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- CA-95:01 CERT Advisory
- January 23, 1995
- IP Spoofing Attacks and Hijacked Terminal Connections
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of attacks in which
- intruders create packets with spoofed source IP addresses. These attacks
- exploit applications that use authentication based on IP addresses. This
- exploitation leads to user and possibly root access on the targeted system.
- Note that this attack does not involve source routing. Recommended solutions
- are described in Section III below.
-
- In the current attack pattern, intruders may dynamically modify the kernel of
- a Sun 4.1.X system once root access is attained. In this attack, which is
- separate from the IP spoofing attack, intruders use a tool to take control of
- any open terminal or login session from users on the system. Note that
- although the tool is currently being used primarily on SunOS 4.1.x systems,
- the system features that make this attack possible are not unique to SunOS.
-
- As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place
- it, along with any clarifications, in a CA-95:01.README file. CERT advisories
- and their associated README files are available by anonymous FTP from
- info.cert.org. We encourage you to check the README files regularly for
- updates on advisories that relate to your site.
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- I. Description
-
- This description summarizes both the IP spoofing technique that can
- lead to root access on a system and the tool that intruders are using to
- take over open terminal and login connections after they get root access.
- We are currently seeing attacks in which intruders combine IP spoofing
- with use of the tool. However, these are two separate actions. Intruders
- can use IP spoofing to gain root access for any purpose; similarly, they
- can highjack terminal connections regardless of their method of gaining
- root access.
-
- IP spoofing
- To gain access, intruders create packets with spoofed source IP
- addresses. This exploits applications that use authentication based on
- IP addresses and leads to unauthorized user and possibly root access
- on the targeted system. It is possible to route packets through
- filtering-router firewalls if they are not configured to filter
- incoming packets whose source address is in the local domain. It
- is important to note that the described attack is possible even if
- no reply packets can reach the attacker.
-
- Examples of configurations that are potentially vulnerable include
- - routers to external networks that support multiple internal
- interfaces
- - routers with two interfaces that support subnetting on the
- internal network
- - proxy firewalls where the proxy applications use the source
- IP address for authentication
-
- The IP spoofing attacks we are currently seeing are similar to those
- described in two papers: 1) "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol
- Suite" by Steve Bellovin, published in _Computer Communication Review_
- vol. 19, no. 2 (April 1989) pages 32-48; 2) "A Weakness in the 4.2BSD
- Unix TCP/IP Software" by Robert T. Morris. Both papers are available
- by anonymous FTP from
-
- ftp.research.att.com:/dist/internet_security
-
- Bellovin paper: ipext.ps.Z
- Morris paper: 117.ps.Z
-
- Services that are vulnerable to the IP spoofing attack include
- SunRPC & NFS
- BSD UNIX "r" commands
- anything wrapped by the tcp daemon wrappers - site dependent; check
- your configuration
- X windows
- other applications that use source IP addresses for authentication
-
- Hijacking tool
- Once the intruders have root access on a system, they can use a tool
- to dynamically modify the UNIX kernel. This modification allows them
- to hijack existing terminal and login connections from any user on the
- system.
-
- In taking over the existing connections, intruders can bypass one-time
- passwords and other strong authentication schemes by tapping the
- connection after the authentication is complete. For example, a
- legitimate user connects to a remote site through a login or terminal
- session; the intruder hijacks the connection after the user has
- completed the authentication to the remote location; the remote site
- is now compromised. (See Section I for examples of vulnerable
- configurations.)
-
- Currently, the tool is used primarily on SunOS 4.1.x systems. However,
- the system features that make this attack possible are not unique to
- SunOS.
-
-
- II. Impact
-
- Current intruder activity in spoofing source IP addresses can lead to
- unauthorized remote root access to systems behind a filtering-router
- firewall.
-
- After gaining root access and taking over existing terminal and login
- connections, intruders can gain access to remote hosts.
-
-
- III. Solutions
-
- A. Detection
-
- IP spoofing
- If you monitor packets using network-monitoring software such as
- netlog, look for a packet on your external interface that has
- both its source and destination IP addresses in your local domain.
- If you find one, you are currently under attack. Netlog is
- available by anonymous FTP from
- net.tamu.edu:/pub/security/TAMU/netlog-1.2.tar.gz
- MD5 checksum: 1dd62e7e96192456e8c75047c38e994b
-
- Another way to detect IP spoofing is to compare the process
- accounting logs between systems on your internal network. If
- the IP spoofing attack has succeeded on one of your systems,
- you may get a log entry on the victim machine showing a remote
- access; on the apparent source machine, there will be no
- corresponding entry for initiating that remote access.
-
- Hijacking tool
- When the intruder attaches to an existing terminal or login
- connection, users may detect unusual activity, such as commands
- appearing on their terminal that they did not type or a blank window
- that will no longer respond to their commands. Encourage your users
- to inform you of any such activity. In addition, pay particular
- attention to connections that have been idle for a long time.
-
- Once the attack is completed, it is difficult to detect. However,
- the intruders may leave remnants of their tools. For example, you
- may find a kernel streams module designed to tap into existing TCP
- connections.
-
- B. Prevention
-
- IP spoofing
- The best method of preventing the IP spoofing problem is to install
- a filtering router that restricts the input to your external
- interface (known as an input filter) by not allowing a packet
- through if it has a source address from your internal network. In
- addition, you should filter outgoing packets that have a source
- address different from your internal network in order to prevent
- a source IP spoofing attack originating from your site.
-
- The following vendors have reported support for this feature:
- Bay Networks/Wellfleet routers, version 5 and later
- Cabletron - LAN Secure
- Cisco - RIS software all releases of version 9.21 and later
- Livingston - all versions
-
- If you need more information about your router or about firewalls,
- please contact your vendor directly.
-
- If your vendor's router does not support filtering on the inbound
- side of the interface or if there will be a delay in incorporating
- the feature into your system, you may filter the spoofed IP packets
- by using a second router between your external interface and your
- outside connection. Configure this router to block, on the outgoing
- interface connected to your original router, all packets that have a
- source address in your internal network. For this purpose, you can
- use a filtering router or a UNIX system with two interfaces that
- supports packet filtering.
-
- NOTE: Disabling source routing at the router does not protect you
- from this attack, but it is still good security practice to
- do so.
-
- Hijacking tool
- There is no specific way to prevent use of the tool other than
- preventing intruders from gaining root access in the first place.
- If you have experienced a root compromise, see Section C for general
- instructions on how to recover.
-
- C. Recovery from a UNIX root compromise
-
- 1. Disconnect from the network or operate the system in
- single-user mode during the recovery. This will keep users
- and intruders from accessing the system.
-
- 2. Verify system binaries and configuration files against the
- vendor's media (do not rely on timestamp information to
- provide an indication of modification). Do not trust any
- verification tool such as cmp(1) located on the compromised
- system as it, too, may have been modified by the intruder.
- In addition, do not trust the results of the standard UNIX
- sum(1) program as we have seen intruders modify system
- files in such a way that the checksums remain the same.
- Replace any modified files from the vendor's media, not
- from backups.
- -- or --
-
- Reload your system from the vendor's media.
-
- 3. Search the system for new or modified setuid root files.
-
- find / -user root -perm -4000 -print
-
- If you are using NFS or AFS file systems, use ncheck to
- search the local file systems.
-
- ncheck -s /dev/sd0a
-
- 4. Change the password on all accounts.
-
- 5. Don't trust your backups for reloading any file used by
- root. You do not want to re-introduce files altered by an
- intruder.
-
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- The CERT Coordination Center thanks Eric Allman, Steve Bellovin, Keith Bostic,
- Bill Cheswick, Mike Karels, and Tsutomu Shimomura for contributing to our
- understanding of these problems and their solutions.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
- Coordination Center or your representative in Forum of Incident
- Response and Security Teams (FIRST).
-
- If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to
- CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be
- encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP
- (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact
- CERT staff for details).
-
- Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
- Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
- CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
- and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
- Fax: +1 412-268-6989
-
- CERT Coordination Center
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
- USA
-
- Past advisories, CERT bulletins, information about FIRST representatives,
- and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous
- FTP from info.cert.org.
-
-
-
- CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
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