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Ignacio Ramonet:        Lessons of a non-war

What lessons are to be learned from the recent Gulf crisis? There
are at least three. First, in the new unipolar world, the United
States is tempted to act in an authoritarian manner, knowing full
well that it is the strongest member of the international family of
nations. It is attempting to marginalise the United Nations, the
system established in 1945 which held the balance between powers of
equal strength.

America holds sway over the world as no empire has ever done before
in the entire history of mankind. It dominates in every sphere:
political, economic, military, technological and cultural. Thus,
after its 1991 victory in the Gulf war, Washington proposed to
build a "new world order", fashioned in its own image.
Prophetically, President George Bush declared at the time: "The
United States is destined to lead the world out of the darkness and
chaos of dictatorship towards the promise of better days".

This call to lead the world, to intervene in crises and influence
events to its own advantage, has been constantly reaffirmed under
President Bill Clinton. The French foreign minister, Hubert
V╚drine, has observed that "the United States believes it has a
self-appointed mission because of the weight it carries on the
world chess-board ... We are looking at a hyperpower" (1).

And the US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, stated during
the confrontation with Iraq that she represented "an America that
is convinced that it plainly has global responsibilities, which
means that when we can change things, we ought to do so" (2). This
without reference to the United Nations. (Washington had insisted,
when it refused to countenance the re-election of Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in 1996, that the new secretary-general must not be a
politician.) "The UN secretary-general must be simply an
administrator." said Mrs Albright: "he may have a more political
role in the course of time, but not in the next five years" (3). It
is one of life's little ironies that this "administrator" should be
Kofi Annan, who gave a perfect demonstration of the need for a
politician - and indeed for the United Nations - when he signed the
Baghdad agreement on 23 February.

The second lesson is that the United States has no overall strategy
for the Middle East. Washington is still determined to bomb Baghdad
but appears to be quite unable to explain the political purpose of
such a strike. But the situation in the Arab world today is not the
same as it was in 1991. The brutality of the embargo imposed on
Baghdad (an Iraqi child has died every six minutes for the past
seven years) and successive American raids in 1992, 1993 and 1996
suggest that the US is in the grip of an anti-Iraq fever, directed
mainly against civilians.

This contrasts sharply with its extremely indulgent attitude
towards Israel. A country that continues to occupy part of Lebanon
and Syria, as well as East Jerusalem and territories in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, in defiance of international law. A country
whose government, under Binyamin Netanyahu, has brought the peace
negotiations with the Palestinians to a standstill and is
continuing to pursue its settlements policy, despite all protests.
A country, finally, that has weapons of mass destruction of all
kinds (chemical, biological and nuclear) and for thirty years has
systematically - and with complete impunity - refused to comply
with any of the relevant UN resolutions. Yet Washington continues
to grant it aid amounting to $3 billion a year.

In Arab circles, this is felt to be quite unjust and Arab public
opinion is increasingly sympathetic to Iraq. The region's most
influential thinkers, while aware that the Baghdad regime is a
dictatorship based on terror and repression, have taken the lead in
a movement of solidarity with the Iraqi people. Fearing the power
of this movement (and angered by the intransigence of the Israeli
government), most leaders in the region have refused to have
anything to do with the plan to bomb Iraq. This would have provoked
large-scale anti-American demonstrations throughout the region. And
it would doubtless have destabilised several regimes, including
those closest to Washington, in an Arab world governed by a
collection of ageing leaders and characterised by the absence of
any real democracy.

The third lesson is that Europe simply does not exist. Its Common
Foreign and Security Policy is a complete myth. Look at what
happened in the latest crisis! On 3 February, without consulting
the other states of the European Union, the British - who happened
to hold the presidency - followed the United States' lead and
announced that they would join in bombing Iraq. One by one, in a
raggle-taggle way, most of the Fifteen - with the notable exception
of France - fell in with this bellicose line, putting loyalty to
NATO above their own interests as Europeans. War in the Gulf has
been avoided this time. But for how long? Meanwhile, these three
lessons offer food for thought.