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Benchmarking Working Group D. Newman
INTERNET-DRAFT Data Communications
Expires in January 1998 H. Holzbaur, J. Hurd, and S. Platt
National Software Testing Laboratories
Benchmarking Terminology for Network Security Devices
<draft-ietf-bmwg-secperf-00.txt>
Status of This Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-
Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work
in progress."
To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check
the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts
Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net
(Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East
Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This
memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
1. Introduction
Despite the rapid rise in deployment of network security devices
such as firewalls and authentication/encryption products, there is
no standard method for evaluating the performance of these
devices.
The lack of a standard is troubling for two reasons. First,
hardware and software implementations vary widely, making it
difficult to do direct performance comparisons. Second, a growing
number of organizations are deploying these devices on internal
networks that operate at relatively high data rates, while many
network security devices are optimized for use over relatively
low-speed wide-area connections. As a result, users are often
unsure whether the products they buy will stand up to the
relatively heavy loads found on internal networks.
This document defines terms used in measuring the performance of
network security devices. It extends the terminology already used
for benchmarking routers and switches to network security devices.
The primary metrics defined in this document are maximum
forwarding rate and maximum number of connections.
Depending on the outcome of discussions within the BMWG, we may
also attempt to classify devices using various architectural
considerations (proxy, packet filter) or offered load levels
Newman et al [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
(high, medium, low) as criteria. Additionally, new metrics may
need to be defined to evaluate application-level issues.
2. Existing definitions
This document uses the conceptual framework established in RFCs
1242 and 1944 and draft-ietf-bmwg-lanswitch-05.txt, which
describes benchmarking of LAN
switch performance. In addition to defining basic practices, these
documents
contain discussions of several terms relevant to benchmarking
performance of network security devices. This document uses the
definition format described in RFC 1242, Section 2. Readers should
consult these documents before making use of this document.
3. Term definitions
3.1 Authentication
Definition:
The process of verifying that a client user or machine requesting
a network resource is who he, she, or it claims to be, and vice
versa.
Discussion:
Trust is a critical concept in network security. Obviously, any
network resource (such as a file server or printer) with
restricted access MUST require authentication before granting
access.
Authentication takes many forms, including but not limited to IP
addresses; TCP or UDP port numbers; passwords; external token
authentication cards; and pattern matching based on human
characteristics such as signature, speech, or retina patterns.
Authentication MAY work either by client machine (for example, by
proving that a given IP source address really is that address, and
not a rogue machine spoofing that address) or by user (by proving
that the user really is who he or she claims to be). Servers
SHOULD also authenticate themselves to clients.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
forwarding rate (3.9)
user (3.25)
virtual client (3.26)
3.2 Bidirectional traffic
Definition:
Newman et al [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Packets presented to a DUT/SUT such that the network interfaces of
the DUT/SUT both receive and transmit traffic.
Discussion:
Traffic patterns offered to the DUT/SUT MUST be bidirectional or
fully meshed. See forwarding rate (3.9) for a more complete
discussion of issues with traffic patterns.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
truncated binary exponential back-off algorithm
See Also:
forwarding rate (3.9)
fully meshed traffic (3.10)
unidirectional traffic (3.24)
3.3 Data source
Definition:
A station capable of generating traffic to the DUT/SUT.
Discussion:
One data source MAY emulate multiple users or stations. In
addition, one data source MAY offer traffic to multiple network
interfaces on the DUT/SUT. However, each virtual client MUST offer
traffic to only one interface.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
user (3.25)
virtual client (3.26)
3.4 Demilitarized zone (DMZ)
Definition:
A network segment or segments located between protected and
external networks. DMZ networks are sometimes called perimeter
networks.
Discussion:
As an extra security measure, networks are often designed such
that protected and external segments are never directly connected.
Instead, security devices (and possibly other public resources
such as WWW or FTP servers) often reside in the so-called DMZ
network. To connect protected, DMZ, and external networks with one
device, the device MUST have at least three network interfaces.
Newman et al [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Multiple devices MAY constitute the DMZ, in which case the devices
connected the protected network with the DMZ and the DMZ with the
external network MUST have two network interfaces.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
Dual-homed
Multihomed
See also:
external network (3.8)
perimeter network (3.15)
protected network (3.17)
3.5 Device under test (DUT)
Definition:
The network security device to which traffic is offered and
response measured.
Discussion:
A single station, generally equipped with at least two network
interfaces.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
system under test (SUT) (3.23)
3.6 Dual-homed
Definition:
A station with at least two network interfaces.
Discussion:
Dual-homed network security devices connect two segments with
different network-layer addresses.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
multihomed (3.12)
3.7 Dynamic proxy
Definition:
Newman et al [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
A proxy service that is set up and torn down in response to a
client request, rather than existing on a static basis.
Discussion:
Proxy services (see section 3.18) typically are configured to
"listen" on a given port number for client requests. However, some
devices set up a proxy service only when a client requests the
service.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
rule sets
See also:
proxy (3.18)
rule sets (3.20)
3.8 External network
Definition:
The segment or segments not protected by the network security
DUT/SUT.
Discussion:
Network security devices are deployed between protected and
unprotected segments. The external network is not protected by the
DUT/SUT.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
demilitarized zone (DMZ) (3.4)
protected network (3.17)
3.9 Forwarding rate
Definition: The number of bits per second a DUT/SUT can transmit
to the correct destination network interface in response to a
specified offered load.
Discussion:
Network security devices are by definition session-oriented: They
will only grant access to a desired resource once authentication
occurs and a session has been established.
Because application-layer sessions are always involved,
unidirectional packet-per-second metrics are not meaningful in the
context of testing network security devices. Instead, this
Newman et al [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
definition MUST measure application-layer performance once a
session has been established.
Forwarding rate refers to the number of bits per second observed
on the output side of the network interface under test. Forwarding
rate can be measured with different traffic orientations and
distributions. When multiple network interfaces are measured,
measurements MUST be observed from the interface with the highest
forwarding rate.
Measurement units:
bits per second (bit/s)
kilobits per second (kbit/s)
Megabits per second (Mbit/s)
Issues:
truncated binary exponential back-off algorithm
unidirectional vs. bidirectional
See Also:
authentication (3.1)
maximum forwarding rate (3.11)
offered load (3.13)
unidirectional traffic (3.24)
3.10 Fully meshed traffic
Definition:
Packets forwarded simultaneously among all of a designated number
of network interfaces of a DUT/SUT such that each of the
interfaces under test will both forward packets to and receive
packets from all of the other interfaces.
Discussion:
Fully meshed traffic is the most thorough method of exercising the
transmitting and receiving capabilities of the DUT/SUT.
Unlike past definitions for router or switch testing, it should be
noted that fully meshed traffic in this context is not necessarily
symmetrical. While all of a designated group of network interfaces
MUST simultaneously send and receive traffic, the type and amount
of traffic offered MAY differ on each interface. For example, a
network security device may see more traffic from the protected
network bound for the external network than the opposite (although
the inverse could be true during an attack on the DUT/SUT).
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
Half duplex
Full duplex
See also:
Newman et al [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
bidirectional traffic (3.2)
unidirectional traffic (3.24)
3.11 Maximum forwarding rate
Definition:
The highest forwarding rate of a network security device taken
from a set of iterative measurements.
Discussion:
Maximum forwarding rate may degrade before maximum load is
offered.
Unlike benchmarks for evaluating router and switch performance,
this definition MUST involve measurement of application-layer
performance rather than network-layer packet-per-second metrics.
Measurement units:
Megabits per second
kbytes per second
bytes per second
Issues:
full duplex vs. half duplex
truncated binary exponential back-off algorithm
See also:
bidirectional traffic (3.2)
partially meshed traffic (3.24)
unidirectional traffic
3.12 Multihomed
Definition:
A network security device with more than two network interfaces.
Discussion:
Multihoming is a way to connect three or more networks-protected,
DMZ, and external-with a single network security device. However,
this configuration is not mandatory if multiple network security
devices are used. For example, one device could secure the
connection between an external and DMZ network, while another
could secure the connection between a DMZ and protected network;
the two stations collectively form the SUT.
Because of the differences in traffic patterns between dual-homed
and multihomed devices, direct performance comparisons should be
avoided. However, it is acceptable to compare results between a
dual-homed device and a DUT/SUT in which only two network
interfaces are used.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Newman et al [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Issues:
truncated binary exponential back-off algorithm
See also:
bidirectional traffic (3.2)
dual-homed (3.6)
fully meshed traffic (3.10)
3.13 Offered load
Definition:
The number of bits per second that an external source can transmit
to a DUT/SUT for forwarding to a specified network interface or
interfaces.
Discussion:
The load that an external source actually applies to a DUT/SUT may
be lower than the external source attempts to apply because of
collisions on the wire. The transmission capabilities of the
external source SHOULD be verified without the DUT/SUT by
transmitting unidirectional traffic.
Measurement units:
bits per second
kilobits per second (kbit/s)
Megabits per second (Mbit/s)
Issues:
truncated binary exponential back-off algorithm
See also:
forwarding rate (3.9)
maximum forwarding rate (3.11)
3.14 Packet filtering
Definition:
The process of controlling access by examining packets based on
network-layer or transport-layer criteria.
Discussion:
Packet-filtering devices forward or deny packets based on
information in each packet's header. A packet-filtering network
security device uses a rule set (see section 3.20) to determine
which traffic should be forwarded and which should be blocked.
Packet filtering may be used in a dual-homed or multihomed device.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
dynamic proxy (3.7)
Newman et al [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
proxy (3.18)
rule set (3.20)
stateful inspection (3.22)
3.15 Perimeter network
Definition:
A network segment or segments located between protected and
external networks. Perimeter networks are often called DMZ
networks.
Discussion:
See the definition of DMZ (which see) for a discussion.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
Dual-homed
Multihomed
See also:
Demilitarized zone (DMZ) (3.4)
external network (3.8)
protected network (3.17)
3.16 Policy
Definition:
A document defining acceptable use of protected, DMZ, and external
networks.
Discussion:
Security policies generally do not spell out specific
configurations for network security devices; rather, they set
general guidelines for what it and is not acceptable network
behavior.
The actual mechanism for controlling access is usually the rule
set (see section 3.20) implemented in the DUT/SUT.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
Rule set (3.20)
3.17 Protected network
Definition:
A network segment or segments to which access is controlled by the
DUT/SUT.
Newman et al [Page 9]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Discussion:
Network security devices are intended to prevent unauthorized
access either to or from the protected network. Depending on the
configuration specified by the policy and rule set, the DUT/SUT
may allow stations on the protected segment to act as clients for
servers on either the DMZ or the external network, or both.
Protected networks are often called "internal networks." That term
is not used here because network security devices increasingly are
deployed within an organization, where all segments are by
definition internal.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
Demilitarized zone (DMZ) (3.4)
external network (3.8)
policy (3.16)
rule set (3.20)
3.18 Proxy
Definition:
The process of requesting sessions with servers on behalf of
clients.
Discussion:
Proxy-based network security devices never involve direct
connections between client and server. Instead, two sessions are
established: one between the client and the DUT/SUT, and another
between the DUT/SUT and server.
As with packet-filtering network security devices, proxy-based
devices use a rule set (which see) to determine which traffic
should be forwarded and which should be blocked.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
dynamic proxy (3.7)
packet filtering (3.14)
stateful inspection (3.22)
3.19 Rejected traffic
Definition:
Packets dropped as a result of the rule set of the DUT/SUT.
Newman et al [Page 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Discussion:
Network security devices typically are configured to drop any
traffic not explicitly permitted in the rule set (which see).
Dropped packets MUST NOT be included in calculating the forwarding
rate or maximum forwarding rate of the DUT/SUT.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
forwarding rate (3.9)
maximum forwarding rate (3.11)
policy (3.16)
rule set (3.20)
3.20 Rule set
Definition:
The collection of definitions that determines which packets the
DUT/SUT will forward and which it will reject.
Discussion:
Rule sets control access to and from the network interfaces of the
DUT/SUT. By definition, rule sets MUST NOT apply equally to all
network interfaces; otherwise there would be no need for the
network security device. Therefore, a specific rule set MUST be
applied to each network device used in the DUT/SUT.
The order of rules within the rule set is critical. Network
security devices generally scan rule sets in a "top down" fashion,
which is to say that the device compares each packet received with
each rule in the rule set until it finds a rule that applies to
the packet. Once the device finds an applicable rule, it applies
the actions defined in that rule (such as forwarding or rejecting
the packet) and ignores all subsequent rules. For purposes of this
document, the rule set MUST conclude with a rule denying all
access except that which is permitted in the rule set.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
Demilitarized zone (DMZ) (3.4)
external network (3.8)
policy (3.17)
protected network (3.18)
rejected traffic (3.19)
3.21 Session
Newman et al [Page 11]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Definition:
A logical connection established between two stations using a
known protocol. For purposes of this document, a session MUST be
conducted over either TCP (RFC 793) or UDP (RFC 768).
Discussion:
Because of the application-layer focus of many network security
devices, sessions are a more useful metric than the packet-based
measurements used in benchmarking routers and switches. Although
network security device rule sets generally work on a per-packet
basis, it is ultimately sessions that a network security device
must handle. For example, the number of file transfer protocol
(ftp) sessions a DUT/SUT can handle concurrently is a more
meaningful measurement in benchmarking performance than the number
of ftp "open" packets it can reject. Further, a stateful
inspection device (which see) will not forward individual packets
if those packets' headers conflict with state information
maintained in the device's rule set.
For purposes of this document, a session MUST be established using
a known protocol. A traffic pattern is not considered a session
until it successfully completes the establishment procedures
defined by that protocol.
Also for purposes of this document, a session constitutes the
logical connection between two end-stations and not the
intermediate connections that proxy-based network security devices
may use.
Issues:
See also:
policy (3.16)
proxy (3.18)
rule set (3.20)
stateful inspection (3.22)
3.22 Stateful inspection
Definition:
The process of forwarding or rejecting traffic based on the
contents of a state table maintained by the network security
device.
Discussion:
Packet filtering and proxy devices are essentially static, in that
they always forward or reject traffic based on the contents of the
rule set. Devices using stateful inspection, in contrast, will
only forward traffic if it corresponds with state information
maintained by the device about each session. For example, a
stateful inspection device will reject a packet on TCP port 21
(ftp DATA) if no ftp session has been established.
Newman et al [Page 12]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
dynamic proxy (3.7)
packet filter (3.14)
proxy (3.18)
3.23 System under test (SUT)
Definition:
The collective set of network security devices to which traffic is
offered as a single entity and response measured.
Discussion:
A system under test may comprise multiple network security
devices. A typical configuration involves two or more devices,
with at least one located between the protected network and DMZ
and at least one other located between the DMZ and external
network. Some devices may be active, such as firewalls or
authentication products; other devices, such as systems for
logging, may be passive.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
demilitarized zone (DMZ) (3.4)
device under test (3.5)
external network (3.8)
protected network (3.17)
3.24 Unidirectional traffic
Definition:
Packets offered to the DUT/SUT such that the sending and receiving
network interface or interfaces are mutually exclusive.
Discussion:
This definition is included mainly for purposes of completeness;
it is not particularly meaningful in the context of network
security device performance. As noted in the discussion of
forwarding rate (see section 3.9), network security devices almost
invariably involve sessions with bidirectional traffic flow.
However, unidirectional traffic is appropriate for evaluating the
maximum forwarding rate of data sources (absent the DUT/SUT), and
for evaluating the maximum forwarding rate of certain
connectionless protocols.
Newman et al [Page 13]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
half duplex vs. full duplex
See also:
bidirectional traffic (3.2)
forwarding rate (3.9)
maximum forwarding rate (3.11)
3.25 User
Definition:
The person or machine requesting access to resources protected by
the DUT/SUT.
Discussion:
"User" is a problematic term in the context of security device
performance testing, for several reasons. First, a user may in
fact be a machine or machines requesting services through the
DUT/SUT. Second, different "user" requests may require radically
different amounts of DUT/SUT resources. Third, traffic profiles
vary widely from one organization to another, making it difficult
to characterize the load offered by a typical users. For these
reasons, we prefer not to measure DUT/SUT performance in terms of
users supported. Instead, we describe performance in terms of
maximum forwarding rate and maximum number of sessions sustained.
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
data source (3.3)
virtual client (3.26)
3.26 Virtual client
Definition:
A subset of a data source that represents one individual user.
Discussion:
In offering traffic to the DUT/SUT it may be useful for one data
source to emulate multiple users, machines, or networks. For
purposes of this document, each emulated user should be considered
a virtual client.
One data source MAY offer traffic from multiple virtual clients to
multiple network interfaces on the DUT/SUT. However, each virtual
client MUST offer traffic to just one network interface.
Newman et al [Page 14]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
Measurement units:
Not applicable
Issues:
See also:
data source (3.3)
user (3.25)
4. Security considerations
Security considerations are explicitly excluded from this memo.
The authors plan to address security and management concerns in a
separate proposal brought to the IETF's security directorate.
5. References
Bradner, S., editor. "Benchmarking Terminology for Network
Interconnection Devices." RFC 1242.
Bradner, S., and McQuaid, J. "Benchmarking Methodology for Network
Interconnect Devices." RFC 1944.
Mandeville, B. "Benchmarking Terminology for LAN Switching
Devices." ftp://ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-bmwg-
lanswitch-05.txt
Newman, D., and Melson, B. "Can Firewalls Take the Heat?" Data
Communications, November 21, 1995.
http://www.data.com/Lab_Tests/Firewalls.html
Newman, D., Holzbaur, H., and Bishop, K. "Firewalls: Don't Get
Burned," Data Communications, March 21, 1997.
http://www.data.com/lab_tests/firewalls97.html
Ranum, M. "Firewall Performance Measurement Techniques: A
Scientific Approach."
http://www.clark.net/pub/mjr/pubs/fwperf/intro.htm
Shannon, G. "Profile of Corporate Internet Application Traffic."
http://www.milkyway.com/libr/prof.html
6. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the IETF Benchmarking Working Group for
agreeing to review this document. Ted Doty (Network Systems),
Shlomo Kramer (Check Point Software Technologies), Bob Mandeville
(European Network Laboratories), Brent Melson (National Software
Testing Laboratories), Marcus Ranum (Network Flight Recorder
Inc.), Greg Shannon (Milkyway Networks), Rick Siebenaler
(Cyberguard), and Greg Smith (Check Point Software Technologies)
offered valuable contributions and critiques during this project.
7. Contact Information
David Newman
Data Communications magazine
Newman et al [Page 15]
INTERNET-DRAFT Terminology for Network Security Devices July 1997
1221 Avenue of the Americas, 41st Floor
New York, NY 10020
USA
212-512-6182 voice
212-512-6833 fax
dnewman@data.com
Helen Holzbaur
National Software Testing Laboratories Inc.
625 Ridge Pike
Conshohocken, PA 19428
USA
helen@nstl.com
Jim Hurd
National Software Testing Laboratories Inc.
625 Ridge Pike
Conshohocken, PA 19428
USA
jimh@nstl.com
Steven Platt, PhD.
National Software Testing Laboratories Inc.
625 Ridge Pike
Conshohocken, PA 19428
USA
steve@nstl.com
Newman et al [Page 16]
