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$Unique_ID{bob01031}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 7B   June 1986:  New Congressional Inquiry}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
poindexter
information
letter
boland
committee
meeting
resolution
amendment
congress}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 7B   June 1986:  New Congressional Inquiry

     On June 4, Representative Ron Coleman of Texas introduced a Resolution of
Inquiry (H. Res. 485), directing the President to provide documents and
information about support for the Contras.  In a public statement, the
Resolution's author explained the need "to get at the truth" behind the widely
publicized allegations:  "[D]isturbing new reports that our own government
officials may have deliberately violated the law that prohibited any open or
hidden U.S. assistance for military operations inside Nicaragua [suggest that
there] may have been an intentional disregard for our own democratic process."

     In a statement inserted into the Congressional Record, the author of the
Resolution explained the information sought from the Administration:

My resolution of inquiry seeks answers and information on two central
questions.  Did Lieutenant Colonel North develop and implement a plan for
Contra funding in the event that Congress did adopt the Boland Amendment?
. . .  Second, what was the degree of Lieutenant Colonel North's involvement
with the Contra high command before, during, and after the Boland Amendment
became the law of this land.  Did he assure the Contra generals that the
administration would find a way to ensure continued funding and assistance
even in the event of a congressional ban?  Did he, as alleged, provide regular
tactical and logistical assistance to the Contra high command on a regular
basis?  Did Lieutenant Colonel North then implement a sham network of
intermediaries to filter his continued advice to the Contra generals in direct
violation of at least the spirit of the Boland language?

Representative Coleman said he introduced his Resolution "very reluctantly,"
adding:  "No one can be allowed to operate above the law of this great country
- least of all those officials obligated to defend our Constitution."  He
concluded by stating that the Resolution "touches upon areas of concern that
go far beyond the question of one's position relative to Contra aid. Rather,
this course of action goes to accountability and ensuring that one branch of
our Government [does not] disregard . . . the other two."

     The Resolution of Inquiry directed the President to provide to the House
information and documents in three areas:

     1.  Funds and Supplies:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and private individuals or representatives of foreign
governments relating to the provision of funds and supplies to the Contras.

     2.  Military Activities:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and any member of the Nicaraguan Resistance relating to
Contra military activities.

     3.  Singlaub, Owen & Hull:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and Robert W. Owen, Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, and John
Hull.

     The Resolution was referred to the House Committees on Intelligence,
Foreign Affairs and Armed Services.  On June 25 and July 1, the Chairmen of
the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence Committee requested
comments from the President on the Resolution.

The Executive's Response

     On July 21, Poindexter wrote the Chairmen of the three Committees "in
reply to your letter to the President."  Poindexter testified that he
"probably" did not show the letter to the President, but discussed the issue
with him "in general terms . . . .  I probably told him about the Resolution
of inquiry and told him that we were opposed to it.  He agreed."

     In the one-page letter, Poindexter first stated the Administration's
opposition to the resolution of inquiry.  He continued:

Last fall, in an effort to cooperate with Chairman Barnes, my predecessor,
Robert C. McFarlane, met with members of your committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.  While I did not participate in these discussions, I
understand that information on the specific issues raised in H. Res. 485, was
provided to your Committee and that this information made it clear that the
actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both
the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaraguan
resistance.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on H. Res. 485.  I have forwarded
similar letters to Chairman Fascell and Chairman Aspin and sincerely hope that
this matter can finally be put to rest.

Insisting that the letter was technically accurate, Poindexter acknowledged to
the Select Committees that the letter "clearly withholds information."

     By any standard the response was misleading.  First, the National
Security Adviser implied in the letter that he accepted the view that the
Boland Amendment applied to the NSC stall", and that the NSC staff under his
tenure was not providing covert lethal support to the Contras.  Poindexter
referred explicitly to the information McFarlane had provided Congress that
"made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in
compliance with both the spirit and the letter" of the Boland Amendment. He
did not disclose that he had authorized North to provide to the Contras
precisely the kind of covert aid the Boland Amendment was intended to prohibit
or that, as he put it, "We had been running this [Contra] operation on our own
for a long period of time."

     Asked how he could reconcile the statement that the NSC staff was
complying with the "letter and spirit" of the Boland Amendment with the
actions North had taken and that he had approved, Poindexter testified:

I felt that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and I felt
that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland
Amendment.  Now, it doesn't say that we are not helping the Contras.  We were.

     In addition, Poindexter's letter implied that he had no dispute in 1985
with the categorical denials McFarlane gave Congress on allegations about
North's activities.  In fact, however, Poindexter was aware that North had
taken over coordination of Contra-support activities after enactment of the
Boland Amendment.  Moreover, when the Barnes letter arrived at the NSC on
August 17, 1985, it was Deputy National Security Adviser Poindexter who
assigned North to draft the response, intending that North would conceal his
true activities from Congress.  As Poindexter himself put it before these
Committees, he intended with his letter to say "that the questions had been
addressed by Mr. McFarlane in the previous year."  But McFarlane's denials had
misled Congress the previous year, as Poindexter's letter misled Congress in
1986.

August 1986:  North's Meeting with Members of Congress

     In response to the Resolution of Inquiry, the House Intelligence
Committee sought to meet with North.  On August 6, North met with 11 members
of the House Intelligence Committee in the White House Situation Room.  North
began the session with a presentation about his activities.  The description
echoed closely McFarlane's letters the year before to Representatives Hamilton
and Barnes: North's principal mission was to coordinate contacts with the
Contras; a main purpose of his job was to assess the viability of the
Nicaraguan Resistance as a democratic organization; and he explained to Contra
leaders the limitations on U.S. support as imposed by the Boland Amendment.
According to a memorandum based on notes taken at the meeting, North said
"that he did not in any way, nor at any time violate the spirit, principles or
legal requirements of the Boland Amendment."

     In response to specific questions, North denied that he had raised funds
for the Contras or offered them military advice.  North told the Members that
his relationship with Robert Owen was "casual," that Owen never took guidance
from him.  He stated that he had not been in contact with John Singlaub at all
in 1985 or 1986.

     By his own testimony, North lied to the Members of the Intelligence
Committee at this meeting:

     A:  . . .  I will tell you right now, counsel, and all the Members here
gathered, that I misled the Congress.  I misled -

     Q:  At that meeting?

     A:  At that meeting.

     Q:  Face to face?

     A:  Face to face.

     Q:  You made false statements to them about your activities in support of
the Contras?

     A:  I did.

     At the conclusion of the meeting, according to an observer,
Representative Hamilton "expressed his appreciation for the good-faith effort
that Admiral Poindexter had shown in arranging a meeting and indicated his
satisfaction in the responses received."  On August 12, Hamilton wrote
Representative Coleman that the House Intelligence Committee would not move
forward with the Resolution:  "Based on our discussions and review of the
evidence provided, it is my belief that the published press allegations cannot
be proven."

Authority to Lie

     North conceded in his testimony that Poindexter did not give him specific
prior authority to make false statements.  Before meeting with the Members of
the House Intelligence Committee, North expressed to his aide Robert Earl
"concern . . . [about] what he was authorized to say" at the session.
According to Earl, North tried to obtain guidance from Poindexter but could
not reach him.  Poindexter "was on leave, yes, out of the office" during this
period, according to Earl, who testified:  "My impression was that the leave
was not accidental.  The timing of the leave was just not a coincidence."  In
his testimony, Earl characterized his observation as follows:

     Q:  So that your impression of it, your observation of it, was that
Colonel North had some information to protect and that he was being left to
figure out how to protect it on his own?

     A:  I think that's a fair statement.

     North and Poindexter differ on whether North had general authority from
the National Security Adviser to lie at the session.  North testified that he
was acting under such authority:  "I went down to that oral meeting with the
same kind of understanding that I had prepared those memos in 1985 and other
communications."  North added:  "[Poindexter] did not specifically go down and
say, 'Ollie, lie to the Committee.'  I told him what I had said afterwards,
and he sent me a note saying, "Well done."

     While Poindexter did send such a note, he claimed it did not indicate
approval of North's lies.  Poindexter acknowledged that North and he had a
"general understanding that he [North] was to withhold information about our
involvement."  But Poindexter told these Committees that he did not know North
had lied at his meeting with the Intelligence Committee, and that he had not
expected North would do so.

     The evidence is clear, however, that Poindexter knew North had misled the
Members of Congress.  Poindexter attached his "well done" message to a PROF
Note summarizing the meeting.  The summary was written by Bob Pearson, one of
two NSC staffers besides North who had attended the August 8 meeting in the
Situation Room, and sent to Poindexter who forwarded the PROF note to North.
The message began by declaring, "Session was success," and went on to describe
North's presentation as "thorough and convincing."  Pearson wrote:

     In response to specific questions, Ollie covered the following points:

     - contact with FDN and UNO aimed to foster viable, democratic political
strategy for Nicaraguan opposition, gave no military advice, knew of no
specific military operations.

     - Singlaub - gave no advice, has had no contact in 20 months:  Owen -
never worked from OLN office, OLN had casual contact, never provided Owen
guidance.

     Poindexter testified that "by reading the summary in this note, I didn't
attach any great significance to it because I knew that the questions and
answers would be very carefully crafted."  Yet Pearson's PROF is clear that
North told the Members he "gave no military advice" to the Resistance, that he
had only "casual" contact with Owen and never "provided . . . guidance," and
that he had "no contact" with Singlaub for 20 months.

     Thus, even if Poindexter did not expressly authorize North to lie, he was
aware of North's misleading statements and made no effort to correct them.
Nor did he reprimand North.  On the contrary, Poindexter congratulated North
on his performance and on his success at deflecting the inquiry.

     In his testimony, Poindexter acknowledged that he did not expect North to
disclose the truth:

I did think that he would withhold information and be evasive, frankly, in
answering questions.  My objective all along was to withhold from the Congress
exactly what the NSC staff was doing in carrying out the President's policy
. . . .  I thought that Colonel North would withhold information.  There was
no doubt about that in my mind.