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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-7675
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R. A. V., PETITIONER v. CITY OF
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
minnesota
[June 22, 1992]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner and
several other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely-made
cross by taping together broken chair legs.  They then
allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black
family that lived across the street from the house where
petitioner was staying.  Although this conduct could have
been punished under any of a number of laws, one of the
two provisions under which respondent city of St. Paul
chose to charge petitioner (then a juvenile) was the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn. Legis.
Code 292.02 (1990), which provides:
      -Whoever places on public or private property a
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.-
Petitioner moved to dismiss this count on the ground that
the St. Paul ordinance was substantially overbroad and
impermissibly content-based and therefore facially invalid
under the First Amendment.  The trial court granted this
motion, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.  That
court rejected petitioner's overbreadth claim because, as
construed in prior Minnesota cases, see, e.g., In re Welfare
of S. L. J., 263 N. W. 2d 412 (Minn. 1978), the modifying
phrase -arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others-
limited the reach of the ordinance to conduct that amounts
to -fighting words,- i.e., -conduct that itself inflicts injury
or tends to incite immediate violence . . .,- In re Welfare of
R. A. V., 464 N. W. 2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942)),
and therefore the ordinance reached only expression -that
the first amendment does not protect.-  464 N. W. 2d, at
511.  The court also concluded that the ordinance was not
impermissibly content-based because, in its view, -the
ordinance is a narrowly tailored means toward accomplish-
ing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the
community against bias-motivated threats to public safety
and order.-  Ibid.  We granted certiorari, 501 U. S. ___
(1991).
                            I
  In construing the St. Paul ordinance, we are bound by the
construction given to it by the Minnesota court.  Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U. S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747,
769, n. 24 (1982); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4
(1949).  Accordingly, we accept the Minnesota Supreme
Court's authoritative statement that the ordinance reaches
only those expressions that constitute -fighting words-
within the meaning of Chaplinsky.  464 N. W. 2d, at
510-511.  Petitioner and his amici urge us to modify the
scope of the Chaplinsky formulation, thereby invalidating
the ordinance as -substantially overbroad,- Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610 (1973).  We find it unneces-
sary to consider this issue.  Assuming, arguendo, that all of
the expression reached by the ordinance is proscribable
under the -fighting words- doctrine, we nonetheless
conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in
that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.
  The First Amendment generally prevents government
from proscribing speech, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 309-311 (1940), or even expressive conduct,
see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 406 (1989),
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.  Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.  Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 8-9); id., at ___
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3-4);
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 536 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972).  From 1791 to the present,
however, our society, like other free but civilized societies,
has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a
few limited areas, which are -of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.-  Chaplinsky, supra, at 572.  We have
recognized that -the freedom of speech- referred to by the
First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard
these traditional limitations.  See, e.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, supra, (-fighting words-); see generally
Simon & Schuster, supra, at ___ (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 4).  Our decisions since the 1960's
have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical
exceptions for defamation, see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323 (1974); see generally Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1, 13-17 (1990), and for obscenity,
see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), but a limited
categorical approach has remained an important part of our
First Amendment jurisprudence.
  We have sometimes said that these categories of expres-
sion are -not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech,- Roth, supra, at 483; Beauharnais, supra, at 266;
Chaplinsky, supra, at 571-572, or that the -protection of the
First Amendment does not extend- to them, Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 504
(1984); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U. S. 115, 124 (1989).  Such statements must be taken in
context, however, and are no more literally true than is the
occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity
-as not being speech at all,- Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 Duke L. J. 589, 615, n. 146.  What
they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently
with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation,
etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely
invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content.  Thus, the government
may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of
the government.  We recently acknowledged this distinction
in Ferber, 458 U. S., at 763, where, in upholding New
York's child pornography law, we expressly recognized that
there was no -question here of censoring a particular
literary theme . . . .-  See also id., at 775 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (-As drafted, New York's statute does not
attempt to suppress the communication of particular
ideas-).
  Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the
First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to
regulation of particular instances of such proscribable
expression, so that the government -may regulate [them]
freely,- post, at 4 (White, J., concurring in judgment).  That
would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance
prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain
criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not
include endorsement of the city government.  Such a
simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amend-
ment protection is at odds with common sense and with our
jurisprudence as well.  It is not true that -fighting words-
have at most a -de minimis- expressive content, ibid., or
that their content is in all respects -worthless and unde-
serving of constitutional protection,- post, at 6; sometimes
they are quite expressive indeed.  We have not said that
they constitute -no part of the expression of ideas,- but only
that they constitute -no essential part of any exposition of
ideas.-  Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572 (emphasis added).
  The proposition that a particular instance of speech can
be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity)
but not on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city
government) is commonplace, and has found application in
many contexts.  We have long held, for example, that
nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the
action it entails, but not because of the ideas it express-
es-so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance
against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning
a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the
flag is not.  See Johnson, 491 U. S., at 406-407.  See also
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1991)
(plurality) (slip op., at 4-6); id., at ___-___ (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 5-6); id., at ___-___
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1-2);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968).
Similarly, we have upheld reasonable -time, place, or
manner- restrictions, but only if they are -justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.-  Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting
that the O'Brien test differs little from the standard applied
to time, place, or manner restrictions).  And just as the
power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a
noncontent element (e.g., noise) does not entail the power
to proscribe the same speech on the basis of a content
element; so also, the power to proscribe it on the basis of
one content element (e.g., obscenity) does not entail the
power to proscribe it on the basis of other content elements.
  In other words, the exclusion of -fighting words- from the
scope of the First Amendment simply means that, for
purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of
the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a
-nonspeech- element of communication.  Fighting words are
thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice
Frankfurter recognized, a -mode of speech,- Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result); both can be used to convey an idea;
but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First
Amendment.  As with the sound truck, however, so also
with fighting words: The government may not regulate use
based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying
message expressed.  Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S.
474 (1988) (upholding, against facial challenge, a content-
neutral ban on targeted residential picketing) with Carey v.
Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980) (invalidating a ban on residen-
tial picketing that exempted labor picketing).
  The concurrences describe us as setting forth a new First
Amendment principle that prohibition of constitutionally
proscribable speech cannot be -underinclusiv[e],- post, at 6
(White, J., concurring in judgment)-a First Amendment
-absolutism- whereby -within a particular `proscribable'
category of expression, . . . a government must either pro-
scribe all speech or no speech at all,- post, at 4 (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment).  That easy target is of the
concurrences' own invention.  In our view, the First
Amendment imposes not an -underinclusiveness- limitation
but a -content discrimination- limitation upon a State's
prohibition of proscribable speech.  There is no problem
whatever, for example, with a State's prohibiting obscenity
(and other forms of proscribable expression) only in certain
media or markets, for although that prohibition would be
-underinclusive,- it would not discriminate on the basis of
content.  See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U. S., at
124-126 (upholding 47 U. S. C. 223(b)(1) (1988), which
prohibits obscene telephone communications).
  Even the prohibition against content discrimination that
we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute.  It
applies differently in the context of proscribable speech
than in the area of fully protected speech.  The rationale of
the general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimina-
tion -rais[es] the specter that the Government may effec-
tively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place,- Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. ___, ___ (1991); FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California, 468 U. S. 364,
383-384 (1984); Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U. S., at 536;
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 95-98.  But
content discrimination among various instances of a class
of proscribable speech often does not pose this threat.
  When the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists.  Such a reason, having
been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the
entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is
also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within
the class.  To illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit
only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in
its prurience-i.e., that which involves the most lascivious
displays of sexual activity.  But it may not prohibit, for
example, only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages.  See Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F. 2d
513, 517 (CA7 1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. ___ (1991).
And the Federal Government can criminalize only those
threats of violence that are directed against the President,
see 18 U. S. C. 871-since the reasons why threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting
individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur) have special force when
applied to the person of the President.  See Watts v. United
States, 394 U. S. 705, 707 (1969) (upholding the facial
validity of 871 because of the -overwhelmin[g] interest in
protecting the safety of [the] Chief Executive and in
allowing him to perform his duties without interference
from threats of physical violence-).  But the Federal
Government may not criminalize only those threats against
the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities.
And to take a final example (one mentioned by Justice
Stevens, post, at 6-7), a State may choose to regulate price
advertising in one industry but not in others, because the
risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial
speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment
protection, see Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-772 (1976)) is
in its view greater there.  Cf. Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. ___ (1992) (state regulation of
airline advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436
U. S. 447 (1978) (state regulation of lawyer advertising).
But a State may not prohibit only that commercial advertis-
ing that depicts men in a demeaning fashion, see, e.g., L. A.
Times, Aug. 8, 1989, section 4, p. 6, col. 1.
  Another valid basis for according differential treatment
to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is
that the subclass happens to be associated with particular
-secondary effects- of the speech, so that the regulation is
-justified without reference to the content of the . . .
speech,- Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 48
(1986) (quoting, with emphasis, Virginia Pharmacy Bd.,
supra, at 771); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 71, n. 34 (1976) (plurality); id., at 80-82
(Powell, J., concurring); Barnes, 501 U. S., at ___-___
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3-7).
A State could, for example, permit all obscene live perfor-
mances except those involving minors.  Moreover, since
words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason,
for example, is violated by telling the enemy the nation's
defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of
a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech.  See id., at ___ (plurality) (slip op., at 4); id.,
at ___ (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 5-6);
id., at ___ (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at
1-2); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S.
411, 425-432 (1990); O'Brien, 391 U. S., at 376-377.  Thus,
for example, sexually derogatory -fighting words,- among
other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment
practices, 42 U. S. C. 2000e-2; 29 CFR 1604.11 (1991).
See also 18 U. S. C. 242; 42 U. S. C. 1981, 1982.  Where
the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or
philosophy.
  These bases for distinction refute the proposition that the
selectivity of the restriction is -even arguably `conditioned
upon the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may
intend to say.'-  Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S.
490, 555 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).  There may be other such bases as well.  Indeed,
to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable
speech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify
any particular -neutral- basis, so long as the nature of the
content discrimination is such that there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.  (We
cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would
stand in the way of a State's prohibiting only those obscene
motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.)  Save for that
limitation, the regulation of -fighting words,- like the
regulation of noisy speech, may address some offensive
instances and leave other, equally offensive, instances
alone.  See Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U. S., at 342-343.
                           II
  Applying these principles to the St. Paul ordinance, we
conclude that, even as narrowly construed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the ordinance is facially unconstitutional.
Although the phrase in the ordinance, -arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others,- has been limited by the
Minnesota Supreme Court's construction to reach only those
symbols or displays that amount to -fighting words,- the
remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance
applies only to -fighting words- that insult, or provoke
violence, -on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.-  Displays containing abusive invective, no matter
how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are
addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.  Those
who wish to use -fighting words- in connection with other
ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexual-
ity-are not covered.  The First Amendment does not per-
mit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.  See
Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8-9);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221,
229-230 (1987).
  In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes
even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual
viewpoint discrimination.  Displays containing some
words-odious racial epithets, for example-would be
prohibited to proponents of all views.  But -fighting words-
that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or
gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for exam-
ple-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards
of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and
equality, but could not be used by that speaker's opponents.
One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all -anti-
Catholic bigots- are misbegotten; but not that all -papists-
are, for that would insult and provoke violence -on the basis
of religion.-  St. Paul has no such authority to license one
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other
to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.
  What we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a
prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain
persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause); but
rather, a prohibition of fighting words that contain (as the
Minnesota Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized) mes-
sages of -bias-motivated- hatred and in particular, as ap-
plied to this case, messages -based on virulent notions of
racial supremacy.-  464 N. W. 2d, at 508, 511.  One must
wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court
that -[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse
communities to confront such notions in whatever form they
appear,- ibid., but the manner of that confrontation cannot
consist of selective limitations upon speech.  St. Paul's brief
asserts that a general -fighting words- law would not meet
the city's needs because only a content-specific measure can
communicate to minority groups that the -group hatred-
aspect of such speech -is not condoned by the majority.-
Brief for Respondent 25.  The point of the First Amendment
is that majority preferences must be expressed in some
fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its
content.
  Despite the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court and
St. Paul acknowledge that the ordinance is directed at
expression of group hatred, Justice Stevens suggests that
this -fundamentally misreads- the ordinance.  Post, at
18-19.  It is directed, he claims, not to speech of a particu-
lar content, but to particular -injur[ies]- that are -qualita-
tively different- from other injuries.  Post, at 9.  This is
word-play.  What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor,
etc. produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the
anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc. produced by other
fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it is
caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive
message.  The First Amendment cannot be evaded that
easily.  It is obvious that the symbols which will arouse
-anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender- are those symbols that
communicate a message of hostility based on one of these
characteristics.  St. Paul concedes in its brief that the
ordinance applies only to -racial, religious, or gender-
specific symbols- such as -a burning cross, Nazi swastika or
other instrumentality of like import.-  Brief for Respon-
dent 8.  Indeed, St. Paul argued in the Juvenile Court that
-[t]he burning of a cross does express a message and it is,
in fact, the content of that message which the St. Paul
Ordinance attempts to legislate.-  Memorandum from the
Ramsey County Attorney to the Honorable Charles A.
Flinn, Jr., dated July 13, 1990, in In re Welfare of R. A. V.,
No. 89-D-1231 (Ramsey Cty. Juvenile Ct.), p. 1, reprinted
in App. to Brief for Petitioner C-1.
  The content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul
ordinance comes within neither any of the specific excep-
tions to the First Amendment prohibition we discussed
earlier, nor within a more general exception for content
discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas.
It assuredly does not fall within the exception for content
discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular
class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is proscri-
bable.  As explained earlier, see supra, at 8, the reason why
fighting words are categorically excluded from the protec-
tion of the First Amendment is not that their content
communicates any particular idea, but that their content
embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unneces-
sary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes
to convey.  St. Paul has not singled out an especially
offensive mode of expression-it has not, for example,
selected for prohibition only those fighting words that
communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely
obnoxious) manner.  Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages of
racial, gender, or religious intolerance.  Selectivity of this
sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas.  That possibil-
ity would alone be enough to render the ordinance presump-
tively invalid, but St. Paul's comments and concessions in
this case elevate the possibility to a certainty.
  St. Paul argues that the ordinance comes within another
of the specific exceptions we mentioned, the one that allows
content discrimination aimed only at the -secondary effects-
of the speech, see Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U. S. 41 (1986).  According to St. Paul, the ordinance is
intended, -not to impact on [sic] the right of free expression
of the accused,- but rather to -protect against the victimiza-
tion of a person or persons who are particularly vulnerable
because of their membership in a group that historically
has been discriminated against.-  Brief for Respondent 28.
Even assuming that an ordinance that completely pro-
scribes, rather than merely regulates, a specified category
of speech can ever be considered to be directed only to the
secondary effects of such speech, it is clear that the St. Paul
ordinance is not directed to secondary effects within the
meaning of Renton.  As we said in Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S.
312 (1988), -[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type
of `secondary effects' we referred to in Renton.-  Id., at 321.
-The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
`secondary effect.'-  Ibid.  See also id., at 334 (opinion of
Brennan, J.).
  It hardly needs discussion that the ordinance does not fall
within some more general exception permitting all selectiv-
ity that for any reason is beyond the suspicion of official
suppression of ideas.  The statements of St. Paul in this
very case afford ample basis for, if not full confirmation of,
that suspicion.
  Finally, St. Paul and its amici defend the conclusion of
the Minnesota Supreme Court that, even if the ordinance
regulates expression based on hostility towards its protected
ideological content, this discrimination is nonetheless
justified because it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.  Specifically, they assert that the ordinance
helps to ensure the basic human rights of members of
groups that have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion, including the right of such group members to live in
peace where they wish.  We do not doubt that these
interests are compelling, and that the ordinance can be said
to promote them.  But the -danger of censorship- presented
by a facially content-based statute, Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 8), requires that that
weapon be employed only where it is -necessary to serve the
asserted [compelling] interest,- Burson v. Freeman, 504
U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (plurality) (slip op., at 8) (emphasis
added); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'
Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983).  The existence of adequate
content-neutral alternatives thus -undercut[s] significantly-
any defense of such a statute, Boos v. Barry, supra, at 329,
casting considerable doubt on the government's protesta-
tions that -the asserted justification is in fact an accurate
description of the purpose and effect of the law,- Burson,
supra, at ___ (Kennedy, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2).  See
Boos, supra, at 324-329; cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 586-587
(1983).  The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is
whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to
achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is not.  An
ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example,
would have precisely the same beneficial effect.  In fact the
only interest distinctively served by the content limitation
is that of displaying the city council's special hostility
towards the particular biases thus singled out.  That is
precisely what the First Amendment forbids.  The politi-
cians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility-but
not through the means of imposing unique limitations upon
speakers who (however benightedly) disagree.
                      *     *     *
  Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a
cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible.  But St. Paul
has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behav-
ior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.
  The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.