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- PRIVACY Forum Digest Friday, 30 April 1993 Volume 02 : Issue 15
-
- Moderated by Lauren Weinstein (lauren@vortex.com)
- Vortex Technology, Topanga, CA, U.S.A.
-
- ===== PRIVACY FORUM =====
-
- The PRIVACY Forum digest is supported in part by the
- ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy.
-
-
- CONTENTS
- Clipper Observations (Rick Pavek)
- Re: Clipper key announcement (Ken Beal)
- Clipper chip (Alan J. Rosenthal)
- Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses (Paul Ferguson)
- Letter on SSN and Health Care (Dave Banisar)
- Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy (Paul Hyland)
-
-
- *** Please include a RELEVANT "Subject:" line on all submissions! ***
- *** Submissions without them may be ignored! ***
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- The PRIVACY Forum is a moderated digest for the discussion and analysis of
- issues relating to the general topic of privacy (both personal and
- collective) in the "information age" of the 1990's and beyond. The
- moderator will choose submissions for inclusion based on their relevance and
- content. Submissions will not be routinely acknowledged.
-
- ALL submissions should be addressed to "privacy@vortex.com" and must have
- RELEVANT "Subject:" lines; submissions without appropriate and relevant
- "Subject:" lines may be ignored. Excessive "signatures" on submissions are
- subject to editing. Subscriptions are by an automatic "listserv" system; for
- subscription information, please send a message consisting of the word
- "help" (quotes not included) in the BODY of a message to:
- "privacy-request@vortex.com". Mailing list problems should be reported to
- "list-maint@vortex.com". All submissions included in this digest represent
- the views of the individual authors and all submissions will be considered
- to be distributable without limitations.
-
- The PRIVACY Forum archive, including all issues of the digest and all
- related materials, is available via anonymous FTP from site "ftp.vortex.com",
- in the "/privacy" directory. Use the FTP login "ftp" or "anonymous", and
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- site "gopher.vortex.com".
-
- For information regarding the availability of this digest via FAX, please
- send an inquiry to privacy-fax@vortex.com, call (310) 455-9300, or FAX
- to (310) 455-2364.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- VOLUME 02, ISSUE 15
-
- Quote for the day:
-
- "You will say you lose your freedom. Freedom is an illusion.
- All you lose is the emotion of pride."
-
- -- Colossus
- "Colossus: The Forbin Project"; 1970
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1993 14:53:25 -0700
- From: Rick Pavek <kuryakin@halcyon.halcyon.com>
- Subject: Clipper Observations
-
- Let's see if I can imagine a scenario...
-
- Drug dealer goes into an AT&T phone store and asks to see a cellular
- phone. Phone salesperson offers the new Clipper protected model.
- DD asks isn't this the new one that the government designed to be
- wiretapped? The salesman says "Yes". DD says "Let me see an unencrypted
- model..."
-
- First point, no one engaged in illegal conduct will knowingly purchase
- something designed to be wiretapped.
-
- Second, I imagine that there will be an aftermarket of products that
- will add layers of encryption to the devices and make wiretapping again
- impossible. The most successful of these will be ones that are cheap.
-
- Third, will the NSA also be using these Clipper Chips? Will law
- enforcement officials that find a CIA operatative using one be able to
- decrypt his transmission, as well? Obviously, the agencies that are the
- most likely to use encryption will not subject themselves to such an easily
- defeated means. (One warrant and two keys to go, please!)
-
- What we need to listen for are rumors of "clipper style" encryption that
- can't be busted by normal means. Just a hunch, but I'll bet that the
- NSA and other clandestine organizations will be purchasing "modified" chips
- that don't include that "family key F" with their encrypted transmissions,
- or that will include bogus ones...
-
- I think the last thing the NSA wants is to be exposed to the observations
- of "normal law enforcement agencies".
-
- OK, just realized that the keys to certain chips could be denied to
- the search warrants if they were tagged "National Security", eh? Anyone
- with an insight into how the actual process/protection will be setup?
-
- Just a curious bloke:
- Rick Pavek
- Halcyon.com
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Fri, 23 Apr 93 16:28:46 EDT
- From: kbeal@amber.ssd.csd.harris.com (Ken Beal)
- Subject: Re: Clipper key announcement
-
- > From: cstern@novus.com (Chuck Stern)
- [...]
- > Under the
- > current court, however, the exclusionary rule has been relaxed: if the police
- > were 'acting in good faith,' then the evidence obtained via an illegally or
- > improperly executed search warrant (for example) is admissable.
-
- While my input to this has little to do with the Clipper Chip per se
- (although I completely disagree with it and hope people will alert
- Intergraph's lawyers), I'd like to take issue with the "good faith"
- ruling.
-
- >Anyone< can >say< that they're acting in good faith. Why should we
- expect that a police officer won't lie? Especially if it means
- busting that so-and-so that he's been after for months?
-
- Alternatively: if the cops can do it, then I can too. "Judge, I
- didn't realize it was illegal to [insert offence here]." etc.
-
- Our society has to realize that, badge or no badge, everyone's an
- individual. Everyone has their own ideas and ideals, their own form
- of greed to deal with, their own morality and their own vices. Giving
- a segment of the population free reign like this is, quite simply,
- frightening.
- --
- Kenneth L. Beal, Jr. kbeal@amber.ssd.csd.harris.com
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Sat, 24 Apr 1993 13:03:46 -0400
- From: Alan J Rosenthal <flaps@dgp.toronto.edu>
- Subject: clipper chip
-
- I'm not really picking on a particular posting, so let me quote anonymously.
-
- A poster supposes that he has purchased another cryptography unit which is not
- breakable by the authorities, as well as purchasing a clipper chip:
- >so that I can of course communicate with other normal Clipper units, but
- >*also* so that a "casual eavesdropper" would detect nothing amiss on my line:
- >since I possess said Clipper unit, one of course *expects* my communications
- >to be encrypted. If the government holds true to its word ...
- >Without using the completed Clipper key, the authorities cannot distinguish a
- >data stream generated by my [secure] unit from a data stream generated by my
- >decidedly legal Clipper unit.
-
- I think that now would be a good time for all to re-read Ken Thompson's
- "Reflections on Trusting Trust", which was published as an ACM Turing Award
- lecture and appears in a collection book called "ACM Turing Award lectures:
- the first twenty years, 1966 to 1985", ACM Press, New York, 1987, 0897911830.
- Wouldn't it be cool if when you switched off the switch on your telephone which
- activates the clipper chip (so that you could use your other chip), the clipper
- chip listened in and tried to determine if you were using some other encryption
- method and if so, the next time you used the clipper chip, it integrated some
- evidence of this fact into the encrypted data stream? But that's kind of far
- out; hopefully others can come up with more plausible scenarios. But that's
- not what I came to talk about here today...
-
- The cryptographic algorithm could insert (and remove upon decrypting) a short
- literal sequence every specified number of bytes, or anything like that to
- prove that you were really using that algorithm to a "casual eavesdropper". If
- the algorithm is unpublished or if the published algorithm is somewhat abstract
- so that you can't do it yourself just from reading the article, there would be
- no way for a normal person to detect this. Of course the hypothetical
- non-clipper cryptography unit could be designed to contain this sequence as
- well, but only if the makers knew it was there. It is also possible for more
- sophisticated characteristics of the stream to indicate that it's really a
- clipper chip stream. One thing which comes to mind is bizarre distribution
- properties of the output bytes, assuming the encrypted stuff was digital, which
- it probably isn't, but heck this is just an example. For example, let's say
- that data is encoded so that bytes range only from 0-200 rather than 0-255.
- Now add 0 to the first byte, 1 to the next byte, and so on, up to adding 55,
- then add 0 to the subsequent byte, and so on. The resulting stream will never
- have a value less than (n mod 56) for the nth byte (zero-origin) nor a value
- greater than (n mod 56) + 200 for the nth byte. So the stream would be easily
- identifiable but still probably look normal if you didn't know what you were
- looking for. This is just an example and may be flawed because I don't know
- too much about cryptology but I think the principle is correct.
-
- In the absence of a published algorithm, we can't make ANY assumptions.
- It's also still possible that the code is easily broken, or that only one half
- of the key (i.e. from only one escrow agent) makes it become easily broken.
- Without knowing something about key distribution it's hard to say too much
- either; perhaps the keys are assigned in some pattern such that knowing the
- manufacturer and the year in which the equipment is manufactured gives you only
- a couple of possible values for one of the halves. Or, say, only a hundred
- possibilities, which still renders it feasible to try all of 'em.
-
- Someone else made a good point that it sure would simplify things to encode the
- serial number of the chip into its broadcast now and then so that the cops
- didn't have to enter your home to look at the serial numbers on your equipment.
- Wouldn't it save them a lot of time to encode the key instead?
-
- Unless I missed it, I haven't seen the DES concerns repeated yet. They should
- be. The concerns are that one has to be suspicious about the government
- promoting a particular cryptographic standard so heavily. People suspected the
- NSA of having some influence over the choice of encryption method for DES. And
- no one ever suggested that DES would have some legal status with respect to
- individuals.
-
- in solidarity,
- Alan "V guvax jr fubhyq cebzbgr ebg13 nf gur arj rapelcgvba fgnaqneq" Rosenthal
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 11:19:44 EDT
- From: fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)
- Subject: Wiretap Chip and Key Escrow Abuses
-
- I've been following the discussions on several newsgroups and
- mailing lists (RISKS, PRIVACY and Cypherpunks) concerning the
- Wiretap Chip (Clipper/Capstone) and the proposed key escrow
- system.
-
- Here's my $.02, as well.
-
- In RISK 14.55, <jim@RSA.COM> Jim Bidzos wrote -
-
- JB> Since Clipper, as currently defined, cannot be implemented in
- JB> software, what options are available to those who can benefit
- JB> from cryptography in software? Was a study of the impact on
- JB> these vendors or of the potential cost to the software industry
- JB> conducted? (Much of the use of cryptography by software
- JB> companies, particularly those in the entertainment industry, is
- JB> for the protection of their intellectual property. Using hardware
- JB> is not economically feasible for most of them.)
-
- Jim raises a valid concern. Although a hardware based system is
- ideal for voice encryption, the idea of registered key systems,
- where government and/or LE agencies have involvement, is not a
- popular one. The key escrow scheme in this proposal reeks of Big
- Brother. (As in, "Trust me. I'm from the government and I'm your
- friend.") In some circles, it is not even a consideration.
- Software encryption systems employed to protect intellectual and
- commercial data and electronic mail are much more flexible and
- desirable, especially when they are not governmentally proposed,
- imposed, designed and sanctioned by spook organizations such as
- the NSA.
-
- The real sore spot with the Clipper proposal is that private
- industry and citizenry were blind-sided by this entire process.
- The possibility that Uncle Sam will try to make this a de-facto
- standard and subsequently place restrictions on other forms of
- crypto (eg. software based) is real.
-
- Also in RISKS 14.55, <billc@glacier.sierra.com> Bill Campbell
- wrotes -
-
- BC> There are dozens, perhaps hundreds, of commercial, criminal and
- BC> governmental entities with access to government resources who
- BC> would not hesitate for a moment to violate my rights if they
- BC> found it expedient to do so. These individuals and organizations
- BC> have demonstrated beyond question that they are not constrained
- BC> by legal or ethical considerations, and as has been suggested
- BC> in a number of other postings, the technology employed by Clipper
- BC> (including the dual escrow sham) will probably not even pose so
- BC> much as an inconvenience to a determined adversary. To suggest
- BC> otherwise is, at best, profoundly naive.
-
- I have a tendency to agree with Bill. In fact, California is
- currently embroiled in a scandal involving the release of
- confidential data (DMV addresses), by employees of the Anaheim
- Police Department, to third party interests. This is clearly in
- violation of their employer's policies, their own terms of
- employment, state criminal law, and civil law. What's to
- stop the same blatant, unethical breech of confidentiality with
- regards to the Clipper key escrow implementation? Nothing, that's
- what. In the future, information will be the most powerful possession
- and in the spirit of SNEAKERS, s/he who has control of and access to
- the information is the most powerful. Power corrupts, but absolute
- power corrupts absolutely. I think that Clipper offers maximum abuse
- in this scenario.
-
- Also in RISK 14.55, <firth@SEI.CMU.EDU> Robert Firth wrote -
-
- RF> You see, friends, if the Clipper becomes the normal, standard, or
- RF> accepted means of encryption, then *the use of any other encryption
- RF> scheme can of itself be considered "probable cause" for search and
- RF> seizure*. And thereby could be lost in the courts what was won at
- RF> such great cost.
-
- This is perhaps my greatest concern in all of the Clipper/Capstone
- hoopla. Personally, I don't have much faith in the law enforcment
- agencies to act responsibly. The Secret Service and FBI have, in the
- past, clearly demonstrated that do not grasp the scope of the
- problems technically challenging modern society. The Steve Jackson
- Games case is one instance that immediately springs to mind. Some
- parts of the country are demographically more at risk than others.
- For example, the criteria which may be deemed as "probable cause"
- for search and seizure in Jackson, Mississippi could very well be
- reason for the ACLU to file a suit against the LEA in New York City.
-
- Also in RISKS 14.55, <padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com> A. PADGETT
- PETERSON writes -
-
- PP> Like I said, both the government and corporate America *need*
- PP> Clipper, the designers are some of the best in the world, and
- PP> the administration has more to lose than we do. Given that,
- PP> Clipper will work as advertised.
-
- The only way that I can imagine the government actually *needing*
- Clipper is where Clipper is forced upon the country as the de-facto
- standard and other forms of cryptography are restricted. Uncle Sam
- tends to forget that what is desirable for the government, is not
- always acceptable to the public at large.
-
- Cynically,
-
- Paul Ferguson
- Network Integrator
- Centreville, Virginia USA
- fergp@sytex.com
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Thu, 29 Apr 1993 9:42:58 EST
- From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
- Subject: Letter on SSN and Health Care
-
- PRESS RELEASE
- April 26, 1993
-
- Contact: Dave Banisar
- 202/544-9240 (tel)
- 202/547-5481 (fax)
- banisar@washofc.cpsr.org (email)
-
- Experts Call for Medical Privacy Protection:
-
- Recommend that Social Security number be LEFT OFF Health ID Card
-
- Leading privacy experts have called on Hillary Rodham Clinton
- to establish privacy safeguards for medical identification cards.
- Mrs. Clinton chairs the Health Care Reform Task Force and is expected
- to release a report on the program in the next few weeks.
-
- The letter specifically asks Mrs. Clinton to avoid using the
- Social Security Number for patient record identification. "Now is
- the right time to develop an appropriate identification scheme. A
- poorly designed system will create privacy problems for many years to
- come."
-
- The letter says that the widespread use of the SSN has led to
- an increase in credit and banking fraud. "The harm that can be
- inflicted from the disclosure of a SSN to an unscrupulous individual
- is alarming and potentially ruinous."
-
- The signatories of the letter include the countries leading
- experts on privacy protection, computer security, information law,
- and technology and society.
- Among the signers are Janlori Goldman, head of the ACLU
- Privacy and Technology Project and Evan Hendricks of the US Privacy
- Council.
- Mr. Hendricks said, "The privacy problems with medical
- records are frightening. If you don't prohibit Social Security
- numbers, you're left with a miniaturized ticking bomb inside every
- health care card."
-
- The letter was signed by Professor Eric Roberts, Department
- of Computer Science, Stanford University; President, Computer
- Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR); Janlori Goldman,
- Director, ACLU Privacy and Technology Project; Evan Hendricks, Chair,
- US Privacy Council; Sheri Alpert, author, "Medical Records, Privacy
- and Health Care Reform"; Michael S. Baum, Chair, EDI and Information
- Technology Division, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar
- Association; Professor Mary J. Culnan, School of Business
- Administration, Georgetown University; Simon Davies, Director
- General, Privacy International; Jack Esbin, Secretary, ACM; Professor
- Oscar Gandy, Annenberg School for Communication, University of
- Pennsylvania; Marc Greidinger, plaintiff in Greidinger v. Davis;
- Chris Hibbert, Chair, CPSR Palo Alto Civil Liberties Working Group;
- Professor Lance Hoffman, Department of Electrical Engineering and
- Computer Science, George Washington University; Jim Horning, Systems
- Research Center, Palo Alto, Digital Equipment Corporation; Larry
- Hunter, Chair, CPSR/DC; Professor Gary Marx, Director, Center for the
- Social Study of Information Technology, University of Colorado; Peter
- G. Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI
- International; Amy Pearl, Member of Technical Staff, Sun
- Microsystems; Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova University
- School of Law; Professor Priscilla M. Regan, Department of Public and
- International Affairs, George Mason University; Virginia Rezmierski,
- Information Technology Division, University of Michigan; Professor
- Ron Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT; Marc Rotenberg,
- Director, CPSR Washington office; Professor Rohan Samarajiva,
- National Regulatory Research Institute, Ohio State University;
- Barbara Simons, Chair, ACM Public Policy Committee; Robert Ellis
- Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal; Professor George Trubow, John
- Marshall School of Law; A. Joe Turner; Fred W. Weingarten, Executive
- Director, Computing Research Associates; and, Paul Wolfson, staff
- attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group.
-
- --------------------------------------------------
-
- April 26, 1993
-
- Mrs Hillary Rodham Clinton,
- Chairperson Health Care Reform Task Force
- The White House
- 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
- Washington, DC 20550
-
- Dear Mrs. Clinton,
-
- We are writing to you regarding privacy protection and the
- anticipated report of the Health Care Reform Task Force. There are
- many privacy issues in the management of medical records, but one
- issue we are specifically concerned about is the possible use of the
- Social Security Number as a patient identifier. It is our belief
- that the SSN should not be used for medical record identification and
- that an alternative identification scheme must be developed.
-
- Now is the right time to develop an appropriate
- identification scheme. A good plan will serve the goal of
- streamlining health care administration while avoiding the risk
- inherent in the use of the Social Security number. A poorly designed
- system will create privacy problems for many years to come.
-
- There are several reasons we believe the SSN should not be
- used as a patient identifier.
-
- First, the widespread use of the SSN has led to an increase
- in credit and banking fraud and invites many types of abuse. A
- recent decision from a federal appeals court said simply that "the
- harm that can be inflicted from the disclosure of a SSN to an
- unscrupulous individual is alarming and potentially financially
- ruinous." For this reason, the Social Security Administration has
- said that it opposes new uses of the SSN for record identification.
-
- Second, the use of the SSN increases the likelihood that
- medical information will be improperly disclosed to insurers,
- employers, and others. Direct marketing firms use the SSN to link
- discrete records about individuals. While it may be appropriate to
- collect the SSN for some purposes, there is no reason that it should
- be publicly disseminated.
-
- Third, section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 creates a
- presumption that the Social Security number should not be used for
- record-keeping purposes unrelated to Social Security and taxation.
- Congress recognized the dangers of widespread use of the SSN as a
- universal identifier. The Senate report stated that the widespread
- use of SSNs is "one of the most serious manifestations of privacy
- concerns in the Nation." Since passage of the Privacy Act, concern
- about SSN confidentiality and misuse has become even more compelling.
-
- Fourth, from a technical viewpoint, the SSN is not a good
- identifier. It is not unique, there are multiple users of a single
- SSN, and the absence of certain technical features makes it difficult
- to determine whether a random nine-digit number is in fact an SSN.
- The use of the current SSN as a patient identifier will likely lead
- to record misidentifications that could otherwise be avoided.
-
- Many organizations that provide comprehensive health services
- do not use the SSN as a patient identifier. For example, the Harvard
- Community Health Plan, with over half a million subscribers, uses a
- separate number for patient identification in its automated records
- system. The SSN is collected for administrative use but is not
- publicly disclosed.
-
- Also, when Canada confronted the issue of patient record
- identification several years ago, the province of Ontario decided not
- to use the Social Insurance Number, and instead to develop a separate
- Medical Identification Number. Ontario also passed legislation
- restricting the use of the MID for health care purposes. We believe
- that a similar approach, based on an identification scheme unique for
- medical records and supported by clear legal safeguards, should be
- pursued in the United States.
-
- The protection of privacy is a critical part of the delivery
- of quality health care services. Patients and health care providers
- both require the assurance of confidently so that accurate and
- complete information will be available for diagnosis and ongoing
- patient care. Absent clear safeguards for privacy protection,
- patients may not be forthcoming about potentially embarrassing but
- medically relevant facts which providers should know.
-
- For these reasons, privacy protection must be incorporated
- into the recommendations of the Health Care Reform Task Force.
- Identification schemes that diminish the confidentiality of patient
- records should be avoided.
-
- In spite of the superficial attractiveness of the SSN, we
- urge the Health Care Task Force to state clearly in the anticipated
- report that the Social Security Number should not be used as a
- patient identifier.
-
- We would be pleased to meet with those members of the Task
- Force that you have asked to examine privacy concerns, and also to
- work with you personally or any other members of your staff regarding
- the problems with the use of the SSN.
-
-
- Sincerely yours,
-
-
- Professor Eric Roberts, Department of Computer Science, Stanford
- University; President, Computer Professionals for Social
- Responsibility (CPSR)
-
- Janlori Goldman, Director, ACLU Privacy and Technology Project
-
- Evan Hendricks, Chair, US Privacy Council
-
- Sheri Alpert, author, "Medical Records, Privacy and Health Care
- Reform"
-
- Michael S. Baum, Chair, EDI and Information Technology Division,
- Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association
-
- Professor Mary J. Culnan, School of Business Administration,
- Georgetown University
-
- Simon Davies, Director General, Privacy International
-
- Jack Esbin, Secretary, Association of Computing Machinists
-
- Professor Oscar Gandy, Annenberg School for Communication, University
- of Pennsylvania
-
- Marc Greidinger, plaintiff in Greidinger v. Davis
-
- Chris Hibbert, Chair, CPSR Palo Alto Civil Liberties Working Group
-
- Professor Lance Hoffman, Department of Electrical Engineering and
- Computer Science, George Washington University
-
- Jim Horning, Systems Research Center, Palo Alto, Digital Equipment
- Corporation
-
- Larry Hunter, Chair, CPSR/DC
-
- Professor Gary Marx, Director, Center for the Social Study of
- Information Technology, University of Colorado
-
- Peter G. Neumann, Principal Scientist, Computer Science Laboratory,
- SRI International
-
- Amy Pearl, Member of Technical Staff, Sun Microsystems
-
- Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova University School of Law
-
- Professor Priscilla M. Regan, Department of Public and International
- Affairs, George Mason University
-
- Virginia Rezmierski, Information Technology Division, University of
- Michigan
-
- Professor Ron Rivest, Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT
-
- Marc Rotenberg, Director, CPSR Washington office
-
- Professor Rohan Samarajiva, National Regulatory Research Institute,
- Ohio State University
-
- Barbara Simons, Chair, ACM Public Policy Committee
-
- Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal
-
- Professor George Trubow, John Marshall School of Law
-
- A. Joe Turner
-
- Fred W. Weingarten, Executive Director, Computing Research Associates
-
- Paul Wolfson, staff attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group
-
- (Affiliations listed for identification purposes)
-
- cc: Ira Magaziner
- Dennis Steinhauer, NIST
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Fri, 30 Apr 1993 11:23:41 EDT
- From: Paul Hyland <phyland@essential.org>
- Subject: Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy
-
- [ Original posting source: nigel.allen@canrem.com in
- igc:alt.news-media -- MODERATOR ]
-
- White House Official Outlines Freedom of Information Strategy
- at 'Information Summit'
-
- To: National Desk, Media Writer
- Contact: Ellen Nelson of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center,
- 615-321-9588
-
- NASHVILLE, Tenn., April 13 -- A White House official
- today outlined a broad open government strategy for
- the Clinton administration, throwing support behind legislation
- to apply the Freedom of Information Act to electronic records.
- "At the Clinton White House, most of the debate over the E-mail
- system is about how we can interconnect it to public services rather
- than how we can destroy the records or tear out the hard drives
- before the subpoenas come to reach us," said John Podesta, assistant
- to the president and staff secretary.
- Podesta made his comments in front of 70 participants in the
- nation's first Freedom of Information Summit, sponsored by The
- Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University.
- Though the economy dominates the headlines, Podesta said the new
- administration was quietly working across a broad front to open
- government. His "predictions for the first year," included:
-
- -- Working with Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) to win approval
- this session for a bill allowing access to dozens of electronic
- databases in the federal government.
- -- Developing an electronic mail system within the federal
- government to improve citizen participation in government.
- -- Making the government's archives available on the nation's
- "information highway," and appointing a national archivist "who
- cares more about preserving history than about preserving his job."
- --Creating a "mood of declassification" with new executive orders
- from the president outlining what government may keep secret.
- -- "Reinventing government" under initiatives developed by the
- fall by Vice President Gore to require more openness on the part of
- civil servants throughout the bureaucracy.
-
- Podesta also pledged lobbying reform and political reform to "get
- rid of the soft money in campaigns." The Freedom of Information
- Act may need strengthening in addition to electronic access, he said.
- Pinched by a dozen years of tight information policy, news
- organizations have sent President Clinton a freedom of information
- policy paper calling for wholesale personnel changes in FOIA-related
- jobs, junking the secrecy classifications of President Reagan's
- Executive Order 12356, overhauling the Freedom of Information Act and
- ending military censorship of war reporting.
- "People working on behalf of the public on more openness in
- government at all levels are heartened by the prospect of the White
- House taking the lead in this area," said Paul McMasters, executive
- director of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
- University.
- The conference, sponsored by The Freedom Forum First Amendment
- Center at Vanderbilt University, is focusing on issues ranging from
- the Clinton administration's policies on open government to
- restrictions on public access to crime, accident and disaster scenes.
- The conference, open to the public, is at the Stouffer Hotel in
- downtown Nashville.
- Speakers on the Clinton FOI Agenda included Richard Schmidt Jr.,
- general counsel to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
- partner in the law firm of Cohn & Marks in Washington, D.C.; Theresa
- Amato, the director of the FOI Clearinghouse in Washington, D.C. and
- staff counsel for Public Citizens Litigation Group in Washington,
- D.C.; and Quinlan Shea, former Carter administration official who
- discussed problems of access to government. Former American hostage
- Terry Anderson will give the keynote address at the dinner tonight.
- The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University
- is an independent operating program of The Freedom Forum. The
- Center's mission is to foster a better public understanding of and
- appreciation for First Amendment rights and values, including freedom
- of religion, free speech and press, the right to petition government
- and peaceful assembly.
- The Freedom Forum is a nonpartisan, international organization
- dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people.
- It is supported entirely by an endowment established by Frank E.
- Gannett in 1935 that has grown to more than $700 million in
- diversified managed assets. Its headquarters is The Freedom Forum
- World Center in Arlington, Va.
- -30-
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- Canada Remote Systems - Toronto, Ontario
- 416-629-7000/629-7044
-
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- End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 02.15
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