Handbook of Infosec Terms 2.0/Handbook_of_Infosec_Terms_Version_2.0_ISSO.iso/text/privacy/p04_010.txt

Text File | 1996-09-03 | 49KB | 1,006 lines

PRIVACY Forum Digest     Friday, 5 May 1995     Volume 04 : Issue 10

            Moderated by Lauren Weinstein ([e-mail])
              Vortex Technology, Woodland Hills, CA, U.S.A.

                       ===== PRIVACY FORUM =====

         The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the
          ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy,
                  and the Data Services Division
               of MCI Communications Corporation.


CONTENTS
    New FCC Order on Caller ID: Per-Line ID Blocking *Permitted*
       (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
    Privacy and anonymity (Phil Agre)
    Privacy, cellular telephones, and 911 (Jerry Leichter)
    Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995 (Bob Rahe)
    California Digital Signature Bill (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse)
    Re: Destruction of data (Gary Kremen)
    Clipper paper available for anon FTP (Michael Froomkin)
    Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Second Annual Report Available
       (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse)
    CPSR / Seattle Opposes WA State Bill ESSB 5466 (Susan Evoy)
    Olympic surveillance and ITS (Phil Agre)
    "Audience tracking system" for electronic newspapers (Jim Warren)
    The Road Watches You: 'Smart' highway systems may know too much
       (Simson L. Garfinkel)
    ASIS on WWW (Frederick B. Cohen)
    CFP - Advanced Surveillance (Dave Banisar)


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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and
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The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all
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server at the URL: "http://www.vortex.com".
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

VOLUME 04, ISSUE 10

   Quote for the day:

    "Where was it I lost control of this interview?"

            -- Hans Conried
               "Fractured Flickers" (1963; Syndicated)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 5 May 95 20:02 PDT
From:    [e-mail] (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
Subject: New FCC Order on Caller ID: Per-Line ID Blocking *Permitted*

Greetings.  Another chapter is unfolding in the seemingly never-ending saga
of Calling Number ID (CNID) systems in the U.S.  As you may recall, around
March of last year, the FCC ordered that interstate transmission of CNID
information be required, that free per-call ID blocking be made available
(at least for interstate calls) and that per-line ID blocking for interstate
calls would *not* be permitted, regardless of state rules.

This latter point triggered a great deal of concern and the beginnings of
litigation, since many states had already mandated the availability of
per-line ID blocking, which would enable a subscriber to simply tell the
telephone company that they wanted to protect their number on *all* calls by
default, rather than having to dial the per-call blocking code on every call.

The original FCC order was to become effective about now.  However, very
recently the FCC stayed that original order, both because of implementation
timing and other concerns.

A new FCC order on this matter was just issued.  It is to become effective
December of this year and still requires the interstate transmission of CNID
data.  However, in a major shift, it apparently no longer prohibits the
implementation of per-line blocking for interstate calls.  The upshot of
this would be that states (e.g. California and many others) where per-line
blocking was to be permitted will be able to allow telephone subscribers to
specify that CNID display will not be available for any calls they dial by
default, regardless of destination.

The Commission apparently chose not to follow the California model which
would have also mandated that all non-published numbers be set to per-line
blocking initially without any action being needed by the subscriber.  The
result will be that virtually all subscribers will need to take specific
steps to communicate their desire of per-line ID blocking to their local
telco to protect their numbers, since by default most subscribers will not
have CNID blocking on their lines.  The telcos are promising an education
campaign about this, though with the large numbers of persons who never read
their bill inserts one can't help but wonder how many will miss the info
until they have a CNID-related problem.

The full text of the new order has not yet been made widely available, so
I'm basing the above analysis on information gleaned from press releases and
other sources.  I'll report back on important details, and any variations
from the above, after I've seen the full order.

A number of issues (per-call unblocking of lines set to per-line blocking,
issues surrounding ANI delivery of calling numbers to 800 and 900 services,
and a variety of other points are still unclear at this moment, but
hopefully will be clarified soon (800 numbers represent a particularly
complex issue, due to their "collect call" nature).

This move by the FCC, if it follows the framework described above, may put
to rest many of the most contentious issues surrounding CNID, at least at
the interstate level.  One of the two large telcos in California (Pacific
Bell) announced immediately after the order that they would now go ahead
with making CNID available to subscribers.

However, in this state where the majority of lines are non-published, and
where the percentage of persons likely to choose per-line ID blocking can be
expected to be extremely high, it remains to be seen how useful CNID
services are really going to be for the (mainly marketing-oriented)
applications the telcos have been promoting them.  An interesting statistic
to watch for will be the percentage of persons who order CNID service for
themselves, but also request per-line ID blocking for their *own* lines!

More as information becomes available...

--Lauren--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 21 Apr 1995 21:33:00 -0700
From:    Phil Agre <[e-mail]>
Subject: privacy and anonymity

The April 1995 issue of The Network Observer focuses on privacy issues
in Intelligent Transportation Systems.  To retrieve a copy, aim your
web client at  http://communication.ucsd.edu/pagre/tno/april-1995.html
or send a message that looks like this:

  To: [e-mail]
  Subject: archive send tno-april-1995

The industry group ITS America is circulating a "draft final" set of
"fair information and privacy principles" for ITS.  I regard these
principles as extremely weak and encourage you to study them and send
your comments to ITS America and your local transportation authority.
The text, along with pointers to a long list of questions to ask about
them, is available at  http://weber.ucsd.edu/~pagre/its-privacy.html
or by sending a message that looks like this:

  To: [e-mail]
  Subject: archive send its-privacy

Finally, courtesy of Dave Banisar <[e-mail]> at the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, the very interesting new US Supreme Court
decision favoring anonymous political leaflets -- a case with possible
implications for the legal status of anonymous electronic messages --
can be obtained by sending a message that looks like this:

  To: [e-mail]
  Subject: archive send anonymous

Feel free to pass these resources along to others on the net who might
benefit from them.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 22 Apr 95 09:05:24 EDT
From:    Jerry Leichter <[e-mail]>
Subject: Privacy, cellular telephones, and 911

This Tuesday's (18-Apr) Wall Street Journal had an article about the
interactions of 911 with cellular phones.  It had a nice discussion of the
history of 911, including some of the political problems that have kept
Enhanced 911 from become universal - to this day, Chicago doesn't have it -
and of the real difficulties with 911 calls from cellular phones.  With cell
phones, of course, the 911 center gets no usable location information - and in
many cases people on the phone can't give good information.  (There's one
story of a cellular dispatcher who happened to see a fire at a Safeway
supermarket, and called it in on his cell phone.  It took a while to get
across to the person he spoke to where he was - and he wasn't sure he got it
right.  By chance, a few moments after he hung up, he spotted a pay phone.  So
he called back.  This time, the E911 system provided the location - and a good
thing, since subsequent discus- sion revealed that fire engines had been
dispatched to the wrong Safeway!)

The privacy connection:  The FCC has proposed that a system be developed that
will allow 911 centers to determine the location of a calling cellphone.  They
are asking for 150 meter resolution.

The FCC and proponents see this as "just like E-911, but for cell phones".
The problem, of course, is that E-911 uses information that has never been
particularly private (the calling phone number - even before Caller ID,
everyone knew from movies that the number *could* be traced if necessary),
combined with a phone-number-to-fixed-physical-location map, which has no
particular privacy implications.  Cellular location, on the other hand, has to
require some technology for pinning down the physical location of a cell phone
quickly and reliably.  Any such method would be impossible to limit to use
just with 911.  In addition, given the nature of cell phones and the on-air
protocols, it would be quite possible to allow for remote interrogation of
this information; in fact, that's likely.  Since 911 is supposed to be useful
to people in serious trouble, who may not be able to take an explicit action
to acknowledge a system request, chances are overwhelming that any such system
would not require explicit action by the cellphone owner.  I would expect most
phones wouldn't even provide an indication that they'd been interrogated.

There's been a great deal of resistance to the proposal from the cell phone
industry.  It would require expensive modification to their equipment; it's
not clear, in fact, whether the FCC's 150 meter goal can be reached without
also modifying all the phones, a fantastically expensive proposition.  There
is also some debate about whether there really is any significant need for
such a system.  So it's all on hold for the moment.

In principle, a cell phone can be located fairly accurately even today, though
it may require a significant effort with specialized equipment.  (Note the
methods used to locate Kevin Mitnick when he was recently arrested.)  It is
also, in principle, possible to locate a cell phone that is simply turned on,
even if it's not in active use.  The next generation of PCS's, with their much
smaller cells, will inherently know where a cell phone is to a much greater
degree of precision than do current systems.  This makes the public safety/
privacy tradeoffs all the more complex:  If we are inherently going to lose
the ability to keep our location secret when using (or even carrying) a cell
phone, we might as well get the public safety features.  On the other hand,
perhaps we want to think twice about the grand vision of a cell-phone only
network.  (Of course, even with such a network, I suppose you can always leave
your phone at home.)

Phil Agre, UCSD

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 24 Apr 1995 09:03:47 EDT
From:    [e-mail] (Bob Rahe)
Subject: Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995

Some comments on comments wrt FPPA of 1995.

In V4:I9 Robert Gellman writes:

Subject: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995
...

>     I offer a few observations about the bill.  First, it
>appears that this is part of the agenda of the new right.  Buried
>in the Committee report is this sentence which may explain the
>principal purpose of the bill:

>           In some cases, survey questions have been phrased
>     in a manner that suggests neutrality or even tacit
>     approval of behavior or attitudes which may be contrary
>     to the values held by parents.

  In other words, survey questions have not been used to elicit information
but to 'teach'?

>     Second, none of the key terms in the bill is defined.
>"Sexual behavior" could arguably range from mating activities of
>earthworms to fashion trends for seventh graders.  Also, a survey
>could arguably include a question asked by one teacher to one
>student.  It is also not clear what constitutes "antisocial"
>behavior.  Drinking?  Rock concerts?  Baseball strikes?  Poorly
>drafted legislation?

  Are ANY of those things valid and/or useful 'survey' questions?  Maybe
it does include some extraneous things, probably includes many other things
that might seem silly.  So what?  It would seem that the point would be does
it exclude things that SHOULD be valid/useful for a school to do a survey
on?  If not then it would seem that 'no harm, no foul' would be appropriate.

>     Third, the exclusion for tests of academic performance is
>based on the intent of the test.  Thus, prohibited questions
>might be permissible in a test whose principal intent is the
>measurement of academic performance.  This may be true even if
>the test is non-identifiable.  On the other side, a sharp student
>might argue that a biology test violates the rules without
>parental consent and advance availability by questioning the
>intent.  This is not necessarily a winning argument, but it might
>buy a postponement of an exam while the lawyers argue about
>things.

  Every law has the nit-pickers who can do exactly that - produce a non-
winning argument that delays and postpones while lawyers get to argue (and
charge.) See the OJ trial for a great example of the power of lawyers to
find the most inane things to argue and obfuscate.

>     Finally, the exceptions are worthy of note.  You may not ask
>a minor about sexual experiences without written parental
>permission unless your purpose is to put the student or the
>parent in jail or to collect taxes.  This turns privacy
>legislation on its head by denying anonymous and recourseless use
>of information but permitting use of the information to harm the
>provider.  Thus, it is okay to ask children if their parents have
>committed a crime if it is part of a criminal investigation but
>not as part of a research project.

  This is neither particularly new nor unreasonable.  All it says is that you
can't use this law to avoid others that have been already argued (nitpicked?).
I.e. the privacy issues wrt law enforcement and tax collection have been
argued already and this law does not overrule such.  It would seem the
alternative is that the bill allow, say, sexual abuse because it would
disallow the questioning when abuse is suspect?  That would certainly not
pass any reasonableness test, nor would it be what the framers had in mind
I'm sure.

  Finally, I would suggest, rather than attempting to argue only the demerits
of the law, show how it could be fixed to satisfy these complaints.
It would seem there is an agenda in the attack, namely that of the 'old
left' and that it is purely political.  I find the argument that essentially
says that schools should be allowed to ask any question they like in any
method under any guise to be a large privacy problem.  Maybe this bill is
not the best solution but with no alternatives offered and no suggestions to
'repair' it, one must conclude the argument is not about privacy but
possibly about advocating the exact behavior that the writer originally claimed
was the reason for the bill in the first place, i.e. unfettered social
engineering disguised as 'surveys' and social work.  Let's address the
privacy issues involved in those activities.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 24 Apr 1995 13:49:29 -0700 (PDT)
From:    Privacy Rights Clearinghouse <[e-mail]>
Subject: California Digital Signature Bill

Those interested in on-line privacy should be aware of a bill in
the California Legislature.  A.B. 1577, sponsored by Debra Bowen,
addresses the issue of digital signatures.  There are versions of the
same bill under consideration in Oregon, Washington, and Utah as well.

Evidently, the bill would provide for a certification procedure
that would be used to verify the digital signature of anyone who
has had their signature "certified."  The bill would provide for a
publicly-accessible database of certificates, which could be
accessed by anyone wishing to verify a digital signature.

We have looked over the bill and, while we believe something along
these lines is essential to prevent widespread fraud and
misrepresentation in on-line activities, we are concerned that this
specific bill raises several serious privacy concerns.

The public database idea may be particularly intrusive.  This
sounds like a direct marketer's dream: a fully accessible database
of e-mail addresses that are certified authentic and reliable for
on-line sales up to an expressed amount.  Will it be possible to
access the repository and compile a list of e-mail addresses which
could then be used for marketing purposes?  For example, could a
list of all certificates with "recommended reliance limits" above
$1000 be culled from these repositories?  If other information is
included in the certificate, would direct marketers be able to
search for all e-mail addresses, say, in a certain zip code or area
code?

There may be other privacy problems with A.B. 1577.  We would like
to hear comments from anyone regarding this bill.  If you wish, we
can forward your comments to Assemblywoman Bowen's office.

The legislative counsel's digest of the bill is attached.  The full
text of the bill (about 30 pages worth) are available on the Net
from:
     gopher sen.ca.gov   [Under the Bills, Codes, & Analyses..]
     http://www.sen.ca.gov    [Under the sen.ca.gov gopher
                              interface]
     gopher mother.com   [Under California/Assemblywoman Debra
                          Bowen/Bills:  1995-96 Session]

If you have comments, please contact the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse:                  voice 800.773.7748
                                (outside California 619.298.3396)
                                e-mail [e-mail]


                  LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

        AB 1577, as introduced, Bowen.  Digital signatures.

          Existing statutes do not generally govern the
     authenticity and  verification of electronic or similar
     data intended to act as a  signature, except in the case
     of electronic fund transfers in nonconsumer situations
     which provides for security procedures related to
     verification of authenticity of orders.

          This bill would add the California Digital Signature
     Act.  A digital signature would be a sequence of bits
     meeting certain encryption requirements, that would be as
     valid as if it had been written on paper, except in the
     case of a digital signature that would make a negotiable
     instrument payable to bearer, which would be void except
     to effectuate a funds transfer or a transaction between
     financial institutions.  The bill would further set forth
     the effect of certain actions taken with respect to
     digital signatures.

         The bill would provide for the issuance of a
     certificate by a certification authority that would
     contain information to verify a digital signature of a
     subscriber.  The bill would provide for a database of
     certificates by repositories.

          The bill would provide for the licensure of
     certification authorities by the Office of Information
     Technology, and for the recognition of repositories. The
     bill would require the office to be a repository.  The
     bill would provide for fees, and would impose related
     duties on the office.

          The bill would set forth provisions governing and
     limiting the  liability of certification authorities and
     repositories.

          The bill would make it a misdemeanor for a person to
     knowingly or intentionally misrepresent to a
     certification authority his or her identity, name,
     distinguished name, or authorization when requesting
     suspension of a certificate, thereby imposing a
     state-mandated local program.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 24 Apr 1995 21:19:20 -0800
From:    [e-mail] (Gary Kremen)
Subject: Re: Destruction of data

A company that I use to work at (Los Altos Technologies - [e-mail],
http://www.lat.com) has as far I know the only government certified solution
to destruction of data without destroying the media.  As I remember the
problems are quite complex with bad sectors, alternative cylinders and grown
defects.  However my information might be dated.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 27 Apr 1995 15:24:59 -0400 (EDT)
From:    Michael Froomkin <[e-mail]>
Subject: Clipper paper available for anon FTP

My paper, "The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution" is now available for anonymous FTP.  It is about 180pp.
long, and contains more than 800 references.

I would welcome your feedback on this paper -- even (especially?)
contributions to the inevitable errata sheet.

(Please note this docment resides at what is officially a "temporary"
site, so that if you create a web link to it, please let me know so that
I can notify you when it moves).

Contents of FTP://acr.law.miami.edu/pub/..

File                  Type
---------------       ----------
clipper.asc           ASCII
clipper.wp            WP 5.1/Dos
clipperwp.zip         Pkzipped version of clipper.wp
clipper.ps            My best effort at Postscript.  YMMV.  (approx. 7Mb.)
clipperps.zip         Pkzipped version of clipper.ps
clipper.ps.gz         Gzipped version of clipper.ps

Ports provided by nice people (please note I have not checked these)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
clipper.ps.Z          Unix compressed version of clipper.ps with carriage
                      returns removed -- courtesy of Whit Diffie
clipperMSW.sea.hqx    Binhexed self-extracting Microsoft Word 5.1 for
                      Macintosh version of clipper.wp -- courtesy
              of Ted Byfield

None of these files contains correct and final page numbers, and there are
generally trivial typos that were corrected in the printed version.  The
printed version appears at 143 U.Penn.L.Rev. 709 (1995).

I intend to put up a web version presently.  The .index file in the above
directory will have details when a clean copy is ready for prime time.  A
link to an experimental and highly buggy HTMLized version may appear at
erratic intervals at http://acr.law.miami.edu at the very bottom of the
homepage.

A.Michael Froomkin
Associate Professor of Law
U.Miami Law School

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 27 Apr 1995 13:40:45 -0700 (PDT)
From:    Privacy Rights Clearinghouse <[e-mail]>
Subject: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Second Annual Report Available

April 24, 1995

The Second Annual Report of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is now
available. The 68-page report covers the time frame from October
1993 through September 1994, our second full year of hotline
operation. We discuss project usage statistics and accomplishments
as well as what we consider to be the most significant privacy
issues affecting California consumers.

This year we have reported privacy issues a little differently,
selecting some of the more troubling privacy abuses from hotline
calls and discussing them in a separate section of the report. The
Second Annual Report highlights nearly 50 such case studies. We
have made particular note of what we call invisible information
gathering; we also focus on the growing crime of identity theft. In
addition, we revisit some of the topics discussed last year, such
as "junk" mail, unwanted telemarketing sales calls, medical records
privacy and workplace monitoring.

A 15-page Executive Summary of the Annual Report can be found on
the PRC's gopher site. The Executive Summary includes all of the
case studies featured in the full report. Gopher to
gopher.acusd.edu. Go into the menu item "USD Campuswide Information
Services" to find the PRC's materials.

For a complete paper copy of the 68-page report, call the PRC at
800-773-7748 (Calif. only) or 619-298-3396.

The PRC is a nonprofit consumer education program administered by
the University of San Diego Center for Public Interest Law. It is
funded in part by the Telecommunications Education Trust, a program
of the California Public Utilities Commission.


====================================================================
   Barry D. Fraser                      [e-mail]
   Online Legal Research Associate

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 27 Apr 1995 01:15:44 -0700
From:    Susan Evoy <[e-mail]>
Subject: CPSR / Seattle Opposes WA State Bill ESSB 5466

Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility / Seattle
P.O. Box 75481
Seattle, WA 98145
206-783-4821

CPSR / Seattle Opposes WA State Bill ESSB 5466

For Immediate Release
Wednesday, April 26, 1995
Contact:        Eric Rehm
783-4821 (eves.)
865-8904 (days)

Seattle -- Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility /
Seattle is calling upon Washington State Governor Lowry to veto Senate
Bill 5466.  "ESSB 5466 is the wrong medicine at the wrong time!", says
Eric Rehm, parent and President of the Seattle chapter of CPSR.  "This
bill purports to be an 'act relating to the well-being of
children'.  In fact, it takes away control from parents, unfairly
burdens on-line providers to verify the age of it's clients and the
nature of their postings.  In doing so, it assaults freedom and
privacy on the information highway."

National CPSR Chair Doug Schuler, also a Seattle parent, is concerned
that the Internet and other computer networks are being unfairly
assessed for the ease at which information can be transmitted.  "CPSR
views the information highway as a new medium in which First Amendment
rights must first be secured, not limited.  Further, on-line services
are more akin to a bookstore than a television or radio broadcast
studio.  On-line users can make choices about what to view and read,
just as in a bookstore or library.

CPSR NW Regional Director Aki Namioka is concerned about the
educational impact of complying with a law like ESSB 5466.  "On-line
service system operators (sysops) in Washington will have to police
all postings, and will effectively become available only to those 18
and older.  This will deprive Washington K-12 schools of access to the
Internet or other on-line services."

Background: On April 14 the Washington State Legislature passed Senate
Bill 5466 "An act relating to the well-being of children."  This bill
is similar to the Exon legislation (Federal bill S. 314, co-sponsored
by WA Sen. Slade Gorton) that would restrict minors' access to
pornography.

On-line services were exempted from the bill in a Senate passed
amendment on March 11.  However, when the House passed the bill on the
14th, it removed the exemption for on-line services.  The bill will go
into effect immediately upon the signature of the governor.

The result will be that every delivery or display of a picture or text
viewed as obscene by community standards will subject the sysop to a
$5000 fine or year in jail. Furthermore every day that the offending
material is available on a BBS or Internet-connected-system counts as
a separate offense!  Since the sysop is liable for the infraction and
not the person doing the uploading of material, all that is necessary
for someone who doesn't like a service to put that service out of
business is to upload an offending file, wait a couple of weeks, have
an accomplice "find" the file, and turn it, and the hapless sysop,
into the authorities.

Alternatives: There are other ways to address the legitimate concerns
that some Net users and parents have about material on the network
without violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression.
The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), a nonprofit public
interest organization, suggests an alternative: giving parents and
guardians the ability to screen what kids can access.  A system akin
to telephone restrictions on access to 900-numbers could be created to
limit what content could come into one's home. This would not
necessarily be foolproof or easy to create, but it is much better than
attempting to police the information highway.  CPSR History: Founded
in 1981 by a group of computer scientists concerned about the use of
computers in nuclear weapons systems, CPSR has grown into a national
public-interest alliance of information technology professionals and
other people.  Currently, CPSR has 22 chapters in the U.S. and
contacts with similar groups worldwide.  CPSR/Seattle has over 200
members, and has been active on the state, county, and local level on
computer-related issues confronting Washington's communities.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 27 Apr 1995 15:02:59 -0700
From:    Phil Agre <[e-mail]>
Subject: Olympic surveillance and ITS

The press is now rapidly putting together the story about privacy in
Intelligent Transportation Systems.  The first article, so far as I
am aware, was Dan Gillmor's piece in the 10/18/93 Detroit Free Press.

The latest article is by Rodger Brown in the Atlanta-based weekly
tabloid "Creative Loafing" ("Secure Legacy", 4/22/95, pages 20-23).  Its
point of departure is the pervasive use of surveillance technologies at
the Atlanta Olympic Games.  ("More than 800 surveillance cameras will be
placed around Atlanta for the Olympics.  When the athletes go home, the
cameras will stay.")  It seems that the Olympics have become a public
relations feeding frenzy, and this year the makers of surveillance gear
are using the Olympics as a showcase for their products.

The article's main focus is on technologies relating to Intelligent
Transportation systems.  After discussing the use of these systems
as part of the Olympic infrastructure, Brown moves on to discuss the
Georgia DOT's plans.  He mentions that the national industry group
ITS America is circulating "fair information and privacy principles"
for ITS, but...

  Although Georgia's DOT is a member of ITS [America] and has agreed
  to abide by the common technical standards, it chooses to opt out
  of the privacy principles.

  "We're not interested in privacy issues", [Georgia DOT traffic
  operations engineer Marion] Waters explains.  "It's not my
  understanding that we have to do a privacy assessment because
  we're not doing anything that addresses privacy.

  Despite the fact that the traffic management system includes nearly
  400 surveillance cameras, DOT is comfortable operating on its own
  good faith.

  "We do have some locations where you could turn the cameras and look
  into nearby neighborhoods, but there's no location where we're next
  to an apartment building", Waters says.  "If we find a location like
  that, we'll block the camera."

The article goes on to explain the Georgia DOT's plans to cooperate
with the police in using the cameras to issue traffic tickets.  The
article does not indicate, however, whether the Georgia DOT plans to
employ any technologies that automatically identify individuals or
cars, for example through toll collection.

(Footnote: The article also mistakenly ascribes to me the view that
the systems run the risk of forcing people to follow supposedly
optimal paths to their destinations.  Although this is obviously not
impossible, I do not regard it as a likely enough possibility to get
riled up about.  A more likely danger, in my view, is that tracking
data will eventually be used to set insurance rates, thereby creating
a penalty for driving on the wrong side of the tracks.  I have heard
rumors of such schemes, but have never been able to document them.
Most likely they are a decade off.)

Phil Agre, UCSD

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 28 Apr 1995 12:14:28 +0800
From:    [e-mail] (Jim Warren)
Subject: "audience tracking system" for electronic newspapers

From: [e-mail]
Date: Thu, 27 Apr 1995 04:13:11 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: TeleGrafix News Release
To: [e-mail]

Advanced Internet Publishing
and
Audience Tracking System                <<====== !!!!
Debuts At Newspaper Convention


(NEW ORLEANS) April 25, 1995 -- TeleGrafix Communications Inc. of Huntington
Beach, Calif., and Cykic Software Inc. of San Diego have announced the first
media server systems dedicated to electronic newspaper publishing and online
broadcasting that integrate the Internet and World Wide Web with advanced
database, audiotex, fax-on-demand, advertising placement and
audience measurement technologies.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^    <====== !!!

The media servers, which combine TeleGrafix's RIPscrip(TM) 2.0 online
multimedia software with Cykic's MultiBase(TM) Internet networking platform,
were demonstrated today for the 1,500 newspaper publishers attending the
Newspaper Association of America's annual convention in New Orleans.

<...>

Multibase is a unique multiuser networking system and database environment for
advanced online and Internet media systems. It operates on 386, 486 and
Pentium-based IBM-compatible personal computers. Programs that run under dBASE,
Clipper, FoxBase+ and other popular systems can be run under MultiBase with few
changes. <...>

The media servers combine TeleGrafix's Cybermedia Advertising Research
System(TM) with Internet audience tracking technologies developed by Cykic.
                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
These tools are ideal for consortia such as the newly announced New Century
Network founded by eight major newspaper publishers, or by any other group
seeking ways to put electronic newspapers before the widest possible audience.
Publishers can now determine exactly who is accessing World Wide Web sites,
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
collecting precise individual user information.  Advertisers may also receive
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
live, real-time reports on advertising reach and effectiveness.

<...>

Cykic Software was founded in 1987 and is privately held.  Its networking and
database technologies are widely used in the aerospace, defense and health care
industries, by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Defense, Martin
Marietta, Kaiser Permanente, TEAC of Korea, and John Deere & Co.

Contact:  Patrick Clawson, TeleGrafix Communications,
Phone: [phone].  Fax: [phone]..  BBS: [phone].
Internet: [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 3 May 1995 15:37:38 -0400
From: [e-mail] (Simson L. Garfinkel)
Subject: The Road Watches You: 'Smart' highway systems may know too much

  [ From Risks-Forum Digest; Thursday, 4 May 1995, Volume 17, Issue 11
        -- PRIVACY Forum MODERATOR ]


The Road Watches You: 'Smart' highway systems may know too much
(C) 1995, Simson L. Garfinkel

    (This is slightly longer version of my article that appeared
    in the March 3 1995 issue of The New York Times.)

Highway authorities throughout the country are building futuristic "smart
road" systems designed to unclog our highways and bridges, improve driver
safety, and create a variety of new services for our nation's motorists.
But these smart roads could lead to an Orwellian surveillance state if we
do not act now to change their course.

One smart road system is already in operation on New York's Tappan Zee
Bridge. Called E-ZPass, the system allows drivers to drive through the toll
plaza without reaching for their wallets or rolling down their windows.
Instead, a computer operated by the Thruway Authority reads an electronic
tag mounted inside the car's windshield, and automatically deducts the toll
from a special pre-established account.

Other systems are going up around the country. In Florida, the
Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority has a system called E-PASS which
lets drivers pay their tolls on the East-West Expressway and certain parts
of the Central Florida GreeneWay. Instead of a windshield tag, E-PASS uses
a radio transponder the size of a flashlight mounted under the car's front
bumper. A similar system is being planned for the San Francisco Bay Area.

These automatic toll collection systems are just the beginning of a
nationwide plan called Intelligent Transportation Systems, or ITS. Rather
than have each city adopt its own tag or transponder, the Department of
Transportation and ITS America, a Washington-based organization that
promotes the system, are scrambling to create a single, national standard.

As envisioned, smart roads could further reduce highway congestion by
alerting drivers to upcoming accidents; a computer display mounted on the
dashboard could suggest alternative routes. With its planned two-way
communication between the car and the intelligent road, ITS could even
eliminate the search of a place to park. Instead, your car's computer could
automatically locate the nearest lot with an opening and electronically
reserve you a place.

But there is a dark side to this plan, a privacy problem that its boosters
are trying to pave under. These systems offer unprecedented opportunities
to monitor the movements of drivers. It would create a bank of personal
information that government and private industry might have difficulty
resisting.

Consider Florida's E-PASS system. Each month, every E-PASS subscriber gets
a detailed statement listing the exact time, date and location that each
toll was collected.  ITS America has adopted a set of privacy principles
which say that states shouldn't take advantage of this dat, yet the
organization  specifically envisions that "states may legislate conditions
under which ITS information will be made available."

Phil Agre, who teaches communications at the University of California, San
Diego, and closely follows privacy issues, warns that there might be other
unintended consequences of the widespread use of ITS systems.  Auto
insurance companies already offer discounts to driver who don't live in
areas of high auto theft or accidents; in the future, says Agree, they
might offer discounts to drivers who can prove that they haven't driven
onto "the wrong side of the tracks."

The data could also be sold illegally by insiders. Information about a
person's movements might be a key fact in forcing an out-of-court
settlement in a divorce or worker's compensation case. Private
investigators would have a big incentive to bribe low-paid clerical workers
for a photocopy of somebody's toll-crossing bill.

There is an alternative to this system. Instead of transmitting an account
number, a radio would transmit "digital cash" using a smart card inside the
car  similar to the telephone cards used in many European countries. But
judging by plans under way so far, state agencies and the Government
haven't shown much interest in making privacy a priority in the design of
the tomorrow's intelligent highways.

Americans have always loved the freedom that their cars give them. Could
that too become a thing of the past?

Simson Garfinkel is a Cambridge-based writer who covers privacy issues. His
fourth book, PGP: Pretty Good Privacy, was published by O'Reilly in January.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 5 May 1995 09:37:02 -0400 (EDT)
From:    [e-mail] (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen)
Subject: ASIS on WWW

The American Society for Industrial Security's (ASIS) Security
Management Magazine is now making select articles available on an
experimental basis over World Wide Web.  This WWW area is still under
development, but you might want to read a fine article about the
problems of erasing electromagnetic media no on-line in this area.  The
URL is:
            http://all.net:8080

------------------------------

Date:    29 Apr 1995 13:22:30 -0400
From:    "Dave Banisar" <[e-mail]>
Subject: CFP - Advanced Surveillance

                         CALL FOR PAPERS

                Advanced Surveillance Technologies

                           Sponsored by

                     Privacy International, and
               Electronic Privacy Information Center

                        4  September 1995

                       Copenhagen,  Denmark


Overview

Over the past decade, fundamental changes have taken place in the
nature and the environment of surveillance. New information systems
offer an unprecedented ability to identify, monitor and track a
virtually limitless number of individuals. Some leading-edge
technologies are likely to revolutionize the practice of
surveillance. The factors of cost, scale, size, location and
distance have, in many instances,  become largely irrelevant.

The impact of political and economic change throughout the world has
also created unforeseen dimensions to surveillance. The evolution of
a Global Information Infrastructure will have a profound impact on
the scope of potential surveillance of individuals. The end of the
cold war and the privatization of public sector activities has
magnified the impact of change. The merging of technologies has also
created new opportunities for wide-scale surveillance.

The nature of surveillance has changed to the extent that modern
information systems involve a pre-requisite of general surveillance
of populations. The pursuit of perfect identity has created a rush
to develop systems which create an intimacy between people and
technology.  Advanced biometric identification and sophisticated ID
card systems combine with geographic tracking to create the
potential to pinpoint the location of any individual. The use of
distributed databases and data matching programs makes such tracking
economically feasible on a large scale.

Extraordinary advances have recently been made in the field of
visual surveillance. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems can
digitally scan, record, reconfigure and identify human faces, even
in very poor light conditions. Remote sensing through advanced
satellite systems can combine with ground databases and
geodemographic systems to create mass surveillance of human
activity.

The globalization of information systems will take information once
and for all away from the protection and jurisdiction of national
boundaries. The development of data havens and rogue data states is
allowing highly sensitive personal information to be processed
outside any legal protection.

At a more intimate level, research is underway in more than a dozen
countries with the aim of implanting microchip technology directly
into the human brain. US and European medical institutes have
already conducted many such operations. The creation of a direct
link between the human brain and computer technology is at an
advanced stage. Such procedures are initially aimed at stimulating
dead senses and paralyzed limbs. Within two decades, it is possible
that such implants will be at a sufficiently advanced stage to
enable complex interaction between the brain and external
technology.

The science of nanotechnology, which involves the re-configuration
of individual atoms and molecules, will present the potential for
virtually undetectable covert surveillance.

These and other developments are changing the nature and meaning of
surveillance. Law has scarcely had time to address even the most
visible of these changes. Public policy lags behind the technology
by many years. The repercussions for privacy and for numerous other
aspects of law and human rights need to be considered sooner rather
than later.

This one day conference will present an overview of these
leading-edge technologies, and will assess the impact that they may
have in the immediate future. Experts and analysts will discuss the
nature and application of the new technologies, and the public
policy that should be developed to cope with their use.

The conference theme is unique, and interest in the event has
already been expressed from throughout the world.


Program contents

The first session will assess new dimensions in current surveillance
technologies. The remainder of the day will be devoted to exploring
technologies which are in the formative stage of development.

        Preliminary List of Topics:

        o  Advanced Satellite Surveillance
        o  Microchip Implants
        o  Nanotechnology
        o  Biometrics and perfect identity
        o  Advanced Geodemographic Systems
        o  Data Havens and Rogue Data States
        o  Information Warfare
        o  Cryptography

The conference will be held in Copenhagen, and is timed to coincide
with the 17th annual international meeting of privacy and data
protection commissioners.

Number of participants :  approximately one hundred

Cost:      US  $75 - Individuals/non-profit organizations
                    $175 - Commercial organizations

Privacy International and the Electronic Privacy Information Center
are now requesting abstracts for papers.  Papers should be directed
at a general audience, and should either present an overview of an
aspect of advanced surveillance technology, or they should discuss
the likely use and impact of the technology.

Abstracts or papers can be emailed to Privacy International at:
[e-mail]

Alternatively, they can be sent to :

        Privacy International Washington Office
        666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301
        Washington, DC 20003 USA
        1-202-544-9240 (phone)
        1-202-547-5482 (fax)

Web address: http://privacy.org/pi/
gopher/ftp cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/privacy_international/

------------------------------

End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 04.10
************************