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draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-02.txt
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User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)
30 September 1997 4
U. Blumenthal
IBM T. J. Watson Research
uri@watson.ibm.com
B. Wijnen
IBM T. J. Watson Research
wijnen@vnet.ibm.com
<draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-02.txt> |
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow
Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim).
Abstract
This document describes the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMP
version 3 for use in the SNMP architecture [SNMP-ARCH]. It defines
the Elements of Procedure for providing SNMP message level security.
This document also includes a MIB for remotely monitoring/managing
the configuration parameters for this Security Model.
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0. Issues and Change Log
When we go to RFC status, we will remove all the text of section 0. 4
0.1. Resolved Issues
- Is it OK to use MD5 for KeyChange Algorithm ??
We changed the TC so that we use the hash-function that |
the user's authentication protocol (usmUserAuthProtocol) |
is based on instead of fixing it to MD5 |
- Improve acknowledgements and sync it up with other documents
Resolved by Russ.
- Should the USM define checking such that a received Response
messages used the same or better securityLevel than the Request
message that this is a response to.
In section 3.1 step 9, we return a completed outgoing message
to the calling module (Message Processing). We believe it is
the Message Processing Subsystem that should cache information
about outgoing messages regarding msgID and such so that a
possible Response Message can be mapped to an outstanding
request. At the same time that piece of code can then ensure
that the same securityModel and the same (or better??)
securityLevel has been used for the Response Message. So in
step 9 we do not save any cachedSecurityData for outgoing
messages.
Resolution. Statements have been added to state that this is
the responsibility of the calling Message Processing Model.
The v3MP has been changed to indeed do the check.
- At an authoritative SNMP engine we must be able to determine
if the msgAuthoritativeEngineID value used for Requests is the
local snmpEngineID. However, to do so we'd have to peek into
either the message or into the PDU. That is not clean.
Resolution. The USM must pass the securityEngineID that was
used for security purposes (i.e., the value extracted from |
the msgAuthoritativeEngineID) so that the MP can check it
when it determines that it is a Request. The MP document has
been updated to make the check.
- An authenticated incoming message at a non-authoritative SNMP
engine always allowed the notion snmpEngineTime to be updated
(as long as it was not older than what we had). This allowed
intruders to slow down our notion of time dramatically.
Resolution. Check the value not only to be greater than
latestReceivedEngineTime but also against out notion of
time to ensure it is not older than 150 seconds. This will
have a side-effect in that if an authoritative engine ever
gets more than 150 seconds behind, then the authoritative end
MUST do explicit time synchronization.
- Should we use Integers or OIDs for identifying protocols
Resolution. Consensus is to use OID.
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0.2. Change Log
[version 3.4] September 30 version: 4
- these changes are marked with a revision-code "4" in right margin 4
- editorial changes based on mail exchanges between Bert/Uri 4
- Quick spell check. 4
- SMICng compile the USM MIB to verify correct syntax. 4
- paginate 4
- post as I-D: <draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-02.txt> 4
4
[version 3.3] Internal version exchanged between editors: 3
- these changes are marked with a revision-code "3" in right margin 3
- Added section 2.6 to explain algorithm for generating localized 3
key and added the word 'localized' at various places. 3
- Added appendix A.1.2 to show example code for SHA localized key 3
- Changed text at the end of section 11.2 to state that passwords 3
and non-localized keys SHOULD NOT be stored on managed devices. 3
- changed usmSecurityParameters so that Boots/Time values are now 3
represented as INTEGERS. 3
3
[version 3.2] September 29 version: |
- these changes are marked with a revision-code "|" in right margin |
- fix ASN.1 definition of securityParameters |
- specify that wrongValue must be returned if a SET tries to set |
an unknown or unsupported Authentication or Privacy protocol |
- add summary of USM internal ASIs now that they were removed from |
the architecture document. This is section 1.6. |
- add text to section 1 to explain usage of SHOULD, MUST and such. |
- tried to be more consistent in use of the terms Protocol, |
Mechanism and Algorithm. |
- defined that keys for MD5 and DES MUST be 16 octets long and for |
SHA they MUST be 20 octets long |
- described that key must be extended to 64 octets before applying |
HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA algorithms. |
- Fixed writeup on key use. We no longer insert/append key but |
instead prepend it to the message before calculating the digest. |
- tried to be more consistent and always use the term octet(s) |
instead of byte(s). |
- placed a comma after each i.e. |
- Adapt Appendix samples to match rest of document(s). |
- SMICng compile the USM MIB to verify correct syntax. |
- Quick spell check. |
|
[version 3.1] September 25 version: |
- these changes are marked with a revision-code "|" in right margin |
- msgAuthoritativeEngineTime is an Integer32, not an Unsigned32 |
- msgUserName can be up to 32 octets long |
- changing authentication algorithm from MD5 to HMAC-MD5-96 and |
HMAC-SHA-96 [RFC2104] |
- Delete un-referenced references |
- roll back time synchronization procedure |
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- address comments from mailing list |
- added section 7 to describe HMAC-SHA-96 and renumbered sections |
8-11 as a result. |
[version 2.2]
- formatting
- pagination
[version 2.1] - August 1 version
- Changed max size for usmUserName from 16 to 32.
For SnmpAdminString 16 is rather short.
- incorporate comments by Uri.
- Update References
- Update acknowledgement section
- remove expectResponse parameter. It was a bad idea
- renamed snmpEngineID parameter to securityEngineID to
reduce confusion with other uses of term snmpEngineID
- added an OUT parameter securityEngineID to processIncomingMsg
primitive, so that MP can check if correct snmpEngineID was
used for Request messages.
- added some more considerations about redirected Traps.
- state that MP is responsible for matching a Response or Report
to an outstanding Request and discard it if none found.
- Discussion about msgID and request-id changed into an example,
because it is SNMPv3 MP specific and the MP MUST handle it.
- Spell check
- SMICng MIB check
- Paginate
- Post to I-D repository and SNMPv3 mailing list as:
<draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-01.txt>
[version 2.0] - July 28 version
- Address comments by Juergen
- fix typos and editorial changes
- Other changes
- adapt to new (synchronous) abstract service primitives
- adapt to new field names in the messages
- adapt to new parameter names for abstract data type
- Address Dave Perkins comments
- modify definition of usmSecurityParameters
- Address Dave Levi's issue on checking msgAuthoritativeEngineID
properly to local snmpEngineID for incoming Request Messages
- Address Uri issue about slow-down of non-authoritative
engine's notion of time at remote SNMP engine.
- Address Uri issue about redirection of (authenticated) Traps.
Describe it is not a problem because they come from the
authoritative SNMP engine.
- Address comments by Arnoud Zwemmer about the fact that only
Report PDUs can slow down timeliness notion
[version 1.8]
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- Add reference to RFC2119 about use of SHOULD and MUST
- paginate and generate table of contents
- posted as I-D <draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-00.txt> on 15 July 1997
[version 1.7]
- Changed the KeyChange description so it allows for other
hash algorithms instead of MD5. If in the future the MD5 gets
replaced by another Authentication -- algorithm, then it seems
we also need to use that new algorithm to -- calculate the
digest during KeyChange.
- Updated the password to key code fragment to cater for the
variable length of the snmpEngineID.
- Added issue on cacheing of data on outgoing messages and one
on required review of timeliness handling.
[version 1.4 - version 1.6]
- Editorial changes because of internal review by authors
- Adapt to latest list of Primitive names and parameters
- Change USEC to USM
- Changes based on comments from Jeff Case.
- Checked MIB with SMICng
[version 1.3]
- Too many changes have taken place, so marking it was skipped
The most important changes are listed here.
However, changes that just split text on different lines
and changes like different capitalization of words/terms
has not been listed. Also changes to fit new terms and such
have not been listed.
- Split/Join some lines to ensure we stay within 72 columns
as required by RFC guidelines.
- Addressed Dave Perkins comments:
1) Section 1.3, last paragraph's, timeliness was left off. -done
2) Section 1.5.1, the operations need to be made general, since
additional one may be added later. - done
3) Section 1.5.2, the field "request-id" is used throughout
this section when it should be field "msgID" - done
4) The document must allow the value of engineID in the
security to be a zero length string. There are several
places that are affected by this change. An actual value is
never needed, since secrets are never the same on different
agents (see your paper). - done
5) Last sentence of description for object usmUserCloneFrom is
not correct, since the object has a OID data type - done
- Removed groupName from usmUserTable.
Now done in Access Control as agreed at 2nd interim
- Stats counters back in this document as agreed at 2nd interim
- Use AutonomousType for usmUserPrivProtocol and
usmUserAuthProtocol. Also use OBJECT-IDENTITY for the
protocol OIDs (John Flick).
- Changed "SNMPv3 engine" to "SNMP engine" at various places
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- added appendix with sample encoding of securityParameters
- cleanup elements of procedure to use consistent terms
- fix up some problems in elements of procedure
- Do not use IMPLIED on usmUserTable as agreed at 2nd interim.
For one thing, SNMPv1 cannot handle it.
- cleanup section 2.3 and 3.3 step 7b based on comments by
Dave Levi.
[version 1.2]
- changed (simplified) time sync in section 3 item 7.
- added usmUserMiId
- cleaned up text
- defined IV "salt" generation
- removed Statistics counters (now in MPC) and Report PDU
generation (now in MPC)
- Removed auth and DES MIBs which are now merged into
User-based Security MIB
- specified where cachedSecurityData needs to be discarded
- added abstract service interface definitions
- removed section on error reporting (is MPC responsibility)
- removed auth/priv protocol definitions, they are in ARCH now
- removed MIB definitions for snmpEngineID, Time, Boots. They
are in ARCH now.
[version 1.1]
- removed <securityCookie>.
- added <securityIdentity>, <securityCachedData>.
- added abstract function interface description of
inter-module communications.
- modified IV generation process to accommodate messages produced
faster than one-per-second (still open).
- always update the clock regardless of whether incoming message
was Report or not (if the message was properly authenticated
and its time-stamp is ahead of our notion of their clock).
[version 1.0]
- first version posted to the SNMPv3 editor's mailing list.
- based on v2adv slides, v2adv items and issues list and on
RFC1910 and SNMPv2u and SNMPv2* documents.
- various iterations were done by the authors via private email.
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1. Introduction
The Architecture for describing Internet Management Frameworks
[SNMP-ARCH] describes that an SNMP engine is composed of:
1) a Dispatcher
2) a Message Processing Subsystem,
3) a Security Subsystem, and
4) an Access Control Subsystem.
Applications make use of the services of these subsystems.
It is important to understand the SNMP architecture and the
terminology of the architecture to understand where the Security
Model described in this document fits into the architecture and
interacts with other subsystems within the architecture. The
reader is expected to have read and understood the description of
the SNMP architecture, as defined in [SNMP-ARCH].
This memo [SNMP-USM] describes the User-based Security Model as it
is used within the SNMP Architecture. The main idea is that we use
the traditional concept of a user (identified by a userName) with
which to associate security information.
This memo describes the use of HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 as the |
authentication protocols and the use of CBC-DES as the privacy |
protocol. The User-based Security Model however allows for other |
such protocols to be used instead of or concurrent with these |
protocols. Therefore, the description of HMAC-MD5-96, HMAC-SHA-96 |
and CBC-DES are in separate sections to reflect their self-contained |
nature and to indicate that they can be replaced or supplemented in |
the future. |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. |
1.1. Threats
Several of the classical threats to network protocols are
applicable to the network management problem and therefore would
be applicable to any SNMP Security Model. Other threats are not
applicable to the network management problem. This section
discusses principal threats, secondary threats, and threats which
are of lesser importance.
The principal threats against which this SNMP Security Model
should provide protection are:
- Modification of Information
The modification threat is the danger that some unauthorized
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entity may alter in-transit SNMP messages generated on behalf
of an authorized user in such a way as to effect unauthorized
management operations, including falsifying the value of an
object.
- Masquerade
The masquerade threat is the danger that management operations
not authorized for some user may be attempted by assuming the
identity of another user that has the appropriate authorizations.
Two secondary threats are also identified. The Security Model
defined in this memo provides limited protection against:
- Disclosure
The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping on the
exchanges between managed agents and a management station.
Protecting against this threat may be required as a matter of
local policy.
- Message Stream Modification
The SNMP protocol is typically based upon a connection-less
transport service which may operate over any sub-network service.
The re-ordering, delay or replay of messages can and does occur
through the natural operation of many such sub-network services.
The message stream modification threat is the danger that
messages may be maliciously re-ordered, delayed or replayed to
an extent which is greater than can occur through the natural
operation of a sub-network service, in order to effect
unauthorized management operations.
There are at least two threats that an SNMP Security Model need
not protect against. The security protocols defined in this memo
do not provide protection against:
- Denial of Service
This SNMP Security Model does not attempt to address the broad
range of attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users
is denied. Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many
cases indistinguishable from the type of network failures with
which any viable network management protocol must cope as a
matter of course.
- Traffic Analysis
This SNMP Security Model does not attempt to address traffic
analysis attacks. Indeed, many traffic patterns are predictable
- devices may be managed on a regular basis by a relatively small
number of management applications - and therefore there is no
significant advantage afforded by protecting against traffic
analysis.
1.2. Goals and Constraints
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Based on the foregoing account of threats in the SNMP network
management environment, the goals of this SNMP Security Model
are as follows.
1) Provide for verification that each received SNMP message has
not been modified during its transmission through the network.
2) Provide for verification of the identity of the user on whose
behalf a received SNMP message claims to have been generated.
3) Provide for detection of received SNMP messages, which request
or contain management information, whose time of generation was
not recent.
4) Provide, when necessary, that the contents of each received
SNMP message are protected from disclosure.
In addition to the principal goal of supporting secure network
management, the design of this SNMP Security Model is also
influenced by the following constraints:
1) When the requirements of effective management in times of
network stress are inconsistent with those of security, the
design should prefer the former.
2) Neither the security protocol nor its underlying security
mechanisms should depend upon the ready availability of other
network services (e.g., Network Time Protocol (NTP) or key
management protocols).
3) A security mechanism should entail no changes to the basic
SNMP network management philosophy.
1.3. Security Services
The security services necessary to support the goals of this SNMP
Security Model are as follows:
- Data Integrity
is the provision of the property that data has not been altered
or destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data sequences
been altered to an extent greater than can occur non-maliciously.
- Data Origin Authentication
is the provision of the property that the claimed identity of
the user on whose behalf received data was originated is
corroborated.
- Data Confidentiality
is the provision of the property that information is not made
available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities,
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or processes.
- Message timeliness and limited replay protection
is the provision of the property that a message whose generation
time is outside of a specified time window is not accepted.
Note that message reordering is not dealt with and can occur in
normal conditions too.
For the protocols specified in this memo, it is not possible to
assure the specific originator of a received SNMP message; rather,
it is the user on whose behalf the message was originated that is
authenticated.
For these protocols, it not possible to obtain data integrity
without data origin authentication, nor is it possible to obtain
data origin authentication without data integrity. Further,
there is no provision for data confidentiality without both data
integrity and data origin authentication.
The security protocols used in this memo are considered acceptably
secure at the time of writing. However, the procedures allow for
new authentication and privacy methods to be specified at a future
time if the need arises.
1.4. Module Organization
The security protocols defined in this memo are split in three
different modules and each has its specific responsibilities such
that together they realize the goals and security services
described above:
- The authentication module MUST provide for:
- Data Integrity,
- Data Origin Authentication
- The timeliness module MUST provide for:
- Protection against message delay or replay (to an extent
greater than can occur through normal operation)
- The privacy module MUST provide for
- Protection against disclosure of the message payload.
The timeliness module is fixed for the User-based Security Model
while there is provision for multiple authentication and/or
privacy modules, each of which implements a specific authentication
or privacy protocol respectively.
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1.4.1. Timeliness Module
Section 3 (Elements of Procedure) uses the timeliness values in an
SNMP message to do timeliness checking. The timeliness check is
only performed if authentication is applied to the message. Since
the complete message is checked for integrity, we can assume that
the timeliness values in a message that passes the authentication
module are trustworthy.
1.4.2. Authentication Protocol
Section 6 describes the HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol which |
is the first authentication protocol that MUST be supported with |
the User-based Security Model. |
Section 7 describes the HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol which |
is another authentication protocol that SHOULD be supported with |
the User-based Security Model. |
In the future additional or replacement authentication protocols may |
be defined as new needs arise. |
The User-based Security Model prescribes that, if authentication
is used, then the complete message is checked for integrity in
the authentication module.
For a message to be authenticated, it needs to pass authentication
check by the authentication module and the timeliness check which
is a fixed part of this User-based Security model.
1.4.3. Privacy Protocol
Section 8 describes the CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol |
which is the first privacy protocol to be used with the
User-based Security Model. In the future additional or
replacement privacy protocols may be defined as new needs arise.
The User-based Security Model prescribes that the scopedPDU
is protected from disclosure when a message is sent with privacy.
The User-based Security Model also prescribes that a message
needs to be authenticated if privacy is in use.
1.5. Protection against Message Replay, Delay and Redirection
1.5.1. Authoritative SNMP engine
In order to protect against message replay, delay and redirection,
one of the SNMP engines involved in each communication is
designated to be the authoritative SNMP engine. When an SNMP
message contains a payload which expects a response (for example
a Get, GetNext, GetBulk, Set or Inform PDU), then the receiver of
such messages is authoritative. When an SNMP message contains a
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payload which does not expect a response (for example an
SNMPv2-Trap, Response or Report PDU), then the sender of such a
message is authoritative.
1.5.2. Mechanisms
The following mechanisms are used:
1) To protect against the threat of message delay or replay (to an
extent greater than can occur through normal operation), a set
of timeliness indicators (for the authoritative SNMP engine) are
included in each message generated. An SNMP engine evaluates
the timeliness indicators to determine if a received message is
recent. An SNMP engine may evaluate the timeliness indicators
to ensure that a received message is at least as recent as the
last message it received from the same source.
A non-authoritative SNMP engine uses received authentic messages
to advance its notion of the timeliness indicators at the remote
authoritative source.
An SNMP engine MUST also use a mechanism to match incoming
Responses to outstanding Requests and it MUST drop any Responses
that do not match an outstanding request. For example, a msgID
can be inserted in every message to cater for this functionality.
These mechanisms provide for the detection of authenticated
messages whose time of generation was not recent.
This protection against the threat of message delay or replay
does not imply nor provide any protection against unauthorized
deletion or suppression of messages. Also, an SNMP engine may
not be able to detect message reordering if all the messages
involved are sent within the Time Window interval. Other
mechanisms defined independently of the security protocol can
also be used to detect the re-ordering replay, deletion, or
suppression of messages containing Set operations (e.g., the
MIB variable snmpSetSerialNo [RFC1907]).
2) Verification that a message sent to/from one authoritative SNMP
engine cannot be replayed to/as-if-from another authoritative
SNMP engine.
Included in each message is an identifier unique to the
authoritative SNMP engine associated with the sender or intended
recipient of the message.
A Report, Response or Trap message sent by an authoritative SNMP
engine to one non-authoritative SNMP engine can potentially be
replayed to another non-authoritative SNMP engine. The latter
non-authoritative SNMP engine might (if it knows about the same
userName with the same secrets at the authoritative SNMP engine)
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as a result update its notion of timeliness indicators of the
authoritative SNMP engine, but that is not considered a threat.
In this case, A Report or Response message will be discarded by
the Message Processing Model, because there should not be an
outstanding Request message. A Trap will possibly be accepted.
Again, that is not considered a threat, because the communication
was authenticated and timely. It is as if the authoritative SNMP
engine was configured to start sending Traps to the second SNMP
engine, which theoretically can happen without the knowledge of
the second SNMP engine anyway. Anyway, the second SNMP engine may
not expect to receive this Trap, but is allowed to see the
management information contained in it.
3) Detection of messages which were not recently generated.
A set of time indicators are included in the message, indicating
the time of generation. Messages without recent time indicators
are not considered authentic. In addition, an SNMP engine MUST
drop any Responses that do not match an outstanding request. This
however is the responsibility of the Message Processing Model.
This memo allows the same user to be defined on multiple SNMP
engines. Each SNMP engine maintains a value, snmpEngineID,
which uniquely identifies the SNMP engine. This value is included
in each message sent to/from the SNMP engine that is authoritative
(see section 1.5.1). On receipt of a message, an authoritative
SNMP engine checks the value to ensure that it is the intended
recipient, and a non-authoritative SNMP engine uses the value to
ensure that the message is processed using the correct state
information.
Each SNMP engine maintains two values, snmpEngineBoots and
snmpEngineTime, which taken together provide an indication of
time at that SNMP engine. Both of these values are included in
an authenticated message sent to/received from that SNMP engine.
On receipt, the values are checked to ensure that the indicated
timeliness value is within a Time Window of the current time.
The Time Window represents an administrative upper bound on
acceptable delivery delay for protocol messages.
For an SNMP engine to generate a message which an authoritative
SNMP engine will accept as authentic, and to verify that a message
received from that authoritative SNMP engine is authentic, such an
SNMP engine must first achieve timeliness synchronization with the
authoritative SNMP engine. See section 2.3.
1.6. Abstract Service Interfaces. |
|
Abstract service interfaces have been defined to describe the |
conceptual interfaces between the various subsystems within an SNMP |
entity. Similarly a set of abstract service interfaces have been |
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defined within the User-based Security Model (USM) to describe the |
conceptual interfaces between the generic USM services and the |
self-contained authentication and privacy services. |
|
These abstract service interfaces are defined by a set of primitives |
that define the services provided and the abstract data elements that |
must be passed when the services are invoked. This section lists the 4
primitives that have been defined for the User-based Security Model. 4
|
1.6.1. User-based Security Model Primitives for Authentication |
|
The User-based Security Model provides the following internal |
primitives to pass data back and forth between the Security Model |
itself and the authentication service: |
|
statusInformation = |
authenticateOutgoingMsg( |
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication |
IN wholeMsg -- unauthenticated complete message |
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message |
) |
|
statusInformation = |
authenticateIncomingMsg( |
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication |
IN authParameters -- as received on the wire |
IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire |
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message |
) |
|
1.6.2. User-based Security Model Primitives for Privacy |
|
The User-based Security Model provides the following internal |
primitives to pass data back and forth between the Security Model |
itself and the privacy service: |
|
statusInformation = |
encryptData( |
IN encryptKey -- secret key for encryption |
IN dataToEncrypt -- data to encrypt (scopedPDU) |
OUT encryptedData -- encrypted data (encryptedPDU) |
OUT privParameters -- filled in by service provider |
) |
|
statusInformation = |
decryptData( |
IN decryptKey -- secret key for decrypting |
IN privParameters -- as received on the wire |
IN encryptedData -- encrypted data (encryptedPDU) |
OUT decryptedData -- decrypted data (scopedPDU) |
) |
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2. Elements of the Model
This section contains definitions required to realize the security
model defined by this memo.
2.1. User-based Security Model Users
Management operations using this Security Model make use of a
defined set of user identities. For any user on whose behalf
management operations are authorized at a particular SNMP engine,
that SNMP engine must have knowledge of that user. An SNMP engine
that wishes to communicate with another SNMP engine must also have
knowledge of a user known to that engine, including knowledge of
the applicable attributes of that user.
A user and its attributes are defined as follows:
userName
A string representing the name of the user.
securityName
A human-readable string representing the user in a format that
is Security Model independent.
authProtocol
An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user can
be authenticated, and if so, the type of authentication protocol
which is used. Two such protocols are defined in this memo: |
- the HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol. |
- the HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol. |
authKey
If messages sent on behalf of this user can be authenticated,
the (private) authentication key for use with the authentication
protocol. Note that a user's authentication key will normally
be different at different authoritative SNMP engines. The authKey |
is not accessible via SNMP. The length requirements of the authKey |
are defined by the authProtocol in use. |
authKeyChange and authOwnKeyChange
The only way to remotely update the authentication key. Does
that in a secure manner, so that the update can be completed
without the need to employ privacy protection.
privProtocol
An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of this user
can be protected from disclosure, and if so, the type of privacy
protocol which is used. One such protocol is defined in this
memo: the CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol. |
privKey
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If messages sent on behalf of this user can be en/decrypted,
the (private) privacy key for use with the privacy protocol.
Note that a user's privacy key will normally be different at
different authoritative SNMP engines. The privKey is not
accessible via SNMP. The length requirements of the privKey are |
defined by the privProtocol in use. |
privKeyChange and privOwnKeyChange
The only way to remotely update the encryption key. Does that
in a secure manner, so that the update can be completed without
the need to employ privacy protection.
2.2. Replay Protection
Each SNMP engine maintains three objects:
- snmpEngineID, which (at least within an administrative domain)
uniquely and unambiguously identifies an SNMP engine.
- snmpEngineBoots, which is a count of the number of times the
SNMP engine has re-booted/re-initialized since snmpEngineID
was last configured; and,
- snmpEngineTime, which is the number of seconds since the
snmpEngineBoots counter was last incremented.
Each SNMP engine is always authoritative with respect to these
objects in its own SNMP entity. It is the responsibility of a
non-authoritative SNMP engine to synchronize with the
authoritative SNMP engine, as appropriate.
An authoritative SNMP engine is required to maintain the values of
its snmpEngineID and snmpEngineBoots in non-volatile storage.
2.2.1. msgAuthoritativeEngineID
The msgAuthoritativeEngineID value contained in an authenticated
message is used to defeat attacks in which messages from one SNMP
engine to another SNMP engine are replayed to a different SNMP
engine. It represents the snmpEngineID at the authoritative SNMP
engine involved in the exchange of the message.
When an authoritative SNMP engine is first installed, it sets its
local value of snmpEngineID according to a enterprise-specific
algorithm (see the definition of the Textual Convention for
SnmpEngineID in the SNMP Architecture document [SNMP-ARCH]).
2.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and msgAuthoritativeEngineTime
The msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and msgAuthoritativeEngineTime
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values contained in an authenticated message are used to defeat
attacks in which messages are replayed when they are no longer
valid. They represent the snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime
values at the authoritative SNMP engine involved in the exchange
of the message.
Through use of snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime, there is no
requirement for an SNMP engine to have a non-volatile clock which
ticks (i.e., increases with the passage of time) even when the
SNMP engine is powered off. Rather, each time an SNMP engine
re-boots, it retrieves, increments, and then stores snmpEngineBoots
in non-volatile storage, and resets snmpEngineTime to zero.
When an SNMP engine is first installed, it sets its local values
of snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime to zero. If snmpEngineTime
ever reaches its maximum value (2147483647), then snmpEngineBoots
is incremented as if the SNMP engine has re-booted and
snmpEngineTime is reset to zero and starts incrementing again.
Each time an authoritative SNMP engine re-boots, any SNMP engines
holding that authoritative SNMP engine's values of snmpEngineBoots
and snmpEngineTime need to re-synchronize prior to sending
correctly authenticated messages to that authoritative SNMP engine
(see Section 2.3 for (re-)synchronization procedures). Note,
however, that the procedures do provide for a notification to be
accepted as authentic by a receiving SNMP engine, when sent by an
authoritative SNMP engine which has re-booted since the receiving
SNMP engine last (re-)synchronized.
If an authoritative SNMP engine is ever unable to determine its
latest snmpEngineBoots value, then it must set its snmpEngineBoots
value to 2147483647. 3
3
Whenever the local value of snmpEngineBoots has the value 2147483647 3
it latches at that value and an authenticated message always causes 3
an notInTimeWindow authentication failure. 3
In order to reset an SNMP engine whose snmpEngineBoots value has
reached the value 2147483647, manual intervention is required. 3
The engine must be physically visited and re-configured, either
with a new snmpEngineID value, or with new secret values for the
authentication and privacy protocols of all users known to that
SNMP engine. Note that even if an SNMP engine re-boots once a second 3
that it would still take approximately 68 years before the max value 3
of 2147483647 would be reached. 3
2.2.3. Time Window
The Time Window is a value that specifies the window of time in
which a message generated on behalf of any user is valid. This
memo specifies that the same value of the Time Window, 150 seconds,
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is used for all users.
2.3. Time Synchronization
Time synchronization, required by a non-authoritative SNMP engine
in order to proceed with authentic communications, has occurred
when the non-authoritative SNMP engine has obtained a local notion
of the authoritative SNMP engine's values of snmpEngineBoots and
snmpEngineTime from the authoritative SNMP engine. These values
must be (and remain) within the authoritative SNMP engine's Time
Window. So the local notion of the authoritative SNMP engine's
values must be kept loosely synchronized with the values stored
at the authoritative SNMP engine. In addition to keeping a local
copy of snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime from the authoritative
SNMP engine, a non-authoritative SNMP engine must also keep one
local variable, latestReceivedEngineTime. This value records the
highest value of snmpEngineTime that was received by the
non-authoritative SNMP engine from the authoritative SNMP engine
and is used to eliminate the possibility of replaying messages
that would prevent the non-authoritative SNMP engine's notion of
the snmpEngineTime from advancing.
A non-authoritative SNMP engine must keep local notions of these
values for each authoritative SNMP engine with which it wishes to
communicate. Since each authoritative SNMP engine is uniquely
and unambiguously identified by its value of snmpEngineID, the
non-authoritative SNMP engine may use this value as a key in
order to cache its local notions of these values.
Time synchronization occurs as part of the procedures of receiving
an SNMP message (Section 3.2, step 7b). As such, no explicit time |
synchronization procedure is required by a non-authoritative SNMP |
engine. Note, that whenever the local value of snmpEngineID is |
changed (e.g., through discovery) or when secure communications |
are first established with an authoritative SNMP engine, the local |
values of snmpEngineBoots and latestReceivedEngineTime should be |
set to zero. This will cause the time synchronization to occur |
when the next authentic message is received. |
Note, that whenever the local value of snmpEngineID is changed
(e.g., through discovery) or when secure communications are first
established with an authoritative SNMP engine, the local values of
snmpEngineBoots and latestReceivedEngineTime should be set to zero.
This will cause the time synchronization to occur when the next
authentic message is received.
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2.4. SNMP Messages Using this Security Model
The syntax of an SNMP message using this Security Model adheres
to the message format defined in the version-specific Message
Processing Model document (for example [SNMP-MP]).
The field msgSecurityParameters in SNMPv3 messages has a data type
of OCTET STRING. Its value is the BER serialization of the
following ASN.1 sequence:
USMSecurityParametersSyntax DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN |
4
UsmSecurityParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
-- global User-based security parameters
msgAuthoritativeEngineID OCTET STRING, |
msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots INTEGER (0..2147483647), 3
msgAuthoritativeEngineTime INTEGER (0..2147483647), 3
msgUserName OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)), |
-- authentication protocol specific parameters
msgAuthenticationParameters OCTET STRING,
-- privacy protocol specific parameters
msgPrivacyParameters OCTET STRING |
}
END
The fields of this sequence are:
- The msgAuthoritativeEngineID specifies the snmpEngineID of the
authoritative SNMP engine involved in the exchange of the message.
- The msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots specifies the snmpEngineBoots
value at the authoritative SNMP engine involved in the exchange
of the message.
- The msgAuthoritativeEngineTime specifies the snmpEngineTime value
at the authoritative SNMP engine involved in the exchange of the
message.
- The msgUserName specifies the user (principal) on whose behalf
the message is being exchanged.
- The msgAuthenticationParameters are defined by the authentication
protocol in use for the message, as defined by the
usmUserAuthProtocol column in the user's entry in the usmUserTable.
- The msgPrivacyParameters are defined by the privacy protocol in
use for the message, as defined by the usmUserPrivProtocol column
in the user's entry in the usmUserTable).
See appendix A.4 for an example of the BER encoding of field
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msgSecurityParameters.
2.5. Services provided by the User-based Security Model
This section describes the services provided by the User-based
Security Model with their inputs and outputs.
The services are described as primitives of an abstract service
interface and the inputs and outputs are described as abstract data
elements as they are passed in these abstract service primitives.
2.5.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message
When the Message Processing (MP) Subsystem invokes the User-based
Security module to secure an outgoing SNMP message, it must use
the appropriate service as provided by the Security module. These
two services are provided:
1) A service to generate a Request message. The abstract service
primitive is:
statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication
generateRequestMsg(
IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version
IN globalData -- message header, admin data
IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity
IN securityModel -- for the outgoing message
IN securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity
IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal
IN securityLevel -- Level of Security requested
IN scopedPDU -- message (plaintext) payload
OUT securityParameters -- filled in by Security Module
OUT wholeMsg -- complete generated message
OUT wholeMsgLength -- length of generated message
)
2) A service to generate a Response message. The abstract service
primitive is:
statusInformation = -- success or errorIndication
generateResponseMsg(
IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version
IN globalData -- message header, admin data
IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity
IN securityModel -- for the outgoing message
IN securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity
IN securityName -- on behalf of this principal
IN securityLevel -- Level of Security requested
IN scopedPDU -- message (plaintext) payload
IN securityStateReference -- reference to security state
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-- information from original
-- request
OUT securityParameters -- filled in by Security Module
OUT wholeMsg -- complete generated message
OUT wholeMsgLength -- length of generated message
)
The abstract data elements passed as parameters in the abstract
service primitives are as follows:
statusInformation
An indication of whether the encoding and securing of the message
was successful. If not it is an indication of the problem.
messageProcessingModel
The SNMP version number for the message to be generated.
This data is not used by the User-based Security module.
globalData
The message header (i.e., its administrative information). This |
data is not used by the User-based Security module.
maxMessageSize
The maximum message size as included in the message.
This data is not used by the User-based Security module.
securityParameters
These are the security parameters. They will be filled in
by the User-based Security module.
securityModel
The securityModel in use. Should be User-based Security Model.
This data is not used by the User-based Security module.
securityName
Together with the snmpEngineID it identifies a row in the
usmUserTable that is to be used for securing the message.
The securityName has a format that is independent of the
Security Model. In case of a response this parameter is
ignored and the value from the cash is used.
securityLevel
The Level of Security from which the User-based Security
module determines if the message needs to be protected from
disclosure and if the message needs to be authenticated.
In case of a response this parameter is ignored and the value
from the cash is used.
securityEngineID
The snmpEngineID of the authoritative SNMP engine to which a
Request message is to be sent. In case of a response it is
implied to be the processing SNMP engine's snmpEngineID and
so if it is specified, then it is ignored.
scopedPDU
The message payload. The data is opaque as far as the
User-based Security Model is concerned.
securityStateReference
A handle/reference to cachedSecurityData to be used when
securing an outgoing Response message. This is the exact same
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handle/reference as it was generated by the User-based Security
module when processing the incoming Request message to which
this is the Response message.
wholeMsg
The fully encoded and secured message ready for sending on
the wire.
wholeMsgLength
The length of the encoded and secured message (wholeMsg).
Upon completion of the process, the User-based Security module
returns statusInformation. If the process was successful, the
completed message with privacy and authentication applied if such
was requested by the specified securityLevel. If the process was
not successful, then an errorIndication is returned.
2.5.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message
When the Message Processing (MP) Subsystem invokes the User-based
Security module to verify proper security of an incoming message,
it must use the service provided for an incoming message. The
abstract service primitive is:
statusInformation = -- errorIndication or success
-- error counter OID/value if error
processIncomingMsg(
IN messageProcessingModel -- typically, SNMP version
IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity
IN securityParameters -- for the received message
IN securityModel -- for the received message
IN securityLevel -- Level of Security
IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire
IN wholeMsgLength -- length as received on the wire
OUT securityEngineID -- authoritative SNMP entity
OUT securityName -- identification of the principal
OUT scopedPDU, -- message (plaintext) payload
OUT maxSizeResponseScopedPDU -- maximum size of the Response PDU
OUT securityStateReference -- reference to security state
) -- information, needed for response
The abstract data elements passed as parameters in the abstract
service primitives are as follows:
statusInformation
An indication of whether the process was successful or not.
If not, then the statusInformation includes the OID and the
value of the error counter that was incremented.
messageProcessingModel
The SNMP version number as received in the message.
This data is not used by the User-based Security module.
maxMessageSize
The maximum message size as included in the message.
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The User-based Security module uses this value to calculate the
maxSizeResponseScopedPDU.
securityParameters
These are the security parameters as received in the message.
securityModel
The securityModel in use.
Should be the User-based Security Model.
This data is not used by the User-based Security module.
securityLevel
The Level of Security from which the User-based Security
module determines if the message needs to be protected from
disclosure and if the message needs to be authenticated.
wholeMsg
The whole message as it was received.
wholeMsgLength
The length of the message as it was received (wholeMsg).
securityEngineID
The snmpEngineID that was extracted from the field
msgAuthoritativeEngineID and that was used to lookup the secrets
in the usmUserTable.
securityName
The security name representing the user on whose behalf the
message was received. The securityName has a format that is
independent of the Security Model.
scopedPDU
The message payload. The data is opaque as far as the
User-based Security Model is concerned.
maxSizeResponseScopedPDU
The maximum size of a scopedPDU to be included in a possible
Response message. The User-base Security module calculates
this size based on the mms (as received in the message) and
the space required for the message header (including the
securityParameters) for such a Response message.
securityStateReference
A handle/reference to cachedSecurityData to be used when
securing an outgoing Response message. When the Message
Processing Subsystem calls the User-based Security module to
generate a response to this incoming message it must pass this
handle/reference.
Upon completion of the process, the User-based Security module
returns statusInformation and, if the process was successful,
the additional data elements for further processing of the message.
If the process was not successful, then an errorIndication,
possibly with a OID and value pair of an error counter that was
incremented.
2.6. Key Localization Algorithm. 3
3
A localized key is a secret key shared between a user U and one 3
authoritative SNMP engine E. Even though a user may have only one 3
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password and therefore one key for the whole network, the actual 3
secrets shared between the user and each authoritative SNMP engine 3
will be different. This is achieved by key localization 3
[Localized-key]. 3
3
First, if a user uses a password, then the user's password is 3
converted into a key Ku using one of the two algorithms described 4
in Appendices A.2.1 and A.2.2. 3
3
To convert key Ku into a localized key Kul of user U at the 4
authoritative SNMP engine E, one appends the snmpEngineID of the 3
authoritative SNMP engine to the key Ku and then appends the key Ku 4
to the result, thus enveloping the snmpEngineID within the two 3
copies of user's key Ku. Then one runs a secure hash function 4
(which one depends on the authentication protocol defined for this 3
user U at authoritative SNMP engine E; this document defines two 3
authentication protocols with their associated algorithms based on 3
MD5 and SHA). The output of the hash-function is the localized key 3
Kul for user U at the authoritative SNMP engine E. 4
3
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3. Elements of Procedure
This section describes the security related procedures followed by
an SNMP engine when processing SNMP messages according to the
User-based Security Model.
3.1. Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it generates a message containing a management operation
(like a request, a response, a notification, or a report) on
behalf of a user, with a particular securityLevel.
1) a) If any securityStateReference is passed (Response message),
then information concerning the user is extracted from the
cachedSecurityData. The securityEngineID and the
securityLevel are extracted from the cachedSecurityData.
The cachedSecurityData can now be discarded.
Otherwise,
b) based on the securityName, information concerning the
user at the destination snmpEngineID, specified by the
securityEngineID, is extracted from the Local Configuration
Datastore (LCD, usmUserTable). If information about the user
is absent from the LCD, then an error indication
(unknownSecurityName) is returned to the calling module.
2) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
protected from disclosure, but the user does not support both
an authentication and a privacy protocol then the message
cannot be sent. An error indication (unsupportedSecurityLevel)
is returned to the calling module.
3) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
authenticated, but the user does not support an authentication
protocol, then the message cannot be sent. An error indication
(unsupportedSecurityLevel) is returned to the calling module.
4) a) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
protected from disclosure, then the octet sequence
representing the serialized scopedPDU is encrypted according
to the user's privacy protocol. To do so a call is made to
the privacy module that implements the user's privacy
protocol according to the abstract primitive:
statusInformation = -- success or failure
encryptData(
IN encryptKey -- user's localized privKey 3
IN dataToEncrypt -- serialized scopedPDU
OUT encryptedData -- serialized encryptedPDU
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OUT privParameters -- serialized privacy parameters
)
statusInformation
indicates if the encryption process was successful or not.
encryptKey
the user's localized private privKey is the secret key that 3
can be used by the encryption algorithm. 3
dataToEncrypt
the serialized scopedPDU is the data that to be encrypted.
encryptedData
the encryptedPDU represents the encrypted scopedPDU,
encoded as an OCTET STRING.
privParameters
the privacy parameters, encoded as an OCTET STRING.
If the privacy module returns failure, then the message
cannot be sent and an error indication (encryptionError) 4
is returned to the calling module.
If the privacy module returns success, then the returned
privParameters are put into the msgPrivacyParameters field of
the securityParameters and the encryptedPDU serves as the
payload of the message being prepared.
Otherwise,
b) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is not to be
protected from disclosure, then the NULL string is encoded
as an OCTET STRING and put into the msgPrivacyParameters
field of the securityParameters and the plaintext scopedPDU
serves as the payload of the message being prepared.
5) The snmpEngineID is encoded as an OCTET STRING into the
msgAuthoritativeEngineID field of the securityParameters.
Note that an empty (zero length) snmpEngineID is OK for a
Request message, because that will cause the remote
(authoritative) SNMP engine to return a Report PDU with the
proper snmpEngineID included in the privParameters of that
returned Report PDU.
6) a) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
authenticated, then the current values of snmpEngineBoots
and snmpEngineTime corresponding to the snmpEngineID from
the LCD are used.
Otherwise,
b) If this is a Response message, then the current value of
snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime corresponding to the
local snmpEngineID from the LCD are used.
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Otherwise,
c) If this is a Request message, then a zero value is used
for both snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime. This zero
value gets used if snmpEngineID is empty.
The values are encoded as Unsigned32 and Integer32 respectively |
into the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and |
msgAuthoritativeEngineTime fields of the securityParameters. |
7) The userName is encoded as an OCTET STRING into the msgUserName
field of the securityParameters.
8) a) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
authenticated, the message is authenticated according to the
user's authentication protocol. To do so a call is made to
the authentication module that implements the user's
authentication protocol according to the abstract service
primitive:
statusInformation =
authenticateOutgoingMsg(
IN authKey -- the user's localized authKey 3
IN wholeMsg -- unauthenticated message
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- authenticated complete message
)
statusInformation
indicates if authentication was successful or not.
authKey
the user's localized private authKey is the secret key that 3
can be used by the authentication algorithm. 3
wholeMsg
the complete serialized message to be authenticated.
authenticatedWholeMsg
the same as the input given to the authenticateOutgoingMsg
service, but with msgAuthenticationParameters properly
filled in.
If the authentication module returns failure, then the
message cannot be sent and an error indication
(authenticationFailure) is returned to the calling module.
If the authentication module returns success, then the
msgAuthenticationParameters field is put into the
securityParameters and the authenticatedWholeMsg represents
the serialization of the authenticated message being
prepared.
Otherwise,
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b) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is not to
be authenticated then the NULL string is encoded as an
OCTET STRING into the msgAuthenticationParameters field of
the securityParameters. The wholeMsg is now serialized and
then represents the unauthenticated message being prepared.
9) The completed message with its length is returned to the
calling module with the statusInformation set to success.
3.2. Processing an Incoming SNMP Message
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it receives a message containing a management operation
on behalf of a user, with a particular securityLevel.
To simplify the elements of procedure, the release of state
information is not always explicitly specified. As a general rule,
if state information is available when a message gets discarded,
the state information should also be released.
Also, when an error indication with an OID and value for an
incremented counter is returned, then the available information
(like securityStateReference) must be passed back to the caller
so it can generate a Report PDU.
1) If the received securityParameters is not the serialization
(according to the conventions of [RFC1906]) of an OCTET STRING
formatted according to the UsmSecurityParameters defined in
section 2.4, then the snmpInASNParseErrs counter [RFC1907] is
incremented, and an error indication (parseError) is returned
to the calling module.
Note that we return without the OID and value of the incremented
counter, because in this case there is not enough information
to generate a Report PDU.
2) The values of the security parameter fields are extracted from
the securityParameters. The securityEngineID to be returned to
the caller is the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineID field.
The cachedSecurityData is prepared and a securityStateReference
is prepared to reference this data. Values to be cached are:
msgUserName
securityEngineID
securityLevel
3) If the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineID field in the
securityParameters is unknown then:
a) a non-authoritative SNMP engine that performs discovery may
optionally create a new entry in its Local Configuration
Datastore (LCD) and continue processing;
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or
b) the usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs counter is incremented, and
an error indication (unknownEngineID) together with the
OID and value of the incremented counter is returned to
the calling module.
4) Information about the value of the msgUserName and
msgAuthoritativeEngineID fields is extracted from the Local
Configuration Datastore (LCD, usmUserTable). If no information
is available for the user, then the usmStatsUnknownUserNames
counter is incremented and an error indication
(unknownSecurityName) together with the OID and value of the
incremented counter is returned to the calling module.
5) If the information about the user indicates that it does not
support the securityLevel requested by the caller, then the
usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels counter is incremented and an
error indication (unsupportedSecurityLevel) together with the
OID and value of the incremented counter is returned to the
calling module.
6) If the securityLevel specifies that the message is to be
authenticated, then the message is authenticated according to
the user's authentication protocol. To do so a call is made
to the authentication module that implements the user's
authentication protocol according to the abstract service
primitive:
statusInformation = -- success or failure
authenticateIncomingMsg(
IN authKey -- the user's localized authKey 3
IN authParameters -- as received on the wire
IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- checked for authentication
)
statusInformation
indicates if authentication was successful or not.
authKey
the user's localized private authKey is the secret key that 3
can be used by the authentication algorithm. 3
wholeMsg
the complete serialized message to be authenticated.
authenticatedWholeMsg
the same as the input given to the authenticateIncomingMsg
service, but after authentication has been checked.
If the authentication module returns failure, then the message
cannot be trusted, so the usmStatsWrongDigests counter is
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incremented and an error indication (authenticationFailure)
together with the OID and value of the incremented counter is
returned to the calling module.
If the authentication module returns success, then the message
is authentic and can be trusted so processing continues.
7) If the securityLevel indicates an authenticated message, then
the local values of snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime
corresponding to the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineID
field are extracted from the Local Configuration Datastore.
a) If the extracted value of msgAuthoritativeEngineID is the
same as the value of snmpEngineID of the processing SNMP
engine (meaning this is the authoritative SNMP engine),
then if any of the following conditions is true, then the
message is considered to be outside of the Time Window:
- the local value of snmpEngineBoots is 2147483647; 3
- the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots field differs
from the local value of snmpEngineBoots; or,
- the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineTime field differs
from the local notion of snmpEngineTime by more than
+/- 150 seconds.
If the message is considered to be outside of the Time Window
then the usmStatsNotInTimeWindows counter is incremented and
an error indication (notInTimeWindow) together with the OID
and value of the incremented counter is returned to the
calling module.
b) If the extracted value of msgAuthoritativeEngineID is not the
same as the value snmpEngineID of the processing SNMP engine
(meaning this is not the authoritative SNMP engine), then:
1) if at least one of the following conditions is true:
- the extracted value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots
field is greater than the local notion of the value of
snmpEngineBoots; or,
- the extracted value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots
field is equal to the local notion of the value of
snmpEngineBoots, the extracted value of
msgAuthoritativeEngineTime field is greater than the
value of latestReceivedEngineTime, |
|
then the LCD entry corresponding to the extracted value
of the msgAuthoritativeEngineID field is updated, by
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setting:
- the local notion of the value of snmpEngineBoots to
the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots field,
- the local notion of the value of snmpEngineTime to
the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineTime field,
and
- the latestReceivedEngineTime to the value of the
value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineTime field.
2) if any of the following conditions is true, then the
message is considered to be outside of the Time Window:
- the local notion of the value of snmpEngineBoots is
2147483647; 3
- the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots field is
less than the local notion of the value of
snmpEngineBoots; or,
- the value of the msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots field is
equal to the local notion of the value of
snmpEngineBoots and the value of the
msgAuthoritativeEngineTime field is more than 150
seconds less than the local notion of of the value of
snmpEngineTime.
If the message is considered to be outside of the Time
Window then an error indication (notInTimeWindow) is
returned to the calling module;
Note that this means that a too old (possibly replayed)
message has been detected and is deemed unauthentic.
Note that this procedure allows for the value of
msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots in the message to be greater
than the local notion of the value of snmpEngineBoots to
allow for received messages to be accepted as authentic
when received from an authoritative SNMP engine that has
re-booted since the receiving SNMP engine last
(re-)synchronized.
Note that this procedure does not allow for automatic
time synchronization if the non-authoritative SNMP engine
has a real out-of-sync situation whereby the authoritative
SNMP engine is more than 150 seconds behind the
non-authoritative SNMP engine.
8) a) If the securityLevel indicates that the message was protected
from disclosure, then the OCTET STRING representing the
encryptedPDU is decrypted according to the user's privacy
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protocol to obtain an unencrypted serialized scopedPDU value.
To do so a call is made to the privacy module that implements
the user's privacy protocol according to the abstract
primitive:
statusInformation = -- success or failure
decryptData(
IN decryptKey -- the user's localized privKey 3
IN privParameters -- as received on the wire
IN encryptedData -- encryptedPDU as received
OUT decryptedData -- serialized decrypted scopedPDU
)
statusInformation
indicates if the decryption process was successful or not.
decryptKey
the user's localized private privKey is the secret key that 3
can be used by the decryption algorithm. 3
privParameters
the msgPrivacyParameters, encoded as an OCTET STRING.
encryptedData
the encryptedPDU represents the encrypted scopedPDU,
encoded as an OCTET STRING.
decryptedData
the serialized scopedPDU if decryption is successful.
If the privacy module returns failure, then the message can
not be processed, so the usmStatsDecryptionErrors counter
is incremented and an error indication (decryptionError) 4
together with the OID and value of the incremented counter
is returned to the calling module.
If the privacy module returns success, then the decrypted
scopedPDU is the message payload to be returned to the
calling module.
Otherwise,
b) The scopedPDU component is assumed to be in plain text
and is the message payload to be returned to the calling
module.
9) The maxSizeResponseScopedPDU is calculated. This is the
maximum size allowed for a scopedPDU for a possible Response
message. Provision is made for a message header that allows
the same securityLevel as the received Request.
10) The securityName for the user is retrieved from the
usmUserTable.
11) The security data is cached as cachedSecurityData, so that a
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possible response to this message can and will use the same
authentication and privacy secrets, the same securityLevel and
the same value for msgAuthoritativeEngineID. Information to be
saved/cached is as follows:
msgUserName,
usmUserAuthProtocol, usmUserAuthKey
usmUserPrivProtocol, usmUserPrivKey
securityEngineID, securityLevel
12) The statusInformation is set to success and a return is made to
the calling module passing back the OUT parameters as specified
in the processIncomingMsg primitive.
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4. Discovery
The User-based Security Model requires that a discovery process
obtains sufficient information about other SNMP engines in order
to communicate with them. Discovery requires an non-authoritative
SNMP engine to learn the authoritative SNMP engine's snmpEngineID
value before communication may proceed. This may be accomplished by
generating a Request message with a securityLevel of noAuthNoPriv,
a msgUserName of "initial", a msgAuthoritativeEngineID value of zero
length, and the varBindList left empty.
The response to this message will be a Report message containing
the snmpEngineID of the authoritative SNMP engine as the value of
the msgAuthoritativeEngineID field within the msgSecurityParameters
field. It contains a Report PDU with the usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs
counter in the varBindList.
If authenticated communication is required, then the discovery
process should also establish time synchronization with the
authoritative SNMP engine. This may be accomplished by sending an
authenticated Request message with the value of
msgAuthoritativeEngineID set to the newly learned snmpEngineID and
with the values of msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and
msgAuthoritativeEngineTime set to zero.
The response to this authenticated message will be a Report message
containing the up to date values of the authoritative SNMP engine's
snmpEngineBoots and snmpEngineTime as the value of the
msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and msgAuthoritativeEngineTime fields
respectively. It also contains the usmStatsNotInTimeWindows counter
in the varBindList of the Report PDU. The time synchronization then
happens automatically as part of the procedures in section 3.2
step 7b. See also section 2.3.
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5. Definitions
SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY,
snmpModules, Counter32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TestAndIncr,
RowStatus, RowPointer,
StorageType, AutonomousType FROM SNMPv2-TC
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF
SnmpAdminString, SnmpEngineID,
snmpAuthProtocols, snmpPrivProtocols FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB;
snmpUsmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "9709290000Z" -- 29 Sept 1997, midnight |
ORGANIZATION "SNMPv3 Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO "WG-email: snmpv3@tis.com
Subscribe: majordomo@tis.com
In msg body: subscribe snmpv3
Chair: Russ Mundy
Trusted Information Systems
postal: 3060 Washington Rd
Glenwood MD 21738
USA
email: mundy@tis.com
phone: +1-301-854-6889
Co-editor Uri Blumenthal
IBM T. J. Watson Research
postal: 30 Saw Mill River Pkwy,
Hawthorne, NY 10532
USA
email: uri@watson.ibm.com
phone: +1-914-784-7964
Co-editor: Bert Wijnen
IBM T. J. Watson Research
postal: Schagen 33
3461 GL Linschoten
Netherlands
email: wijnen@vnet.ibm.com
phone: +31-348-432-794
"
DESCRIPTION "The management information definitions for the
SNMP User-based Security Model.
"
::= { snmpModules 9 } -- to be verified with IANA
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-- Administrative assignments ****************************************
usmAdmin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpUsmMIB 1 }
usmMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpUsmMIB 2 }
usmMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpUsmMIB 3 }
-- Identification of Authentication and Privacy Protocols ************
usmNoAuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "No Authentication Protocol."
::= { snmpAuthProtocols 1 }
usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY |
STATUS current |
DESCRIPTION "The HMAC-MD5-96 Digest Authentication Protocol." |
REFERENCE "- H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti HMAC: |
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, |
RFC2104, Feb 1997. |
- Rivest, R., Message Digest Algorithm MD5, RFC1321. |
" |
::= { snmpAuthProtocols 2 } |
|
usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY |
STATUS current |
DESCRIPTION "The HMAC-SHA-96 Digest Authentication Protocol." |
REFERENCE "- H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: |
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, |
RFC2104, Feb 1997. |
- Secure Hash Algorithm. NIST FIPS 180-1. | |
" |
::= { snmpAuthProtocols 3 } |
|
usmNoPrivProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "No Privacy Protocol."
::= { snmpPrivProtocols 1 }
usmDESPrivProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol."
REFERENCE "- Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46-1.
Supersedes FIPS Publication 46,
(January, 1977; reaffirmed January, 1988).
- Data Encryption Algorithm, American National
Standards Institute. ANSI X3.92-1981,
(December, 1980).
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- DES Modes of Operation, National Institute of
Standards and Technology. Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 81,
(December, 1980).
- Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation,
American National Standards Institute.
ANSI X3.106-1983, (May 1983).
"
::= { snmpPrivProtocols 2 }
-- Textual Conventions ***********************************************
-- Editor's note:
-- If in the future the MD5 gets replaced by another Authentication
-- algorithm, then it seems we also need to use that new algorithm to
-- calculate the digest during KeyChange. So this TC has been defined
-- to cater for that.
-- End Editor's note
KeyChange ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Every definition of an object with this syntax must identify
a protocol, P, a secret key, K, and a hash algorithm, H |
that produces output of L octets. |
|
The object's value is a manager-generated, partially-random
value which, when modified, causes the value of the secret
key, K, to be modified via a one-way function.
The value of an instance of this object is the concatenation
of two components: a 'random' component and a 'delta'
component. The lengths of the random and delta components
are given by the corresponding value of the protocol, P;
if P requires K to be a fixed length, the length of both the
random and delta components is that fixed length; if P
allows the length of K to be variable up to a particular
maximum length, the length of the random component is that
maximum length and the length of the delta component is any
length less than or equal to that maximum length.
For example, usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed |
length of 16 octets and L - of 16 octets. |
usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol requires K to be a fixed length of |
20 octets and L - of 20 octets. Other protocols may define |
other sizes, as deemed appropriate. |
When an instance of this object is modified to have a new
value by the management protocol, the agent generates a new
value of K as follows:
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- a temporary variable is initialized to the existing value
of K;
- if the length of the delta component is greater than 16
octets, then: |
- the random component is appended to the value of the
temporary variable, and the result is input to the
the hash algorithm H to produce a digest value, and
the temporary variable is set to this digest value;
- the value of the temporary variable is XOR-ed with
the first (next) L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) |
of the delta component to produce the first (next) |
L-octets (16 octets in case of MD5) of the new value |
of K. |
- the above two steps are repeated until the unused
portion of the delta component is 16 octets or less,
- the random component is appended to the value of the
temporary variable, and the result is input to the
hash algorithm H to produce a digest value;
- this digest value, truncated if necessary to be the same
length as the unused portion of the delta component, is
XOR-ed with the unused portion of the delta component to
produce the (final portion of the) new value of K.
for example, using MD5 as the hash algorithm H:
iterations = (lenOfDelta - 1)/16; /* integer division */
temp = keyOld;
for (i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
temp = MD5 (temp || random);
keyNew[i*16 .. (i*16)+15] =
temp XOR delta[i*16 .. (i*16)+15];
}
temp = MD5 (temp || random);
keyNew[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1] =
temp XOR delta[i*16 .. lenOfDelta-1];
The value of an object with this syntax, whenever it is
retrieved by the management protocol, is always the zero
length string.
"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING
-- Statistics for the User-based Security Model **********************
usmStats OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBObjects 1 }
usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they requested a
securityLevel that was unknown to the SNMP engine
or otherwise unavailable.
"
::= { usmStats 1 }
usmStatsNotInTimeWindows OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they appeared
outside of the authoritative SNMP engine's window.
"
::= { usmStats 2 }
usmStatsUnknownUserNames OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they referenced a
user that was not known to the SNMP engine.
"
::= { usmStats 3 }
usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they referenced an
snmpEngineID that was not known to the SNMP engine.
"
::= { usmStats 4 }
usmStatsWrongDigests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they didn't
contain the expected digest value.
"
::= { usmStats 5 }
usmStatsDecryptionErrors OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION "The total number of packets received by the SNMP
engine which were dropped because they could not be
decrypted.
"
::= { usmStats 6 }
-- The usmUser Group ************************************************
usmUser OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBObjects 2 }
usmUserSpinLock OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TestAndIncr
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An advisory lock used to allow several cooperating
Command Generator Applications to coordinate their
use of facilities to alter secrets in the
usmUserTable.
"
::= { usmUser 1 }
-- The table of valid users for the User-based Security Model ********
usmUserTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF UsmUserEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The table of users configured in the SNMP engine's
Local Configuration Datastore (LCD)."
::= { usmUser 2 }
usmUserEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX UsmUserEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A user configured in the SNMP engine's Local
Configuration Datastore (LCD) for the User-based
Security Model.
"
INDEX { usmUserEngineID,
usmUserName
}
::= { usmUserTable 1 }
UsmUserEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
usmUserEngineID SnmpEngineID,
usmUserName SnmpAdminString,
usmUserSecurityName SnmpAdminString,
usmUserCloneFrom RowPointer,
usmUserAuthProtocol AutonomousType,
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usmUserAuthKeyChange KeyChange,
usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange KeyChange,
usmUserPrivProtocol AutonomousType,
usmUserPrivKeyChange KeyChange,
usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange KeyChange,
usmUserPublic OCTET STRING,
usmUserStorageType StorageType,
usmUserStatus RowStatus
}
usmUserEngineID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpEngineID
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An SNMP engine's administratively-unique identifier.
In a simple agent, this value is always that agent's
own snmpEngineID value.
The value can also take the value of the snmpEngineID
of a remote SNMP engine with which this user can
communicate.
"
::= { usmUserEntry 1 }
usmUserName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32))
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A human readable string representing the name of
the user.
This is the (User-based Security) Model dependent
security ID.
"
::= { usmUserEntry 2 }
usmUserSecurityName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A human readable string representing the user in
Security Model independent format.
The default transformation of the User-based Security
Model dependent security ID to the securityName and
vice versa is the identity function so that the
securityName is the same as the userName.
"
::= { usmUserEntry 3 }
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usmUserCloneFrom OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowPointer
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A pointer to another conceptual row in this
usmUserTable. The user in this other conceptual
row is called the clone-from user.
When a new user is created (i.e., a new conceptual
row is instantiated in this table), the privacy and
authentication parameters of the new user are cloned
from its clone-from user.
The first time an instance of this object is set by
a management operation (either at or after its
instantiation), the cloning process is invoked.
Subsequent writes are successful but invoke no
action to be taken by the receiver.
The cloning process fails with an 'inconsistentName'
error if the conceptual row representing the
clone-from user is not in an active state when the
cloning process is invoked.
Cloning also causes the initial values of the secret
authentication key and the secret encryption key of
the new user to be set to the same value as the
corresponding secret of the clone-from user.
When this object is read, the ZeroDotZero OID
is returned.
"
::= { usmUserEntry 4 }
usmUserAuthProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AutonomousType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of
this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
usmUserEngineID, can be authenticated, and if so,
the type of authentication protocol which is used.
An instance of this object is created concurrently
with the creation of any other object instance for
the same user (i.e., as part of the processing of
the set operation which creates the first object
instance in the same conceptual row). Once created,
the value of an instance of this object can not be
changed.
|
If a set operation tries to set a value for an unknown |
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or unsupported protocol, then a wrongValue error must |
be returned. |
"
DEFVAL { usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol } |
::= { usmUserEntry 5 }
usmUserAuthKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX KeyChange -- typically (SIZE (0..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An object, which when modified, causes the secret
authentication key used for messages sent on behalf
of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way
function.
The associated protocol is the usmUserAuthProtocol.
The associated secret key is the user's secret
authentication key (authKey). The associated hash
algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's
usmUserAuthProtocol.
When creating a new user, it is an 'inconsistentName'
error for a Set operation to refer to this object
unless it is previously or concurrently initialized
through a set operation on the corresponding value
of usmUserCloneFrom.
"
DEFVAL { ''H } -- the empty string
::= { usmUserEntry 6 }
usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX KeyChange -- typically (SIZE (0..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Behaves exactly as usmUserAuthKeyChange, with one
notable difference: in order for the Set operation
to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation
requester must match the usmUserName that
indexes the row which is targeted by this
operation.
The idea here is that access to this column can be
public, since it will only allow a user to change
his own secret authentication key (authKey).
"
DEFVAL { ''H } -- the empty string
::= { usmUserEntry 7 }
usmUserPrivProtocol OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AutonomousType
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MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An indication of whether messages sent on behalf of
this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
usmUserEngineID, can be protected from disclosure,
and if so, the type of privacy protocol which is used.
An instance of this object is created concurrently
with the creation of any other object instance for
the same user (i.e., as part of the processing of
the set operation which creates the first object
instance in the same conceptual row). Once created,
the value of an instance of this object can not be
changed.
|
If a set operation tries to set a value for an unknown |
or unsupported protocol, then a wrongValue error must |
be returned. |
"
DEFVAL { usmNoPrivProtocol }
::= { usmUserEntry 8 }
usmUserPrivKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX KeyChange -- typically (SIZE (0..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An object, which when modified, causes the secret
encryption key used for messages sent on behalf
of this user to/from the SNMP engine identified by
usmUserEngineID, to be modified via a one-way
function.
The associated protocol is the usmUserPrivProtocol.
The associated secret key is the user's secret
privacy key (privKey). The associated hash
algorithm is the algorithm used by the user's
usmUserAuthProtocol.
When creating a new user, it is an 'inconsistentName'
error for a set operation to refer to this object
unless it is previously or concurrently initialized
through a set operation on the corresponding value
of usmUserCloneFrom.
"
DEFVAL { ''H } -- the empty string
::= { usmUserEntry 9 }
usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX KeyChange -- typically (SIZE (0..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION "Behaves exactly as usmUserPrivKeyChange, with one
notable difference: in order for the Set operation
to succeed, the usmUserName of the operation
requester must match the usmUserName that indexes
the row which is targeted by this operation.
The idea here is that access to this column can be
public, since it will only allow a user to change
his own secret privacy key (privKey).
"
DEFVAL { ''H } -- the empty string
::= { usmUserEntry 10 }
usmUserPublic OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A publicly-readable value which is written as part
of the procedure for changing a user's secret
authentication and/or privacy key, and later read to
determine whether the change of the secret was
effected.
"
DEFVAL { ''H } -- the empty string
::= { usmUserEntry 11 }
usmUserStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The storage type for this conceptual row.
Conceptual rows having the value 'permanent'
must allow write-access at a minimum to:
- usmUserAuthKeyChange, usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange
and usmUserPublic for a user who employs
authentication, and
- usmUserPrivKeyChange, usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange
and usmUserPublic for a user who employs
privacy.
Note that any user who employs authentication or
privacy must allow its secret(s) to be updated and
thus cannot be 'readOnly'.
"
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { usmUserEntry 12 }
usmUserStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
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MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The status of this conceptual row.
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the
corresponding instance of the usmUserStatus column
is 'notReady'.
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made
active until the corresponding usmUserCloneFrom,
usmUserAuthKeyChange, usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange,
usmUserPrivKeyChange and usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange
have all been set.
The RowStatus TC [RFC1903] requires that this
DESCRIPTION clause states under which circumstances
other objects in this row can be modified:
The value of this object has no effect on whether
other objects in this conceptual row can be modified.
"
::= { usmUserEntry 13 }
-- Conformance Information *******************************************
usmMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBConformance 1 }
usmMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { usmMIBConformance 2 }
-- Compliance statements
usmMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines which
implement the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB.
"
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { usmMIBBasicGroup }
OBJECT usmUserAuthProtocol
MIN-ACCESS read-only
DESCRIPTION "Write access is not required."
OBJECT usmUserPrivProtocol
MIN-ACCESS read-only
DESCRIPTION "Write access is not required."
::= { usmMIBCompliances 1 }
-- Units of compliance
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usmMIBBasicGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels,
usmStatsNotInTimeWindows,
usmStatsUnknownUserNames,
usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs,
usmStatsWrongDigests,
usmStatsDecryptionErrors,
usmUserSpinLock,
usmUserSecurityName,
usmUserCloneFrom,
usmUserAuthProtocol,
usmUserAuthKeyChange,
usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange,
usmUserPrivProtocol,
usmUserPrivKeyChange,
usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange,
usmUserPublic,
usmUserStorageType,
usmUserStatus
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects providing for configuration
of an SNMP engine which implements the SNMP
User-based Security Model.
"
::= { usmMIBGroups 1 }
END
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6. HMAC-MD5-96 Authentication Protocol |
|
This section describes the HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol. |
This authentication protocol is the first defined for |
the User-based Security Model. It uses MD5 hash-function which |
is described in [MD5], in HMAC mode described in [RFC2104], |
truncating the output to 96 bits. |
|
This protocol is identified by usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol. |
Over time, other authentication protocols may be defined either
as a replacement of this protocol or in addition to this protocol.
6.1. Mechanisms
- In support of data integrity, a message digest algorithm is
required. A digest is calculated over an appropriate portion
of an SNMP message and included as part of the message sent
to the recipient.
- In support of data origin authentication and data integrity, |
a secret value is prepended to SNMP message prior to computing the |
digest; the calculated digest is partially inserted into the SNMP |
message prior to transmission, and the prepended value is not |
transmitted. The secret value is shared by all SNMP engines |
authorized to originate messages on behalf of the appropriate user. |
3
3
6.1.1. Digest Authentication Mechanism |
The Digest Authentication Mechanism defined in this memo provides |
for:
- verification of the integrity of a received message, i.e., the |
message received is the message sent. |
The integrity of the message is protected by computing a digest
over an appropriate portion of the message. The digest is
computed by the originator of the message, transmitted with the
message, and verified by the recipient of the message.
- verification of the user on whose behalf the message was generated. |
|
A secret value known only to SNMP engines authorized to |
generate messages on behalf of a user is used in HMAC mode |
(see [RFC2104]). It also recommends the hash-function output |
used as Message Authentication Code, to be truncated. |
This protocol uses the MD5 [MD5] message digest algorithm.
A 128-bit MD5 digest is calculated in a special (HMAC) way over |
the designated portion of an SNMP message and the first 96 bits |
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o this digest is included as part of the message sent to the |
recipient. The size of the digest carried in a message is 12 |
octets. The size of the private authentication key (the secret) |
is 16 octets. For the details see section 6.3. |
6.2. Elements of the Digest Authentication Protocol
This section contains definitions required to realize the
authentication module defined in this section of this memo. |
6.2.1. Users
Authentication using this authentication protocol makes
use of a defined set of userNames. For any user on whose behalf a
message must be authenticated at a particular SNMP engine, that
SNMP engine must have knowledge of that user. An SNMP engine that
wishes to communicate with another SNMP engine must also have
knowledge of a user known to that engine, including knowledge of
the applicable attributes of that user.
A user and its attributes are defined as follows:
<userName>
A string representing the name of the user.
<authKey>
A user's secret key to be used when calculating a digest.
It MUST be 16 octets long for MD5. |
6.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID
The msgAuthoritativeEngineID value contained in an authenticated
message specifies the authoritative SNMP engine for that particular
message (see the definition of SnmpEngineID in the SNMP
Architecture document [SNMP-ARCH]).
The user's (private) authentication key is normally different at
each authoritative SNMP engine and so the snmpEngineID is used
to select the proper key for the authentication process.
6.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Authentication Protocol
Messages using this authentication protocol carry a
msgAuthenticationParameters field as part of the
msgSecurityParameters. For this protocol, the
msgAuthenticationParameters field is the serialized OCTET STRING
representing the first 12 octets of the HMAC-MD5-96 output done |
over the wholeMsg. |
The digest is calculated over the wholeMsg so if a message is
authenticated, that also means that all the fields in the message
are intact and have not been tampered with.
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6.2.4. Services provided by the HMAC-MD5-96 Authentication Module |
|
This section describes the inputs and outputs that the HMAC-MD5-96 |
Authentication module expects and produces when the User-based |
Security module calls the HMAC-MD5-96 Authentication module for |
services. |
6.2.4.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message
The HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol assumes that the selection |
of the authKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes
the secret key to be used.
Upon completion the authentication module returns statusInformation
and, if the message digest was correctly calculated, the wholeMsg
with the digest inserted at the proper place. The abstract service
primitive is:
statusInformation = -- success or failure
authenticateOutgoingMsg(
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication
IN wholeMsg -- unauthenticated complete message
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message
)
The abstract data elements are:
statusInformation
An indication of whether the authentication process was
successful. If not it is an indication of the problem.
authKey
The secret key to be used by the authentication algorithm.
The length of this key MUST be 16 octets. |
wholeMsg
The message to be authenticated.
authenticatedWholeMsg
The authenticated message (including inserted digest) on output.
Note, that authParameters field is filled by the authentication
module and this field should be already present in the wholeMsg
before the Message Authentication Code (MAC) is generated.
6.2.4.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message
The HMAC-MD5-96 authentication protocol assumes that the selection |
of the authKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes |
the secret key to be used. |
Upon completion the authentication module returns statusInformation
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and, if the message digest was correctly calculated, the wholeMsg
as it was processed. The abstract service primitive is:
statusInformation = -- success or failure
authenticateIncomingMsg(
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication
IN authParameters -- as received on the wire
IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message
)
The abstract data elements are:
statusInformation
An indication of whether the authentication process was
successful. If not it is an indication of the problem.
authKey
The secret key to be used by the authentication algorithm.
The length of this key MUST be 16 octets. |
authParameters
The authParameters from the incoming message.
wholeMsg
The message to be authenticated on input and the authenticated
message on output.
authenticatedWholeMsg
The whole message after the authentication check is complete.
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6.3. Elements of Procedure
This section describes the procedures for the HMAC-MD5-96 |
authentication protocol.
6.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must authenticate an outgoing message using the
usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol. |
1) The msgAuthenticationParameters field is set to the
serialization, according to the rules in [RFC1906], of an
OCTET STRING containing 96 zero octets. |
|
2) From the secret authKey, two keys K1 and K2 are derived: 3
3
a) extend the authKey to 64 octets by appending 48 zero |
octets; save it as extendedAuthKey |
b) obtain IPAD by replicating the octet 0x36 64 times; |
c) obtain K1 by XORing extendedAuthKey with IPAD; |
d) obtain OPAD by replicating the octet 0x5C 64 times; |
e) obtain K2 by XORing extendedAuthKey with OPAD. |
|
4) Prepend K1 to the wholeMsg and calculate MD5 digest over it |
according to [MD5]. |
|
5) Prepend K2 to the result of the step 4 and calculate MD5 digest |
over it according to [MD5]. Take the first 12 octets of the final |
digest - this is Message Authentication Code (MAC). |
|
6) Replace the msgAuthenticationParameters field with MAC obtained |
in the step 5. |
|
7) The authenticatedWholeMsg is then returned to the caller |
together with statusInformation indicating success. |
|
6.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must authenticate an incoming message using the
usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol. |
|
1) If the digest received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field |
is not 12 octets long, then an failure and an errorIndication |
(authenticationError) is returned to the calling module. |
|
2) The MAC received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field |
is saved. |
|
3) The digest in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced |
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by the 12 zero octets. |
|
4) From the secret authKey, two keys K1 and K2 are derived: 3
3
a) extend the authKey to 64 octets by appending 48 zero |
octets; save it as extendedAuthKey |
b) obtain IPAD by replicating the octet 0x36 64 times; |
c) obtain K1 by XORing extendedAuthKey with IPAD; |
d) obtain OPAD by replicating the octet 0x5C 64 times; |
e) obtain K2 by XORing extendedAuthKey with OPAD. |
|
5) The MAC is calculated over the wholeMsg: |
|
a) prepend K1 to the wholeMsg and calculate the MD5 digest |
over it; |
b) prepend K2 to the result of step 5.a and calculate the |
MD5 digest over it; |
c) first 12 octets of the result of step 5.b is the MAC. |
|
The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the |
MAC value that was saved in step 2. |
|
6) Then the newly calculated MAC is compared with the MAC |
saved in step 2. If they do not match, then an failure |
and an errorIndication (authenticationFailure) is returned to |
the calling module. |
|
7) The authenticatedWholeMsg and statusInformation indicating |
success are then returned to the caller. |
|
|
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7. HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol |
|
This section describes the HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol. |
This protocol uses the SHA hash-function which is described in |
[SHA-NIST], in HMAC mode described in [RFC2104], truncating |
the output to 96 bits. |
|
This protocol is identified by usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol. |
|
Over time, other authentication protocols may be defined either |
as a replacement of this protocol or in addition to this protocol. |
|
7.1. Mechanisms |
|
- In support of data integrity, a message digest algorithm is |
required. A digest is calculated over an appropriate portion |
of an SNMP message and included as part of the message sent |
to the recipient. |
|
- In support of data origin authentication and data integrity, |
a secret value is prepended to the SNMP message prior to |
computing the digest; the calculated digest is then partially |
inserted into the message prior to transmission. The prepended |
secret is not transmitted. The secret value is shared by all |
SNMP engines authorized to originate messages on behalf of the |
appropriate user. |
3
3
7.1.1. Digest Authentication Mechanism |
|
The Digest Authentication Mechanism defined in this memo provides |
for: |
|
- verification of the integrity of a received message, i.e., the |
the message received is the message sent. |
|
The integrity of the message is protected by computing a digest |
over an appropriate portion of the message. The digest is |
computed by the originator of the message, transmitted with the |
message, and verified by the recipient of the message. |
|
- verification of the user on whose behalf the message was generated. |
|
A secret value known only to SNMP engines authorized to |
generate messages on behalf of a user is used in HMAC mode |
(see [RFC2104]). It also recommends the hash-function output |
used as Message Authentication Code, to be truncated. |
|
This mechanism uses the SHA [SHA-NIST] message digest algorithm. |
A 160-bit SHA digest is calculated in a special (HMAC) way over |
the designated portion of an SNMP message and the first 96 bits |
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of this digest is included as part of the message sent to the |
recipient. The size of the digest carried in a message is 12 |
octets. The size of the private authentication key (the secret) |
is 20 octets. For the details see section 7.3. |
|
7.2. Elements of the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol |
|
This section contains definitions required to realize the |
authentication module defined in this section of this memo. |
|
7.2.1. Users |
|
Authentication using this authentication protocol makes use |
of a defined set of userNames. For any user on whose behalf a |
message must be authenticated at a particular SNMP engine, that |
SNMP engine must have knowledge of that user. An SNMP engine that |
wishes to communicate with another SNMP engine must also have |
knowledge of a user known to that engine, including knowledge of |
the applicable attributes of that user. |
|
A user and its attributes are defined as follows: |
|
<userName> |
A string representing the name of the user. |
<authKey> |
A user's secret key to be used when calculating a digest. |
It MUST be 20 octets long for SHA. |
|
7.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID |
|
The msgAuthoritativeEngineID value contained in an authenticated |
message specifies the authoritative SNMP engine for that particular |
message (see the definition of SnmpEngineID in the SNMP |
Architecture document [SNMP-ARCH]). |
|
The user's (private) authentication key is normally different at |
each authoritative SNMP engine and so the snmpEngineID is used |
to select the proper key for the authentication process. |
|
7.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Authentication Protocol |
|
Messages using this authentication protocol carry a |
msgAuthenticationParameters field as part of the |
msgSecurityParameters. For this protocol, the |
msgAuthenticationParameters field is the serialized |
OCTET STRING representing the first 12 octets of HMAC-SHA-96 |
output done over the wholeMsg. |
|
The digest is calculated over the wholeMsg so if a message is |
authenticated, that also means that all the fields in the |
message are intact and have not been tampered with. |
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|
7.2.4. Services provided by the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Module |
|
This section describes the inputs and outputs that the HMAC-SHA-96 |
Authentication module expects and produces when the User-based |
Security module calls the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication module |
for services. |
|
|
7.2.4.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message |
|
HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol assumes that the selection |
of the authKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes |
the secret key to be used. |
|
Upon completion the authentication module returns statusInformation |
and, if the message digest was correctly calculated, the wholeMsg |
with the digest inserted at the proper place. The abstract service |
primitive is: |
|
statusInformation = -- success or failure |
authenticateOutgoingMsg( |
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication |
IN wholeMsg -- unauthenticated complete message |
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message |
) |
|
The abstract data elements are: |
|
statusInformation |
An indication of whether the authentication process was |
successful. If not it is an indication of the problem. |
authKey |
The secret key to be used by the authentication algorithm. |
The length of this key MUST be 20 octets. |
wholeMsg |
The message to be authenticated. |
authenticatedWholeMsg |
The authenticated message (including inserted digest) on output. |
|
Note, that authParameters field is filled by the authentication |
module and this field should be already present in the wholeMsg |
before the Message Authentication Code (MAC) is generated. |
|
7.2.4.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message |
|
HMAC-SHA-96 authentication protocol assumes that the selection |
of the authKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes |
the secret key to be used. |
|
Upon completion the authentication module returns statusInformation |
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and, if the message digest was correctly calculated, the wholeMsg |
as it was processed. The abstract service primitive is: |
|
statusInformation = -- success or failure |
authenticateIncomingMsg( |
IN authKey -- secret key for authentication |
IN authParameters -- as received on the wire |
IN wholeMsg -- as received on the wire |
OUT authenticatedWholeMsg -- complete authenticated message |
) |
|
The abstract data elements are: |
|
statusInformation |
An indication of whether the authentication process was |
successful. If not it is an indication of the problem. |
authKey |
The secret key to be used by the authentication algorithm. |
The length of this key MUST be 20 octets. |
authParameters |
The authParameters from the incoming message. |
wholeMsg |
The message to be authenticated on input and the authenticated |
message on output. |
authenticatedWholeMsg |
The whole message after the authentication check is complete. |
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7.3. Elements of Procedure |
|
This section describes the procedures for the HMAC-SHA-96 |
authentication protocol. |
|
7.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message |
|
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine |
whenever it must authenticate an outgoing message using the |
usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol. |
|
1) The msgAuthenticationParameters field is set to the |
serialization, according to the rules in [RFC1906], of an |
OCTET STRING containing 12 zero octets. |
|
2) From the secret authKey, two keys K1 and K2 are derived: 3
3
a) extend the authKey to 64 octets by appending 44 zero |
octets; save it as extendedAuthKey |
b) obtain IPAD by replicating the octet 0x36 64 times; |
c) obtain K1 by XORing extendedAuthKey with IPAD; |
d) obtain OPAD by replicating the octet 0x5C 64 times; |
e) obtain K2 by XORing extendedAuthKey with OPAD. |
|
4) Prepend K1 to the wholeMsg and calculate the SHA digest over it |
according to [SHA-NIST]. |
|
5) Prepend K2 to the result of the step 4 and calculate SHA digest |
over it according to [SHA-NIST]. Take the first 12 octets of the |
final digest - this is Message Authentication Code (MAC). |
|
6) Replace the msgAuthenticationParameters field with MAC obtained |
in the step 5. |
|
7) The authenticatedWholeMsg is then returned to the caller |
together with statusInformation indicating success. |
|
7.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message |
|
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine |
whenever it must authenticate an incoming message using the |
usmHMACSHAAuthProtocol. |
|
1) If the digest received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field |
is not 12 octets long, then an failure and an errorIndication |
(authenticationError) is returned to the calling module. |
|
2) The MAC received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field |
is saved. |
|
3) The digest in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is |
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replaced by the 12 zero octets. |
|
4) From the secret authKey, two keys K1 and K2 are derived: 3
3
a) extend the authKey to 64 octets by appending 44 zero |
octets; save it as extendedAuthKey |
b) obtain IPAD by replicating the octet 0x36 64 times; |
c) obtain K1 by XORing extendedAuthKey with IPAD; |
d) obtain OPAD by replicating the octet 0x5C 64 times; |
e) obtain K2 by XORing extendedAuthKey with OPAD. |
|
5) The MAC is calculated over the wholeMsg: |
|
a) prepend K1 to the wholeMsg and calculate the SHA digest |
over it; |
b) prepend K2 to the result of step 5.a and calculate the |
SHA digest over it; |
c) first 12 octets of the result of step 5.b is the MAC. |
|
The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the |
MAC value that was saved in step 2. |
|
6) The the newly calculated MAC is compared with the MAC saved in |
step 2. If they do not match, then a failure and an |
errorIndication (authenticationFailure) are returned to the |
calling module. |
|
7) The authenticatedWholeMsg and statusInformation indicating |
success are then returned to the caller. |
|
|
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8. CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol |
|
This section describes the CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol. |
This protocol is the first privacy protocol defined for the
User-based Security Model.
This protocol is identified by usmDESPrivProtocol.
Over time, other privacy protocols may be defined either
as a replacement of this protocol or in addition to this protocol.
8.1. Mechanisms |
- In support of data confidentiality, an encryption algorithm is
required. An appropriate portion of the message is encrypted
prior to being transmitted. The User-based Security Model
specifies that the scopedPDU is the portion of the message
that needs to be encrypted.
- A secret value in combination with a timeliness value is used
to create the en/decryption key and the initialization vector.
The secret value is shared by all SNMP engines authorized to
originate messages on behalf of the appropriate user.
3
3
8.1.1. Symmetric Encryption Protocol |
The Symmetric Encryption Protocol defined in this memo provides
support for data confidentiality. The designated portion of an
SNMP message is encrypted and included as part of the message
sent to the recipient.
Two organizations have published specifications defining the DES:
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[DES-NIST] and the American National Standards Institute
[DES-ANSI]. There is a companion Modes of Operation specification
for each definition ([DESO-NIST] and [DESO-ANSI], respectively).
The NIST has published three additional documents that implementers
may find useful.
- There is a document with guidelines for implementing and using
the DES, including functional specifications for the DES and
its modes of operation [DESG-NIST].
- There is a specification of a validation test suite for the DES
[DEST-NIST]. The suite is designed to test all aspects of the
DES and is useful for pinpointing specific problems.
- There is a specification of a maintenance test for the DES
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[DESM-NIST]. The test utilizes a minimal amount of data and
processing to test all components of the DES. It provides a
simple yes-or-no indication of correct operation and is useful
to run as part of an initialization step, e.g., when a computer
re-boots.
8.1.1.1. DES key and Initialization Vector. |
The first 8 octets of the 16-octet secret (private privacy key) are |
used as a DES key. Since DES uses only 56 bits, the Least
Significant Bit in each octet is disregarded. |
The Initialization Vector for encryption is obtained using the
following procedure.
The last 8 octets of the 16-octet secret (private privacy key) |
are used as pre-IV.
In order to ensure that the IV for two different packets encrypted
by the same key, are not the same (i.e., the IV does not repeat) we |
need to "salt" the pre-IV with something unique per packet.
An 8-octet string is used as the "salt". The concatenation |
of the generating SNMP engine's 32-bit snmpEngineBoots and a local
32-bit integer, that the encryption engine maintains, is input to
the "salt". The 32-bit integer is initialized to an arbitrary
value at boot time.
The 32-bit snmpEngineBoots is converted to the first 4 octets |
(Most Significant Byte first) of our "salt". The 32-bit integer
is then converted to the last 4 octet (Most Significant Byte first) |
of our "salt". The resulting "salt" is then XOR-ed with the
pre-IV. The 8-octet "salt" is then put into the privParameters
field encoded as an OCTET STRING. The "salt" integer is then
modified. We recommend that it be incremented by one and wrap
when it reaches the maximum value.
How exactly the value of the "salt" (and thus of the IV) varies,
is an implementation issue, as long as the measures are taken to
avoid producing a duplicate IV.
The "salt" must be placed in the privParameters field to enable the
receiving entity to compute the correct IV and to decrypt the
message.
8.1.1.2. Data Encryption. |
The data to be encrypted is treated as sequence of octets. Its
length should be an integral multiple of 8 - and if it is not, the
data is padded at the end as necessary. The actual pad value
is irrelevant.
The data is encrypted in Cipher Block Chaining mode.
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The plaintext is divided into 64-bit blocks.
The plaintext for each block is XOR-ed with the ciphertext
of the previous block, the result is encrypted and the output
of the encryption is the ciphertext for the block.
This procedure is repeated until there are no more plaintext
blocks.
For the very first block, the Initialization Vector is used
instead of the ciphertext of the previous block.
8.1.1.3. Data Decryption |
Before decryption, the encrypted data length is verified.
If the length of the OCTET STRING to be decrypted is not an
integral multiple of 8 octets, the decryption process is halted
and an appropriate exception noted. When decrypting, the padding
is ignored.
The first ciphertext block is decrypted, the decryption output is
XOR-ed with the Initialization Vector, and the result is the first
plaintext block.
For each subsequent block, the ciphertext block is decrypted,
the decryption output is XOR-ed with the previous ciphertext
block and the result is the plaintext block.
8.2. Elements of the DES Privacy Protocol |
This section contains definitions required to realize the privacy
module defined by this memo.
8.2.1. Users |
Data en/decryption using this Symmetric Encryption Protocol makes
use of a defined set of userNames. For any user on whose behalf
a message must be en/decrypted at a particular SNMP engine, that
SNMP engine must have knowledge of that user. An SNMP engine that
wishes to communicate with another SNMP engine must also have
knowledge of a user known to that SNMP engine, including knowledge
of the applicable attributes of that user.
A user and its attributes are defined as follows:
<userName>
An octet string representing the name of the user.
<privKey>
A user's secret key to be used as input for the DES key and IV.
The length of this key MUST be 16 octets. |
8.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID |
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The msgAuthoritativeEngineID value contained in an authenticated
message specifies the authoritative SNMP engine for that particular
message (see the definition of SnmpEngineID in the SNMP
Architecture document [SNMP-ARCH]).
The user's (private) privacy key is normally different at each
authoritative SNMP engine and so the snmpEngineID is used to select
the proper key for the en/decryption process.
8.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Privacy Protocol |
Messages using this privacy protocol carry a msgPrivacyParameters
field as part of the msgSecurityParameters. For this protocol, the
msgPrivacyParameters field is the serialized OCTET STRING
representing the "salt" that was used to create the IV.
8.2.4. Services provided by the DES Privacy Module |
This section describes the inputs and outputs that the DES Privacy
module expects and produces when the User-based Security module
invokes the DES Privacy module for services.
8.2.4.1. Services for Encrypting Outgoing Data |
This DES privacy protocol assumes that the selection of the
privKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes
the secret key to be used.
Upon completion the privacy module returns statusInformation
and, if the encryption process was successful, the encryptedPDU
and the msgPrivacyParameters encoded as an OCTET STRING.
The abstract service primitive is:
statusInformation = -- success of failure
encryptData(
IN encryptKey -- secret key for encryption
IN dataToEncrypt -- data to encrypt (scopedPDU)
OUT encryptedData -- encrypted data (encryptedPDU)
OUT privParameters -- filled in by service provider
)
The abstract data elements are:
statusInformation
An indication of the success or failure of the encryption
process. In case of failure, it is an indication of the error.
encryptKey
The secret key to be used by the encryption algorithm.
The length of this key MUST be 16 octets. |
dataToEncrypt
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The data that must be encrypted.
encryptedData
The encrypted data upon successful completion.
privParameters
The privParameters encoded as an OCTET STRING.
8.2.4.2. Services for Decrypting Incoming Data |
This DES privacy protocol assumes that the selection of the
privKey is done by the caller and that the caller passes
the secret key to be used.
Upon completion the privacy module returns statusInformation
and, if the decryption process was successful, the scopedPDU
in plain text. The abstract service primitive is:
statusInformation =
decryptData(
IN decryptKey -- secret key for decryption
IN privParameters -- as received on the wire
IN encryptedData -- encrypted data (encryptedPDU)
OUT decryptedData -- decrypted data (scopedPDU)
)
The abstract data elements are:
statusInformation
An indication whether the data was successfully decrypted
and if not an indication of the error.
decryptKey
The secret key to be used by the decryption algorithm.
The length of this key MUST be 16 octets. |
privParameters
The "salt" to be used to calculate the IV.
encryptedData
The data to be decrypted.
decryptedData
The decrypted data.
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8.3. Elements of Procedure. |
This section describes the procedures for the DES privacy protocol.
8.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message |
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must encrypt part of an outgoing message using the
usmDESPrivProtocol.
1) The secret cryptKey is used to construct the DES encryption key, 3
the "salt" and the DES pre-IV (as described in section 8.1.1.1). 3
2) The privParameters field is set to the serialization according
to the rules in [RFC1906] of an OCTET STRING representing the
the "salt" string.
3) The scopedPDU is encrypted (as described in section 8.1.1.2) |
and the encrypted data is serialized according to the rules
in [RFC1906] as an OCTET STRING.
4) The serialized OCTET STRING representing the encrypted
scopedPDU together with the privParameters and statusInformation
indicating success is returned to the calling module.
8.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message |
This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine
whenever it must decrypt part of an incoming message using the
usmDESPrivProtocol.
1) If the privParameters field is not an 8-octet OCTET STRING, |
then an error indication (decryptionError) is returned to
the calling module.
2) The "salt" is extracted from the privParameters field.
3) The secret cryptKey and the "salt" are then used to construct the 3
DES decryption key and pre-IV (as described in section 8.1.1.1). 3
4) The encryptedPDU is then decrypted (as described in
section 8.1.1.3). |
5) If the encryptedPDU cannot be decrypted, then an error
indication (decryptionError) is returned to the calling module.
6) The decrypted scopedPDU and statusInformation indicating
success are returned to the calling module.
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9. Editors' Addresses |
Co-editor Uri Blumenthal
IBM T. J. Watson Research
postal: 30 Saw Mill River Pkwy,
Hawthorne, NY 10532
USA
email: uri@watson.ibm.com
phone: +1-914-784-7064
Co-editor: Bert Wijnen
IBM T. J. Watson Research
postal: Schagen 33
3461 GL Linschoten
Netherlands
email: wijnen@vnet.ibm.com
phone: +31-348-432-794
10. Acknowledgements
This document is the result of the efforts of the SNMPv3 Working Group.
Some special thanks are in order to the following SNMPv3 WG members:
Dave Battle (SNMP Research, Inc.)
Uri Blumenthal (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center)
Jeff Case (SNMP Research, Inc.)
John Curran (BBN)
T. Max Devlin (Hi-TECH Connections)
John Flick (Hewlett Packard)
David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.)
N.C. Hien (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center)
Dave Levi (SNMP Research, Inc.)
Louis A Mamakos (UUNET Technologies Inc.)
Paul Meyer (Secure Computing Corporation)
Keith McCloghrie (Cisco Systems)
Russ Mundy (Trusted Information Systems, Inc.)
Bob Natale (ACE*COMM Corporation)
Mike O'Dell (UUNET Technologies Inc.)
Dave Perkins (DeskTalk)
Peter Polkinghorne (Brunel University)
Randy Presuhn (BMC Software, Inc.)
David Reid (SNMP Research, Inc.)
Shawn Routhier (Epilogue)
Juergen Schoenwaelder (TU Braunschweig)
Bob Stewart (Cisco Systems)
Bert Wijnen (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center)
The document is based on recommendations of the IETF Security and
Administrative Framework Evolution for SNMP Advisory Team.
Members of that Advisory Team were:
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David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.)
Jeff Johnson (Cisco Systems)
David Levi (SNMP Research Inc.)
John Linn (Openvision)
Russ Mundy (Trusted Information Systems) chair
Shawn Routhier (Epilogue)
Glenn Waters (Nortel)
Bert Wijnen (IBM T. J. Watson Research Center)
As recommended by the Advisory Team and the SNMPv3 Working Group
Charter, the design incorporates as much as practical from previous
RFCs and drafts. As a result, special thanks are due to the authors
of previous designs known as SNMPv2u and SNMPv2*:
Jeff Case (SNMP Research, Inc.)
David Harrington (Cabletron Systems Inc.)
David Levi (SNMP Research, Inc.)
Keith McCloghrie (Cisco Systems)
Brian O'Keefe (Hewlett Packard)
Marshall T. Rose (Dover Beach Consulting)
Jon Saperia (BGS Systems Inc.)
Steve Waldbusser (International Network Services)
Glenn W. Waters (Bell-Northern Research Ltd.)
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11. Security Considerations |
11.1. Recommended Practices |
This section describes practices that contribute to the secure,
effective operation of the mechanisms defined in this memo.
- An SNMP engine must discard SNMP Response messages that do not
correspond to any currently outstanding Request message. It is
the responsibility of the Message Processing module to take care
of this. For example it can use a msgID for that.
An SNMP Command Generator Application must discard any Response
PDU for which there is no currently outstanding Request PDU;
for example for SNMPv2 [RFC1905] PDUs, the request-id component
in the PDU can be used to correlate Responses to outstanding
Requests.
Although it would be typical for an SNMP engine and an SNMP
Command Generator Application to do this as a matter of course,
when using these security protocols it is significant due to
the possibility of message duplication (malicious or otherwise).
- If an SNMP engine uses a msgID for correlating Response messages
to outstanding Request messages, then it MUST use different
msgIDs in all such Request messages that it sends out during a
Time Window (150 seconds) period.
A Command Generator or Notification Originator Application MUST
use different request-ids in all Request PDUs that it sends out
during a TimeWindow (150 seconds) period.
This must be done to protect against the possibility of message
duplication (malicious or otherwise).
For example, starting operations with a msgID and/or request-id
value of zero is not a good idea. Initializing them with an
unpredictable number (so they do not start out the same after
each reboot) and then incrementing by one would be acceptable.
- An SNMP engine should perform time synchronization using
authenticated messages in order to protect against the
possibility of message duplication (malicious or otherwise).
- When sending state altering messages to a managed authoritative
SNMP engine, a Command Generator Application should delay sending
successive messages to that managed SNMP engine until a positive
acknowledgement is received for the previous message or until
the previous message expires.
No message ordering is imposed by the SNMP. Messages may be
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received in any order relative to their time of generation and
each will be processed in the ordered received. Note that when
an authenticated message is sent to a managed SNMP engine, it
will be valid for a period of time of approximately 150 seconds
under normal circumstances, and is subject to replay during this
period. Indeed, an SNMP engine and SNMP Command Generator
Applications must cope with the loss and re-ordering of messages
resulting from anomalies in the network as a matter of course.
However, a managed object, snmpSetSerialNo [RFC1907], is
specifically defined for use with SNMP Set operations in order
to provide a mechanism to ensure that the processing of SNMP
messages occurs in a specific order.
- The frequency with which the secrets of a User-based Security
Model user should be changed is indirectly related to the
frequency of their use.
Protecting the secrets from disclosure is critical to the overall
security of the protocols. Frequent use of a secret provides a
continued source of data that may be useful to a cryptanalyst in
exploiting known or perceived weaknesses in an algorithm.
Frequent changes to the secret avoid this vulnerability.
Changing a secret after each use is generally regarded as the
most secure practice, but a significant amount of overhead may
be associated with that approach.
Note, too, in a local environment the threat of disclosure may be
less significant, and as such the changing of secrets may be less
frequent. However, when public data networks are used as the
communication paths, more caution is prudent.
11.2 Defining Users |
The mechanisms defined in this document employ the notion of users
on whose behalf messages are sent. How "users" are defined is
subject to the security policy of the network administration.
For example, users could be individuals (e.g., "joe" or "jane"),
or a particular role (e.g., "operator" or "administrator"), or a
combination (e.g., "joe-operator", "jane-operator" or "joe-admin").
Furthermore, a user may be a logical entity, such as an SNMP
Application or a set of SNMP Applications, acting on behalf of an
individual or role, or set of individuals, or set of roles,
including combinations.
Appendix A describes an algorithm for mapping a user "password" to
a 16 octet value for use as either a user's authentication key or
privacy key (or both). Note however, that using the same password
(and therefore the same key) for both authentication and privacy
is very poor security practice and should be strongly discouraged.
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Passwords are often generated, remembered, and input by a human.
Human-generated passwords may be less than the 16 octets required
by the authentication and privacy protocols, and brute force
attacks can be quite easy on a relatively short ASCII character
set. Therefore, the algorithm is Appendix A performs a
transformation on the password. If the Appendix A algorithm is
used, SNMP implementations (and SNMP configuration applications)
must ensure that passwords are at least 8 characters in length.
Because the Appendix A algorithm uses such passwords (nearly)
directly, it is very important that they not be easily guessed.
It is suggested that they be composed of mixed-case alphanumeric
and punctuation characters that don't form words or phrases that
might be found in a dictionary. Longer passwords improve the
security of the system. Users may wish to input multiword
phrases to make their password string longer while ensuring that
it is memorable.
Since it is infeasible for human users to maintain different
passwords for every SNMP engine, but security requirements
strongly discourage having the same key for more than one SNMP
engine, the User-based Security Model employs a compromise
proposed in [Localized-key]. It derives the user keys for the
SNMP engines from user's password in such a way that it is
practically impossible to either determine the user's password,
or user's key for another SNMP engine from any combination of
user's keys on SNMP engines.
Note however, that if user's password is disclosed, then key
localization will not help and network security may be compromised 3
in this case. Therefore a user's password or non-localized key 3
MUST NOT be stored on a managed device/node. Instead the 4
localized key SHALL be stored (if at all) , so that, in case a 4
device does get compromised, no other managed or managing devices 4
get compromised. 3
11.3. Conformance |
To be termed a "Secure SNMP implementation" based on the
User-based Security Model, an SNMP implementation MUST:
- implement one or more Authentication Protocol(s). The HMAC-MD5-96 |
and HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocols defined in this memo are |
examples of such protocols. |
- to the maximum extent possible, prohibit access to the secret(s) |
of each user about which it maintains information in a Local |
Configuration Datastore (LCD) under all circumstances except as |
required to generate and/or validate SNMP messages with respect |
to that user. |
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- implement the key-localization mechanism.
- implement the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB. |
In addition, an authoritative SNMP engine SHOULD provide initial |
configuration in accordance with Appendix A.1. |
Implementation of a Privacy Protocol (the DES Symmetric Encryption
Protocol defined in this memo is one such protocol) is optional.
12. References |
[RFC1903] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., |
and S. Waldbusser, "Textual Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple |
Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1903, January 1996. |
|
[RFC1905] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K.,
Rose, M., and S., Waldbusser, "Protocol Operations for
Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)",
RFC 1905, January 1996.
[RFC1906] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K.,
Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport Mappings for
Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)",
RFC 1906, January 1996.
[RFC1907] The SNMPv2 Working Group, Case, J., McCloghrie, K.,
Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Management Information Base for
Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)",
RFC 1907 January 1996.
[RFC2104] Network Working Group, H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, |
"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, |
February 1997. |
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 4
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 4
[SNMP-ARCH] The SNMPv3 Working Group, Harrington, D., Wijnen, B., 3
Presuhn, R., "An Architecture for describing SNMP Management 3
Frameworks", draft-ietf-snmpv3-next-gen-arch-05.txt, 3
September 1997. 3
[SNMP-USM] The SNMPv3 Working Group, Blumenthal, U., Wijnen, B.,
"The User-Based Security Model for Version 3 of the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)",
draft-ietf-snmpv3-usm-02.txt, September 1997. |
[Localized-Key] U. Blumenthal, N. C. Hien, B. Wijnen
"Key Derivation for Network Management Applications"
IEEE Network Magazine, April/May issue, 1997.
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[MD5] Rivest, R., "Message Digest Algorithm MD5",
RFC 1321, April 1992.
[DES-NIST] Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
Publication 46-1. Supersedes FIPS Publication 46, (January, 1977;
reaffirmed January, 1988).
[DES-ANSI] Data Encryption Algorithm, American National Standards
Institute. ANSI X3.92-1981, (December, 1980).
[DESO-NIST] DES Modes of Operation, National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
Publication 81, (December, 1980).
[DESO-ANSI] Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation, American
National Standards Institute. ANSI X3.106-1983, (May 1983).
[DESG-NIST] Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data
Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
Publication 74, (April, 1981).
[DEST-NIST] Validating the Correctness of Hardware Implementations of
the NBS Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Special Publication 500-20.
[DESM-NIST] Maintenance Testing for the Data Encryption Standard,
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Special Publication 500-61, (August, 1980).
[SHA-NIST] Secure Hash Algorithm. NIST FIPS 180-1, (April, 1995) 4
http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.txt (ASCII) 4
http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.ps (Postscript) 4
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APPENDIX A - Installation
A.1. SNMP engine Installation Parameters
During installation, an authoritative SNMP engine SHOULD (in the
meaning as defined in [RFC2119]) be configured with several initial
parameters. These include:
1) A security posture
The choice of security posture determines if initial configuration
is implemented and if so how. One of three possible choices
is selected:
minimum-secure,
semi-secure,
very-secure (i.e., no-initial-configuration)
In the case of a very-secure posture, there is no initial
configuration, and so the following steps are irrelevant.
2) one or more secrets
These are the authentication/privacy secrets for the first user
to be configured.
One way to accomplish this is to have the installer enter a
"password" for each required secret. The password is then
algorithmically converted into the required secret by:
- forming a string of length 1,048,576 octets by repeating the
value of the password as often as necessary, truncating
accordingly, and using the resulting string as the input to
the MD5 algorithm [MD5]. The resulting digest, termed
"digest1", is used in the next step.
- a second string is formed by concatenating digest1, the SNMP
engine's snmpEngineID value, and digest1.
This string is used as input to the MD5 algorithm [MD5].
The resulting digest is the required secret (see Appendix A.2).
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With these configured parameters, the SNMP engine instantiates
the following usmUserEntry in the usmUserTable:
no privacy support privacy support
------------------ ---------------
usmUserEngineID localEngineID localEngineID
usmUserName "initial" "initial"
usmUserSecurityName "initial" "initial"
usmUserCloneFrom ZeroDotZero ZeroDotZero
usmUserAuthProtocol usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol |
usmUserAuthKeyChange "" ""
usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange "" ""
usmUserPrivProtocol none usmDESPrivProtocol
usmUserPrivKeyChange "" ""
usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange "" ""
usmUserPublic "" ""
usmUserStorageType anyValidStorageType anyValidStorageType
usmUserStatus active active
A.2. Password to Key Algorithm
A sample code fragment (section A.2.1) demonstrates the password to 3
key algorithm which can be used when mapping a password to an 3
authentication or privacy key using MD5. The reference source code 4
of MD5 is available in [RFC1321]. 4
3
Another sample code fragment (section A.2.2) demonstrates the 3
password to key algorithm which can be used when mapping a password 3
to an authentication or privacy key using SHA (documented in 4
SHA-NIST). 4
An example of the results of a correct implementation is provided
(section A.3) which an implementer can use to check if his 3
implementation produces the same result.
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A.2.1. Password to Key Sample Code for MD5 3
void password_to_key_md5( 3
u_char *password, /* IN */
u_int passwordlen, /* IN */
u_char *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */
u_int engineLength /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */
u_char *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 16-octet buffer */
{
MD5_CTX MD;
u_char *cp, password_buf[64];
u_long password_index = 0;
u_long count = 0, i;
MD5Init (&MD); /* initialize MD5 */
/**********************************************/
/* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */
/**********************************************/
while (count < 1048576) {
cp = password_buf;
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
/*************************************************/
/* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */
/* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/
/*************************************************/
*cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen];
}
MD5Update (&MD, password_buf, 64);
count += 64;
}
MD5Final (key, &MD); /* tell MD5 we're done */
/*****************************************************/
/* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */
/* through MD5 to produce final key */
/* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */
/* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 64 */
/*****************************************************/
memcpy(password_buf, key, 16);
memcpy(password_buf+16, engineID, engineLength);
memcpy(password_buf+engineLength, key, 16);
MD5Init(&MD);
MD5Update(&MD, password_buf, 32+engineLength);
MD5Final(key, &MD);
return;
}
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A.2.2. Password to Key Sample Code for SHA 3
3
void password_to_key_sha( 3
u_char *password, /* IN */ 3
u_int passwordlen, /* IN */ 3
u_char *engineID, /* IN - pointer to snmpEngineID */ 3
u_int engineLength /* IN - length of snmpEngineID */ 3
u_char *key) /* OUT - pointer to caller 20-octet buffer */ 3
{ 3
SHA_CTX SH; 4
u_char *cp, password_buf[72]; 3
u_long password_index = 0; 3
u_long count = 0, i; 3
3
SHAInit (&SH); /* initialize SHA */ 4
3
/**********************************************/ 3
/* Use while loop until we've done 1 Megabyte */ 3
/**********************************************/ 3
while (count < 1048576) { 3
cp = password_buf; 3
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { 3
/*************************************************/ 3
/* Take the next octet of the password, wrapping */ 3
/* to the beginning of the password as necessary.*/ 3
/*************************************************/ 3
*cp++ = password[password_index++ % passwordlen]; 3
} 3
SHAUpdate (&SH, password_buf, 64); 4
count += 64; 3
} 3
SHAFinal (key, &SH); /* tell SHA we're done */ 4
3
/*****************************************************/ 3
/* Now localize the key with the engineID and pass */ 3
/* through SHA to produce final key */ 3
/* May want to ensure that engineLength <= 32, */ 3
/* otherwise need to use a buffer larger than 72 */ 3
/*****************************************************/ 3
memcpy(password_buf, key, 20); 3
memcpy(password_buf+20, engineID, engineLength); 3
memcpy(password_buf+engineLength, key, 20); 3
3
SHAInit(&SH); 4
SHAUpdate(&SH, password_buf, 40+engineLength); 4
SHAFinal(key, &SH); 4
3
return; 3
} 3
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A.3. Password to Key Sample Results
A.3.1. Password to Key Sample Results using MD5 3
The following shows a sample output of the password to key
algorithm for a 16-octet key using MD5. 3
With a password of "maplesyrup" the output of the password to key
algorithm before the key is localized with the SNMP engine's
snmpEngineID is:
'9f af 32 83 88 4e 92 83 4e bc 98 47 d8 ed d9 63'H
After the intermediate key (shown above) is localized with the
snmpEngineID value of:
'00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02'H
the final output of the password to key algorithm is:
'52 6f 5e ed 9f cc e2 6f 89 64 c2 93 07 87 d8 2b'H
A.3.2. Password to Key Sample Results using SHA 3
3
The following shows a sample output of the password to key 3
algorithm for a 20-octet key using SHA. 4
3
With a password of "maplesyrup" the output of the password to key 3
algorithm before the key is localized with the SNMP engine's 3
snmpEngineID is: 3
3
'f1 be a9 ae 66 7f 4f b6 34 1e 51 af 06 80 7e 91 e4 3b 01 ac'H 4
3
After the intermediate key (shown above) is localized with the 3
snmpEngineID value of: 3
3
'00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02'H 3
3
the final output of the password to key algorithm is: 3
3
'8a a3 d9 9e 3e 30 56 f2 bf e3 a9 ee f3 45 d5 39 54 91 12 be'H 4
3
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A.4. Sample encoding of msgSecurityParameters
The msgSecurityParameters in an SNMP message are represented as
an OCTET STRING. This OCTET STRING should be considered opaque
outside a specific Security Model.
The User-based Security Model defines the contents of the OCTET
STRING as a SEQUENCE (see section 2.4).
Given these two properties, the following is an example of the
msgSecurityParameters for the User-based Security Model, encoded
as an OCTET STRING:
04 <length>
30 <length>
04 <length> <msgAuthoritativeEngineID>
02 <length> <msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots>
02 <length> <msgAuthoritativeEngineTime>
04 <length> <msgUserName>
04 0c <HMAC-MD5-96-digest> |
04 08 <salt>
Here is the example once more, but now with real values (except
for the digest in msgAuthenticationParameters and the salt in
msgPrivacyParameters, which depend on variable data that we have
not defined here):
Hex Data Description
-------------- -----------------------------------------------
04 39 OCTET STRING, length 57
30 37 SEQUENCE, length 55
04 0c 80000002 msgAuthoritativeEngineID: IBM |
01 IPv4 address |
09840301 9.132.3.1
02 01 01 msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots: 1
02 02 0101 msgAuthoritativeEngineTime: 257
04 04 62657274 msgUserName: bert
04 0c 01234567 msgAuthenticationParameters: sample value |
89abcdef
fedcba98
04 08 01234567 msgPrivacyParameters: sample value
89abcdef
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Table of Contents
0. Issues and Change Log 2
0.1. Resolved Issues 2
0.2. Change Log 3
1. Introduction 7
1.1. Threats 7
1.2. Goals and Constraints 8
1.3. Security Services 9
1.4. Module Organization 10
1.4.1. Timeliness Module 11
1.4.2. Authentication Protocol 11
1.4.3. Privacy Protocol 11
1.5. Protection against Message Replay, Delay and Redirection 11
1.5.1. Authoritative SNMP engine 11
1.5.2. Mechanisms 12
1.6. Abstract Service Interfaces. 13
1.6.1. User-based Security Model Primitives for Authentication 14
1.6.2. User-based Security Model Primitives for Privacy 14
2. Elements of the Model 15
2.1. User-based Security Model Users 15
2.2. Replay Protection 16
2.2.1. msgAuthoritativeEngineID 16
2.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots and msgAuthoritativeEngineTime 16
2.2.3. Time Window 17
2.3. Time Synchronization 18
2.4. SNMP Messages Using this Security Model 19
2.5. Services provided by the User-based Security Model 20
2.5.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message 20
2.5.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message 22
2.6. Key Localization Algorithm. 23
3. Elements of Procedure 25
3.1. Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message 25
3.2. Processing an Incoming SNMP Message 28
4. Discovery 34
5. Definitions 35
6. HMAC-MD5-96 Authentication Protocol 48
6.1. Mechanisms 48
6.1.1. Digest Authentication Mechanism 48
6.2. Elements of the Digest Authentication Protocol 49
6.2.1. Users 49
6.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID 49
6.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Authentication Protocol 49
6.2.4. Services provided by the HMAC-MD5-96 Authentication Module 50
6.2.4.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message 50
6.2.4.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message 50
6.3. Elements of Procedure 52
6.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message 52
6.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message 52
7. HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol 54
7.1. Mechanisms 54
7.1.1. Digest Authentication Mechanism 54
7.2. Elements of the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol 55
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7.2.1. Users 55
7.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID 55
7.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Authentication Protocol 55
7.2.4. Services provided by the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Module 56
7.2.4.1. Services for Generating an Outgoing SNMP Message 56
7.2.4.2. Services for Processing an Incoming SNMP Message 56
7.3. Elements of Procedure 58
7.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message 58
7.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message 58
8. CBC-DES Symmetric Encryption Protocol 60
8.1. Mechanisms 60
8.1.1. Symmetric Encryption Protocol 60
8.1.1.1. DES key and Initialization Vector. 61
8.1.1.2. Data Encryption. 61
8.1.1.3. Data Decryption 62
8.2. Elements of the DES Privacy Protocol 62
8.2.1. Users 62
8.2.2. msgAuthoritativeEngineID 62
8.2.3. SNMP Messages Using this Privacy Protocol 63
8.2.4. Services provided by the DES Privacy Module 63
8.2.4.1. Services for Encrypting Outgoing Data 63
8.2.4.2. Services for Decrypting Incoming Data 64
8.3. Elements of Procedure. 65
8.3.1. Processing an Outgoing Message 65
8.3.2. Processing an Incoming Message 65
9. Editors' Addresses 66
A.1. SNMP engine Installation Parameters 73
A.2. Password to Key Algorithm 74
A.2.1. Password to Key Sample Code for MD5 75
A.2.2. Password to Key Sample Code for SHA 76
A.3. Password to Key Sample Results 77
A.3.1. Password to Key Sample Results using MD5 77
A.3.2. Password to Key Sample Results using SHA 77
A.4. Sample encoding of msgSecurityParameters 78
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