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Network Working Group C. Newman
Internet Draft: Plain Transition SASL mechanism Innosoft
Document: draft-newman-sasl-plaintrans-00.txt May 1997
Expires in six months
Plaintext Password Transition SASL mechanism
Status of this memo
This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas,
and its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet Drafts.
Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months. Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet
Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a
"working draft" or "work in progress".
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
1id-abstracts.txt listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
Directories on ds.internic.net, nic.nordu.net, ftp.isi.edu, or
munnari.oz.au.
A revised version of this draft document will be submitted to the
RFC editor as a Proposed Standard for the Internet Community.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested. This
document will expire six months after publication. Distribution of
this draft is unlimited.
Abstract
In order to replace plaintext passwords, the Internet community
needs a strong authentication system which is standards track,
general purpose, and sufficiently easy to implement that client
authors might be willing to spend valuable development time
implementing it. The only mechanism which comes close to this
today is CRAM-MD5 [CRAM-MD5].
Unfortunately, CRAM-MD5 and it's predecessor APOP [POP3] can not be
used with most server authentication databases in use today since
these databases store the password after applying an incompatible
one-way function. This proposal defines a SASL [SASL] mechanism
and associated response codes which can be used to make the
Newman [Page 1]
Internet Draft Plain Transition SASL mechanism May 1997
transition relatively painless.
1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
in this document are to be interpreted as defined in "Key words for
use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS].
2. Plaintext Password Transition SASL mechanism
The mechanism name associated with plaintext password transition is
"PLAINTRANSITION".
The mechanism consists of a single message from the client to the
server. The client sends the authorization identity, followed by a
US-ASCII tab character, followed by the authentication identity,
followed by a US-ASCII tab character, followed by the plaintext
password. The client may leave the authorization identity empty to
indicate that it is the same as the authentication identity.
The server will verify the authentication identity and password
with the system authentication database and verify that the
authentication credentials permit the client to login as the
authorization identity. If both these steps succeed, the password
will be stored in a new authentication database capable of
supporting stronger authentication mechanisms. Once this has
completed, the server MUST refuse future PLAINTRANSITION commands
by that authentication identity, and SHOULD refuse future plaintext
login commands by that authentication identity.
The formal grammar for the client message using Augmented BNF
[ABNF] follows.
message = [authorize-id] TAB authenticate-id TAB password
ACHAR = %x20..7E
PCHAR = %x01..09 / %x0B..0C / %x0E..7F
TAB = %x09
authenticate-id = 1*255ACHAR
authorize-id = 1*255ACHAR
password = 1*255PCHAR
Newman [Page 2]
Internet Draft Plain Transition SASL mechanism May 1997
3. New response codes
This mechanism requires support for new failure codes in protocols
which use it.
The failure codes for use with IMAP4 [IMAP4] are defined here:
TRANSITION-NEEDED
This IMAP response code occurs on the tagged NO response to an
AUTHENTICATE command after an attempt to use a mechanism other
than PLAINTRANSITION. It indicates that that mechanism is not
currently usable, but would be usable one a PLAINTRANSITION
has occured. This may also occur in response to a LOGIN
command indicating that the user is required to use
PLAINTRANSITION but all other uses of plaintext passwords will
be denied. This may also be used on an OK response to a LOGIN
command to indicate that the user should transition to a
stronger mechanism. In this context it may be followed by a
number indicating the number of days until the user's password
will expire if the user fails to transition.
PLAINTEXT-DENIED
This IMAP response code occurs on the tagged NO response to a
LOGIN command or "AUTHENTICATE PLAINTRANSITION" command. It
indicates that a transition has already happened on the server
and plaintext passwords are no longer permitted.
The failure codes for use with POP3 [POP3] are defined here:
-ERR Transition needed
This occurs in response to an APOP or AUTH [POP-AUTH] command
that is not currently available, but will be available after
the use of PLAINTRANSITION. It can occur in response to a
USER or PASS command to indicate that transition is required
but all other uses of plaintext passwords will be denied.
Additional text may be added on the end of this message to
explain the error more clearly.
+OK <number> days until password transition required
This message occurs in response to a successful PASS command
and indicates when the user's password will expire if the user
fails to transition.
Newman [Page 3]
Internet Draft Plain Transition SASL mechanism May 1997
-ERR Plaintext passwords forbidden
This occurs in response to a USER, PASS or AUTH
PLAINTRANSITION command and indicates that the server no
longer permits plaintext passwords because a transition has
occurred. Additional text may be added on the end of this
message to explain the error more clearly.
4. Implementation Requirements for Plaintext Password Transition
Clients MUST NOT use the PLAINTRANSITION mechanism unless the
server offers another SASL mechanism which the client understands.
Servers which support PLAINTRANSITION MUST support another stronger
SASL mechanism.
Clients SHOULD NOT use PLAINTRANSITION unless they first attempt a
stronger mechanism and receive an indication from the server that a
transition is needed. Clients are encouraged to warn the user that
the transition may be one way and could prevent future use of
insecure clients. Clients are encouraged to negotiate an encrypted
stream prior to use of PLAINTRANSITION if possible. Clients which
fail to do this may wish to warn the user that the transition
itself is an insecure process.
5. Example
Here is a sample transition exchange between an IMAP client and
server. In this example, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the
client and server respectively. If such lines are wrapped without
a new "C:" or "S:" label, then the wrapping is for editorial
clarity and is not part of the command.
Note that this example uses the IMAP profile [IMAP4] of SASL. The
base64 encoding of challenges and responses, as well as the "+ "
preceding the responses are part of the IMAP4 profile, not part of
SASL itself. Newer profiles of SASL will include the client
message with the AUTHENTICATE command itself so the extra round
trip below (the server response with an empty "+ ") can be
eliminated.
In this example, the user's authentication identifier is "tim", his
authorization identifier is the same, and his password is
"tanstaaftanstaaf".
S: * OK IMAP4 server ready
C: A001 CAPABILITY
Newman [Page 4]
Internet Draft Plain Transition SASL mechanism May 1997
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4rev1 AUTH=CRAM-MD5 AUTH=PLAINTRANSITION
S: A001 OK done
C: A002 AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5
S: + PDE4OTYuNjk3MTcwOTUyQHBvc3RvZmZpY2UucmVzdG9uLm1jaS5uZXQ+
C: dGltIGI5MTNhNjAyYzdlZGE3YTQ5NWI0ZTZlNzMzNGQzODkw
S: A002 NO [TRANSITION-NEEDED] You can't login securely until
you've changed your password on the server
C: A003 AUTHENTICATE PLAINTRANSITION
S: +
C: CXRpbQl0YW5zdGFhZnRhbnN0YWFmCg==
S: A003 OK You can now login securely in the future.
C: A004 SELECT INBOX
...
6. Security Considerations
Security considerations are discussed throughout this document.
A passive network observer can aquire the user's password if a
client uses PLAINTRANSITION over an unencrypted stream.
Clients are encouraged to record the occurance of a successful
strong authentication or a successful PLAINTRANSITION for a given
user, server and protocol combination and refuse to use plain text
passwords for that user and that server in the future. This will
prevent a man in the middle or a spoof server from aquiring the
user's password by pretending no strong authentication mechanisms
are available.
7. References
[ABNF] Crocker, D., "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications:
ABNF", Work in progress: draft-ietf-drums-abnf-xx.txt
[CRAM-MD5] Klensin, Catoe, Krumviede, "IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension
for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC 2095, MCI, January 1997.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2095.txt>
[IMAP4] Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version
4rev1", RFC 2060, University of Washington, December 1996.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2060.txt>
Newman [Page 5]
Internet Draft Plain Transition SASL mechanism May 1997
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2119.txt>
[POP3] Myers, J., Rose, M., "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", RFC
1939, Carnegie Mellon, Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., May 1996.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1939.txt>
[POP-AUTH] Myers, "POP3 AUTHentication command", RFC 1734, Carnegie
Mellon, December 1994.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1734.txt>
[SASL] Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",
work in progress.
[UTF8] Yergeau, F. "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and
ISO 10646", RFC 2044, Alis Technologies, October 1996.
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2044.txt>
8. Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Ned Freed and Kevin Carosso for coming up with
the basic idea for this proposal.
9. Author's Address
Chris Newman
Innosoft International, Inc.
1050 East Garvey Ave. South
West Covina, CA 91790 USA
Email: chris.newman@innosoft.com
Newman [Page 6]