Handbook of Infosec Terms 2.0/Handbook_of_Infosec_Terms_Version_2.0_ISSO.iso/text/privacy/p02_021.txt

Text File | 1996-09-03 | 10KB | 225 lines

PRIVACY Forum Digest        Sunday, 27 June 1993        Volume 02 : Issue 21

          Moderated by Lauren Weinstein ([e-mail])
                Vortex Technology, Topanga, CA, U.S.A.

                     ===== PRIVACY FORUM =====

         The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the
          ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy.


CONTENTS
    Summer Doldrums (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
    Re: The other side of Clipper (Barry Jaspan)
    The other side of Clipper (Bob Leone)
    Questions for the Privacy Forum ([e-mail])
    Re: USPS NCOA request results (Phil Karn)
    USPS NCOA request results (Alan Wexelblat)


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The Internet PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and
analysis of issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal
and collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond.  The
moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and
content.  Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged.

ALL submissions should be addressed to "[e-mail]" and must have
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VOLUME 02, ISSUE 21

   Quote for the day:

    "All you of Earth are idiots."

        -- Eros (Dudley Manlove)
           "Plan 9 From Outer Space" (1959)

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Date:    Sun, 27 Jun 93 16:12 PDT
From:    [e-mail] (Lauren Weinstein; PRIVACY Forum Moderator)
Subject: Summer Doldrums

Greetings.  We've now entered the "summer doldrums" period for
Internet Digests, where submissions and volume tend to drop
to minimums for the year.  So, this is a good time to submit
your own privacy concerns, concepts, horror stories, or other
relevant materials.  Remember, privacy is *you*.

--Lauren--

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 13 Jun 93 11:35:08 EDT
From:    "Barry Jaspan" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: The other side of Clipper ([e-mail])

   First, I believe that the tapping capability of Clipper/Capstone
   will prevent its ever replacing STU-IIIs and other complex
   algoritms for dedicated point-point connections that require
   absolute privacy.

Undeniably.  The question is who will be able to using STU-IIIs
without causing themselves potential problems.  The answer is "the
government, and no one else."

   Legislation from the government banning "any
   other cryptography" would be impossible to enforce and akin to
   trying to stuff knowlege back into Pandora's box. It is just not
   going to be happen and the government is intelligent enough not to
   take on a losing battle that could just flood the legal system (and
   there would be pleanty of floodees).

Since when has a law being impossible to enfoce prevented the
government from enacting it?  Consider: speed limits, drug use,
Prohibition.  Each of these *is* (was) a losing battle, and each *is*
flooding (did flood) the legal system.  And yet the governemnt
continues to stand behind impossible laws.  Why?

The NSA is not stupid.  They *know* they will be unable to prevent
dedicated people from using strong cryptography.  So why bother
mandating Clipper?  Because then anyone using strong cryto will be
labelling themself as a criminal, giving law enforcement authority to
arrest them (or just seize their assets) should the desire ever arise.

Barry Jaspan, [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 16 Jun 1993 11:28:24 -0400
From:    Bob Leone <[e-mail]>
Subject: The other side of Clipper

> Legislation from the government banning "any other cryptography" would
> be impossible to enforce and akin to trying to stuff knowlege back into
> Pandora's box. It is just not going to be happen and the government is
> intelligent enough not to take on a losing battle that could just
> flood the legal system (and there would be pleanty of floodees).

False. There would not be a flood. What would happen, if the govt made
non-Capstone encryption illegal, is that it would be considered prima-facie
evidence of criminal conspiracy (since only a criminal would want his
comm secure against monitoring by law-enforcement agents, right? Sure).

What would then happen is: if the govt wants to monitor you, and you use
non-Capstone, then they nail you. Make the penalties heavy enough, and
they don't really need to prove any of the charges they wanted to
monitor you for. After a few well-publicized cases, not too many people
will use non-Capstone encryption.

Bob Leone ([e-mail])
(The opinions expressed are my own.)

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 18 Jun 93 22:27 EDT
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: Questions for the Privacy Forum

An organization is planning to use the last four digits of employees
Social Security Numbers as part of a scheme for assigning computer
passwords.  I am not asking about the security aspects of this, but am
wondering about the privacy implications.  Is there anything particular
that needs to be considered about the last four digits as apposed to
four other digits?  Is this an acceptable use of (part of) social
security numbers?  Would it matter if the last nine digits (all of) or
the last one digit were used?  What precedents exist for allowing or
prohibiting such use?  What precedent is set by this proposed use?

I look forward to reading how readers would react if they faced such a
proposal.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 21 Jun 93 13:20:08 -0700
From:    Phil Karn <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: USPS NCOA request results

I can personally attest to the popularity of the USPS change of
address database.

Having moved twice in the past two years (first from New Jersey to a
rented house in San Diego, and again a year later within San Diego
when I bought a house), I had a chance to try out a trick suggested by
a local friend. Whenever I gave my new mailing address to someone, I
added a unique, bogus "apartment number" to keep track of how far that
particular copy of my address propagated.

It was hardly worth the effort. The *vast* majority of junk mail I
began to receive at each new address came with "#P", the code I had
added to the USPS change-of-address form. It even appears on my
address in the ham radio ARRL Repeater Directory listing for members
of the ARRL Future Systems Committee, of which I am a member. The
information you put on those harmless-looking little cards goes
*everywhere*.

And since I bought a house last August, another major source of junk
mail without a code has appeared that clearly uses the public real
estate records at the county clerk's office. It seems to go in cycles.
First were all the solicitations from burglar alarm, carpet and
drapery companies. Then it was "let us help you file your homestead
exemption". Now it's mortgage insurance and mortgage refinancing.

The moral is clear: if you want to disappear, don't file a change of
address form with the USPS, and don't buy a house. :-)

Phil

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Date:    Thu, 24 Jun 93 11:29:04 -0400
From:    "Alan (Gesture Man) Wexelblat" <[e-mail]>
Subject: USPS NCOA request results

I, like Steve Peterson, received a thick bundle of dead trees from the USPS
asserting that any and all of the companies listed (several thousand names)
might have received my change-of-address.

Interestingly, the USPS also claims that only those companies that "already
had my address" could have gotten the new one.  I don't see how they could
assert this unless they're denying that they ever sold the list of
people-who-changed-addresses.

Just another data point...

--Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker and Cyberspace Bard
Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group    [e-mail]
Voice: 617-258-9168, Pager: 617-945-1842    [e-mail]

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End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 02.21
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