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$Unique_ID{bob01071}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 20E November 26: Criminal Investigation Underway}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{green
attorney
counsel
general
independent
reynolds
weld
investigation
justice
hall}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author: Various
Date: 1987
Chapter 20E November 26: Criminal Investigation Underway
By Wednesday morning, November 26, Meese was prepared for the
investigation to enter a new phase. At 9:15 a.m., he met with Justice
Department attorneys Burns, Trott, Reynolds, Cooper, Bolton, Cribb, Korten,
Weld, and Richardson. The Attorney General began the meeting by announcing to
Weld that this was the day for the handoff of the investigation to the
Criminal Division. Weld said he wanted to assign the investigation to two
experienced attorneys in the Public Integrity Section, which typically handles
prosecutions of public officials and Independent Counsel inquiries. Attorney
General Meese stated he also wanted Deputies Mark Richard and John Keeny to
participate.
Attorney General Meese then assigned Cooper as an additional member of
the prosecution team. Attorney General Meese explained that he wanted to be
kept informed. Richardson instructed the group that if anything came up that
was "hot," they were to tell the Attorney General immediately. However, the
Attorney General testified before the Tower Board that he did not request
briefings because he felt this case should be referred to an Independent
Counsel. Attorney General Meese also testified, to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, that he suggested from the start that an
Independent Counsel be appointed. Yet the relevant Justice Department
officials do not recall when the Attorney General took that position. In
fact, there was much discussion of appointing a "special counsel," who, unlike
an Independent Counsel, would have been under the control of the Attorney
General.
At approximately 11:00 a.m., Meese spoke with Webster and requested that
the FBI enter the case. At 2:45 p.m., the Attorney General called a meeting
at the Justice Department, that included representatives of the Criminal
Division and the FBI. The Attorney General described the weekend inquiry and
answered questions. The Attorney General also designated the criminal
investigation team members.
November 27: A Thanksgiving Phone Call
November 27 was Thanksgiving. Fawn Hall received a telephone call at
home from Jay Stephens, an attorney on the White House Counsel's staff. Press
reports had appeared claiming that documents pertinent to the Iran-Contra
Affair had been shredded at the NSC. Stephens asked Hall whether those
reports were true. Hall told Stephens exactly what she had earlier told
North's attorney her response would be to such a question: "we shred
everyday." Hall admitted during the public hearings that she misled Stephens
to believe that nothing unusual had occurred.
Final Steps
The NSC security officer had secured North's office on November 25. The
FBI took over joint custody of the documents at the NSC on Friday, November
28. [Mark Richard had advocated serving subpoenas on the NSC staff and
others. His concern was that, if documents were altered or destroyed, a
prosecutor might be unable to charge obstruction of justice because the
defendant could claim that he or she was not aware of any investigation and
therefore did not intend to obstruct justice. Richard Dep., 8/19/87, at
176-77. Indeed, as noted earlier, during their public hearing testimony, both
North and Poindexter made a point of saying they believed Meese was acting as
a friend of, or counselor to, the President, as opposed to acting as Attorney
General, during the factfinding inquiry. North Test., Hearings 100-7, Part I,
7/7/87, at 19; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, 7/16/87, at 133.]
Also on November 28, Hall went to the office of North's new attorney to
deliver messages that North had received. When Hall returned to the NSC,
Craig Coy introduced her to FBI agents, who asked to interview her over the
weekend. Hall left her new office that evening with NSC aide Robert Earl, and
they agreed not to tell the FBI about the removal of documents from the NSC
offices. The next day, after learning that Earl had retained an attorney,
Hall arranged for one as well.
On Monday, December 1, William Reynolds had plans to meet alone with Tom
Green again. When Weld and Richard heard of this, they opposed the meeting
because Reynolds was no longer supposed to be involved in the investigation.
They also pointed out that Reynolds might be a fact witness and should
therefore not be negotiating with defense counsel. Weld called Reynolds to
express his opposition, but Reynolds insisted on meeting with Green. He did,
however, agree to have William Hendricks (Deputy Chief of the Public Integrity
Section of the Justice Department) present. Weld consulted with Trott, who
said that so long as Hendricks was present, the situation should be
"survivable." [Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 41. Reynolds, however, maintains that
he never intended to meet with Green alone and that it was he who insisted
that someone from the Criminal Division be present. Reynolds Dep., 9/1/87, at
67.]
During the meeting, Green said he knew 93 percent of the story and did
not feel the President would be embarrassed if the whole truth came out. Green
made clear now that he represented Secord. Green said that Secord preferred
to tell his story to the Justice Department rather than to Congress.
Green wanted immunity for Secord. He argued that if the Justice
Department did not grant immunity and Secord's story did not come out, the
press would feed on the situation and create the suspicion that the President
and Regan knew more than they claimed they did.
Reynolds and Hendricks asked Green about the 1985 arms shipments. Green
responded that the President authorized the first shipment and that McFarlane
probably authorized the second shipment. Turning to the January 1986 Finding,
Green said it was broad enough to authorize the "commercial activity in this
enterprise."
Going back to the November 1985 shipment, Green said McFarlane did not
impart to others the truth about the cargo. He said CIA "subordinates" were
told the cargo was oil drilling equipment. Concerning the Contra resupply
operation, Green said that only unappropriated funds were used and that
private individuals were used to raise and collect money to support the
airlift operation.
Hendricks asked Green about the possibility that the U.S. sale of arms
was used as leverage against third countries to force them to send money to
the Contras. Green said he knew nothing of that. Green said that the
residuals to the Contras were an "unexpected result" that emerged from the
arms sales, rather than being "cooked up" by the operation.
Hendricks suggested that because Secord was such a "great American," he
should come forward without immunity. Green rejected that idea. Hendricks
responded that there were problems in granting Secord immunity, and noted the
prior criminal investigation against Secord.
Reynolds asked how many people Green thought should be immunized. Green
said it should be limited to Secord, North, and Hakim. Green said he could
secure the approval of Hakim's and North's lawyers. Green assured them that
he did not want to embarrass the President and was not trying to "snooker"
anyone.
Hendricks noted that it would be inappropriate to immunize anyone while
there was an ongoing preliminary inquiry for an Independent Counsel
appointment. Green asserted that Secord, North, and Hakim were not covered
under the law that grants jurisdiction to the Independent Counsel. Green
predicted that if an Independent Counsel were appointed, all the principals
would "clam up." Green noted that time was of the essence. The meeting ended
at 12:15 p.m.
At 2:20 p.m., Meese met with Burns, Cooper, Bolton, Cribb, Weld,
Hendricks, and Richard to discuss the investigation. This meeting focused on
whether to apply for an Independent Counsel. There was concern that North and
Poindexter might not be persons covered by the Independent Counsel statute.
The consensus, however, was that sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest
existed that the Justice Department should apply for an Independent Counsel.
Weld took it upon himself to draft the application that night. Weld mentioned
only North in the application as a possible target because he felt there were
insufficient facts to name others.
On December 19, an Independent Counsel was appointed.