voters. But owing to the property qualifications
required, it is probable that, during the first twenty or thirty years
under the Constitution, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or perhaps
twentieth of the whole population (black and white, men, women, and
minors) were permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as voting was
concerned, not more than one-tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth of those
then existing, could have incurred any obligation to support the
Constitution.
At the present time, it is probable that not more than one-sixth of
the whole population are permitted to vote. Consequently, so far as
voting is concerned, the other five-sixths can have given no pledge
that they will support the Constitution.
2. Of the one-sixth that are permitted to vote, probably not more
than two-thirds (about one-ninth of the whole population) have usually
voted. Many never vote at all. Many vote only once in two, three,
five, or ten years, in periods of great excitement.
No one, by voting, can be said to pledge himself for any longer period
than that for which he votes. If, for example, I vote for an officer
who is to hold his office for only a year, I cannot be said to have
thereby pledged myself to support the government beyond that term.
Therefore, on the ground of actual voting, it probably cannot be said
that more than one-ninth or one-eighth, of the whole population are
usually under any pledge to support the Constitution.
3. It cannot be said that, by voting, a man pledges himself to
support the Constitution, unless the act of voting be a perfectly
voluntary one on his part. Yet the act of voting cannot properly be
called a voluntary one on the part of any very large number of those
who do vote. It is rather a measure of necessity imposed upon them by
others, than one of their own choice. On this point I repeat what was
said in a former number, [See _No Treason_, No. 2, pages 5 and 6.]
viz.:
"In truth, in the case of individuals, their actual
voting is not to be taken as proof of consent, _even for
the time being_. On the contrary, it is to be
considered that, without his consent having even been
asked a man finds himself environed by a government that
he cannot resist; a government that forces him to pay
money, render service, and forego the exercise of many
of his natural rights under peril of weighty
punishments. He sees, too, that other men practice this
tyranny over him by the use of the ballot. He sees
further, that, if he will but use the ballot himself, he
has some chance of relieving himself from this tyranny
of others, by subjecting them to his own. In short, he
finds himself, without his consent, so situated that, if
he use the ballot, he may become a master; if he does
not use it, he must become a slave. And he has no other
alternative than these two. In self-defence, he
attempts the former. His case is analogous to that of a
man who has been forced into battle, where he must
either kill others, or be killed himself. Because, to
save his own life in battle, a man attempts to take the
lives of his opponents, it is not to be inferred that
the battle is one of his own choosing. Neither in
contests with the ballot--which is a mere substitute for
a bullet--because, as his only chance of
self-preservation, a man uses a ballot, is it to be
inferred that the contest is one into which he
voluntarily entered; that he voluntarily set up all his
own natural rights, as a stake against those of others,
to be lost or won by the mere power of numbers. On the
contrary, it is to be considered that in an exigency
into which he had been forced by others, and in which no
other means of self-defence offered, he, as a matter of
necessity, used the only one that was left to him.
"Doubtless the most miserable of men, under the most
oppressive government in the world, if allowed the
ballot, would use it, if they could see any chance of
thereby meliorating their condition. But it would not,
therefore, be a legitimate inference that the government
itself, that crushes them, was one which they had
voluntarily set up, or even consented to.
"Therefore, a man's voting under the Constitution of the
United States, is not to be taken as evidence that he
ever freely assented to the Constitution, _even for the
time being_. Consequently we have no proof that any
very large portion, even of the actual voters of the
United States, ever really and voluntarily consented to
the Constitution _even for the time being_. Nor can we
ever have such proof, until every man is left perfectly
free to consent, or not, without thereby subjecting
himself or his property to be disturbed or injured by
others."
As we can have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who
from the necessity thus forced upon him, we can have no legal
knowledge, as to any particular individual, that he voted from choice;
or, consequently, that by voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to
support the government. Legally speaking, therefore, the act of
voting utterly fails to pledge any one to support the government. It
utterly fails to prove that the government rests upon the voluntary
support of anybody. On general principles of law and reason, it
cannot be said that the government has any voluntary supporters at
all, until it can be distinctly shown who its voluntary supporters
are.
4. As taxation is made compulsory on all, whether they vote or not, a
large proportion of those who vote, no doubt do so to prevent their
own money being used against themselves; when, in fact, they would
have gladly abstained from voting, if they could thereby have saved
themselves from taxation alone, to say nothing of being saved from all
the other usurpations and tyrannies of the government. To take a
man's property without his consent, and then to infer his consent
because he attempts, by voting, to prevent that property from being
used to his injury, is a very insufficient proof of his consent to
support the Constitution. It is, in fact, no proof at all. And as we
can have no legal knowledge as to who the particular individuals are,
if there are any, who are willing to be taxed for the sake of voting,
we can have no legal knowledge that any particular individual consents
to be taxed for the sake of voting; or, consequently, consents to
support the Constitution.
5. At nearly all elections, votes are given for various candidates
for the same office. Those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates
cannot properly be said to have voted to sustain the Constitution.
They may, with more reason, be supposed to have voted, not to support
the Constitution, but specially to prevent the tyranny which they
anticipate the successful candidate intends to practice upon them
under color of the Constitution; and therefore may reasonably be
supposed to have voted against the Constitution itself. This
supposition is the more reasonable, inasmuch as such voting is the
only mode allowed to them of expressing their dissent to the
Constitution.
6. Many votes are usually given for candidates who have no prospect
of success. Those who give such votes may reasonably be supposed to
have voted as they did, with a special intention, not to support, but
to obstruct the execution of, the Constitution; and, therefore,
against the Constitution itself.
7. As all the different votes are given secretly (by secret ballot),
there is no legal means of knowing, from the votes themselves, who
votes for, and who against, the Constitution. Therefore, voting
affords no legal evidence that any particular individual supports the
Constitution. And where there can be no legal evidence that any
particular individual supports the Constitution, it cannot legally be
said that anybody supports it. It is clearly impossible to have any
legal proof of the intentions of large numbers of men, where there can
be no legal proof of the intentions of any particular one of them.
8. There being no legal proof of any man's intentions, in voting, we
can only conjecture them. As a conjecture, it is probable, that a
very large proportion of those who vote, do so on this principle,
viz., that if, by voting, they could but get the government into their
own hands (or that of their friends), and use its powers against their
opponents, they would then willingly support the Constitution; but if
their opponents are to have the power, and use it against them, then
they would _not_ willingly support the Constitution.
In short, men's voluntary support of the Constitution is doubtless, in
most cases, wholly contingent upon the question whether, by means of
the Constitution, they can make themselves masters, or are to be made
slaves.
Such contingent consent as that is, in law and reason, no consent at
all.
9. As everybody who supports the Constitution by voting (if there are
any such) does so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid
all personal responsibility for the act of his agents or
representatives, it cannot legally or reasonably be said that anybody
at all supports the Constitution by voting. No man can reasonably or
legally be said to do such a thing as to assent to, or support, the
Constitution, _unless he does it openly, and in a way to make himself
personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act
within the limits of the power he delegates to them_.
10. As all voting is secret (by secret ballot), and as all secret
governments are necessarily only secret bands of robbers, tyrants, and
murderers, the general fact that our government is practically carried
on by means of such voting, only proves that there is among us a
secret band of robbers, tyrants and murderers, whose purpose is to
rob, enslave, and, so far as necessary to accomplish their purposes,
murder, the rest of the people. The simple fact of the existence of
such a band does nothing towards proving that "the people of the
United States," or any one of them, voluntarily supports the
Constitution.
For all the reasons that have now been given, voting furnishes no
legal evidence as to who the particular individuals are (if there are
any), who voluntarily support the Constitution. It therefore
furnishes no legal evidence that anybody supports it voluntarily.
So far, therefore, as voting is concerned, the Constitution, legally
speaking, has no supporters at all.
And, as matter of fact, there is not the slightest probability that
the Constitution has a single bona fide supporter in the country.
That is to say, there is not the slightest probability that there is a
single man in the country, who both understands what the Constitution
really is, _and sincerely supports it for what it really is_.
The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible
supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes,
viz.: 1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the
government an instrument which they can use for their own
aggrandizement or wealth. 2. Dupes--a large class, no doubt--each of
whom, because he is allowed one voice out of millions in deciding what
he may do with his own person and his own property, and because he is
permitted to have the same voice in robbing, enslaving, and murdering
others, that others have in robbing, enslaving, and murdering himself,
is stupid enough to imagine that he is a "free man," a "sovereign";
that this is "a free government"; "a government of equal rights," "the
best government on earth," [Suppose it be "the best government on
earth," does that prove its own goodness, or only the badness of all
other governments?] and such like absurdities. 3. A class who have
some appreciation of the evils of government, but either do not see
how to get rid of them, or do not choose to so far sacrifice their
private interests as to give themselves seriously and earnestly to the
work of making a change.
III.
The payment of taxes, being compulsory, of course furnishes no
evidence that any one voluntarily supports the Constitution.
1. It is true that the _theory_ of our Constitution is, that all
taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance
company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that
each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others
who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much
protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and
that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay tax, as he
is to pay a tax, and be protected.
But this theory of our government is wholly different from the
practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman,
says to a man: "Your money, or your life." And many, if not most,
taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat.
The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place,
spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head,
proceed to rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a
robbery on that account; and it is far more dastardly and shameful.
The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger,
and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any
rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your
own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has
not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector,"
and that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him
to "protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to
protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of
protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as
these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you
wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road,
against your will; assuming to be your rightful "sovereign," on
account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep
"protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by
requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing
you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure
to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to
your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his
authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be
guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In
short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you
either his dupe or his slave.
The proceedings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves
"the government," are directly the opposite of these of the single
highwayman.
In the first place, they do not, like him, make themselves
individually known; or, consequently, take upon themselves personally
the responsibility of their acts. On the contrary, they secretly (by
secret ballot) designate some one of their number to commit the
robbery in their behalf, while they keep themselves practically
concealed. They say to the person thus designated:
Go to A...B..., and say to him that "the government" has need of money
to meet the expenses of protecting him and his property. If he
presumes to say that he has never contracted with us to protect him,
and that he wants none of our protection, say to him that that is our
business, and not his, that we _choose_ to protect him, whether he
desires us to do so or not; and that we demand pay, too, for
protecting him. If he dares to inquire who the individuals are, who
have thus taken upon themselves the title of "the government," and who
assume to protect him, and demand payment of him, without his having
ever made any contract with them, say to him that that, too, is our
business, and not his; that we do not _choose_ to make ourselves
_individually_ known to him; that we have secretly (by secret ballot)
appointed you our agent to give him notice of our demands, and, if he
complies with them, to give him, in our name, a receipt that will
protect him against any similar demand for the present year. If he
refuses to comply, seize and sell enough of his property to pay not
only our demands, but all your own expenses and trouble beside. If he
resists the seizure of his property, call upon the bystanders to help
you (doubtless some of them will prove to be members of our band).
If, in defending his property, he should kill any of our band who are
assisting you, capture him at all hazards, charge him (in one of our
courts) with murder, convict him, and hang him. If he should call
upon his neighbors, or any others who, like him, may be disposed to
resist our demands, and they should come in large numbers to his
assistance, cry out that they are all rebels and traitors; that "our
country" is in danger; call upon the commander of our hired murderers;
tell him to quell the rebellion and "save the country," cost what it
may. Tell him to kill all who resist, though they should be hundreds
of thousands; and thus strike terror into all others similarly
disposed. See that the work of murder is thoroughly done, that we may
have no further trouble of this kind hereafter. When these traitors
shall have thus been taught our strength and our determination, they
will be good loyal citizens for many years, and pay their taxes
without a why or a wherefore.
It is under such compulsion as this that taxes, so called, are paid.
And how much proof the payment of taxes affords, that the people
consent to support "the government," it needs no further argument to
show.
2. Still another reason why the payment of taxes implies no consent,
or pledge, to support the government, is that the taxpayer does not
know, and has no means of knowing, who the particular individuals are
who compose "the government." To him "the government" is a myth, an
abstraction, an incorporeality, with which he can make no contract,
and to which he can give no consent, and make no pledge. He knows it
only through its pretended agents. "The government" itself he never
sees. He knows indeed, by common report, that certain persons, of a
certain age, are permitted to vote; and thus to make themselves parts
of, or (if they choose) opponents of, the government, for the time
being. But who of them do thus vote, and especially how each one
votes (whether so as to aid or oppose the government), he does not
know; the voting being all done secretly (by secret ballot). Who,
therefore, practically compose "the government," for the time being,
he has no means of knowing. Of course he can make no contract with
them, give them no consent, and make them no pledge. Of necessity,
therefore, his paying taxes to them implies, on his part, no contract,
consent, or pledge to support them--that is, to support "the
government," or the Constitution.
3. Not knowing who the particular individuals are, who call
themselves "the government," the taxpayer does not know whom he pays
his taxes to. All he knows is that a man comes to him, representing
himself to be the agent of "the government"--that is, the agent of a
secret band of robbers and murderers, who have taken to themselves the
title of "the government," and have determined to kill everybody who
refuses to give them whatever money they demand. To save his life, he
gives up his money to this agent. But as this agent does not make his
principals individually known to the taxpayer, the latter, after he
has given up his money, knows no more who are "the government"--that
is, who were the robbers--than he did before. To say, therefore, that
by giving up his money to their agent, he entered into a voluntary
contract with them, that he pledges himself to obey them, to support
them, and to give them whatever money they should demand of him in the
future, is simply ridiculous.
4. All political power, as it is called, rests practically upon this
matter of money. Any number of scoundrels, having money enough to
start with, can establish themselves as a "government"; because, with
money, they can hire soldiers, and with soldiers extort more money;
and also compel general obedience to their will. It is with
government, as Caesar said it was in war, that money and soldiers
mutually supported each other; that with money he could hire soldiers,
and with soldiers extort money. So these villains, who call
themselves governments, well understand that their power rests
primarily upon money. With money they can hire soldiers, and with
soldiers extort money. And, when their authority is denied, the first
use they always make of money, is to hire soldiers to kill or subdue
all who refuse them more money.
For this reason, whoever desires liberty, should understand these
vital facts, viz.: 1. That every man who puts money into the hands of
a "government" (so called), puts into its hands a sword which will be
used against himself, to extort more money from him, and also to keep
him in subjection to its arbitrary will. 2. That those who will take
his money, without his consent, in the first place, will use it for
his further robbery and enslavement, if he presumes to resist their
demands in the future. 3. That it is a perfect absurdity to suppose
that any body of men would ever take a man's money without his
consent, for any such object as they profess to take it for, viz.,
that of protecting him; for why should they wish to protect him, if he
does not wish them to do so? To suppose that they would do so, is
just as absurd as it would be to suppose that they would take his
money without his consent, for the purpose of buying food or clothing
for him, when he did not want it. 4. If a man wants "protection," he
is competent to make his own bargains for it; and nobody has any
occasion to rob him, in order to "protect" him against his will. 5.
That the only security men can have for their political liberty,
consists in their keeping their money in their own pockets, until they
have assurances, perfectly satisfactory to themselves, that it will be
used as they wish it to be used, for their benefit, and not for their
injury. 6. That no government, so called, can reasonably be trusted
for a moment, or reasonably be supposed to have honest purposes in
view, any longer than it depends wholly upon voluntary support.
These facts are all so vital and so self-evident, that it cannot
reasonably be supposed that any one will voluntarily pay money to a
"government," for the purpose of securing its protection, unless he
first makes an explicit and purely voluntary contract with it for that
purpose.
It is perfectly evident, therefore, that neither such voting, nor such
payment of taxes, as actually takes place, proves anybody's consent,
or obligation, to support the Constitution. Consequently we have no
evidence at all that the Constitution is binding upon anybody, or that
anybody is under any contract or obligation whatever to support it.
And nobody is under any obligation to support it.
IV.
_The Constitution not only binds nobody now, but it never did bind
anybody_. It never bound anybody, because it was never agreed to by
anybody in such a manner as to make it, on general principles of law
and reason, binding upon him.
It is a general principle of law and reason, that a written instrument
binds no one until he has signed it. This principle is so inflexible
a one, that even though a man is unable to write his name, he must
still "make his mark," before he is bound by a written contract. This
custom was established ages ago, when few men could write their names;
when a clerk--that is, a man who could write--was so rare and valuable
a person, that even if he were guilty of high crimes, he was entitled
to pardon, on the ground that the public could not afford to lose his
services. Even at that time, a written contract must be signed, and
men who could not write, either "made their mark," or signed their
contracts by stamping their seals upon wax affixed to the parchment on
which their contracts were written. Hence the custom of affixing
seals, that has continued to this time.
The law holds, and reason declares, that if a written instrument is
not signed, the presumption must be that the party to be bound by it,
did not choose to sign it, or to bind himself by it. And law and
reason both give him until the last moment, in which to decide whether
he will sign it, or not. Neither law nor reason requires or expects a
man to agree to an instrument, _until it is written_; for until it is
written, he cannot know its precise legal meaning. And when it is
written, and he has had the opportunity to satisfy himself of its
precise legal meaning, he is then expected to decide, and not before,
whether he will agree to it or not. And if he do not _then_ sign it,
his reason is supposed to be, that he does not choose to enter into
such a contract. The fact that the instrument was written for him to
sign, or with the hope that he would sign it, goes for nothing.
Where would be the end of fraud and litigation, if one party could
bring into court a written instrument, without any signature, and claim
to have it enforced, upon the ground that it was written for another
man to sign? that this other man had promised to sign it? that he
ought to have signed it? that he had had the opportunity to sign it,
if he would? but that he had refused or neglected to do so? Yet that
is the most that could ever be said of the Constitution. [The very men
who drafted it, never signed it in any way to bind themselves by it,
_as a contract_. And not one of them probably ever would have signed
it in any way to bind himself by it, _as a contract_.] The very judges,
who profess to derive all their authority from the Constitution--from
an instrument that nobody ever signed--would spurn any other
instrument, not signed, that should be brought before them for
adjudication.
Moreover, a written instrument must, in law and reason, not
only he signed, but must also be delivered to the party (or to some
one for him), in whose favor it is made, before it can bind the
party making it. The signing is of no effect, unless the instrument
be also delivered. And a party is at perfect liberty to refuse to
deliver a written instrument, after he has signed it. He is as free
to refuse to deliver it, as he is to refuse to sign it. The Constitution
was not only never signed by anybody, but it was never delivered
by anybody, or to anybody's agent or attorney. It can therefore be
of no more validity as a contract, than can any other instrument,
that was never signed or delivered.
V.
As further evidence of the general sense of mankind, as to the
practical necessity there is that all men's _important_ contracts,
especially those of a permanent nature, should be both written and
signed, the following facts are pertinent.
For nearly two hundred years--that is, since 1677--there has been on
the statute book of England, and the same, in substance, if not
precisely in letter, has been re-enacted, and is now in force, in
nearly or quite all the States of this Union, a statute, the general
object of which is to declare that no action shall be brought to
enforce contracts of the more important class, _unless they are put
in writing, and signed by the parties to be held chargeable upon
them_. [I have personally examined the statute books of the
following States, viz.: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Nevada, California, and Oregon, and find that in
all these States the English statute has been reenacted, sometimes
with modifications, but generally enlarging its operations, and is
now in force.
The following are some of the provisions of the Massachusetts statute:
"No action shall be brought in any of the following cases, that is to
say: . . .
"To charge a person upon a special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or misdoings of another: . . .
"Upon a contract for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or
of any interest in, or concerning them, or
"Upon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from
the writing thereof:
"Unless the promise, contract, or agreement, upon which such action is
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized."
"No contract for the sale of goods, wares or merchandise, for the
price of fifty dollars or more, shall be good or valid, unless the
purchaser accepts and receives part of the goods so sold, or gives
something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, or
unless some note or memorandum in writing of the bargain is made and
signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized."]
The principle of the statute, be it observed, is, not merely that
written contracts shall be signed, but also that all contracts, except
those specially exempted -- generally those that are for small
amounts, and are to remain in force but for a short time--_shall be
both written and signed_.
The reason of the statute, on this point, is, that it is now so easy a
thing for men to put their contracts in writing, and sign them, and
their failure to do so opens the door to so much doubt, fraud, and
litigation, that men who neglect to have their contracts--of any
considerable importance--written and signed, ought not to have the
benefit of courts of justice to enforce them. And this reason is a
wise one; and that experience has confirmed its wisdom and necessity,
is demonstrated by the fact that it has been acted upon in England for
nearly two hundred years and has been so nearly universally adopted in
this country, and that nobody thinks of repealing it.
We all know, too how careful most men are to have their contracts
written and signed, even when this statute does not require it. For
example, most men, if they have money due them, of no larger amount
than five or ten dollars, are careful to take a note for it. If they
buy even a small bill of goods, paying for it at the time of delivery,
they take a receipted bill for it. If they pay a small balance of a
book account, or any other small debt previously contracted, they take
a written receipt for it.
Furthermore, the law everywhere (probably) in our country, as well as
in England, requires that a large class of contracts, such as wills,
deeds, etc., shall not only be written and signed, but also sealed,
witnessed, and acknowledged. And in the case of married women
conveying their rights in real estate, the law, in many States,
requires that the women shall be examined separate and apart from
their husbands, and declare that they sign their contracts free of any
fear or compulsion of their husbands.
Such are some of the precautions which the laws require, and which
individuals--from motives of common prudence, even in cases not
required by law--take, to put their contracts in writing and have them
signed, and, to guard against all uncertainties and controversies in
regard to their meaning and validity. And yet we have what purports,
or professes, or is claimed, to be a contract--the Constitution--made
eighty years ago, by men who are now all dead, and who never had any
power to bind _us_, but which (it is claimed) has nevertheless bound
three generations of men, consisting of many millions, and which (it
is claimed) will be binding upon all the millions that are to come;
but which nobody ever signed, sealed, delivered, witnessed, or
acknowledged; and which few persons, compared with the whole number
that are claimed to be bound by it, have ever read, or even seen, or
ever will read or see. And of those who ever have read it, or ever
will read it scarcely any two, perhaps no two, have ever agreed, or
ever will agree, as to what it means.
Moreover, this supposed contract which would not be received in any
court of justice sitting under its authority, if offered to prove a
debt of five dollars, owing by one man to another, is one by
which--_as it is generally interpreted by those who pretend to
administer it_--all men, women and children throughout the country,
and through all time, surrender not only all their property, but also
their liberties, and even lives, into the hands of men who by this
supposed contract, are expressly made wholly irresponsible for their
disposal of them. And we are so insane, or so wicked, as to destroy
property and lives without limit, in fighting to compel men to fulfill
a supposed contract, which, inasmuch as it has never been signed by
anybody, is, on general principles of law and reason--such principles
as we are all governed by in regard to other contracts--the merest
waste paper, binding upon nobody, fit only to be thrown into the fire;
or, if preserved, preserved only to serve as a witness and a warning
of the folly and wickedness of mankind.
VI.
It is no exaggeration, but a literal truth, to say that, by the
Constitution--_not as I interpret it, but as it is interpreted by
those who pretend to administer it_--the properties, liberties, and
lives of the entire people of the United States are surrendered
unreservedly into the hands of men who, it is provided by the
Constitution itself, shall never be "questioned" as to any disposal
they make of them.
Thus the Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 6) provides that, "for any
speech or debate (or vote), in either house, they (the senators and
representatives) shall not be questioned in any other place."
The whole law-making power is given to these senators and
representatives (when acting by a two-thirds vote); [And this
two-thirds vote may be but two-thirds of a quorum--that is two-thirds
of a majority--instead of two-thirds of the whole.] and this provision
protects them from all responsibility for the laws they make.
The Constitution also enables them to secure the execution of all
their laws, by giving them power to withhold the salaries of, and to
impeach and remove, all judicial and executive officers, who refuse to
execute them.
Thus the whole power of the government is in their hands, and they are
made utterly irresponsible for the use they make of it. What is this
but absolute, irresponsible power?
It is no answer to this view of the case to say that these men are
under oath to use their power only within certain limits; for what
care they, or what should they care, for oaths or limits, when it is
expressly provided, by the Constitution itself, that they shall never
be "questioned," or held to any responsibility whatever, for violating
their oaths, or transgressing those limits?
Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the
particular individuals holding this power can be changed once in two
or six years; for the power of each set of men is absolute during the
term for which they hold it; and when they can hold it no longer, they
are succeeded only by men whose power will be equally absolute and
irresponsible.
Neither is it any answer to this view of the case to say that the men
holding this absolute, irresponsible power, must be men chosen by the
people (or portions of them) to hold it. A man is none the less a
slave because he is allowed to choose a new master once in a term of
years. Neither are a people any the less slaves because permitted
periodically to choose new masters. What makes them slaves is the
fact that they now are, and are always hereafter to be, in the hands
of men whose power over them is, and always is to be, absolute and
irresponsible. [Of what appreciable value is it to any man, as an
individual, that he is allowed a voice in choosing these public
masters? His voice is only one of several millions.]
The right of absolute and irresponsible dominion is the right of
property, and the right of property is the right of absolute,
irresponsible dominion. The two are identical; the one necessarily
implying the other. Neither can exist without the other. If,
therefore, Congress have that absolute and irresponsible law-making
power, which the Constitution--according to their interpretation of
it--gives them, it can only be because they own us as property. If
they own us as property, they are our masters, and their will is our
law. If they do not own us as property, they are not our masters, and
their will, as such, is of no authority over us.
But these men who claim and exercise this absolute and irresponsible
dominion over us, dare not be consistent, and claim either to be our
masters, or to own us as property. They say they are only our
servants, agents, attorneys, and representatives. But this
declaration involves an absurdity, a contradiction. No man can be my
servant, agent, attorney, or representative, and be, at the same time,
uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me for his acts. It is of
no importance that I appointed him, and put all power in his hands.
If I made him uncontrollable by me, and irresponsible to me, he is no
longer my servant, agent, attorney, or representative. If I gave him
absolute, irresponsible power over my property, I gave him the
property. If I gave him absolute, irresponsible power over myself, I
made him my master, and gave myself to him as a slave. And it is of
no importance whether I called him master or servant, agent or owner.
The only question is, what power did I put into his hands? Was it an
absolute and irresponsible one? or a limited and responsible one?
For still another reason they are neither our servants, agents,
attorneys, nor representatives. And that reason is, that we do not
make ourselves responsible for their acts. If a man is my servant,
agent, or attorney, I necessarily make myself responsible for all his
acts done within the limits of the power I have intrusted to him. If
I have intrusted him, as my agent, with either absolute power, or any
power at all, over the persons or properties of other men than myself,
I thereby necessarily make myself responsible to those other persons
for any injuries he may do them, so long as he acts within the limits
of the power I have granted him. But no individual who may be injured
in his person or property, by acts of Congress, can come to the
individual electors, and hold them responsible for these acts of their
so-called agents or representatives. This fact proves that these
pretended agents of the people, of everybody, are really the agents of
nobody.
If, then, nobody is individually responsible for the acts of Congress,
the members of Congress are nobody's agents. And if they are nobody's
agents, they are themselves individually responsible for their own
acts, and for the acts of all whom they employ. And the authority
they are exercising is simply their own individual authority; and, by
the law of nature--the highest of all laws--anybody injured by their
acts, anybody who is deprived by them of his property or his liberty,
has the same right to hold them individually responsible, that he has
to hold any other trespasser individually responsible. He has the
same right to resist them, and their agents, that he has to resist any
other trespassers.
VII.
It is plain, then, that on general principles of law and reason--such
principles as we all act upon in courts of justice and in common
life--the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never
did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its
authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all;
that, on general principles of law and reason, they are mere usurpers,
and that everybody not only has the right, but is morally bound, to
treat them as such.
If the people of this country wish to maintain such a government as
the Constitution describes, there is no reason in the world why they
should not sign the instrument itself, and thus make known their
wishes in an open, authentic manner; in such manner as the common
sense and experience of mankind have shown to be reasonable and
necessary in such cases; _and in such manner as to make themselves (as
they ought to do) individually responsible for the acts of the
government_. But the people have never been asked to sign it. And
the only reason why they have never been asked to sign it, has been
that it has been known that they never would sign it; that they were
neither such fools nor knaves as they must needs have been to be
willing to sign it; that (at least as it has been practically
interpreted) it is not what any sensible and honest man wants for
himself; nor such as he has any right to impose upon others. It is,
to all moral intents and purposes, as destitute of obligation as the
compacts which robbers and thieves and pirates enter into with each
other, but never sign.
If any considerable number of the people believe the Constitution to
be good, why do they not sign it themselves, and make laws for, and
administer them upon, each other; leaving all other persons (who do
not interfere with them) in peace? Until they have tried the
experiment for themselves, how can they have the face to impose the
Constitution upon, or even to recommend it to, others? Plainly the
reason for such absurd and inconsistent conduct is that they want the
Constitution, not solely for any honest or legitimate use it can be of
to themselves or others, but for the dishonest and illegitimate power
it gives them over the persons and properties of others. But for this
latter reason, all their eulogiums on the Constitution, all their
exhortations, and all their expenditures of money and blood to sustain
it, would be wanting.
VIII.
The Constitution itself, then, being of no authority, on what
authority does our government practically rest? On what ground can
those who pretend to administer it, claim the right to seize men's
property, to restrain them of their natural liberty of action,
industry, and trade, and to kill all who deny their authority to
dispose of men's properties, liberties, and lives at their pleasure or
discretion?
The most they can say, in answer to this question, is, that some half,
two-thirds, or three-fourths, of the male adults of the country have a
_tacit understanding_ that they will maintain a government under the
Constitution; that they will select, by ballot, the persons to
administer it; and that those persons who may receive a majority, or a
plurality, of their ballots, shall act as their representatives, and
administer the Constitution in their name, and by their authority.
But this tacit understanding (admitting it to exist) cannot at all
justify the conclusion drawn from it. A tacit understanding between
A, B, and C, that they will, by ballot, depute D as their agent, to
deprive me of my property, liberty, or life, cannot at all authorize D
to do so. He is none the less a robber, tyrant, and murderer, because
he claims to act as their agent, than he would be if he avowedly acted
on his own responsibility alone.
Neither am I bound to recognize him as their agent, nor can he
legitimately claim to be their agent, when he brings no _written_
authority from them accrediting him as such. I am under no obligation
to take his word as to who his principals may be, or whether he has
any. Bringing no credentials, I have a right to say he has no such
authority even as he claims to have: and that he is therefore
intending to rob, enslave, or murder me on his own account.
This tacit understanding, therefore, among the voters of the country,
amounts to nothing as an authority to their agents. Neither do the
ballots by which they select their agents, avail any more than does
their tacit understanding; for their ballots are given in secret, and
therefore in a way to avoid any personal responsibility for the acts
of their agents.
No body of men can be said to authorize a man to act as their agent,
to the injury of a third person, unless they do it in so open and
authentic a manner as to make themselves personally responsible for
his acts. None of the voters in this country appoint their political
agents in any open, authentic manner, or in any manner to make
themselves responsible for their acts. Therefore these pretended
agents cannot legitimately claim to be really agents. Somebody must
be responsible for the acts of these pretended agents; and if they
cannot show any open and authentic credentials from their principals,
they cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals. The
maxim applies here, that what does not appear, does not exist. If
they can show no principals, they have none.
But even these pretended agents do not themselves know who their
pretended principals are. These latter act in secret; for acting by
secret ballot is acting in secret as much as if they were to meet in
secret conclave in the darkness of the night. And they are personally
as much unknown to the agents they select, as they are to others. No
pretended agent therefore can ever know by whose ballots he is
selected, or consequently who his real principals are. Not knowing
who his principals are, he has no right to say that he has any. He
can, at most, say only that he is the agent of a secret band of
robbers and murderers, who are bound by that faith which prevails
among confederates in crime, to stand by him, if his acts, done in
their name, shall be resisted.
Men honestly engaged in attempting to establish justice in the world,
have no occasion thus to act in secret; or to appoint agents to do
acts for which they (the principals) are not willing to be
responsible.
The secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government
is a secret band of robbers and murderers. Open despotism is better
than this. The single despot stands out in the face of all men, and
says: I am the State: My will is law: I am your master: I take the
responsibility of my acts: The only arbiter I acknowledge is the
sword: If any one denies my right, let him try conclusions with me.
But a secret government is little less than a government of assassins.
Under it, a man knows not who his tyrants are, until they have struck,
and perhaps not then. He may _guess_, beforehand, as to some of his
immediate neighbors. But he really knows nothing. The man to whom he
would most naturally fly for protection, may prove an enemy, when the
time of trial comes.
This is the kind of government we have; and it is the only one we are
likely to have, until men are ready to say: We will consent to no
Constitution, except such an one as we are neither ashamed nor afraid
to sign; and we will authorize no government to do anything in our
name which we are not willing to be personally responsible for.
IX.
What is the motive to the secret ballot? This, and only this: Like
other confederates in crime those who use it are not friends, but
enemies; and they are afraid to be known, and to have their individual
doings known, even to each other. They can contrive to bring about a
sufficient understanding to enable them to act in concert against
other persons; but beyond this they have no confidence, and no
friendship, among themselves. In fact, they are engaged quite as much
in schemes for plundering each other, as in plundering those who are
not of them. And it is perfectly well understood among them that the
strongest party among them will, in certain contingencies, murder each
other by the hundreds of thousands (as they lately did do) to
accomplish their purposes against each other. Hence they dare not be
known, and have their individual doings known, even to each other.
And this is avowedly the only reason for the ballot: for a secret
government; a government by secret bands of robbers and murderers.
And we are insane enough to call this liberty! To be a member of this
secret band of robbers and murderers is esteemed a privilege and an
honor! Without this privilege, a man is considered a slave; but with
it a free man! With it he is considered a free man, because he has the
same power to secretly (by secret ballot) procure the robbery,
enslavement, and murder of another man, and that other man has to
procure his robbery, enslavement, and murder. And this they call
equal rights!
If any number of men, many or few, claim the right to govern the people
of this country, let them make and sign an open compact with each
other to do so. Let them thus make themselves individually known to
those whom they propose to govern. And let them thus openly take the
legitimate responsibility of their acts. How many of those who now
support the Constitution, will ever do this? How many will ever dare
openly proclaim their right to govern? or take the legitimate
responsibility of their acts? Not one!
X.
It is obvious that, on general principles of law and reason, there
exists no such thing as a government created by, or resting upon, any
consent, compact, or agreement of "the people of the United States"
with each other; that the only visible, tangible, responsible
government that exists, is that of a few individuals only, who act in
concert, and call themselves by the several names of senators,
representatives, presidents, judges, marshals, treasurers, collectors,
generals, colonels, captains, etc., etc.
On general principles of law and reason, it is of no importance
whatever that those few individuals profess to be the agents and
representatives of "the people of the United States"; since they can
show no credentials from the people themselves; they were never
appointed as agents or representatives in any open, authentic manner;
they do not themselves know, and have no means of knowing, and cannot
prove, who their principals (as they call them) are individually; and
consequently cannot, in law or reason, be said to have any principals
at all.
It is obvious, too, that if these alleged principals ever did appoint
these pretended agents, or representatives, they appointed them
secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to avoid all personal
responsibility for their acts; that, at most, these alleged principals
put these pretended agents forward for the most criminal purposes,
viz.: to plunder the people of their property, and restrain them of
their liberty; and that the only authority that these alleged
principals have for so doing, is simply a _tacit understanding_ among
themselves that they will imprison, shoot, or hang every man who
resists the exactions and restraints which their agents or
representatives may impose upon them.
Thus it is obvious that the only visible, tangible government we have
is made up of these professed agents or representatives of a secret
band of robbers and murderers, who, to cover up, or gloss over, their
robberies and murders, have taken to themselves the title of "the
people of the United States"; and who, on the pretense of being "the
people of the United States," assert their right to subject to their
dominion, and to control and dispose of at their pleasure, all
property and persons found in the United States.
XI.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which these
pretended agents of the people take "to support the Constitution," are
of no validity or obligation. And why? For this, if for no other
reason, viz., _that they are given to nobody_. There is no privity
(as the lawyers say) -- that is, no mutual recognition, consent, and
agreement -- between those who take these oaths, and any other
persons.
If I go upon Boston Common, and in the presence of a hundred thousand
people, men, women and children, with whom I have no contract on the
subject, take an oath that I will enforce upon them the laws of Moses,
of Lycurgus, of Solon, of Justinian, or of Alfred, that oath is, on
general principles of law and reason, of no obligation. It is of no
obligation, not merely because it is intrinsically a criminal one,
_but also because it is given to nobody_, and consequently pledges my
faith to nobody. It is merely given to the winds.
It would not alter the case at all to say that, among these hundred
thousand persons, in whose presence the oath was taken, there were
two, three, or five thousand male adults, who had _secretly_--by
secret ballot, and in a way to avoid making themselves _individually_
known to me, or to the remainder of the hundred thousand--designated
me as their agent to rule, control, plunder, and, if need be, murder,
these hundred thousand people. The fact that they had designated me
secretly, and in a manner to prevent my knowing them individually,
prevents all privity between them and me; and consequently makes it
impossible that there can be any contract, or pledge of faith, on my
part towards them; for it is impossible that I can pledge my faith, in
any legal sense, to a man whom I neither know, nor have any means of
knowing, individually.
So far as I am concerned, then, these two, three, or five thousand
persons are a secret band of robbers and murderers, who have secretly,
and in a way to save themselves from all responsibility for my acts,
designated me as their agent; and have, through some other agent, or
pretended agent, made their wishes known to me. But being,
nevertheless, individually unknown to me, and having no open,
authentic contract with me, my oath is, on general principles of law
and reason, of no validity as a pledge of faith to them. And being no
pledge of faith to them, it is no pledge of faith to anybody. It is
mere idle wind. At most, it is only a pledge of faith to an unknown
band of robbers and murderers, whose instrument for plundering and
murdering other people, I thus publicly confess myself to be. And it
has no other obligation than a similar oath given to any other unknown
body of pirates, robbers, and murderers.
For these reasons the oaths taken by members of Congress, "to
support the Constitution," are, on general principles of law and
reason, of no validity. They are not only criminal in themselves,
and therefore void; but they are also void for the further reason
_that they are given to nobody_.
It cannot be said that, in any legitimate or legal sense, they are
given to "the people of the United States"; because neither the whole,
nor any large proportion of the whole, people of the United States
ever, either openly or secretly, appointed or designated these men as
their agents to carry the Constitution into effect. The great body of
the people--that is, men, women and children--were never asked, or
even permitted, to signify, in any _formal_ manner, either openly or
secretly, their choice or wish on the subject. The most that these
members of Congress can say, in favor of their appointment, is
simply this: Each one can say for himself:
I have evidence satisfactory to myself, that there exists, scattered
throughout the country, a band of men, having a tacit understanding
with each other, and calling themselves "the people of the United
States," whose general purposes are to control and plunder each other,
and all other persons in the country, and, so far as they can, even in
neighboring countries; and to kill every man who shall attempt to
defend his person and property against their schemes of plunder and
dominion. Who these men are, _individually_ I have no certain means
of knowing, for they sign no papers, and give no open, authentic
evidence of their individual membership. They are not known
individually even to each other. They are apparently as much afraid
of being individually known to each other, as of being known to other
persons. Hence they ordinarily have no mode either of exercising, or
of making known, their individual membership, otherwise than by giving
their votes secretly for certain agents to do their will. But
although these men are individually unknown, both to each other and to
other persons, it is generally understood in the country that none but
male persons, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, can be
members. It is also generally understood that _all_ male persons,
born in the country, having certain complexions, and (in some
localities) certain amounts of property, and (in certain cases) even
persons of foreign birth, are _permitted_ to be members. But it
appears that usually not more than one half, two-thirds, or, in some
cases, three-fourths, of all who are thus permitted to become members
of the band, ever exercise, or consequently prove, their actual
membership, in the only mode in which they ordinarily can exercise or
prove it, viz., by giving their votes secretly for the officers or
agents of the band. The number of these secret votes, so far as we
have any account of them, varies greatly from year to year, thus
tending to prove that the band, instead of being a permanent
organization, is a merely _pro tempore_ affair with those who choose
to act with it for the time being. The gross number of these secret
votes, or what purports to be their gross number, in different
localities, is occasionally published. Whether these reports are
accurate or not, we have no means of knowing. It is generally
supposed that great frauds are often committed in depositing them.
They are understood to be received and counted by certain men, who are
themselves appointed for that purpose by the same secret process by
which all other officers and agents of the band are selected.
According to the reports of these receivers of votes (for whose
accuracy or honesty, however, I cannot vouch), and according to my
best knowledge of the whole number of male persons "in my district,"
who (it is supposed) were permitted to vote, it would appear that
one-half, two-thirds or three-fourths actually did vote. Who the men
were, individually, who cast these votes, I have no knowledge, for the
whole thing was done secretly. But of the secret votes thus given for
what they call a "member of Congress," the receivers reported that I
had a majority, or at least a larger number than any other one person.
And it is only by virtue of such a designation that I am now here to
act in concert with other persons similarly selected in other parts of
the country. It is understood among those who sent me here, that all
the persons so selected, will, on coming together at the City of
Washington, take an oath in each other's presence "to support the
Constitution of the United States." By this is meant a certain paper
that was drawn up eighty years ago. It was never signed by anybody,
and apparently has no obligation, and never had any obligation, as a
contract. In fact, few persons ever read it, and doubtless much the
largest number of those who voted for me and the others, never even
saw it, or now pretend to know what it means. Nevertheless, it is
often spoken of in the country as "the Constitution of the United
States"; and for some reason or another, the men who sent me here,
seem to expect that I, and all with whom I act, will swear to carry
this Constitution into effect. I am therefore ready to take this
oath, and to co-operate with all others, similarly selected, who are
ready to take the same oath
This is the most that any member of Congress can say in proof that he
has any constituency; that he represents anybody; that his oath "to
support the Constitution," _is given to anybody_, or pledges his faith
to _anybody_. He has no open, written, or other authentic evidence,
such as is required in all other cases, that he was ever appointed the
agent or representative of anybody. He has no written power of
attorney from any single individual. He has no such legal knowledge
as is required in all other cases, by which he can identify a single
one of those who pretend to have appointed him to represent them.
Of course his oath, professedly given to them, "to support the
Constitution," is, on general principles of law and reason, an oath
given to nobody. It pledges his faith to nobody. If he fails to
fulfill his oath, not a single person can come forward, and say to him,
you have betrayed me, or broken faith with me.
No one can come forward and say to him: I appointed you my attorney to
act for me. I required you to swear that, as my attorney, you would
support the Constitution. You promised me that you would do so; and
now you have forfeited the oath you gave to me. No single individual
can say this.
No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can come
forward and say to him: We appointed you our attorney, to act for us.
We required you to swear that, as our attorney, you would support the
Constitution. You promised us that you would do so; and now you have
forfeited the oath you gave to us.
No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can say
this to him; because there is no such association or body of men in
existence. If any one should assert that there is such an
association, let him prove, if he can, who compose it. Let him
produce, if he can, any open, written, or other authentic contract,
signed or agreed to by these men; forming themselves into an
association; making themselves known as such to the world; appointing
him as their agent; and making themselves individually, or as an
association, responsible for his acts, done by their authority. Until
all this can be shown, no one can say that, in any legitimate sense,
there is any such association; or that he is their agent; or that he
ever gave his oath to them; or ever pledged his faith to them.
On general principles of law and reason, it would be a sufficient
answer for him to say, to all individuals, and all pretended
associations of individuals, who should accuse him of a breach of
faith to them:
I never knew you. Where is your evidence that you, either
individually or collectively, ever appointed me your attorney? that
you ever required me to swear to you, that, as your attorney, I would
support the Constitution? or that I have now broken any faith I ever
pledged to you? You may, or you may not, be members of that secret
band of robbers and murderers, who act in secret; appoint their agents
by a secret ballot; who keep themselves individually unknown even to
the agents they thus appoint; and who, therefore, cannot claim that
they have any agents; or that any of their pretended agents ever gave
his oath, or pledged his faith, to them. I repudiate you altogether.
My oath was given to others, with whom you have nothing to do; or it
was idle wind, given only to the idle winds. Begone!
XII.
For the same reasons, the oaths of all the other pretended agents of
this secret band of robbers and murderers are, on general principles
of law and reason, equally destitute of obligation. They are given to
nobody; but only to the winds.
The oaths of the tax-gatherers and treasurers of the band, are, on
general principles of law and reason, of no validity. If any tax
gatherer, for example, should put the money he receives into his own
pocket, and refuse to part with it, the members of this band could not
say to him: You collected that money as our agent, and for our uses;
and you swore to pay it over to us, or to those we should appoint to
receive it. You have betrayed us, and broken faith with us.
It would be a sufficient answer for him to say to them:
I never knew you. You never made yourselves individually known to me.
I never gave my oath to you, as individuals. You may, or you may not,
be members of that secret band, who appoint agents to rob and murder
other people; but who are cautious not to make themselves individually
known, either to such agents, or to those whom their agents are
commissioned to rob. If you are members of that band, you have given
me no proof that you ever commissioned me to rob others for your
benefit. I never knew you, as individuals, and of course never
promised you that I would pay over to you the proceeds of my
robberies. I committed my robberies on my own account, and for my own
profit. If you thought I was fool enough to allow you to keep
yourselves concealed, and use me as your tool for robbing other
persons; or that I would take all the personal risk of the robberies,
and pay over the proceeds to you, you were particularly simple. As I
took all the risk of my robberies, I propose to take all the profits.
Begone! You are fools, as well as villains. If I gave my oath to
anybody, I gave it to other persons than you. But I really gave it to
nobody. I only gave it to the winds. It answered my purposes at the
time. It enabled me to get the money I was after, and now I propose
to keep it. If you expected me to pay it over to you, you relied only
upon that honor that is said to prevail among thieves. You now
understand that that is a very poor reliance. I trust you may become
wise enough to never rely upon it again. If I have any duty in the
matter, it is to give back the money to those from whom I took it; not
to pay it over to such villains as you.
XIII.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths which foreigners
take, on coming here, and being "naturalized" (as it is called), are
of no validity. They are necessarily given to nobody; because there
is no open, authentic association, to which they can join themselves;
or to whom, as individuals, they can pledge their faith. No such
association, or organization, as "the people of the United States,"
having ever been formed by any open, written, authentic, or voluntary
contract, there is, on general principles of law and reason, no such
association, or organization, in existence. And all oaths that
purport to be given to such an association are necessarily given only
to the winds. They cannot be said to be given to any man, or body of
men, as individuals, because no man, or body of men, can come forward
_with any proof_ that the oaths were given to them, as individuals, or
to any association of which they are members. To say that there is a
tacit understanding among a portion of the male adults of the country,
that they will call themselves "the people of the United States," and
that they will act in concert in subjecting the remainder of the
people of the United States to their dominion; but that they will keep
themselves personally concealed by doing all their acts secretly, is
wholly insufficient, on general principles of law and reason, to prove
the existence of any such association, or organization, as "the people
of the United States"; or consequently to prove that the oaths of
foreigners were given to any such association.
XIV.
On general principles of law and reason, all the oaths which since the
war, have been given by Southern men, that they will obey the laws of
Congress, support the Union, and the like, are of no validity. Such
oaths are invalid, not only because they were extorted by military
power, and threats of confiscation, and because they are in
contravention of men's natural right to do as they please about
supporting the government, _but also because they were given to
nobody_. They were nominally given to "the United States." But being
nominally given to "the United States," they were necessarily given to
nobody, because, on general principles of law and reason, there were
no "United States," to whom the oaths could be given. That is to say,
there was no open, authentic, avowed, legitimate association,
corporation, or body of men, known as "the United States," or as "the
people of the United States," to whom the oaths could have been given.
If anybody says there was such a corporation, let him state who were
the individuals that composed it, and how and when they became a
corporation. Were Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C members of it? If so,
where are their signatures? Where the evidence of their membership?
Where the record? Where the open, authentic proof? There is none.
Therefore, in law and reason, there was no such corporation.
On general principles of law and reason, every corporation,
association, or organized body of men, having a legitimate corporate
existence, and legitimate corporate rights, must consist of certain
known individuals, who can prove, by legitimate and reasonable
evidence, their membership. But nothing of this kind can be proved in
regard to the corporation, or body of men, who call themselves "the
United States." Not a man of them, in all the Northern States, can
prove by any legitimate evidence, such as is required to prove
membership in other legal corporations, that he himself, or any other
man whom he can name, is a member of any corporation or association
called "the United States," or "the people of the United States," or,
consequently, that there is any such corporation. And since no such
corporation can be proved to exist, it cannot of course be proved that
the oaths of Southern men were given to any such corporation. The
most that can be claimed is that the oaths were given to a secret band
of robbers and murderers, who called themselves "the United States,"
and extorted those oaths. But that certainly is not enough to prove
that the oaths are of any obligation.
XV.
On general principles of law and reason, the oaths of soldiers, that
they will serve a given number of years, that they will obey the
orders of their superior officers, that they will bear true allegiance
to the government, and so forth, are of no obligation. Independently
of the criminality of an oath, that, for a given number of years, he
will kill all whom he may be commanded to kill, without exercising his
own judgment or conscience as to the justice or necessity of such
killing, there is this further reason why a soldier's oath is of no
obligation, viz., that, like all the other oaths that have now been
mentioned, _it is given to nobody_. There being, in no legitimate
sense, any such corporation, or nation, as "the United States," nor,
consequently, in any legitimate sense, any such government as "the
government of the United States," a soldier's oath given to, or
contract made with, such nation or government, is necessarily an oath
given to, or a contract made with, nobody. Consequently such oath or
contract can be of no obligation.
XVI.
On general principles of law and reason, the treaties, so called,
which purport to be entered into with other nations, by persons
calling themselves ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators
of the United States, in the name, and in behalf, of "the people of
the United States," are of no validity. These so-called ambassadors,
secretaries, presidents, and senators, who claim to be the agents of
"the people of the United States," for making these treaties, can show
no open, written, or other authentic evidence that either the whole
"people of the United States," or any other open avowed, responsible
body of men, calling themselves by that name ever authorized these
pretended ambassadors and others to make treaties in the name of, or
binding upon any one of, "the people of the United States," or any
other open, avowed, responsible body of men, calling themselves by
that name, ever authorized these pretended ambassadors, secretaries,
and others, in their name and behalf, to recognize certain other
persons, calling themselves emperors, kings, queens, and the like, as
the rightful rulers, sovereigns, masters, or representatives of the
different peoples whom they assume to govern, to represent, and to
bind.
The "nations," as they are called, with whom our pretended
ambassadors, secretaries, presidents, and senators profess to make
treaties, are as much myths as our own. On general principles of law
and reason, there are no such "nations." That is to say. neither the
whole people of England, for example, nor any open, avowed,
responsible body of men, calling themselves by that name, ever, by any
open, written, or other authentic contract with each other, formed
themselves into any bona fide, legitimate association or organization,
or authorized any king, queen, or other representative to make
treaties in their name, or to bind them, either individually, or as an
association, by such treaties.
Our pretended treaties, then, being made with no legitimate or bona
fide nations, or representatives of nations, and being made, on our
part, by persons who have no legitimate authority to act for us, have
intrinsically no more validity than a pretended treaty made by the Man
in the Moon with the king of the Pleiades.
XVII.
On general principles of law and reason, debts contracted in the name
of "the United States," or of "the people of the United States," are
of no validity. It is utterly absurd to pretend that debts to the
amount of twenty-five hundred millions of dollars are binding upon
thirty-five or forty millions of people, when there is not a particle
of legitimate evidence--such as would be required to prove a private
debt--that can be produced against any one of them, that either he, or
his properly authorized attorney, ever contracted to pay one cent.
Certainly, neither the whole people of the United States, nor any
number of them, ever separately or individually contracted to pay a
cent of these debts.
Certainly, also, neither the whole people of the United States, nor
any number of them, ever, by any open, written, or other authentic and
voluntary contract, united themselves as a firm, corporation, or
association, by the name of "the United States," or "the people of the
United States," and authorized their agents to contract debts in their
name.
Certainly, too, there is in existence no such firm, corporation, or
association as "the United States," or "the people of the United
States," formed by any open, written, or other authentic and voluntary
contract, and having corporate property with which to pay these debts.
How, then, is it possible, on any general principle of law or reason,
that debts that are binding upon nobody individually, can be binding
upon forty millions of people collectively, when, on general and
legitimate principles of law and reason, these forty millions of
people neither have, nor ever had, any corporate property? never made
any corporate or individual contract? and neither have, nor ever had,
any corporate existence?
Who, then, created these debts, in the name of "the United States"?
Why, at most, only a few persons, calling themselves "members of
Congress," etc., who pretended to represent "the people of the United
States," but who really represented only a secret band of robbers and
murderers, who wanted money to carry on the robberies and murders in
which they were then engaged; and who intended to extort from the
future people of the United States, by robbery and threats of murder
(and real murder, if that should prove necessary), the means to pay
these debts.
This band of robbers and murderers, who were the real principals in
contracting these debts, is a secret one, because its members have
never entered into any open, written, avowed, or authentic contract,
by which they may be individually known to the world or even to each
other. Their real or pretended representatives, who contracted these
debts in their name, were selected (if selected at all) for that
purpose secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to furnish evidence
against none of the principals _individually_; and these principals
were really known _individually_ neither to their pretended
representatives who contracted these debts in their behalf nor to
those who lent the money. The money, therefore, was all borrowed and
lent in the dark; that is, by men who did not see each other's faces,
or know each other's names; who could not then, and cannot now,
identify each other as principals in the transactions; and who
consequently can prove no contract with each other.
Furthermore, the money was all lent and borrowed for criminal
purposes; that is, for purposes of robbery and murder; and for this
reason the contracts were all intrinsically void; and would have been
so, even though the real parties, borrowers and lenders, had come face
to face, and made their contracts openly, in their own proper names.
Furthermore, this secret band of robbers and murderers, who were the
real borrowers of this money, having no legitimate corporate
existence, have no corporate property with which to pay these debts.
They do indeed pretend to own large tracts of wild lands, lying
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and between the Gulf of
Mexico and the North Pole. But, on general principles of law and
reason, they might as well pretend to own the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans themselves; or the atmosphere and the sunlight; and to hold
them, and dispose of them, for the payment of these debts.
Having no corporate property with which to pay what purports to be
their corporate debts, this secret band of robbers and murderers are
really bankrupt. They have nothing to pay with. In fact, they do not
propose to pay their debts otherwise than from the proceeds of their
future robberies and murders. These are confessedly their sole
reliance; and were known to be such by the lenders of the money, at
the time the money was lent. And it was, therefore, virtually a part
of the contract, that the money should be repaid only from the
proceeds of these future robberies and murders. For this reason, if
for no other, the contracts were void from the beginning.
In fact, these apparently two classes, borrowers and lenders, were
really one and the same class. They borrowed and lent money from and
to themselves. They themselves were not only part and parcel, but the
very life and soul, of this secret band of robbers and murderers, who
borrowed and spent the money. Individually they furnished money for a
common enterprise; taking, in return, what purported to be corporate
promises for individual loans. The only excuse they had for taking
these so-called corporate promises of, for individual loans by, the
same parties, was that they might have some apparent excuse for the
future robberies of the band (that is, to pay the debts of the
corporation), and that they might also know what shares they were to
be respectively entitled to out of the proceeds of their future
robberies.
Finally, if these debts had been created for the most innocent and
honest purposes, and in the most open and honest manner, by the real
parties to the contracts, these parties could thereby have bound
nobody but themselves, and no property but their own. They could have
bound nobody that should have come after them, and no property
subsequently created by, or belonging to, other persons.
XVIII.
The Constitution having never been signed by anybody; and there being
no other open, written, or authentic contract between any parties
whatever, by virtue of which the United States government, so called,
is maintained; and it being well known that none but male persons, of
twenty-one years of age and upwards, are allowed any voice in the
government; and it being also well known that a large number of these
adult persons seldom or never vote at all; and that all those who do
vote, do so secretly (by secret ballot), and in a way to prevent their
individual votes being known either to the world, or even to each
other; and consequently in a way to make no one openly responsible for
the acts of their agents or representatives,--all these things being
known, the questions arise: _Who_ compose the real governing power in
the country? Who are the men, _the responsible men_, who rob us of
our property? Restrain us of our liberty? Subject us to their
arbitrary dominion? And devastate our homes, and shoot us down by the
hundreds of thousands, if we resist? How shall we find these men?
How shall we know them from others? How shall we defend ourselves and
our property against them? Who, of our neighbors, are members of this
secret band of robbers and murderers? How can we know which are
_their_ houses, that we may burn or demolish them? Which _their_
property, that we may destroy it? Which their persons, that we may
kill them, and rid the world and ourselves of such tyrants and
monsters?
These are questions that must be answered before men can be free;
before they can protect themselves against this secret band of robbers
and murderers, who now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.
The answer to these questions is, that only those who have the will
and the power to shoot down their fellow men, are the real rulers in
this, as in all other (so-called) civilized countries; for by no
others will civilized men be robbed, or enslaved.
Among savages, mere physical strength, on the part of one man may
enable him to rob, enslave, or kill another man. Among barbarians,
mere physical strength, on the part of a body of men, disciplined, and
acting in concert, though with very little money or other wealth, may,
under some circumstances, enable them to rob, enslave, or kill another
body of men, as numerous, or perhaps even more numerous, than
themselves. And among both savages and barbarians, mere want may
sometimes compel one man to sell himself as a slave to another. But
with (so-called) civilized peoples, among whom knowledge, wealth, and
the means of acting in concert, have become diffused; and who have
invented such weapons and other means of defense as to render mere
physical strength of less importance; and by whom soldiers in any
requisite number, and other instrumentalities of war in any requisite
amount, can always be had for money, the question of war, and
consequently the question of power, is little else than a mere
question of money. As a necessary consequence, those who stand ready
to furnish this money, are the real rulers. It is so in Europe, and
it is so in this country.
In Europe, the nominal rulers, the emperors and kings and parliaments,
are anything but the real rulers of their respective countries. They
are little or nothing else than mere tools, employed by the wealthy to
rob, enslave, and (if need be) murder those who have less wealth, or
none at all.
The Rothschilds, and that class of money-lenders of whom they are the
representatives and agents--men who never think of lending a shilling
to their next-door neighbors, for purposes of honest industry, unless
upon the most ample security, and at the highest rate of
interest--stand ready, at all times, to lend money in unlimited
amounts to those robbers and murderers, who call themselves
governments, to be expended in shooting down those who do not submit
quietly to being robbed and enslaved.
They lend their money in this manner, knowing that it is to be
expended in murdering their fellow men, for simply seeking their
liberty and their rights; knowing also that neither the interest nor
the principal will ever be paid, except as it will be extorted under
terror of the repetition of such murders as those for which the money
lent is to be expended.
These money-lenders, the Rothschilds, for example, say to themselves:
If we lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of
England, it will enable them to murder twenty, fifty or a hundred
thousand people in England, Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired
by such wholesale murder, will enable them to keep the whole people of
those countries in subjection for twenty, or perhaps fifty, years to
come; to control all their trade and industry; and to extort from them
large amounts of money, under the name of taxes; and from the wealth
thus extorted from them, they (the queen and parliament) can afford to
pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we can get in any
other way. Or, if we lend this sum to the emperor of Austria, it will
enable him to murder so many of his people as to strike terror into
the rest, and thus enable him to keep them in subjection, and extort
money from them, for twenty or fifty years to come. And they say the
same in regard to the emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, the
emperor of France, or any other ruler, so called, who, in their
judgment, will be able, by murdering a reasonable portion of his
people, to keep the rest in subjection, and extort money from them,
for a long time to come, to pay the interest and principal of the
money lent him.
And why are these men so ready to lend money for murdering their
fellow men? Solely for this reason, viz., that such loans are
considered better investments than loans for purposes of honest
industry. They pay higher rates of interest; and it is less trouble
to look after them. This is the whole matter.
The question of making these loans is, with these lenders, a mere
question of pecuniary profit. They lend money to be expended in
robbing, enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, solely because, on
the whole, such loans pay better than any others. They are no
respecters of persons, no superstitious fools, that reverence
monarchs. They care no more for a king, or an emperor, than they do
for a beggar, except as he is a better customer, and can pay them
better interest for their money. If they doubt his ability to make
his murders successful for maintaining his power, and thus extorting
money from his people in future, they dismiss him as unceremoniously
as they would dismiss any other hopeless bankrupt, who should want to
borrow money to save himself from open insolvency.
When these great lenders of blood-money, like the Rothschilds, have
loaned vast sums in this way, for purposes of murder, to an emperor or
a king, they sell out the bonds taken by them, in small amounts, to
anybody, and everybody, who are disposed to buy them at satisfactory
prices, to hold as investments. They (the Rothschilds) thus soon get
back their money, with great profits; and are now ready to lend money
in the same way again to any other robber and murderer, called an
emperor or a king, who, they think, is likely to be successful in his
robberies and murders, and able to pay a good price for the money
necessary to carry them on.
This business of lending blood-money is one of the most thoroughly
sordid, cold-blooded, and criminal that was ever carried on, to any
considerable extent, amongst human beings. It is like lending money
to slave traders, or to common robbers and pirates, to be repaid out
of their plunder. And the men who loan money to governments, so
called, for the purpose of enabling the latter to rob, enslave, and
murder their people, are among the greatest villains that the world
has ever seen. And they as much deserve to be hunted and killed (if
they cannot otherwise be got rid of) as any slave traders, robbers, or
pirates that ever lived.
When these emperors and kings, so-called, have obtained their loans,
they proceed to hire and train immense numbers of professional
murderers, called soldiers, and employ them in shooting down all who
resist their demands for money. In fact, most of them keep large
bodies of these murderers constantly in their service, as their only
means of enforcing their extortions. There are now, I think, four or
five millions of these professional murderers constantly employed by
the so-called sovereigns of Europe. The enslaved people are, of
course, forced to support and pay all these murderers, as well as to
submit to all the other extortions which these murderers are employed
to enforce.
It is only in this way that most of the so-called governments of
Europe are maintained. These so-called governments are in reality
only great bands of robbers and murderers, organized, disciplined, and
constantly on the alert. And the so-called sovereigns, in these
different governments, are simply the heads, or chiefs, of different
bands of robbers and murderers. And these heads or chiefs are
dependent upon the lenders of blood-money for the means to carry on
their robberies and murders. They could not sustain themselves a
moment but for the loans made to them by these blood-money
loan-mongers. And their first care is to maintain their credit with
them; for they know their end is come, the instant their credit with
them fails. Consequently the first proceeds of their extortions are
scrupulously applied to the payment of the interest on their loans
In addition to paying the interest on their bonds, they perhaps grant
to the holders of them great monopolies in banking, like the Banks of
England, of France, and of Vienna; with the agreement that these banks
shall furnish money whenever, in sudden emergencies, it may be
necessary to shoot down more of their people. Perhaps also, by means
of tariffs on competing imports, they give great monopolies to certain
branches of industry, in which these lenders of blood-money are
engaged. They also, by unequal taxation, exempt wholly or partially
the property of these loan-mongers, and throw corresponding burdens
upon those who are too poor and weak to resist.
Thus it is evident that all these men, who call themselves by the
high-sounding names of Emperors, Kings, Sovereigns, Monarchs, Most
Christian Majesties, Most Catholic Majesties, High Mightinesses, Most
Serene and Potent Princes, and the like, and who claim to rule "by the
grace of God," by "Divine Right"--that is, by special authority from
Heaven--are intrinsically not only the merest miscreants and wretches,
engaged solely in plundering, enslaving, and murdering their fellow
men, but that they are also the merest hangers on, the servile,
obsequious, fawning dependents and tools of these blood-money
loan-mongers, on whom they rely for the means to carry on their
crimes. These loan-mongers, like the Rothschilds, laugh in their
sleeves, and say to themselves: These despicable creatures, who call
themselves emperors, and kings, and majesties, and most serene and
potent princes; who profess to wear crowns, and sit on thrones; who
deck themselves with ribbons, and feathers, and jewels; and surround
themselves with hired flatterers and lickspittles; and whom we suffer
to strut around, and palm themselves off, upon fools and slaves, as
sovereigns and lawgivers specially appointed by Almighty God; and to
hold themselves out as the sole fountains of honors, and dignities,
and wealth, and power--all these miscreants and impostors know that we
make them, and use them; that in us they live, move, and have their
being; that we require them (as the price of their positions) to take
upon themselves all the labor, all the danger, and all the odium of
all the crimes they commit for our profit; and that we will unmake
them, strip them of their gewgaws, and send them out into the world as
beggars, or give them over to the vengeance of the people they have
enslaved, the moment they refuse to commit any crime we require of
them, or to pay over to us such share of the proceeds of their
robberies as we see fit to demand.
XIX.
Now, what is true in Europe, is substantially true in this country.
The difference is the immaterial one, that, in this country, there is
no visible, permanent head, or chief, of these robbers and murderers,
who call themselves "the government." That is to say, there is no one
man, who calls himself the state, or even emperor, king, or sovereign;
no one who claims that he and his children rule "by the Grace of God,"
by "Divine Right," or by special appointment from Heaven. There are
only certain men, who call themselves presidents, senators, and
representatives, and claim to be the authorized agents, _for the time
being, or for certain short periods, of all_ "the people of the United
States"; but who can show no credentials, or powers of attorney, or
any other open, authentic evidence that they are so; and who
notoriously are not so; but are really only the agents of a secret
band of robbers and murderers, whom they themselves do not know, and
have no means of knowing, individually; but who, they trust, will
openly or secretly, when the crisis comes, sustain them in all their
usurpations and crimes.
What is important to be noticed is, that these so-called presidents,
senators, and representatives, these pretended agents of all "the
people of the United States," the moment their exactions meet with any
formidable resistance from any portion of "the people" themselves, are
obliged, like their co-robbers and murderers in Europe, to fly at once
to the lenders of blood money, for the means to sustain their power.
And they borrow their money on the same principle, and for the same
purpose, viz., to be expended in shooting down all those "people of
the United States"--their own constituents and principals, as they
profess to call them--who resist the robberies and enslavement which
these borrowers of the money are practising upon them. And they
expect to repay the loans, if at all, only from the proceeds of the
future robberies, which they anticipate it will be easy for them and
their successors to perpetrate through a long series of years, upon
their pretended principals, if they can but shoot down now some
hundreds of thousands of them, and thus strike terror into the rest.
Perhaps the facts were never made more evident, in any country on the
globe, than in our own, that these soulless blood-money loan-mongers
are the real rulers; that they rule from the most sordid and mercenary
motives; that the ostensible government, the presidents, senators, and
representatives, so called, are merely their tools; and that no ideas
of, or regard for, justice or liberty had anything to do in inducing
them to lend their money for the war. In proof of all this, look at
the following facts.
Nearly a hundred years ago we professed to have got rid of all that
religious superstition, inculcated by a servile and corrupt priesthood
in Europe, that rulers, so called, derived their authority directly
from Heaven; and that it was consequently a religious duty on the part
of the people to obey them. We professed long ago to have learned
that governments could rightfully exist only by the free will, and on
the voluntary support, of those who might choose to sustain them. We
all professed to have known long ago, that the only legitimate objects
of government were the maintenance of liberty and justice equally for
all. All this we had professed for nearly a hundred years. And we
professed to look with pity and contempt upon those ignorant,
superstitious, and enslaved peoples of Europe, who were so easily kept
in subjection by the frauds and force of priests and kings.
Notwithstanding all this, that we had learned, and known, and
professed, for nearly a century, these lenders of blood money had, for
a long series of years previous to the war, been the willing
accomplices of the slave-holders in perverting the government from the
purposes of liberty and justice, to the greatest of crimes. They had
been such accomplices _for a purely pecuniary consideration_, to wit,
a control of the markets in the South; in other words, the privilege
of holding the slave-holders themselves in industrial and commercial
subjection to the manufacturers and merchants of the North (who
afterwards furnished the money for the war). And these Northern
merchants and manufacturers, these lenders of blood-money, were
willing to continue to be the accomplices of the slave-holders in the
future, for the same pecuniary consideration. But the slave-holders,
either doubting the fidelity of their Northern allies, or feeling
themselves strong enough to keep their slaves in subjection without
Northern assistance, would no longer pay the price which these
Northern men demanded. And it was to enforce this price in the
future--that is, to monopolize the Southern markets, to maintain their
industrial and commercial control over the South--that these Northern
manufacturers and merchants lent some of the profits of their former
monopolies for the war, in order to secure to themselves the same, or
greater, monopolies in the future. These--and not any love of liberty
or justice--were the motives on which the money for the war was lent
by the North. In short, the North said to the slave-holders: If you
will not pay us our price (give us control of your markets) for our
assistance against your slaves, we will secure the same price (keep
control of your markets) by helping your slaves against you, and using
them as our tools for maintaining dominion over you; for the control
of your markets we will have, whether the tools we use for that
purpose be black or white, and be the cost, in blood and money, what
it may.
On this principle, and from this motive, and not from any love of
liberty, or justice, the money was lent in enormous amounts, and at
enormous rates of interest. And it was only by means of these loans
that the objects of the war were accomplished.
And now these lenders of blood-money demand their pay; and the
government, so called, becomes their tool, their servile, slavish,
villainous tool, to extort it from the labor of the enslaved people
both of the North and the South. It is to be extorted by every form
of direct, and indirect, and unequal taxation. Not only the nominal
debt and interest--enormous as the latter was--are to be paid in full;
but these holders of the debt are to be paid still further--and
perhaps doubly, triply, or quadruply paid--by such tariffs on imports
as will enable our home manufacturers to realize enormous prices for
their commodities; also by such monopolies in banking as will enable
them to keep control of, and thus enslave and plunder, the industry
and trade of the great body of the Northern people themselves. In
short, the industrial and commercial slavery of the great body of the
people, North and South, black and white, is the price which these
lenders of blood money demand, and insist upon, and are determined to
secure, in return for the money lent for the war.
This programme having been fully arranged and systematized, they put
their sword into the hands of the chief murderer of the war, and
charge him to carry their scheme into effect. And now he, speaking as
their organ, says: "_Let us have peace_."
The meaning of this is: Submit quietly to all the robbery and slavery
we have arranged for you, and you can have "peace." But in case you
resist, the same lenders of blood-money, who furnished the means to
subdue the South, will furnish the means again to subdue you.
These are the terms on which alone this government, or, with few
exceptions, any other, ever gives "peace" to its people.
The whole affair, on the part of those who furnished the money, has
been, and now is, a deliberate scheme of robbery and murder; not
merely to monopolize the markets of the South, but also to monopolize
the currency, and thus control the industry and trade, and thus
plunder and enslave the laborers, of both North and South. And
Congress and the president are today the merest tools for these
purposes. They are obliged to be, for they know that their own power,
as rulers, so-called, is at an end, the moment their credit with the
blood-money loan-mongers fails. They are like a bankrupt in the hands
of an extortioner. They dare not say nay to any demand made upon
them. And to hide at once, if possible, both their servility and
their crimes, they attempt to divert public attention, by crying out
that they have "Abolished Slavery!" That they have "Saved the
Country!" That they have "Preserved our Glorious Union!" and that, in
now paying the "National Debt," as they call it (as if the people
themselves, _all of them who are to be taxed for its payment_, had
really and voluntarily joined in contracting it), they are simply
"Maintaining the National Honor!"
By "maintaining the national honor," they mean simply that they
themselves, open robbers and murderers, assume to be the nation, and
will keep faith with those who lend them the money necessary to enable
them to crush the great body of the people under their feet; and will
faithfully appropriate, from the proceeds of their future robberies
and murders, enough to pay all their loans, principal and interest.
The pretense that the "abolition of slavery" was either a motive or
justification for the war, is a fraud of the same character with that
of "maintaining the national honor." Who, but such usurpers, robbers,
and murderers as they, ever established slavery? Or what government,
except one resting upon the sword, like the one we now have, was ever
capable of maintaining slavery? And why did these men abolish
slavery? Not from any love of liberty in general--not as an act of
justice to the black man himself, but only "as a war measure," and
because they wanted his assistance, and that of his friends, in
carrying on the war they had undertaken for maintaining and
intensifying that political, commercial, and industrial slavery, to
which they have subjected the great body of the people, both white and
black. And yet these impostors now cry out that they have abolished
the chattel slavery of the black man--although that was not the motive
of the war--as if they thought they could thereby conceal, atone for,
or justify that other slavery which they were fighting to perpetuate,
and to render more rigorous and inexorable than it ever was before.
There was no difference of principle--but only of degree--between the
slavery they boast they have abolished, and the slavery they were
fighting to preserve; for all restraints upon men's natural liberty,
not necessary for the simple maintenance of justice, are of the nature
of slavery, and differ from each other only in degree.
If their object had really been to abolish slavery, or maintain
liberty or justice generally, they had only to say: All, whether white
or black, who want the protection of this government, shall have it;
and all who do not want it, will be left in peace, so long as they
leave us in peace. Had they said this, slavery would necessarily have
been abolished at once; the war would have been saved; and a thousand
times nobler union than we have ever had would have been the result.
It would have been a voluntary union of free men; such a union as will
one day exist among all men, the world over, if the several nations,
so called, shall ever get rid of the usurpers, robbers, and murderers,
called governments, that now plunder, enslave, and destroy them.
Still another of the frauds of these men is, that they are now
establishing, and that the war was designed to establish, "a
government of consent." The only idea they have ever manifested as to
what is a government of consent, is this--that it is one to which
everybody must consent, or be shot. This idea was the dominant one on
which the war was carried on; and it is the dominant one, now that we
have got what is called "peace."
Their pretenses that they have "Saved the Country," and "Preserved our
Glorious Union," are frauds like all the rest of their pretenses. By
them they mean simply that they have subjugated, and maintained their
power over, an unwilling people. This they call "Saving the Country";
as if an enslaved and subjugated people--or as if any people kept in
subjection by the sword (as it is intended that all of us shall be
hereafter)--could be said to have any country. This, too, they call
"Preserving our Glorious Union"; as if there could be said to be any
Union, glorious or inglorious, that was not voluntary. Or as if there
could be said to be any union between masters and slaves; between
those who conquer, and those who are subjugated.
All these cries of having "abolished slavery," of having "saved the
country," of having "preserved the union," of establishing "a
government of consent," and of "maintaining the national honor," are
all gross, shameless, transparent cheats--so transparent that they
ought to deceive no one--when uttered as justifications for the war,
or for the government that has succeeded the war, or for now
compelling the people to pay the cost of the war, or for compelling
anybody to support a government that he does not want.
The lesson taught by all these facts is this: As long as mankind
continue to pay "national debts," so-called--that is, so long as they
are such dupes and cowards as to pay for being cheated, plundered,
enslaved, and murdered--so long there will be enough to lend the money
for those purposes; and with that money a plenty of tools, called
soldiers, can be hired to keep them in subjection. But when they
refuse any longer to pay for being thus cheated, plundered, enslaved,
and murdered, they will cease to have cheats, and usurpers, and
robbers, and murderers and blood-money loan-mongers for masters.
APPENDIX.
Inasmuch as the Constitution was never signed, nor agreed to, by
anybody, as a contract, and therefore never bound anybody, and is now
binding upon nobody; and is, moreover, such an one as no people can
ever hereafter be expected to consent to, except as they may be forced
to do so at the point of the bayonet, it is perhaps of no importance
what its true legal meaning, as a contract, is. Nevertheless, the
writer thinks it proper to say that, in his opinion, the Constitution
is no such instrument as it has generally been assumed to be; but that
by false interpretations, and naked usurpations, the government has
been made in practice a very widely, and almost wholly, different
thing from what the Constitution itself purports to authorize. He has
heretofore written much, and could write much more, to prove that such
is the truth. But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or
another, this much is certain--that it has either authorized such a
government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In
either case, it is unfit to exist.
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
/*
Encode an ISO 8859/1 Etext into LaTeX.
Rules for writing Etexts compatible with this formatting program
are included in the Etext with which this program is supplied.
Designed and implemented by John Walker in July of 1993.
Internet: kelvin@autodesk.com
or: kelvint@netcom.com
This program is in the public domain and may be used and modified
in any manner without restrictions.
Warning: this program and the corresponding specifications for
writing Etexts which are both human readable and suitable for
machine typesetting are in a state of rapid evolution and can be
expected to change as additional Etexts are prepared in this form.
Since future versions may or may not be compatible, Etexts which
use this program or programs derived from it should *include* the
source for the translator program to guarantee compatibility.
*/
/* Define NEWGU to use the fancy guillemets as defined by Johannes
Braams, "International quotations", TeX and TUG News, Vol. 2, No.
3, July 1993. Note that these guillemets require that the LaTeX
symbol fonts be installed; if they aren't, disable NEWGU and
uglier, but functional, guillemets derived from the math "<<" and
">>" symbols will be used. */
#define NEWGU 1 /* Use new fancy guillemets */
#define VERSION "1.1"
#define REVDATE "15.08.93"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#define EOS '\0'
#define FormatWidth 70 /* Format width of original text */
#define QuoteIndent 4 /* Indentation for block quotes */
#define SectionSep \
"<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>\n"
#define abs(x) (((x) < 0) ? (-(x)) : (x))
static int italics = 0, /* Currently in italics mode ? */
quoth = 0, /* Quote parity */
saith = 0, /* In block quotation ? */
inpara = 0, /* In paragraph ? */
inmath = 0, /* Currently in math mode ? */
author = 0, /* Looking for author ? */
firstchap = 0, /* Outputting first chapter break */
chapout = 0, /* Chapter title found */
textstate = 0; /* Text state: 0 = prologue,
1 = text,
2 = appendices. */
/* The following table is indexed by ISO codes 161 to 255, and gives
the LaTeX rendering of the ISO character. */
static char *texform[] = {
"!`", "\\makebox{\\rm\\rlap/c}", "\\pounds", "$\\otimes$",
"\\makebox{\\rm\\rlap Y{\\hspace*{0.07em}\\scriptsize =}}", "$|$",
"{\\S}", "\\\"{}", "{\\copyright}", "\\b{a}",
#ifdef NEWGU
"{\\og}",
#else
"{$\\ll$}",
#endif
"$\\neg$", "$-$",
"{\\ooalign{\\hfil\\raise.07ex\\hbox{\\sc r}\\hfil\\crcr\\mathhexbox20D}}",
"-", "$^{\\circ}$", "$\\pm$", "$^2$", "$^3$", "\\'{}", "$\\mu$",
"{\\P}", "$\\cdot$", "\\c{}", "$^1$", "\\b{o}",
#ifdef NEWGU
"{\\cg}",
#else
"{$\\gg$}",
#endif
"{\\small $1/4$}", "{\\small $1/2$}", "{\\small $3/4$}", "?`",
"\\`{A}", "\\'{A}", "\\^{A}", "\\~{A}", "\\\"{A}", "{\\AA}",
"{\\AE}", "\\c{C}", "\\`{E}", "\\'{E}", "\\^{E}", "\\\"{E}",
"\\`{I}", "\\'{I}", "\\^{I}", "\\\"{I}", "Eth", "\\~{N}",
"\\`{O}", "\\'{O}", "\\^{O}", "\\~{O}", "\\\"{O}", "$\\times$",
"{\\O}", "\\`{U}", "\\'{U}", "\\^{U}", "\\\"{U}", "\\'{Y}",
"Thorn", "{\\ss}", "\\`{a}", "\\'{a}", "\\^{a}", "\\~{a}",
"\\\"{a}", "{\\aa}", "{\\ae}", "\\c{c}", "\\`{e}", "\\'{e}",
"\\^{e}", "\\\"{e}", "\\`{\\i}", "\\'{\\i}", "\\^{\\i}",
"\\\"{\\i}", "eth", "\\~{n}", "\\`{o}", "\\'{o}", "\\^{o}",
"\\~{o}", "\\\"{o}", "$\\div$", "{\\o}", "\\`{u}", "\\'{u}",
"\\^{u}", "\\\"{u}", "\\'{y}", "thorn", "\\\"{y}"
};
/* TRIM -- Trim trailing white space and delete any carriage
return characters which might have crept into the
text. This allows us to process input in a variety
of end of line conventions (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS). */
static void trim(lp)
unsigned char *lp;
{
unsigned char *ap = lp;
while (*ap) {
if (*ap == '\r') {
unsigned char *ep = ap;
do {
*ep = ep[1];
ep++;
} while (*ep);
}
ap++;
}
/* Trim any trailing spaces. */
while (isspace(lp[strlen(lp) - 2])) {
lp[strlen(lp) - 2] = '\n';
lp[strlen(lp) - 1] = EOS;
}
}
/* PROTEXT -- Output text with character-level transformations. */
static void protext(lp, out)
unsigned char *lp;
FILE *out;
{
int c;
/* Now process the input file character by character and translate
each character, if required, emitting the results to the output
stream. */
while ((c = *lp++) != EOS) {
/* It's a control character. Emit as ^<letter> unless it is
considered as white space (for example, carriage return and
line feed), in which case it's sent directly to the output. */
if (c < ' ') {
if (isspace(c)) {
putc(c, out);
} else {
fputs("\\verb+^", out);
putc(c + '@', out);
putc('+', out);
}
/* ISO graphic character. */
} else if (c > 160) {
fputs(texform[c - 161], out);
/* Normal ASCII 7 bit graphic character. */
} if (c >= ' ' && c <= '~') {
/* Italic switch character */
if (!inmath && c == '_') {
italics = !italics;
if (italics) {
fputs("{\\it ", out);
} else {
fputs("}", out);
}
/* Math mode start and end sequences. */
} else if (c == '\\' && (*lp == '(' || *lp == ')')) {
fputc(c, out);
inmath = *lp == '(';
/* Start footnote */
} else if (!inmath && (c == '[' || (c == ' ' && *lp == '[') ||
(c == ' ' && *lp == ' ' && lp[1] == '['))) {
fputs("\\footnote{", out);
if (c == ' ') {
if (*lp == ' ') {
lp++;
}
lp++;
}
/* End footnote */
} else if (!inmath && c == ']') {
fputs("}", out);
/* Dash */
} else if (c == '-' && *lp == '-') {
/* Turn "--" into "---" for M-dash. */
fputs("---", out);
lp += 1;
/* Ellipsis */
} else if (c == '.' && *lp == '.' && lp[1] == '.') {
fputs("\\ldots", out);
if (lp[2] == ' ') {
fputs(" ", out);
} else {
fputs("\\ ", out);
}
lp += 2;
/* ASCII characters requiring verbatim handling */
} else if (c == '~') {
fputs("\\verb+", out);
fputc(c, out);
fputc('+', out);
} else if (!inmath && c == '^') {
fputs("\\verb+", out);
fputc(c, out);
fputc('+', out);
/* ASCII characters requiring math-mode quoting. */
} else if (!inmath && strchr("|<>", c) != NULL) {
fputc('$', out);
fputc(c, out);
fputc('$', out);
/* Try to convert dumb ASCII quotes to open and close quotes. */
} else if (!inmath && c == '"') {
fputs(quoth ? "''" : "``", out);
quoth = !quoth;
/* Normal character */
} else {
/* Characters requiring protection against interpretation
as control sequences. */
if (strchr("$&%#", c) != NULL) {
putc('\\', out);
}
if (!inmath && strchr("{}", c) != NULL) {
putc('\\', out);
}
putc(c, out);
}
}
/* Note that other characters, specifically those in the
range from 127 through 160, get dropped. */
}
}
/* ENDQUOTE -- Terminate a block quotation when a non-conforming
line is encountered. */
static void endquote(out)
FILE *out;
{
if (saith) {
fputs("\n\\end{quote}\n", out);
saith = 0;
}
}
/* Main program */
int main(argc, argv)
int argc; char *argv[];
{
int i, f = 0, peeked = 0, titling = 1;
char *cp, opt;
FILE *in = stdin, *out = stdout;
unsigned char line[256], peek[256];
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
cp = argv[i];
if (*cp == '-') {
opt = *(++cp);
if (islower(opt))
opt = toupper(opt);
switch (opt) {
case '?':
case 'U':
fprintf(stderr,"\nETLATEX -- Etext ISO 8859 Latin-1 to LaTeX. Call");
fprintf(stderr,
"\n with etlatex [input [output]]");
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#ifdef NEEDED
fprintf(stderr,"\n Options:");
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
return 0;
}
} else {
switch (f) {
case 0:
if ((in = fopen(cp, "r")) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open input file %s\n", cp);
return 2;
}
f++;
break;
case 1:
if ((out = fopen(cp, "w")) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open output file %s\n", cp);
return 2;
}
f++;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Too many file names specified.\n");
}
}
}
/* Output document header. */
fprintf(out, "%%\n%% ETLATEX version %s -- %s.\n%%\n",
VERSION, REVDATE);
fputs("\\documentstyle{book}\n", out);
#ifdef NEWGU
/* Output prologue definitions for new guillemets. */
fputs("\\chardef\\lg='050\n", out);
fputs("\\chardef\\rg='051\n", out);
fputs("\\ifx\\undefined\\selectfont\\else\n", out);
fputs("\\def\\ly{\\fontfamily{lasy}\\fontseries{m}\n", out);
fputs("\\fontshape{n}\\selectfont}\\fi\n", out);
fputs("\\def\\og{\\protect\\zzzog}\n", out);
fputs("\\def\\zzzog{\\makebox{\\ly\\lg\\kern-0.2em\\lg\\kern+0.2em}}\n", out);
fputs("\\def\\cg{\\protect\\zzzcg}\n", out);
fputs("\\def\\zzzcg{\\makebox{\\ly\\kern+0.2em\\rg\\kern-0.2em\\rg}}\n", out);
#endif
fputs("\\date{}\n\\title{\n", out);
/* Line level file processing. */
for (;;) {
unsigned char *lp = line;
char *eline = NULL;
if (peeked) {
memcpy(line, peek, sizeof line);
peeked = 0;
} else {
if (fgets((char *) line, (sizeof line) - 1, in) == NULL) {
break;
}
trim(line);
}
/* Reset quote parity on paragraph breaks. */
if (line[0] == '\n') {
quoth = inpara = 0;
}
/* Check for section separator. */
if (strcmp(line, SectionSep) == 0) {
textstate++;
if (textstate == 1) {
continue; /* Ditch section separator */
} else if (textstate > 1) {
break;
}
}
if (textstate < 1) {
continue; /* Ignore prologue text */
}
/* Test for source page turn markers. */
if (line[0] == '-' && isdigit(line[1]) &&
line[strlen(line) - 2] == '-') {
if (fgets((char *) line, (sizeof line) - 1, in) == NULL) {
break;
}
/* Discard blank line, if any, after page turn marker. */
trim(line);
if (line[0] == '\n') {
continue;
}
}
/* Check for title separator. */
if (titling) {
int cheddar = 1, chonk = 0;
unsigned char *pp = lp;
/* Check for title separator */
while (*pp != EOS) {
if (!(isspace(*pp) || (*pp == '='))) {
cheddar = 0;
break;
}
if (*pp++ == '=') {
chonk++;
}
}
if (cheddar && chonk > 2) {
titling = 0;
author = 1;
fputs("}\n\\author{\n", out);
continue;
}
}
/* Heuristic justification for lines which begin with
white space. */
if (line[0] == ' ') {
int n = strlen(line) - 2, w;
unsigned char *ap = line + 1;
while (isspace(*ap)) {
ap++;
n--;
}
line[strlen(line) - 1] = EOS;
if (abs((w = ((FormatWidth - n) / 2) - (ap - lp))) < 3) {
/* It's centered: check for chapter separators. */
if (fgets((char *) peek, (sizeof peek) - 1, in) != NULL) {
unsigned char *pp = peek;
int cheddar = 1, chonk = 0;
peeked = 1;
trim(peek);
while (*pp != EOS) {
if (!(isspace(*pp) || (*pp == '-'))) {
cheddar = 0;
break;
}
if (*pp++ == '-') {
chonk++;
}
}
if (cheddar && chonk > 2) {
chapout = 0;
peeked = 0;
if (author) {
author = 0;
fputs("}\n\\begin{document}\n\\maketitle\n", out);
}
while (fgets((char *) peek, (sizeof peek) - 1, in) != NULL) {
trim(peek);
pp = peek;
peek[strlen(peek) - 1] = EOS;
while (*pp && isspace(*pp)) {
pp++;
}
if (*pp == EOS) {
break;
}
if (!chapout) {
if (!firstchap) {
fputs("\\tableofcontents\n", out);
}
fputs("\\chapter{\n", out);
firstchap = 1;
chapout = 1;
}
protext(pp, out);
fputc('\n', out);
}
if (firstchap && !chapout) {
/* Untitled chapter after one or more titled ones */
fputs("\\chapter{", out);
chapout = 1;
}
if (chapout) {
fputs("}\n", out);
}
continue;
}
}
if (!titling && !author) {
endquote(out);
fputs("\n{\\centering ", out);
eline = "\\\\}\n";
}
} else {
int n;
/* Check for a block quote. */
for (n = 1; n < QuoteIndent; n++) {
if (line[n] != ' ') {
n = -1;
break;
}
}
if (n > 1 && !isspace(line[QuoteIndent])) {
if (!saith) {
fputs("\\begin{quote}\n", out);
saith = 1;
}
/* Ragged left or ragged right: determine which and
output appropriate command. */
} else if (!titling && !author) {
endquote(out);
fputs(w < 0 ? "{\\raggedleft" : "{\\raggedright", out);
eline = "\\\\ }\n\n";
}
}
lp = ap - 1;
} else {
endquote(out);
}
if (titling || author) {
unsigned char *ap = line;
int nonbs = 0;
while (*ap != EOS) {
if (!isspace(*ap)) {
nonbs = 1;
break;
}
ap++;
}
if (!nonbs) {
continue;
}
}
protext(lp, out);
if (titling || author) {
fputs("\\\\\n", out);
}
if (eline) {
fputs(eline, out);
}
}
/* Output document trailer. */
fputs("\\end{document}\n", out);
return 0;
}