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- Date: Mon, 10 Feb 86 11:06:44 MST
- >From: thomas%utah-gr@UTAH-CS.ARPA (Spencer W. Thomas)
- Organization: University of Utah, Salt Lake City
-
- In article <4141@ut-sally.UUCP> pegasus!hansen (Tony Hansen) writes:
- >One slight difference is that Vr2 non-root setuid(2) sets the effective uid
- >and not the real uid. Only a root setuid(2) will change the real uid as
- >well; which can't then be changed back.
-
- This seems to me to be a potential security problem. It means that you
- cannot write a program to give a certain set of people access to a
- particular uid (ala su) without making it setuid root. It would be much
- safer, it seems to me, to make it setuid to the uid you want to give
- access to, and let it do setuid(geteuid()). This is necessary if, for
- example, the program wants to fork a real setuid program with the new
- uid. We have a number of programs that do this. Yet another reason to
- not use SV.
-
- [ Please, let's not start up the System V vs. 4BSD argument here. -mod ]
-
- --
- =Spencer ({ihnp4,decvax}!utah-cs!thomas, thomas@utah-cs.ARPA)
-
- Volume-Number: Volume 5, Number 46
-
-