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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-1488
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SUE SUTER, et al., PETITIONERS v.
ARTIST M. et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the seventh circuit
[March 25, 1992]

  The Chief Justice  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case raises the question whether private individuals
have the right to enforce by suit a provision of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Adoption Act or
Act), 94 Stat. 500, 42 U. S. C. 620-628, 670-679a, either
under the Act itself or through an action under 42 U.S.C.
1983.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that 42 U. S. C. 671(a)(15) contained an implied right of
action, and that respondents could enforce this section of
the Act through an action brought under 1983 as well.
We hold that the Act does not create an enforceable right
on behalf of the respondents.
  The Adoption Act establishes a federal reimbursement
program  for  certain  expenses  incurred  by  the  States in


administering foster care and adoption services.  The Act
provides that States will be reimbursed for a percentage of
foster care and adoption assistance payments when the
State satisfies the requirements of the Act.  42 U. S. C.
672-674, 675(4)(A) (1988 ed. and Supp. I).
  To participate in the program, States must submit a plan
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval
by the Secretary.  42 U. S. C. 670, 671.  Section 671 lists
16 qualifications which state plans must contain in order to
gain the Secretary's approval.  As relevant here, the Act
provides:
   ``(a) Requisite features of State plan
   ``In order for a State to be eligible for payments under
   this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secre-
   tary which-
       .      .       .      .      .
   ``(3) provides that the plan shall be in effect in all
   political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered
   by them, be mandatory upon them;
       .      .       .      .      .
   ``(15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each
   case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the
   placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or elimi-
   nate the need for removal of the child from his home,
   and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his
   home . . . .'' 42 U. S. C. 671(a)(3), (15).
  Petitioners in this action are Sue Suter and Gary T.
Morgan, the Director and the Guardianship Administrator,
respectively, of the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS).  DCFS is the state agency respon-
sible for, among other things, investigating charges of child
abuse and neglect and providing services to abused and
neglected children and their families.  DCFS is authorized
under Illinois law, see Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, -802-1, et.
seq. (1989), to gain temporary custody of an abused or
neglected child  after  a hearing and order by the Juvenile
Court.  Alternatively, the court may order that a child
remain in his home under a protective supervisory order
entered against his parents.  See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917
F. 2d 980, 982-983 (CA7 1990).  Once DCFS has jurisdic-
tion over a child either in its temporary custody, or in the
child's home under a protective order, all services are
provided to the child and his family by means of an
individual caseworker at DCFS to whom the child's case is
assigned.  App. 35-39.
  Respondents filed this class-action suit seeking declarato-
ry and injunctive relief under the Adoption Act.  They
alleged that petitioners, in contravention of 42 U. S. C.
671(a)(15) failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent
removal of children from their homes and to facilitate
reunification of families where removal had occurred.
This failure occurred, as alleged by respondents, because
DCFS failed promptly to assign caseworkers to children
placed in DCFS custody and promptly to reassign cases
when caseworkers were on leave from DCFS.  App. 6-8.
The District Court, without objection from petitioners,
certified two separate classes seeking relief, including all
children who are or will be wards of DCFS and are placed
in foster care or remain in their homes under a judicial
protective order.  Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690,
691 (ND Ill. 1989).  The District Court denied a motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners, holding, as relevant here, that
the Adoption Act contained an implied cause of action and
that suit could also be brought to enforce the Act under 42
U. S. C. 1983.  726 F. Supp., at 696, 697.
  The District Court then entered an injunction requiring
petitioners to assign a caseworker to each child placed in
DCFS custody within three working days of the time the
case is first heard in Juvenile Court, and to reassign a
caseworker within three working days of the date any
caseworker relinquishes responsibility for a particular case.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a.  The three working day deadline
was found by the District Court to ``realistically reflec[t] the
institutional capabilities of DCFS,''  id., at 55a, based in
part on petitioners' assertion that assigning caseworkers
within that time frame ``would not be overly burdensome.''
Id., at 54a.  The District Court, on partial remand from the
Court of Appeals, made additional factual findings regard-
ing the nature of the delays in assigning caseworkers and
the progress of DCFS reforms at the time the preliminary
injunction was entered.  App. 28-50.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Artist M. v. Johnson, 917
F. 2d 980 (CA7 1990).  Relying heavily on this Court's
decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498
(1990), the Court of Appeals held that the ``reasonable
efforts'' clause of the Adoption Act could be enforced
through an action under 1983.  917 F. 2d, at 987-989.
That court, applying the standard established in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), also found that the Adop-
tion Act created an implied right of action such that
private individuals could bring suit directly under the
Act to enforce the provisions relied upon by respondents.
917 F. 2d, at 989-991.  We granted certiorari, and now
reverse.  500 U. S. ___ (1991).
  In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), we first estab-
lished that 1983 is available as a remedy for violations of
federal statutes as well as for constitutional violations.  We
have subsequently recognized that 1983 is not available to
enforce a violation of a federal statute ``where Congress has
foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment
itself and where the statute did not create enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
1983.''  Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987).
  In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U. S. 1 (1981), we held that 6010 of the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42
U. S. C. 6000 et. seq., (1976 ed. and Supp. III) did not
confer an implied cause of action.  That statute, as well as
the statute before us today, was enacted by Congress
pursuant to its spending power.  In Pennhurst, we noted
that it was well established that Congress has the power to
fix the terms under which it disburses federal money to the
States.  451 U. S., at 17, citing Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S.
127 (1947); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970).  As
stated in Pennhurst:
   ``The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under
   the spending power thus rests on whether the State
   voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
   `contract.'  There can, of course, be no knowing accep-
   tance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is
   unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly,
   if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant
   of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.''
   Pennhurst, supra, at 17 (citations and footnote omit-
   ted).
We concluded that the statutory section sought to be
enforced by the Pennhurst respondents did not provide such
unambiguous notice to the States because it spoke in terms
``intended to be hortatory, not mandatory.''  451 U. S., at 24.
  In Wright, the Brooke Amendment to existing housing
legislation imposed a ceiling on the rent which might be
charged low-income tenants living in public housing
projects.  The regulations issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in turn defined rent to
include ```a reasonable amount for [use of] utilities,''' and
further defined how that term would be measured.  Wright,
supra, at 420-421, n. 3.  We held that tenants had an
enforceable right to sue the Housing Authority for utility
charges claimed to be in violation of these provisions.  In
Wilder, 496 U. S., at 503, the Boren Amendment to the
Medicaid Act required that Medicaid providers be reim-
bursed according to rates that the ```State finds, and makes
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary,''' are ```reasonable
and adequate''' to meet the costs of ```efficiently and
economically operated facilities.'''  Again, we held that this
language created an enforceable right, on the part of
providers seeking reimbursement, to challenge the rates set
by the State as failing to meet the standards specified in
the Boren Amendment.
  In both Wright and Wilder the word ``reasonable'' occupied
a prominent place in the critical language of the statute or
regulation, and the word ``reasonable'' is similarly involved
here.  But this, obviously, is not the end of the matter.  The
opinions in both Wright and Wilder took pains to analyze
the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire
legislative enactment, to determine whether the language
in question created ``enforceable rights, privileges, or
immunities within the meaning of 1983.''  Wright, supra,
at 423.  And in Wilder, we caution that ```[s]ection 1983
speaks in terms of ``rights, privileges, or immunities,'' not
violations of federal law.'''  Wilder, supra at 509 quoting
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103
(1989).
  Did Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, unambigu-
ously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right
to enforce the requirement that the State make ``reasonable
efforts'' to prevent a child from being removed from his
home, and once removed to reunify the child with his
family?  We turn now to that inquiry.
  As quoted above, 42 U. S. C. 671(a)(15) requires that to
obtain federal reimbursement, a State have a plan which
``provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made
. . . to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child
from his home, and . . . to make it possible for the child to
return to his home . . . .''  As recognized by petitioners,
respondents, and the courts below, the Act is mandatory in
its terms.  However, in the light shed by Pennhurst, we
must examine exactly what is required of States by the Act.
Here, the terms of 671(a) are clear;  ``In order for a State
to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a
plan approved by the Secretary.''  Therefore the Act does
place a requirement on the States, but that requirement
only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan
approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed
features.
  Respondents do not dispute that Illinois in fact has a plan
approved by the Secretary which provides that reasonable
efforts at prevention and reunification will be made.  Tr. of
Oral Arg. 29-30.  Respondents argue, however, that 1983
allows them to sue in federal court to obtain enforcement of
this particular provision of the state plan.  This argument
is based, at least in part, on the assertion that 42 U. S. C.
671(a)(3) requires that the State has a plan which is ``in
effect.''  This section states that the state plan shall
``provid[e] that the plan shall be in effect in all political
subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be
mandatory upon them.'' But we think that ``in effect'' is
directed to the requirement that the plan apply to all
political subdivisions of the State, and is not intended to
otherwise modify the word ``plan.''
  In Wilder, the underlying Medicaid legislation similarly
required participating States to submit to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services a plan for medical assistance
describing the State's Medicaid program.  But in that case
we held that the Boren Amendment actually required the
States to adopt reasonable and adequate rates, and that
this obligation was enforceable by the providers.  We relied
in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth
in some detail the factors to be considered in determining
the methods for calculating rates.  Wilder, supra, at 519,
n. 17.
  In the present case, however, the term ``reasonable
efforts'' to maintain an abused or neglected child in his
home, or return the child to his home from foster care,
appears in quite a different context.  No further statutory
guidance is found as to how ``reasonable efforts'' are to be
measured.  This directive is not the only one which Con-
gress has given to the States, and it is a directive whose
meaning will obviously vary with the circumstances of each
individual case.  How the State was to comply with this
directive, and with the other provisions of the Act, was,
within broad limits, left up to the State.
  Other sections of the Act provide enforcement mecha-
nisms for the reasonable efforts clause of 42 U. S. C.
671(a)(15).  The Secretary has the authority to reduce or
eliminate payments to a State on finding that the State's
plan no longer complies with 671(a) or that ``there is a
substantial failure'' in the administration of a plan such
that the State is not complying with its own plan.  671(b).
The Act also requires that in order to secure federal
reimbursement for foster care payments made with respect
to a child involuntarily removed from his home the removal
must be ``the result of a judicial determination to the effect
that continuation [in the child's home] would be contrary to
the welfare of such child and (effective October 1, 1983)
that reasonable efforts of the type described in section
671(a)(15) of this title have been made.''  672(a)(1).  While
these statutory provisions may not provide a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism so as to manifest Congress' intent
to foreclose remedies under 1983, they do show that the
absence of a remedy to private plaintiffs under 1983 does
not make the reasonable efforts clause a dead letter.
  The regulations promulgated by the Secretary to enforce
the Adoption Act do not evidence a view that 671(a) places
any requirement for state receipt of federal funds other
than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be
approved by the Secretary.  The regulations provide that
to meet the requirements of 671(a)(15) the case plan for
each child must ``include a description of the services
offered and the services provided to prevent removal of the
child from the home and to reunify the family.''  45 CFR
1356.21(d)(4) (1991).  Another regulation, entitled ``re-
quirements and submittal'', provides that a state plan must
specify ``which preplacement preventive and reunification
services are available to children and families in need.''
1357.15(e)(1).  What is significant is that the regulations
are not specific, and do not provide notice to the States that
failure to do anything other than submit a plan with the
requisite features, to be approved by the Secretary, is a
further condition on the receipt of funds from the Federal
Government.  Respondents contend that ``[n]either [petition-
ers] nor amici supporting them present any legislative
history to refute the evidence that Congress intended 42
U. S. C. 671(a)(15) to be enforceable.''  Brief for Respon-
dents 33.  To the extent such history may be relevant, our
examination of it leads us to conclude that Congress was
concerned that the required reasonable efforts be made by
the States, but also  indicated that the Act left a great deal
of discretion to them.
  Careful examination of the language relied upon by
respondents, in the context of the entire Act, leads us to
conclude that the ``reasonable efforts'' language does not
unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act's
beneficiaries.  The term ``reasonable efforts'' in this context
is at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather
generalized duty on the State, to be enforced not by private
individuals, but by the Secretary in the manner previously
discussed.
  Having concluded that 671(a)(15) does not create a
federally enforceable right to ``reasonable efforts'' under
1983, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
Adoption Act contains an implied right of action for private
enforcement, 917 F. 2d, at 989, may be disposed of quickly.
Under the familiar test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975),
the burden is on respondents to demonstrate that Congress
intended to make a private remedy available to enforce the
reasonable efforts clause of the Adoption Act.  The most
important inquiry here as well is whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy sought by the
plaintiffs.  Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U. S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (``[W]hat must ultimately be
determined is whether Congress intended to create the
private remedy asserted'').  As discussed above, we think
that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for
enforcement of the ``reasonable efforts'' clause.
  We conclude that 42 U. S. C. 671(a)(15) neither confers
an enforceable private right on its beneficiaries nor creates
an implied cause of action on their behalf.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

                                    Reversed.