Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0117/01175.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01175}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Nixon Tapes, The
The White House Summary}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
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$Subject{president
dean
ehrlichman
nixon
pres
haldeman
mitchell
meeting
april
john}
$Date{1974}
$Log{}
Title:       Nixon Tapes, The
Author:      Various
Date:        1974

The White House Summary

Overview of The Nixon Tapes

     [This material covers Nixon's summary of the Watergate scandal,
transcripts of the Nixon tapes covering the period September 15, 1972 - April
30, 1973, text of various Nixon speeches on the subject, and various
statements made by interested parties to the press.]

The White House Summary

     On April 11, 1974, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives of the Congress caused a subpoena to be issued to the
President of the United States, returnable on April 25, 1974.  The subpoena
called for the production of tapes and other materials relating to forty-
two Presidential conversations.  With respect to all but three of these
conversations, the subpoena called for the production of the tapes and
related materials without regard to the subject matter, or matters, dealt
with in these conversations.  In the President's view, such a broad scale
subpoena is unwarranted.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals in Nixon vs. Sirica has
stated, "wholesale public access to Executive deliberations and documents
would cripple the Executive as a co-equal branch," and as the President has
repeatedly stated, he will not participate in the destruction of the office
of the Presidency of the United States by permitting unlimited access to
Presidential conversations and documents.

     The President, on the other hand, does recognize that the House
Committee on the Judiciary has constitutional responsibilities to examine
fully into his conduct and therefore the President has provided the annexed
transcripts of all or portions of the subpoenaed conversations that were
recorded and of a number of additional nonsubpoenaed conversations that
clearly show what knowledge the President had of an alleged cover-up of the
Watergate break-in and what actions he took when he was informed of the
cover-up.  The President believes that these are the matters that primarily
concern the Congress and the American people.

     In order that the Committee may be satisfied that he has in fact
disclosed this pertinent material to the Committee, the President has invited
the Chairman and ranking minority member to review the subpoenaed tapes to
satisfy themselves that a full and complete disclosure of the pertinent
contents of these tapes has, indeed, been made.  If, after such review they
have any questions regarding his conduct, the President has stated that he
stands ready to respond under oath to written interrogatories and to meet
with the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee at the White
House to discuss these matters if they so desire.

     The President is making this response, which exceeds the material called
for in the subpoena, in order that the Committee will be able to carry out
its responsibilities and bring this matter to an expeditious conclusion.

     The attached transcripts represent the best efforts accurately to
transcribe the material contained on the recording tapes.  Expletives have
been omitted in the interest of good taste, except where necessary to depict
accurately the context of the conversation.  Characterization of third
persons, in fairness to them, and other material not relating to the
President's conduct has been omitted, except where inclusion is relevant and
material as bearing on the President's conduct.

     In order that the material submitted in this response to the Committee's
subpoena can be viewed in the context of the events surrounding the Watergate
incident and thereafter, the following summary is provided.

The Break-in at the Watergate - June 17, 1972

     When the break-in at Watergate occurred and the participants were
arrested, the President was in Florida.  As he has stated many times, he had
no prior knowledge of this activity and had nothing whatsoever to do with it.
No one has stated otherwise, not even Mr. Dean, former Counsel to the
President, who is the only one who has made any charges against the
President.  During the course of Dean's conversation with the President on
February 28, 1973, the President stated to Dean:

     son, remember exclusively about - and maybe that was the point -
     exclusively about issues.

     *    *    *

Pres. Nixon:  Right.  That was what it is.  But in all those talks he had
               plenty of opportunity.  He was always coming to me with ideas,
               but Colson in that entire period, John, didn't mention it.  I
               think he would have said, "Look we've gotten some information,"
               but he never said they were.  Haldeman, in this whole period,
               Haldeman I am sure - Bob and you, he talked to both of you
               about the campaign.  Never a word.  I mean maybe all of you
               knew but didn't tell me, but I can't believe that Colson - well

Allegations of a Cover-up Prior to March 21, 1973

     Of all the witnesses who have testified publicly with respect to
allegations of an illegal cover-up of the Watergate break-in prior to March
21, 1973, only Mr. Dean has accused the President of participation in such a
cover-up.  In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee Dean stated
that he was "certain after the September 15 meeting that the President was
fully aware of the cover-up."  However, in answering questions of Senator
Baker, he modified this by stating it "is an inference of mine."  Later he
admitted he had no personal knowledge that the President knew on September
15th about a cover-up of Watergate.

     The tape of the conversation between the President and Dean on September
15, 1972, does not in any way support Dean's testimony that the President was
"fully aware of the cover-up."  The tape of September 15, 1972, does indeed
contain a passage in which the President does congratulate Dean for doing a
good job:

Pres. Nixon:  Oh well, this is a can of worms as you know a lot of this stuff
               that went on.  And the people who worked this way are awfully
               embarrassed.  But the way you have handled all this seems to me
               has been very skillful putting your fingers in the leaks that
               have sprung here and sprung there.

     This was said in the context not of a criminal plot to obstruct justice
as Dean alleges, but rather in the context of the politics of the matter,
such as civil suits, counter-suits, Democratic efforts to exploit Watergate
as a political issue and the like.  The reference to "putting your finger in
the leaks" was clearly related to the handling of the political and public
relations aspect of the matter.  At no point was the word "contained" used as
Dean insisted had been the case in his testimony.

     This is an example of the possible ambiguities that the President says
exists in these tapes that someone with a motive to discredit the President
could take out of context and distort to suit his own purposes.

     If Dean did in fact believe that the President was aware of efforts
illegally to conceal the break-in prior to March 21, 1973, it is strange that
Dean on that date felt compelled to disclose to the President for the first
time what he later testified the President already knew.

     Further questions of Dean's credibility concerning the President's
conduct are raised by his testimony before the Senate Select Committee that
it was on March 13, 1973, that he told the President about money demands and
threats of blackmail.  He said he was "very clear" about this date.  It now
develops that the conversation with the President, on the date of which Dean
was so clear, did not in fact take place until the morning of March 21, 1973,
as the President has always contended.  At no point in the tape of the March
13, 1973, conference between the President and Dean is there any reference
to threats of blackmail or raising a million dollars.  These references are
contained in the tape of the March 21, 1973, A.M. meeting between the
President and Dean.

     This discrepancy in Dean's testimony from the tapes of these two
meetings is surprising in the light of Dean's self-professed excellent memory
and the certainty with which he fixed the date of the blackmail disclosure
as March 13, 1973, rather than March 21, 1973.  Curiously, on April 16, 1973,
as evidenced by the recording of his meeting on that morning with the
President, Dean recalled very specifically that his revelation to the
President was on the Wednesday preceding the Friday [March 23] that the
Watergate defendants were sentenced.

     Dean's testimony to the Senate may have been simply an error of course,
or it may have been an effort to have his disclosures to the President
predate what was then at least thought to be the date of the last payment to
Hunt's attorney for his fees, namely March 20, 1973.  As far as the President
is concerned, however, it makes no difference when this payment was made; he
not only opposed the payment, but never even knew that it had been made until
mid-April when the facts were finally disclosed to him.

     In this connection it is interesting to note that Dean testified that
on March 30, 1973, he told his attorneys "everything that I could remember."
Yet Dean's list of April 14 of persons whom he believed were indictable did
not include the President.  Attorney General Kleindienst testified that Mr.
Silbert, who had been interviewing Mr. Dean and conferring at length with his
counsel, reported on the night of April 14, 1973, that "Nothing was said to
me that night that would implicate the President of the United States."  This
same thing was confirmed by Mr. Petersen who testified that as of April 27
they had no information implicating the President.  In fact it was not until
after April 30, 1973, when Dean was discharged that he for the first time
charged the President with knowledge of a cover-up as early as September 15,
1972.

The Meeting of March 21, 1973, a.m. Between the President and Dean and later
Haldeman

     On or about February 27, 1973, Dean had been instructed to report
directly to the President regarding the Executive Privilege issues raised in
the context of the Gray nomination hearings and the prospective Ervin
Committee hearings, rather than to Ehrlichman as it was taking up too much
of Mr. Ehrlichman's time from his regular duties.  Previous to this Dean had
been keeping himself informed as to the progress of the FBI and Department
of Justice investigation on Watergate so that he could keep Ehrlichman and
Haldeman informed.  Both Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Petersen
confirmed that Dean had represented to them that he was "responsible to keep
the President informed,"  that he "had been delegated by the President to be
posted and kept informed throughout the course of the investigation."  It is
equally clear from the recorded conversations between Dean and the President
that he did not keep the President fully informed until March 21, 1973.
Indeed, on April 16, 1973, Dean so acknowledged that fact to the President,
when he said:

John Dean:  I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you
               didn't cause you any personal problem.

     An analysis of the March 21, 1973, A.M. conversation thus becomes
important in assessing the conduct of the President.  On the previous evening
the President and Dean talked by telephone and Dean requested a meeting with
the President.  They met the next morning, alone, at first, and later Mr.
Haldeman joined them about half way through the meeting, rather than for only
the last few minutes, as Dean testified.  After some preliminary remarks
concerning the Gray confirmation hearings, Dean stated the real purpose for
the meeting:

John Dean:  The reason that I thought we ought to talk this morning is because
               in our conversations I have the impression that you don't know
               everything I know and it makes it very difficult for you to
               make judgments that only you can make on some of these things
               and I thought that -

He then proceeded to detail for the President what he believed the President
should be made aware of, first in the "overall."

     Dean stated, "We have a cancer within, close to the Presidency, that is
growing."  and that "people are going to start perjuring themselves . . ."  He
described the genesis of the DNC break-in; the employment of Liddy; the
formulation of a series of plans by Liddy which Dean disavowed, as did Mr.
Haldeman; the belief that the CREP had a lawful intelligence gathering
operation and the receipt of information from this source; and the arrest at
the DNC on June 17, 1972.  He then informed the President of a call to Liddy
shortly thereafter inquiring ". . . whether anybody in the White House was
involved in this" and the response "No, they weren't."

     Dean then advised the President of the allegation that Magruder and
Porter had committed perjury before the grand jury in denying knowledge that
the DNC was to be bugged.  He did not tell the President he had helped
"prepare" Magruder's testimony as he later admitted before the Senate
Committee.  Dean said he did not know what Mitchell had testified to before
the grand jury.

     Dean next laid out for the President what happened after June 17.  He
informed the President "I was under pretty clear instructions not to
investigate this . . . I worked on a theory of containment - to try to hold it
right where it was," and he admitted that he was "totally aware" of what the
FBI and grand jury was doing.  Throughout these disclosures the President
asked Dean a number of questions such as:

Pres. Nixon:  Tell me this:  did Mitchell go along?

Pres. Nixon:  Did Colson know what they (Liddy and Hunt) were talking about?

Pres. Nixon:  Did he (Colson) talk with Haldeman?

Pres. Nixon:  Did he (Haldeman) know where it (the information) was coming
               from?

     All together, the President asked Dean more than 150 questions in the
course of this meeting.

     Dean then described to the President the commencement of what he alleges
was a cover-up involving himself and others.  Implicit in these revelations,
of course, is that the President was not involved but rather he was learning
of these allegations for the first time.  In fact, later in the conversation,
Dean said:

John Dean:  I know, sir, I can just tell from our conversation that these are
               things you have no knowledge of.

     Dean next recited receiving a demand "from Hunt to me" through an
intermediary for "$120,000 for personal expenses and attorney's fees."

John Dean:  ". . . he wanted it as of the close of business yesterday" (March
               20).

     Dean told how he rejected the demand:

John Dean:  "If you want money, you came to the wrong man, fellow.  I am not
               involved in the money.  I don't know a thing about it.  I can't
               help you.  You better scramble about elsewhere."

Dean also claimed that Hunt had threatened Ehrlichman if he wasn't paid the
money he demanded.  Dean analyzed the situation as he saw it, pointing out
that a number of people know about these events, including Mrs. Hunt who had
died in a plane crash.  At the mention of Mrs. Hunt, the President interjected
that this was a "great sadness" and that he "recalled a conversation with
someone about Hunt's problem on account of his wife and the President said
that "of course commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife's
death, and that was the only conversation I ever had in that light."  During
their conversations, the President repeatedly and categorically rejected the
idea of clemency.

     Following this lengthy description of what had transpired, the
conversation dealt with what should be done about the situation presented by
Hunt's demands.  A number of alternatives were considered.  Dean pointed out
that the blackmail would continue, that it would cost a million dollars and
it would be difficult to handle.

John Dean:  What really bothers me is this growing situation.  As I say, it is
               growing because of the continued need to provide support for
               the Watergate people who are going to hold us up for everything
               we've got, and the need for some people to perjure themselves
               as they go down the road here.  If this thing ever blows, then
               we are in a cover-up situation.  I think it would be extremely
               damaging to you and the

Pres. Nixon:  Sure.  The whole concept of administration (of) justice which we
               cannot have.

Dean then made a recommendation:  Dean was unsure of the best course to
follow, but stated the approach he preferred.     what I real

John Dean:  That's right.  I am coming down to what I really think, is that
               Bob and John and John Mitchell and I can sit down and spend a
               day, or however long, to figure out, one, how this can be
               carved away from you, so that it does not damage you or the
               Presidency.  It just can't.  You are not involved in it an it
               is something you shouldn't . . .

Pres. Nixon:  That is true!

     The President then began to press Dean for his advice as to what should
be done.

Pres. Nixon:  So what you really come to is what we do.  Complete disclosure
               isn't that the best way to do it?

John Dean:  Well, one way to do it is -

Pres. Nixon:  That would be my view

     Dean then suggested that another grand jury be convened but Dean points
out that "some people are going to have to go to jail.  That is the long and
the short of it also."

     Among the alternatives considered were the payment of the money
generally and the payment of the amount demanded by Hunt, specifically.  The
mechanics of these alternatives, such as how the money could be raised and
delivered, were explored.

     The President expressed the belief that the money could be raised, and
perhaps, even, a way could be found to deliver it.  However, he recognized and
pointed out that blackmail would continue endlessly, and in the final
analysis would not be successful unless the Watergate defendants were given
executive clemency, which he said adamantly, could not be done.  The President
stated:

Pres. Nixon:  No, it is wrong that's for sure.

     After the alternatives were explored, the President's conclusion
regarding the demands for money were clearly stated:

Pres. Nixon:  . . . But in the end, we are going to be bled to death.  And in
               the end, it is all going to come out anyway.  Then you get the
               worst of both worlds.  We are going to lose and the people are
               going to

Haldeman:  And look like dopes.

Pres. Nixon:  And in effect look like a cover-up.  So that we can't do.

Restating it, the President said:

Pres. Nixon:  But my point is, do you ever have any choice on Hunt?  That is
               the point.  No matter what we do here now, John, whatever he
               wants if he doesn't get it - immunity, etc., he is going to
               blow the whistle.

     Finally the discussion as to what should be done was concluded by the
President, at least tentatively decided to have another grand jury
investigation at which members of the White House staff would appear and
testify:

Pres. Nixon:  I hate to leave with differences in view of all this stripped
               land.  I could understand this, but I think I want another
               grand jury proceeding and we will have the White House appear
               before them Is that right, John?

John Dean:     Uhhuh.

     Further discussion ensued concerning the benefits of calling for a grand
jury investigation - political as well as substantive -
 and the meeting ended with an agreement to have Dean, Mitchell, Haldeman
and Ehrlichman meet the next day to consider what they would recommend.  The
conclusion of the meeting, however, was not ambiguous:

Haldeman:  We should change that a little bit.  John's point is exactly right.
               The erosion here now is going to you, and that is the thing
               that we have to turn off at whatever cost.  We have to turn it
               off at the lowest cost we can, but at whatever cost it takes.

John Dean:  That's what we have to do.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here, apart from
               anything and all the people saying well the Watergate isn't a
               major issue.  It isn't.  But it will be.  It's bound to.
               (Unintelligible) has to go out.  Delaying is the great danger
               to the White House area.  We don't, I say that the White House
               can't do it.  Right?

John Dean:  Yes, Sir.

     As the President has stated, the transcript of the meeting on the
morning of March 21, 1973, contains ambiguities and statements which taken
out of context could be construed to have a variety of meanings.  The
conversation was wide ranging, consideration was given to a number of
different possibilities, but several things clearly stand out:

1.  The President had not previously been aware of any payments made allegedly
to purchase silence on the part of the Watergate defendants.

2.  The President rejected the payment of $120,000 or any other sum to Hunt
or other Watergate defendants.

3.  The President determined that the best way to proceed was to have White
House people appear before a grand jury even though it meant that some people
might have to go to jail.

     Tapes of recorded conversations following the meeting in the morning of
March 21, 1973, further establish that the President not only did not approve
of any payment to Hunt, but he did not even know a payment had been made to
Hunt's lawyer in the amount of $75,000.

     In the afternoon of the same day, March 21, 1973, the President met
again with Dean, Haldeman and now Ehrlichman.  This conversation makes it even
more clear that the President did not suggest that blackmail should be paid
to Hunt.  Ehrlichman pointed out:

Ehrlichman:  The problem of the Hunt thing or some of these other people,
               there is just no sign off on them.  That problem goes on and
               on.

The President again reiterated his view:

Pres. Nixon:  Maybe we face the situation.  We can't do a thing about the
               participants.  If it is going to be that way eventually why not
               now?  That is what you are sort of resigned to, isn't it?

And later near the end of the meeting:

Pres. Nixon:  You see, if we go your route of cutting the cancer out - if we
               cut it out now.  Take a Hunt, well wouldn't that knock the hell
               out from under him?

John Dean:     That's right.

Shortly after this the President terminated the meeting, apparently rather
abruptly, inquiring as to the time for the meeting the next day among
Mitchell, Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

     Again the recorded conversation clearly discloses that not only did the
President not approve or even know of a payment made or to be made to Hunt.
It is in fact quite clear that, subject to some other solution being
suggested at a meeting scheduled for the next day at which Mr. Mitchell would
attend, he favored "cutting the cancer out . . . now.

     The President next met with his principal aides and now Mitchell on the
afternoon of March 22, 1973.  This was the first meeting of the President with
John Mitchell following the disclosures of March 21, 1973.  Mitchell and the
others had met that morning as the President had requested.  If the
allegations of the grand jury as stated in pending indictments are correct
as to when the arrangements for the payment of Hunt's legal fees were made,
they would have had to have been made prior to this meeting on the afternoon
of March 22nd.  The tape recording of this meeting establishes that no one at
the meeting disclosed to the President that such an arrangement had been
made.  In fact, the President was not informed about these arrangements until
mid-April when Ehrlichman was reporting the results of his investigation to
the President.  In attempting to pin down what had happened, the President was
given two versions, one by Ehrlichman and Haldeman on April 14 and another
by John Dean on April 16.

     Ehrlichman and Haldeman explained to the President what had transpired:

Pres. Nixon:  What happened?

Ehrlichman:  And be just said, "It's taken care of."

Haldeman:  Mitchell raised the problem to Dean and said, "What have you done
               about that other problem?"  Dean said, he kind of looked at us,
               and then said, "Well, you know, I don't know."  And Mitchell
               said, "Oh, I guess that's been taken care of."  Apparently
               through LaRue.

Pres. Nixon:  Apparently who?

Haldeman:  LaRue.  Dean told us, LaRue.

     On April 16 Dean described how it happened that Hunt's legal fees were
paid.  After repeating Hunt's threat against Ehrlichman he said:

John Dean:  . . . Alright I took that to John Ehrlichman.  Ehrlichman said
               "Have you talked to Mitchell about it?"  I said "No I have
               not."  He said "Well, will you talk to Mitchell?"  I said "Yes
               I will."  I talked to Mitchell.  I just passed it along to him.
               And then we were meeting down here a few days later in Bob's
               office with Bob, and Ehrlichman and Mitchell and myself, and
               Ehrlichman said at that time, "Well is that problem with Hunt
               straightened out?"  He said it to me and I said "Well, ask the
               man who may know; Mitchell."  Mitchell said "I think that
               problem is solved."

Pres. Nixon:  That's all?

John Dean:  That's all he said.

     If Dean's disclosure to the President on April 16, 1973, about the
payment of Hunt's legal fees is to be believed, then it is clear that this
fact was concealed from the President when he met with Mitchell and the others
on the afternoon of March 22nd.  The explanation for this concealment perhaps
is contained in a significant statement made by Dean to the President at their
meeting on the morning of April 16, 1973:

John Dean:  I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you
               myself didn't cause you any personal problems.

     This explanation for not making a full disclosure to the President may
have been well intentioned at the time but in the last analysis only served to
prolong the investigation.

The Conduct of the President Following the Disclosures Made on March 21, 1973

     Dean disclosed for the first time on March 21, 1973, that he had been
engaged in conduct that might have amounted to obstruction of justice and
allegations that other high officials and former officials were also
involved.  These matters were thoroughly probed by the President in his talk
with Dean, with the President often taking the role of devil's advocate;
sometimes merely thinking out loud.

     Having received this information of possible obstruction of justice
having taken place following the break-in at the DNC the President promptly
undertook an investigation into the facts.  The record discloses that the
President started his investigation the night of his meeting with Dean on
March 21st, as confided by Dean in his conversation with the President on
April 16, 1973.

Pres. Nixon:  Then it was that night that I started my investigation.

John Dean:  That's right.

Pres. Nixon:  . . . That is when I frankly became interested in the case and
               I said, "Now I want to find out the score" and set in motion
               Ehrlichman, Mitchell and - not Mitchell but a few others.

     At the meeting with Mitchell and the others on the afternoon of March
22nd, the President instructed Dean to prepare a written report of his earlier
oral disclosures:

Haldeman:  I think you (Dean) ought to hole up for the weekend and do
               that and get it done.

Pres. Nixon:  Sure.

Haldeman:  Give it your full attention and get it done.

Pres. Nixon:  I think you need - why don't you do this?  Why don't you go up
               to Camp David.

John Dean:  I might do it, I might do it.

Pres. Nixon:  Completely away from the phone.  Just go up there and
               (inaudible).  I want a written report.

Later during this same conversation the President said:

Pres. Nixon:  I feel that at a very minimum we've got to have this
               statement.  Let's look at it.  I don't know what it - where is
               it - If it opens up doors, it opens up doors - you know.

     The recording of this conversation in which the President instructed Dean
to go to Camp David to write a report should be compared with Dean's testimony
in which he stated:

     "He (the President) never at any time asked me to write a report, and
it wasn't until after I had arrived at Camp David that I received a call from
Haldeman asking me to write the report up."

     Dean in fact did go to Camp David and apparently did some work on such
a report but he never completed the task.  The President then assigned
Ehrlichman to investigate these allegations.

     By as early as March 27, the President met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman
to discuss the evidence thus far developed and how it would be best to
proceed.

     Again the President stated his resolve that White House officials should
appear before the grand jury:

Pres. Nixon:  . . . Actually if called, we are not going to refuse for anybody
               called before the grand jury to go, are we, John?

     The President then reviewed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman the evidence
developed to that time.  They stated that they had not yet talked to Mitchell
and indicated this would have to be done.  They reviewed what they had been
advised was Magruder's current position as to what had happened and compared
that with what Dean had told them.  They reported that Hunt was before the
grand jury that same day.  It is interesting to note that neither the
President, Haldeman nor Ehrlichman say anything that indicate surprise in
Hunt's testifying before the grand jury.  If in fact he had been paid to keep
quiet, it might have been expected that someone would have expressed at least
disappointment that he was testifying before the grand jury less than a week
later.

     They confirmed to the President, as Dean had, that no one at the White
House had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in.  Ehrlichman said, "There
just isn't a scintilla of a hint that Dean knew about this."  The President
asked about the possibility of Colson having prior knowledge and Ehrlichman
said, "His response was one of total surprise . . . He was totally
nonplussed, as the rest of us."  Ehrlichman then revived with the President
the earlier concern that they had for national security leaks and the steps
taken to find out about how they occurred.

     It was decided to ask Mitchell to come to Washington to receive a report
of the facts developed so far and a call was placed to him for that purpose.
It was also decided that Ehrlichman should also call the Attorney General and
review the information on hand with him.  It was during this meeting that the
possibility of having a commission or a special prosecutor appointed in order
to avoid the appearance of the Administration investigating itself and a call
was placed to former Attorney General Rogers to ask him to meet with the
President to discuss the situation.

     The next day Ehrlichman, pursuant to the President's direction given the
previous day, called Attorney General Kleindienst and among other things
advised him that he was to report directly to the President if any evidence
turns up of any wrongdoing on the part of anyone in the White House or about
Mitchell.  Kleindienst raised the question of a possibility of a conflict of
interest and suggests that thought be given to appointing a special
prosecutor.

     On March 30, 1973, consideration was given to the content of a press
briefing with respect to White House officials appearing before the grand
jury.  As a result thereof, Mr. Ziegler stated at the Press briefing that day:

     "With regard to the grand jury, the President reiterates his
instructions that any member of the White House staff who is called by the
grand jury will appear before the grand jury to answer questions regarding
that individual's alleged knowledge or possible involvement in the Watergate
matter."

     Even prior to the completion of Ehrlichman's investigation, the
President was taking steps to get the additional facts before the grand jury.
On April 8, 1973, on the airplane returning to Washington from California,
the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and directed they meet with
Dean that day and urge him to go to the grand jury - "I am not going to
wait, he is going to go."  Haldeman and Ehrlichman met with Dean that
afternoon from 5 to 7.  At 7:33 Ehrlichman reported the results of that
meeting to the President by telephone:

Pres. Nixon:  Oh, John, Hi

Ehrlichman:  I just wanted to post you on the Dean meeting.  It went fine.
               He is going to wait until after he'd had a chance to talk with
               Mitchell and to pass the word to Magruder through his lawyers
               that he is going to appear at the grand jury.  His feeling is
               that Liddy has pulled the plug on Magruder and that
               (unintelligible) he thinks he knows it now.  And he says
               there's no love lost there, and that that was Liddy's motive
               in communicating informally.

     Indeed, Dean did, in fact, communicate his intentions to Mitchell and
Magruder not to support Magruder's previous testimony to the grand jury.  This
Do doubt was the push, initially stimulated by the President, which got
Magruder to go to the U.S. Attorneys on the following Saturday, April 14, and
change his testimony.

     on the morning of April 14, 1973, the President met again with Haldeman
and Ehrlichman to discuss the Watergate matter.  This was an in-depth
discussion lasting more than two and one-half hours.  The obvious purpose was
to review the results of three week's investigation on the part of Ehrlichman
and Haldeman and determine what course of action they would recommend.

     Several conclusions were reached at that meeting by the President.  From
Ehrlichman's report on what Ehrlichman called "hearsay" facts, the President
concluded, with regard to Mitchell:

Pres. Nixon:  I'm not convinced he's guilty but I am convinced that he ought
               to go before a grand jury.

     There was a discussion as to who would be the appropriate person to talk
to Mitchell and tell him that continued silence did not well serve the
President.  Ultimately, it was decided that Haldeman should call Mitchell to
come to Washington and that Ehrlichman should talk to him.

     With respect to Magruder, the President said:

Pres. Nixon:  We've come full circle on the Mitchell thing.  The Mitchell
               thing must come first.  That is something today.  We've got to
               make this move today.  If it fails, just to get back our
               position I think you ought to talk to Magruder.

Haldeman:  I agree.

Pres. Nixon:  And you tell Magruder, now Jeb, this evidence is coming in,
               you ought to go to the grand jury.  Purge yourself if you're
               perjured and tell this whole story.

Haldeman:  I think we have to.

Pres. Nixon:  Then, well Bob, you don't agree with that?

Haldeman:  No, I do.

     The President instructed Ehrlichman to see Magruder, also, and tell him
that he did not serve the President by remaining silent.

     The President's decision to urge Mitchell and Magruder to go to the
grand jury was based on his recognition of his duty to act on the body of
information Ehrlichman had reported to him:

Ehrlichman:  Here's the situation.  Look again at the big picture.  You now
               are possessed of a body of fact.

Pres. Nixon:  That's right.

Ehrlichman:  And you've got to - you can't just sit there.

Pres. Nixon:  That's right.

Ehrlichman:  You've got to act on it.  You've got to make some decisions and
               the Dean thing is one of the decisions you have to make . . .

     At another point in the discussion, the same point was reiterated:

Ehrlichman:  Well, you see, that isn't that kind of knowledge that we had
               was not action knowledge like the kind of knowledge that I put
               together last night.  I hadn't known really what had been
               bothering me this week.

Pres. Nixon:  Yeah.

Ehrlichman:  But what's been bothering me is

Pres. Nixon:  That with knowledge we're still not doing anything.

Ehrlichman:  Right.

Pres. Nixon:  That's exactly right.  The law and order - That's the way I am.
               You know it's a pain for me to do it - the Mitchell thing is
               damn painful.

     A decision was reached to speak to both Mitchell and Magruder before
turning such information as they had developed over to the Department of
Justice in order to afford them "an opportunity to come forward."  The
President told Ehrlichman that when he met with Mitchell to advise him that
"the President has said let the chips fall where they may.  He will not
furnish cover for anybody."  The
President summed up the situation by stating:

Pres. Nixon:  No, seriously, as I have told both of you, the boil had to be
               pricked.  In a very different sense - that's what December 18th
               was about.  We have to prick the boil and take the heat.  Now
               that's what we're doing here.  We're going to prick this boil
               and take the heat.  I - am I overstating?

Ehrlichman:  No, I think that's right.  The idea is this will prick the
               boil.  It may not.  The history of this thing has to be though
               that you did not tuck this under the rug yesterday or today,
               and hope it would go away.

     The decision was also made by the President that Ehrlichman should
provide the information which he had collected to the Attorney General.
Ehrlichman called the Attorney General, but did not reach him.

     Mitchell came to Washington that afternoon and met with Ehrlichman.
Immediately following that meeting, Ehrlichman reported to the President,
stating Mitchell protested his innocence, stating:

     "You know, these characters pulled this thing off without my knowledge
. . . I never saw Liddy for months at a time . . . I didn't know what they
were up to and nobody was more surprised than I was . . . I can't let people
get away with this kind of thing . . . I am just going to have to defend
myself every way I can."

     Ehrlichman said he explained to Mitchell that the President did not want
anyone to stand mute on his account; that everyone had a right to stand mute
for his own reasons but that the "interests of the President . . . were not
served by a person standing mute for that reason alone."

     Ehrlichman said that he advised Mitchell that the information that had
been collected would be turned over to the Attorney General and that Mitchell
agreed this would be appropriate.

     Even later on April 14, Ehrlichman finally was able to reach Magruder
and met with Magruder and his lawyers for the purpose of informing him that
he should not remain silent out of any misplaced loyalty to the President.
Ehrlichman found, however, that Magruder had just come from a meeting with
the U.S. Attorneys where he had told the full story as he knew it.  He,
Magruder, told Ehrlichman what he had told the U.S. Attorney, which
Ehrlichman duly reported to the President.

     During this meeting with the President, Ehrlichman's earlier call to the
Attorney General was completed, and Ehrlichman spoke to the Attorney General
from the President's office.  Ehrlichman told the Attorney General that he had
been conducting an investigation for about the past three weeks for the
President as a substitute for Dean on White House and broader involvement.
He also told him that he had reported his findings to the President the day
before and that he had advised people not to be reticent on the President's
behalf about coming forward.  He informed the Attorney General that he had
talked to Mitchell and had tried to reach Magruder, but that he had not been
able to meet with Magruder until after Magruder had conferred with the U.S.
Attorneys.  He offered to make all of his information available if it would
be in any way useful.

     Following the telephone call Ehrlichman said that the Attorney General
wanted him to meet with Henry Petersen the next day regarding the information
he had obtained.  During the course of the conversation relating to Magruder
changing his testimony the President stated:

Pres. Nixon:  It's the right thing.  We all have to do the right thing.  Damn
               it!  We just cannot have this kind of business, John.  Just
               cannot be.

     Late on the evening of April 14th, after the Correspondents' dinner, the
President spoke by telephone first with Haldeman and then with Ehrlichman.
The President told each that he now thought all persons involved should
testify in public before the Ervin Committee.

     On the morning of Sunday, April 15th, the President talked with
Ehrlichman and told him that he had received a call from the Attorney General
who had advised him that he had been up most of the night with the U.S.
Attorney, and with Assistant Attorney General Peterson.  The Attorney General
had requested to see the President, personally, the President told
Ehrlichman, and the President had agreed to see him after Church.  The
President and Ehrlichman again reviewed the available evidence developed
during Ehrlichman's investigation and the status of relations with the media.

     In the early afternoon of April 15, the President met with Attorney
General Kleindienst.  Kleindienst confirmed to the President that the U.S.
Attorneys had broken the case and knew largely the whole story as a result
of Magruder's discussions with them and from disclosures made by Dean's
attorneys, who were also talking to the U.S. Attorney.  The Attorney General
anticipated indictments of Mitchell, Dean and Magruder and others, possibly
including Haldeman and Ehrlichman.  Kleindienst indicated that he felt that
he could not have anything to do with these cases especially because of his
association with Mitchell, Mardian and LaRue.  The President expressed
reservations about having a special prosecutor:

Pres. Nixon:  First it's a reflection - it's sort of an admitting mea culpa
               for our whole system of justice.  I don't want to do that.

The President then suggested that Kleindienst step aside and that the Deputy
Attorney General, Dean Sneed, be placed in charge of the matter.  The
President expressed confidence in Silbert doing a thorough job.

     Kleindienst pointed out that even if he were to withdraw, his deputy is
still the President's appointee and that he would be "in a tough situation
. . .", Kleindienst recommended that a Special Prosecutor be appointed and a
number of names were suggested.  The President's reaction to the idea of a
Special Prosecutor was negative.

Pres. Nixon:  ". . . I want to get some other judgments because I - I'm open
               on this.  I lean against it and I think it's too much of a
               reflection on our system of justice and everything else."

     Following a further review of the evidence, Kleindienst raised the
question about what the President should do in the event charges are made
against White House officials.  The President resisted the suggestion that
they be asked to step aside on the basis of charges alone.

Pres. Nixon:  . . . the question really is basically whether an individual,
               you know, can be totally, totally - I mean, the point is if a
               guy isn't guilty, you shouldn't let him go.

Kleindienst:  That's right, you shouldn't.

Pres. Nixon:  It's like me - wait now - let's stand up for people if there -
               even though they are under attack.

Further discussion on this subject included the suggestion that Assistant
Attorney General Henry Petersen might be placed in charge rather than the
Deputy Attorney General.  Kleindienst pointed out, "He's the first career
Assistant Attorney General I think in the history of the Department.

     Shortly after this the tape at the President's office in the Executive
Office Building ran out.  It is clear, however, from a recorded telephone
conversation between the President and Kleindienst that he and Henry Petersen
met later in the afternoon with the President.  This was verified by Mr.
Petersen's testimony before the Senate Committee.  It was during this meeting
that the President assigned the responsibility for the on-going investigation
to Mr. Petersen.

     At his meeting with the President, Assistant Attorney General Petersen
presented to the President a summary of the allegations which related to
Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Strachan, and that the summary indicated no case of
criminal conduct by Haldeman and Ehrlichman at that time.

     The President, on the afternoon of April 15, 1973, had every reason to
believe that the judicial process was moving rapidly to complete the case.
He continued to attempt to assist.  He had four telephone conversations with
Petersen after their meeting.  In the afternoon, having been told that Liddy
would not talk unless authorized by "higher authority," who all assumed was
Mitchell, the President directed Petersen to pass the word to Liddy through
his counsel that the President wanted him to cooperate.  Subsequently, the
President told Petersen that Dean doubted Liddy would accept the word of
Petersen, so Petersen was directed to tell Liddy's counsel that the President
personally would confirm his urging of Liddy to cooperate.  The President
stated:

Pres. Nixon:  I just want him (Liddy) to be sure to understand that as far
               as the President is concerned, everybody in this case is to
               talk and to tell the truth.  You are to tell everybody, and you
               don't even have to call me on that with anybody.  You just say
               those are your orders.

     The President continued to seek additional facts and details about the
whole matter.  Petersen could not reveal the details of the further
disclosures by Dean's attorneys, so the President sought Petersen's advice
about getting further information from Dean.

Pres. Nixon:  Right.  Let me ask you this - why don't I get him in now if I
               can find him and have a talk with him?

H. Peterson:  I don't see any objection to that, Mr. President.

Pres. Nixon:  Is that all right with you?

H. Peterson:  Yes, sir.

Pres. Nixon:  All right - I am going to get him over because I am not going
               to screw around with this thing.  As I told you.

H. Peterson:  All right.

Pres. Nixon:  But I want to be sure you understand, that you know we are
               going to get to the bottom of this thing.

H. Peterson:  I think the thing that -

Pres. Nixon:  What do you want me to say to him?  Ask him to tell me the
               whole truth?

     Alter talking with Dean and reviewing Dean's further information, the
President raised the question about when Dean and perhaps Haldeman and
Ehrlichman should resign and Petersen responded, "We would like to wait, Mr.
President."

     On the morning of April 16, the President began a long series of
meetings on the entire subject.  Being uncertain of when the case would become
public, the President decided he wanted resignations or requests for leave
in hand from those against whom there were allegations.  He had Ehrlichman
draft such letters, and discussed them with Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

     The President then met with Dean and discussed with him the manner in
which his possible resignation would be handled.  Dean resisted the idea of
his resigning without Haldeman and Ehrlichman resigning as well.  The
President reviewed with Dean the disclosures Dean made to the President on
March 21st and on the evening of April 15th.

     The President had some more advice for John Dean on this occasion:

Pres. Nixon:  Thank God.  Don't ever do it, John.  Tell the truth.  That is
               the thing I have told everybody around here - tell the truth!
               All they do, John, is compound it.  That Hiss would be free
               today if he hadn't lied.  If he had said, "Yes, I knew Chambers
               and as a young man I was involved with some Communist
               activities but I broke it off a number of years ago."  And
               Chambers would have dropped it.  If you are going to lie, you
               go to jail for the lie rather than the crime.  So believe me,
               don't ever lie.

As to the President's actions, he told Dean:

Pres. Nixon:  No, I don't want, understand when I say don't lie.  Don't lie
               about me either.

John Dean:  No, I won't sir - you -

     The President met with Haldeman at noon on April 16th to discuss at
length how and when Haldeman should make a public disclosure of his actions
in the Segretti and Watergate matters.  Haldeman reported that Mr. Garment
recommended that he and Ehrlichman resign.  Garment had been assigned by the
President on April 9 to work on the matter.  The President stated that he
would discuss that problem with William Rogers that afternoon and asked
Haldeman to get with Ehrlichman and fill in Rogers on the facts.

     The President met in the early afternoon alone with Henry Petersen for
nearly two hours in the Executive Office Building.  They discussed the effect
the Senate Committee hearings would have on the trials in the event
indictments are returned.

     The President then asked Petersen what he should do about Dean's
resignation.

H. Peterson:  Yes.  As Prosecutor I would do something different but from your
              point of view I don't think you can sit on it.  I think we have
              the information under control but that's a dangerous thing to
              say in this City.

Pres. Nixon:  Ah

H. Peterson:  And if this information comes out I think you should have his
               resignation and it should be effective.

     Petersen, however, urged the President not to announce the resignation if
the information did not get out, as that would be "counter-productive" in
their negotiations with Dean's counsel.  Petersen reviewed the status of the
evidence at length with the President with a view toward making a press
release before an indictment or information was filed in open Court.

     During the course of the conversation Petersen informed the President
that they were considering giving Dean immunity.  As for Haldeman and
Ehrlichman, Petersen recommended that they resign.  The status of the
situation was reviewed as follows:

Pres. Nixon:  Okay.  All right come to the Haldeman/Ehrlichman thing.  You
               see you said yesterday they should resign.  Let me tell you
               they should resign in my view if they get splashed with this.
               Now the point is, is the timing.  I think that it's, I want to
               get your advice on it, I think it would be really hanging the
               guy before something comes in if I say look, you guys resign
               because I understand that Mr. Dean in the one instance, and
               Magruder in another instance, made some charges against you.
               And I got their oral resignations last night and they
               volunteered It.  They said, look, we want to go any time.  So
               I just want your advice on it.  I don't know what to do,
               frankly. (Inaudible) so I guess there's nothing in a hurry
               about that is there?  I mean I - Dean's resignation.  I have
               talked to him about it this morning and told him to write it
               out.

H. Peterson:  (Inaudible).

Pres. Nixon:  It's under way - I asked for it.  How about Haldeman and
               Ehrlichman?  I just wonder if you have them walk the plank
               before Magruder splashes and what have you or what not.  I mean
               I have information, true, as to what Magruder's going to do.
               (Inaudible) nothing like this (inaudible).

H. Peterson:  Or for that matter, Mr. President.

H. Peterson:  Its confidence in the Office of the Presidency.

Pres. Nixon:  Right.  You wouldn't want - to you think they ought to resign
               right now?

H. Peterson:  Mr. President, I am sorry to say it.  I think that mindful of
               the need for confidence in your office - yes.

Pres. Nixon:  (Inaudible) basis?

H. Peterson:  That has nothing to do - that has nothing to do with guilt or
               innocence.

     At the end of the meeting with Petersen, the President had every reason
to believe that a public disclosure of the entire case in court would be made
within forty eight hours and perhaps sooner.  The remaining questions for
Presidential decision were:  (1) What action he should take on the
resignation, suspension or leave of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean and whether
it should be before or after they were formally charged; (2) what position
he should take on immunity for Dean; and (3) what statement he should issue
prior to the public disclosure in court.

     On the afternoon of April 17, the President discussed the problem of
granting immunity to White House officials with Henry Petersen.  Petersen
pointed out that he was opposed to immunity but he pointed out that they
might need Dean's testimony in order to get Haldeman and Ehrlichman.  The
President agreed that under those circumstances he might have to move on
Haldeman and Ehrlichman, provided Dean's testimony was corroborated.  The
President told Peterson:

Pres. Nixon:  That's the point.  Well, I feel it strongly - I mean - just
               understand - I am not trying to protect anybody - I just want
               the damn facts if you can get the facts from Dean and I don't
               care whether -

H. Peterson:  Mr. President, if I thought you were trying to protect somebody,
               I would have walked out.

As for Dean, the President told Petersen:

Pres. Nixon:  ". . . No I am not going to condemn Dean until he has a chance
               to present himself.  No he is in exactly the same position they
               are in."

The President remained convinced, however, that a grant of immunity to a
senior aide would appear as a cover-up.

Pres. Nixon:  What you say - Look we are having you here as a witness and
               we want you to talk.

H. Peterson:  That is described as immunity by estoppel.

Pres. Nixon:  I see, I see - that's fair enough.

H. Peterson:  That is really the prosecutor's bargain.

Pres. Nixon:  That is much better basically than immunity - let me say I am
               not, I guess my point on Dean is a matter of principle - it is
               a question of the fact that I am not trying to do Dean in - I
               would like to see him save himself but I think find a way to do
               it without if you go the immunity route I think we are going to
               catch holy hell for it.

H. Peterson:  Scares hell out of me.

     The President went over the draft of his proposed statement with
Petersen.  Petersen further counseled the President that no discussion of the
facts of the case could be made without prejudicing the case and the rights
of the defendants.

     Later on the afternoon of April 17, the President issued his statement,
revealing that he had new facts and had begun his own investigation on March
21; that White House staff members who were indicted would be suspended, and
if they were convicted, they would be discharged.  He announced that all
members of the White House staff would appear and testify before the Senate
Committee.  The President further stated that:

          I have expressed to the appropriate authorities my view that no
     individual holding, in the past or present, a position of major
     importance in the Administration should be given immunity from
     prosecution.

In addition he stated that all White House staff employees were expected
fully to cooperate in this matter.

     Alter making his public statement, the President met with Secretary of
State Rogers, and they were joined later by Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
Secretary Rogers reiterated his advice that the President could not permit
any senior official to be given immunity.  He also reiterated his advice that
for the President to discharge his senior aides before they were formally
charged with a crime would highly prejudice their legal rights and convict
them without a trial.

     The President had concluded that he should treat Dean, Haldeman and
Ehrlichman in the same manner.  Petersen had advised the President that action
on Dean would prejudice the negotiations of the U.S. Attorneys with Dean's
lawyers, and that Dean's testimony might be needed for the case.

     On the evening of April 19, the President met with Messrs.  Wilson and
Strickler, counsel retained by Haldeman and Ehrlichman upon recommendation
of Secretary Rogers.  Wilson and Strickler made strong arguments that Haldeman
and Ehrlichman had no criminal liability and should not be discharged.

     The President continued to struggle with the question of administrative
action against his aides.

     On April 27, Petersen reported to the President that Dean's lawyer was
threatening that unless Dean got immunity.  "We will bring the President in -
 not in this case but in other things."

     On the question of immunity in the face of these threats, the President
told Petersen:

Pres. Nixon:  All right.  We have got the immunity problem resolved.  Do it,
               Dean if you need to, but boy I am telling you - there ain't
               going to be any blackmail.

     On April 27, the President was also advised by Petersen that the
negotiations with Dean's attorneys had bogged down, and action by the
President against Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman would now be helpful to the
U.S. Attorney.

     Three days later, on April 30, the President gave a nationwide address.
He announced that he accepted the resignations of Haldeman, Ehrlichman,
Attorney General Kleindienst and Dean.  The President then announced the
nomination of Elliot Richardson as the new Attorney General.

Conclusion

     Throughout the period of the Watergate affair the raw material of these
recorded confidential conversations establishes that the President had no
prior knowledge of the break-in and that he had no knowledge of any cover-
up prior to March 21, 1973.  In all of the thousands of words spoken, even
though they often are unclear and ambiguous, not once does it appear that the
President of the United States was engaged in a criminal plot to obstruct
justice.

     On March 21, 1973, when the President learned for the first time of
allegations of such a plot and an alleged attempt to blackmail the White
House, he sought to find out the facts first from John Dean then others.  When
it appeared as a result of these investigations that there was reason to
believe that there may have been some wrongdoing he conferred with the
Attorney General and with the Assistant in charge of the criminal division
of the Department of Justice and cooperated fully to bring the matter
expeditiously before the grand jury.

     Ultimately Dean has plead guilty to a felony and seven former White
House officials stand indicted.  Their innocence or guilt will be determined
in a court of law.

     This is as it should be.

     The recent acquittals of former Secretary Stans and former Attorney
General Mitchell in the Vesco case demonstrate the wisdom of the President's
actions insisting that the orderly process of the judicial system be utilized
to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals charged with crime, rather
than participating in trials in the public media.