Handbook of Infosec Terms 2.0/Handbook_of_Infosec_Terms_Version_2.0_ISSO.iso/text/privacy/p02_015.txt

Text File | 1996-09-03 | 33KB | 684 lines

PRIVACY Forum Digest     Friday, 30 April 1993     Volume 02 : Issue 15

          Moderated by Lauren Weinstein ([e-mail])
                Vortex Technology, Topanga, CA, U.S.A.

                     ===== PRIVACY FORUM =====

         The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the
          ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy.


CONTENTS
    Clipper Observations (Rick Pavek)
    Re: Clipper key announcement (Ken Beal)
    Clipper chip (Alan J. Rosenthal)
    Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses (Paul Ferguson)
    Letter on SSN and Health Care (Dave Banisar)
    Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy (Paul Hyland)


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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

VOLUME 02, ISSUE 15

   Quote for the day:

    "You will say you lose your freedom.  Freedom is an illusion.
     All you lose is the emotion of pride."

        -- Colossus
               "Colossus: The Forbin Project"; 1970

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 22 Apr 1993 14:53:25 -0700
From:    Rick Pavek <[e-mail]>
Subject: Clipper Observations

Let's see if I can imagine a scenario...

Drug dealer goes into an AT&T phone store and asks to see a cellular
phone.  Phone salesperson offers the new Clipper protected model.
DD asks isn't this the new one that the government designed to be
wiretapped?  The salesman says "Yes".  DD says "Let me see an unencrypted
model..."

  First point, no one engaged in illegal conduct will knowingly purchase
something designed to be wiretapped.

  Second, I imagine that there will be an aftermarket of products that
will add layers of encryption to the devices and make wiretapping again
impossible.  The most successful of these will be ones that are cheap.

  Third, will the NSA also be using these Clipper Chips?  Will law
enforcement officials that find a CIA operatative using one be able to
decrypt his transmission, as well?  Obviously, the agencies that are the
most likely to use encryption will not subject themselves to such an easily
defeated means.  (One warrant and two keys to go, please!)

  What we need to listen for are rumors of "clipper style" encryption that
can't be busted by normal means.  Just a hunch, but I'll bet that the
NSA and other clandestine organizations will be purchasing "modified" chips
that don't include that "family key F" with their encrypted transmissions,
or that will include bogus ones...

  I think the last thing the NSA wants is to be exposed to the observations
of "normal law enforcement agencies".

  OK, just realized that the keys to certain chips could be denied to
the search warrants if they were tagged "National Security", eh?  Anyone
with an insight into how the actual process/protection will be setup?

Just a curious bloke:
Rick Pavek
Halcyon.com

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 23 Apr 93 16:28:46 EDT
From:    [e-mail] (Ken Beal)
Subject: Re: Clipper key announcement

> From: [e-mail] (Chuck Stern)
[...]
> Under the
> current court, however, the exclusionary rule has been relaxed: if the police
> were 'acting in good faith,' then the evidence obtained via an illegally or
> improperly executed search warrant (for example) is admissable.

While my input to this has little to do with the Clipper Chip per se
(although I completely disagree with it and hope people will alert
Intergraph's lawyers), I'd like to take issue with the "good faith"
ruling.

>Anyone< can >say< that they're acting in good faith.  Why should we
expect that a police officer won't lie?  Especially if it means
busting that so-and-so that he's been after for months?

Alternatively: if the cops can do it, then I can too.  "Judge, I
didn't realize it was illegal to [insert offence here]."  etc.

Our society has to realize that, badge or no badge, everyone's an
individual.  Everyone has their own ideas and ideals, their own form
of greed to deal with, their own morality and their own vices.  Giving
a segment of the population free reign like this is, quite simply,
frightening.
--
Kenneth L. Beal, Jr.  [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 24 Apr 1993 13:03:46 -0400
From:    Alan J Rosenthal <[e-mail]>
Subject: clipper chip

I'm not really picking on a particular posting, so let me quote anonymously.

A poster supposes that he has purchased another cryptography unit which is not
breakable by the authorities, as well as purchasing a clipper chip:
>so that I can of course communicate with other normal Clipper units, but
>*also* so that a "casual eavesdropper" would detect nothing amiss on my line:
>since I possess said Clipper unit, one of course *expects* my communications
>to be encrypted.  If the government holds true to its word ...
>Without using the completed Clipper key, the authorities cannot distinguish a
>data stream generated by my [secure] unit from a data stream generated by my
>decidedly legal Clipper unit.

I think that now would be a good time for all to re-read Ken Thompson's
"Reflections on Trusting Trust", which was published as an ACM Turing Award
lecture and appears in a collection book called "ACM Turing Award lectures:
the first twenty years, 1966 to 1985", ACM Press, New York, 1987, 0897911830.
Wouldn't it be cool if when you switched off the switch on your telephone which
activates the clipper chip (so that you could use your other chip), the clipper
chip listened in and tried to determine if you were using some other encryption
method and if so, the next time you used the clipper chip, it integrated some
evidence of this fact into the encrypted data stream?  But that's kind of far
out; hopefully others can come up with more plausible scenarios.  But that's
not what I came to talk about here today...

The cryptographic algorithm could insert (and remove upon decrypting) a short
literal sequence every specified number of bytes, or anything like that to
prove that you were really using that algorithm to a "casual eavesdropper".  If
the algorithm is unpublished or if the published algorithm is somewhat abstract
so that you can't do it yourself just from reading the article, there would be
no way for a normal person to detect this.  Of course the hypothetical
non-clipper cryptography unit could be designed to contain this sequence as
well, but only if the makers knew it was there.  It is also possible for more
sophisticated characteristics of the stream to indicate that it's really a
clipper chip stream.  One thing which comes to mind is bizarre distribution
properties of the output bytes, assuming the encrypted stuff was digital, which
it probably isn't, but heck this is just an example.  For example, let's say
that data is encoded so that bytes range only from 0-200 rather than 0-255.
Now add 0 to the first byte, 1 to the next byte, and so on, up to adding 55,
then add 0 to the subsequent byte, and so on.  The resulting stream will never
have a value less than (n mod 56) for the nth byte (zero-origin) nor a value
greater than (n mod 56) + 200 for the nth byte.  So the stream would be easily
identifiable but still probably look normal if you didn't know what you were
looking for.  This is just an example and may be flawed because I don't know
too much about cryptology but I think the principle is correct.

In the absence of a published algorithm, we can't make ANY assumptions.
It's also still possible that the code is easily broken, or that only one half
of the key (i.e. from only one escrow agent) makes it become easily broken.
Without knowing something about key distribution it's hard to say too much
either; perhaps the keys are assigned in some pattern such that knowing the
manufacturer and the year in which the equipment is manufactured gives you only
a couple of possible values for one of the halves.  Or, say, only a hundred
possibilities, which still renders it feasible to try all of 'em.

Someone else made a good point that it sure would simplify things to encode the
serial number of the chip into its broadcast now and then so that the cops
didn't have to enter your home to look at the serial numbers on your equipment.
Wouldn't it save them a lot of time to encode the key instead?

Unless I missed it, I haven't seen the DES concerns repeated yet.  They should
be.  The concerns are that one has to be suspicious about the government
promoting a particular cryptographic standard so heavily.  People suspected the
NSA of having some influence over the choice of encryption method for DES.  And
no one ever suggested that DES would have some legal status with respect to
individuals.

in solidarity,
Alan "V guvax jr fubhyq cebzbgr ebg13 nf gur arj rapelcgvba fgnaqneq" Rosenthal

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 28 Apr 93 11:19:44 EDT
From:    [e-mail] (Paul Ferguson)
Subject: Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses

I've been following the discussions on several newsgroups and
mailing lists (RISKS, PRIVACY and Cypherpunks) concerning the
Wiretap Chip (Clipper/Capstone) and the proposed key escrow
system.

Here's my $.02, as well.

In RISK 14.55, <[e-mail]> Jim Bidzos wrote -

JB> Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
JB> software, what options are available to those who can benefit
JB> from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on
JB> these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry
JB> conducted?  (Much of the use of cryptography by software
JB> companies, particularly those in the entertainment industry, is
JB> for the protection of their intellectual property. Using hardware
JB> is not economically feasible for most of them.)

 Jim raises a valid concern. Although a hardware based system is
 ideal for voice encryption, the idea of registered key systems,
 where government and/or LE agencies have involvement, is not a
 popular one. The key escrow scheme in this proposal reeks of Big
 Brother. (As in, "Trust me. I'm from the government and I'm your
 friend.") In some circles, it is not even a consideration.
 Software encryption systems employed to protect intellectual and
 commercial data and electronic mail are much more flexible and
 desirable, especially when they are not governmentally proposed,
 imposed, designed and sanctioned by spook organizations such as
 the NSA.

 The real sore spot with the Clipper proposal is that private
 industry and citizenry were blind-sided by this entire process.
 The possibility that Uncle Sam will try to make this a de-facto
 standard and subsequently place restrictions on other forms of
 crypto (eg. software based) is real.

 Also in RISKS 14.55, <[e-mail]> Bill Campbell
 wrotes -

BC> There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of commercial, criminal and
BC> governmental entities with access to government resources who
BC> would not hesitate for a moment to violate my rights if they
BC> found it expedient to do so.  These individuals and organizations
BC> have demonstrated beyond question that they are not constrained
BC> by legal or ethical considerations, and as has been suggested
BC> in a number of other postings, the technology employed by Clipper
BC> (including the dual escrow sham) will probably not even pose so
BC> much as an inconvenience to a determined adversary.  To suggest
BC> otherwise is, at best, profoundly naive.

 I have a tendency to agree with Bill. In fact, California is
 currently embroiled in a scandal involving the release of
 confidential data (DMV addresses), by employees of the Anaheim
 Police Department, to third party interests. This is clearly in
 violation of their employer's policies, their own terms of
 employment, state criminal law, and civil law. What's to
 stop the same blatant, unethical breech of confidentiality with
 regards to the Clipper key escrow implementation? Nothing, that's
 what. In the future, information will be the most powerful possession
 and in the spirit of SNEAKERS, s/he who has control of and access to
 the information is the most powerful. Power corrupts, but absolute
 power corrupts absolutely. I think that Clipper offers maximum abuse
 in this scenario.

 Also in RISK 14.55, <[e-mail]> Robert Firth wrote -

RF> You see, friends, if the Clipper becomes the normal, standard, or
RF> accepted means of encryption, then *the use of any other encryption
RF> scheme can of itself be considered "probable cause" for search and
RF> seizure*.  And thereby could be lost in the courts what was won at
RF> such great cost.

 This is perhaps my greatest concern in all of the Clipper/Capstone
 hoopla. Personally, I don't have much faith in the law enforcment
 agencies to act responsibly. The Secret Service and FBI have, in the
 past, clearly demonstrated that do not grasp the scope of the
 problems technically challenging modern society. The Steve Jackson
 Games case is one instance that immediately springs to mind. Some
 parts of the country are demographically more at risk than others.
 For example, the criteria which may be deemed as "probable cause"
 for search and seizure in Jackson, Mississippi could very well be
 reason for the ACLU to file a suit against the LEA in New York City.

 Also in RISKS 14.55, <[e-mail]> A. PADGETT
 PETERSON writes -

PP> Like I said, both the government and corporate America *need*
PP> Clipper, the designers are some of the best in the world, and
PP> the administration has more to lose than we do. Given that,
PP> Clipper will work as advertised.

 The only way that I can imagine the government actually *needing*
 Clipper is where Clipper is forced upon the country as the de-facto
 standard and other forms of cryptography are restricted. Uncle Sam
 tends to forget that what is desirable for the government, is not
 always acceptable to the public at large.

 Cynically,

Paul Ferguson
Network Integrator
Centreville, Virginia USA
[e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 29 Apr 1993 9:42:58 EST
From:    Dave Banisar <[e-mail]>
Subject: Letter on SSN and Health Care

PRESS RELEASE
April 26, 1993

Contact:    Dave Banisar
        202/544-9240 (tel)
        202/547-5481 (fax)
    [e-mail] (email)

Experts Call for Medical Privacy Protection:

Recommend that Social Security number be LEFT OFF Health ID Card

    Leading privacy experts have called on Hillary Rodham Clinton
to establish privacy safeguards for medical identification cards.
Mrs. Clinton chairs the Health Care Reform Task Force and is expected
to release a report on the program in the next few weeks.

    The letter specifically asks Mrs. Clinton to avoid using the
Social Security Number for patient record identification.  "Now is
the right time to develop an appropriate identification scheme.  A
poorly designed system will create privacy problems for many years to
come."

    The letter says that the widespread use of the SSN has led to
an increase in credit and banking fraud. "The harm that can be
inflicted from the disclosure of a SSN to an unscrupulous individual
is alarming and potentially ruinous."

    The signatories of the letter include the countries leading
experts on privacy protection, computer security, information law,
and technology and society.
    Among the signers are Janlori Goldman, head of the ACLU
Privacy and Technology Project and Evan Hendricks of the US Privacy
Council.
    Mr. Hendricks said, "The privacy problems with medical
records are frightening.  If you don't prohibit Social Security
numbers, you're left with a miniaturized ticking bomb inside every
health care card."

    The letter was signed by Professor Eric Roberts, Department
of Computer Science, Stanford University; President, Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR); Janlori Goldman,
Director, ACLU Privacy and Technology Project; Evan Hendricks, Chair,
US Privacy Council; Sheri Alpert, author, "Medical Records, Privacy
and Health Care Reform"; Michael S. Baum, Chair, EDI and Information
Technology Division, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar
Association; Professor Mary J. Culnan, School of Business
Administration, Georgetown University; Simon Davies, Director
General, Privacy International; Jack Esbin, Secretary, ACM; Professor
Oscar Gandy, Annenberg School for Communication, University of
Pennsylvania; Marc Greidinger, plaintiff in Greidinger v. Davis;
Chris Hibbert, Chair, CPSR Palo Alto Civil Liberties Working Group;
Professor Lance Hoffman, Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science, George Washington University; Jim Horning, Systems
Research Center, Palo Alto, Digital Equipment Corporation; Larry
Hunter, Chair, CPSR/DC; Professor Gary Marx, Director, Center for the
Social Study of Information Technology, University of Colorado; Peter
G. Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI
International; Amy Pearl, Member of Technical Staff, Sun
Microsystems; Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova University
School of Law; Professor Priscilla M. Regan, Department of Public and
International Affairs, George Mason University; Virginia Rezmierski,
Information Technology Division, University of Michigan; Professor
Ron Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT; Marc Rotenberg,
Director, CPSR Washington office; Professor Rohan Samarajiva,
National Regulatory Research Institute, Ohio State University;
Barbara Simons, Chair, ACM Public Policy Committee; Robert Ellis
Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal; Professor George Trubow, John
Marshall School of Law; A. Joe Turner; Fred W. Weingarten, Executive
Director, Computing Research Associates; and, Paul Wolfson, staff
attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group.

      --------------------------------------------------

April 26, 1993

Mrs Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Chairperson Health Care Reform Task Force
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20550

Dear Mrs. Clinton,

    We are writing to you regarding privacy protection and the
anticipated report of the Health Care Reform Task Force. There are
many privacy issues in the management of medical records, but one
issue we are specifically concerned about is the possible use of the
Social Security Number as a patient identifier.  It is our belief
that the SSN should not be used for medical record identification and
that an alternative identification scheme must be developed.

    Now is the right time to develop an appropriate
identification scheme.  A good plan will serve the goal of
streamlining health care administration while avoiding the risk
inherent in the use of the Social Security number.  A poorly designed
system will create privacy problems for many years to come.

    There are several reasons we believe the SSN should not be
used as a patient identifier.

    First, the widespread use of the SSN has led to an increase
in credit and banking fraud and invites many types of abuse.  A
recent decision from a federal appeals court said simply that "the
harm that can be inflicted from the disclosure of a SSN to an
unscrupulous individual is alarming and potentially financially
ruinous."  For this reason, the Social Security Administration has
said that it opposes new uses of the SSN for record identification.

    Second, the use of the SSN increases the likelihood that
medical information will be improperly disclosed to insurers,
employers, and others.  Direct marketing firms use the SSN to link
discrete records about individuals.  While it may be appropriate to
collect the SSN for some purposes, there is no reason that it should
be publicly disseminated.

    Third, section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 creates a
presumption that the Social Security number should not be used for
record-keeping purposes unrelated to Social Security and taxation.
Congress recognized the dangers of widespread use of the SSN as a
universal identifier.  The Senate report stated that the widespread
use of SSNs is "one of the most serious manifestations of privacy
concerns in the Nation."  Since passage of the Privacy Act, concern
about SSN confidentiality and misuse has become even more compelling.

    Fourth, from a technical viewpoint, the SSN is not a good
identifier. It is not unique, there are multiple users of a single
SSN, and the absence of certain technical features makes it difficult
to determine whether a random nine-digit number is in fact an SSN.
The use of the current SSN as a patient identifier will likely lead
to record misidentifications that could otherwise be avoided.

    Many organizations that provide comprehensive health services
do not use the SSN as a patient identifier.  For example, the Harvard
Community Health Plan, with over half a million subscribers, uses a
separate number for patient identification in its automated records
system.  The SSN is collected for administrative use but is not
publicly disclosed.

    Also, when Canada confronted the issue of patient record
identification several years ago, the province of Ontario decided not
to use the Social Insurance Number, and instead to develop a separate
Medical Identification Number.  Ontario also passed legislation
restricting the use of the MID for health care purposes.  We believe
that a similar approach, based on an identification scheme unique for
medical records and supported by clear legal safeguards, should be
pursued in the United States.

    The protection of privacy is a critical part of the delivery
of quality health care services.  Patients and health care providers
both require the assurance of confidently so that accurate and
complete information will be available for diagnosis and ongoing
patient care.  Absent clear safeguards for privacy protection,
patients may not be forthcoming about potentially embarrassing but
medically relevant facts which providers should know.

    For these reasons, privacy protection must be incorporated
into the recommendations of the Health Care Reform Task Force.
Identification schemes that diminish the confidentiality of patient
records should be avoided.

    In spite of the superficial attractiveness of the SSN, we
urge the Health Care Task Force to state clearly in the anticipated
report that the Social Security Number should not be used as a
patient identifier.

    We would be pleased to meet with those members of the Task
Force that you have asked to examine privacy concerns, and also to
work with you personally or any other members of your staff regarding
the problems with the use of the SSN.


Sincerely yours,


Professor Eric Roberts, Department of Computer Science, Stanford
University; President, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR)

Janlori Goldman, Director, ACLU Privacy and Technology Project

Evan Hendricks, Chair, US Privacy Council

Sheri Alpert, author, "Medical Records, Privacy and Health Care
Reform"

Michael S. Baum, Chair, EDI and Information Technology Division,
Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association

Professor Mary J. Culnan, School of Business Administration,
Georgetown University

Simon Davies, Director General, Privacy International

Jack Esbin, Secretary, Association of Computing Machinists

Professor Oscar Gandy, Annenberg School for Communication, University
of Pennsylvania

Marc Greidinger, plaintiff in Greidinger v. Davis

Chris Hibbert, Chair, CPSR Palo Alto Civil Liberties Working Group

Professor Lance Hoffman, Department of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science, George Washington University

Jim Horning, Systems Research Center, Palo Alto, Digital Equipment
Corporation

Larry Hunter, Chair, CPSR/DC

Professor Gary Marx, Director, Center for the Social Study of
Information Technology, University of Colorado

Peter G. Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer Science Laboratory,
SRI International

Amy Pearl, Member of Technical Staff, Sun Microsystems

Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova University School of Law

Professor Priscilla M. Regan, Department of Public and International
Affairs, George Mason University

Virginia Rezmierski, Information Technology Division, University of
Michigan

Professor Ron Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT

    Marc Rotenberg, Director, CPSR Washington office

Professor Rohan Samarajiva, National Regulatory Research Institute,
Ohio State University

Barbara Simons, Chair, ACM Public Policy Committee

Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal

Professor George Trubow, John Marshall School of Law

A. Joe Turner

Fred W. Weingarten, Executive Director, Computing Research Associates

Paul Wolfson, staff attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group

    (Affiliations listed for identification purposes)

cc:  Ira Magaziner
        Dennis Steinhauer, NIST

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 30 Apr 1993 11:23:41 EDT
From:    Paul Hyland <[e-mail]>
Subject: Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy

           [ Original posting source: [e-mail] in
             igc:alt.news-media -- MODERATOR ]

 White House Official Outlines Freedom of Information Strategy
 at 'Information Summit'

 To: National Desk, Media Writer
 Contact: Ellen Nelson of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center,
          615-321-9588

   NASHVILLE, Tenn., April 13  -- A White House official
today outlined a broad open government strategy for
the Clinton administration, throwing support behind legislation
to apply the Freedom of Information Act to electronic records.
   "At the Clinton White House, most of the debate over the E-mail
system is about how we can interconnect it to public services rather
than how we can destroy the records or tear out the hard drives
before the subpoenas come to reach us," said John Podesta, assistant
to the president and staff secretary.
   Podesta made his comments in front of 70 participants in the
nation's first Freedom of Information Summit, sponsored by The
Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University.
   Though the economy dominates the headlines, Podesta said the new
administration was quietly working across a broad front to open
government.  His "predictions for the first year," included:

   -- Working with Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) to win approval
this session for a bill allowing access to dozens of electronic
databases in the federal government.
   -- Developing an electronic mail system within the federal
government to improve citizen participation in government.
   -- Making the government's archives available on the nation's
"information highway," and appointing a national archivist "who
cares more about preserving history than about preserving his job."
   --Creating a "mood of declassification" with new executive orders
from the president outlining what government may keep secret.
   -- "Reinventing government" under initiatives developed by the
fall by Vice President Gore to require more openness on the part of
civil servants throughout the bureaucracy.

   Podesta also pledged lobbying reform and political reform to "get
rid of the soft money in campaigns." The Freedom of Information
Act may need strengthening in addition to electronic access, he said.
   Pinched by a dozen years of tight information policy, news
organizations have sent President Clinton a freedom of information
policy paper calling for wholesale personnel changes in FOIA-related
jobs, junking the secrecy classifications of President Reagan's
Executive Order 12356, overhauling the Freedom of Information Act and
ending military censorship of war reporting.
   "People working on behalf of the public on more openness in
government at all levels are heartened by the prospect of the White
House taking the lead in this area," said Paul McMasters, executive
director of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University.
   The conference, sponsored by The Freedom Forum First Amendment
Center at Vanderbilt University, is focusing on issues ranging from
the Clinton administration's policies on open government to
restrictions on public access to crime, accident and disaster scenes.
The conference, open to the public, is at the Stouffer Hotel in
downtown Nashville.
   Speakers on the Clinton FOI Agenda included Richard Schmidt Jr.,
general counsel to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
partner in the law firm of Cohn & Marks in Washington, D.C.; Theresa
Amato, the director of the FOI Clearinghouse in Washington, D.C. and
staff counsel for Public Citizens Litigation Group in Washington,
D.C.; and Quinlan Shea, former Carter administration official who
discussed problems of access to government.  Former American hostage
Terry Anderson will give the keynote address at the dinner tonight.
   The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University
is an independent operating program of The Freedom Forum.  The
Center's mission is to foster a better public understanding of and
appreciation for First Amendment rights and values, including freedom
of religion, free speech and press, the right to petition government
and peaceful assembly.
   The Freedom Forum is a nonpartisan, international organization
dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people.
It is supported entirely by an endowment established by Frank E.
Gannett in 1935 that has grown to more than $700 million in
diversified managed assets.  Its headquarters is The Freedom Forum
World Center in Arlington, Va.
 -30-
--
Canada Remote Systems - Toronto, Ontario
416-629-7000/629-7044

------------------------------

End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 02.15
************************