Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0100/01008.txt

Text File | 1993-07-27 | 9KB | 161 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01008}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Who Was Responsible}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{president
north
diversion
casey
told
law
poindexter
attorney
public
responsibility}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Who Was Responsible

     Who was responsible for the Iran-Contra Affair?  Part of our mandate was
to answer that question, not in a legal sense (which is the responsibility of
the Independent Counsel), but in order to reaffirm that those who serve the
Government are accountable for their actions.  Based on our investigation, we
reach the following conclusions.

     At the operational level, the central figure in the Iran-Contra Affair
was Lt. Col. North, who coordinated all of the activities and was involved in
all aspects of the secret operations.  North, however, did not act alone.

     North's conduct had the express approval of Admiral John Poindexter,
first as Deputy National Security Adviser, and then as National Security
Adviser.  North also had at least the tacit support of Robert McFarlane, who
served as National Security Adviser until December 1985.

     In addition, for reasons cited earlier, we believe that the late Director
of Central Intelligence, William Casey, encouraged North, gave him direction,
and promoted the concept of an extra-legal covert organization. Casey, for the
most part, insulated CIA career employees from knowledge of what he and the
NSC staff were doing.  Casey's passion for covert operations - dating back to
his World War II intelligence days - was well known.  His close relationship
with North was attested to by several witnesses.  Further, it was Casey who
brought Richard Secord into the secret operation, and it was Secord who, with
Albert Hakim, organized the Enterprise.  These facts provide strong reasons to
believe that Casey was involved both with the diversion and with the plans for
an "off-the-shelf" covert capacity.

     The Committees are mindful, however, of the fact that the evidence
concerning Casey's role comes almost solely from North; that this evidence,
albeit under oath, was used by North to exculpate himself; and that Casey
could not respond.  Although North told the Committees that Casey knew of the
diversion from the start, he told a different story to the Attorney General in
November 1986, as did Casey himself.  Only one other witness, Lt. Col. Robert
Earl, testified that he had been told by North during Casey's lifetime that
Casey knew of the diversion.

     The Attorney General recognized on November 21, 1986 the need for an
inquiry.  His staff was responsible for finding the diversion memorandum,
which the Attorney General promptly made public.  But as described earlier,
his fact-finding inquiry departed from standard investigative techniques. The
Attorney General saw Director Casey hours after the Attorney General learned
of the diversion memorandum, yet he testified that he never asked Casey about
the diversion.  He waited two days to speak to Poindexter, North's superior,
and then did not ask him what the President knew.  He waited too long to seal
North's offices.  These lapses placed a cloud over the Attorney General's
investigation.  There is no evidence that the Vice President was aware of the
diversion.  The Vice President attended several meetings on the Iran
initiative, but none of the participants could recall his views.

     The Vice President said he did not know of the Contra resupply operation.
His National Security Adviser, Donald Gregg, was told in early August 1986 by
a former colleague that North was running the Contra resupply operation, and
that ex-associates of Edwin Wilson - a well known ex-CIA official convicted of
selling arms to Libya and plotting the murder of his prosecutors - were
involved in the operation.  Gregg testified that he did not consider these
facts worthy of the Vice President's attention and did not report them to him,
even after the Hasenfus airplane was shot down and the Administration had
denied any connection with it.

     The central remaining question is the role of the President in the
Iran-Contra Affair.  On this critical point, the shredding of documents by
Poindexter, North, and others, and the death of Casey, leave the record
incomplete.

     As it stands, the President has publicly stated that he did not know of
the diversion.  Poindexter testified that he shielded the President from
knowledge of the diversion.  North said that he never told the President, but
assumed that the President knew.  Poindexter told North on November 21, 1986
that he had not informed the President of the diversion.  Secord testified
that North told him he had talked with the President about the diversion, but
North testified that he had fabricated this story to bolster Secord's morale.

     Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for the events in the
Iran-Contra Affair must rest with the President.  If the President did not
know what his National Security Advisers were doing, he should have.  It is
his responsibility to communicate unambiguously to his subordinates that they
must keep him advised of important actions they take for the Administration.
The Constitution requires the President to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."  This charge encompasses a responsibility to leave the
members of his Administration in no doubt that the rule of law governs.

     Members of the NSC staff appeared to believe that their actions were
consistent with the President's desires.  It was the President's policy - not
an isolated decision by North or Poindexter - to sell arms secretly to Iran
and to maintain the Contras "body and soul," the Boland Amendment
notwithstanding.  To the NSC staff, implementation of these policies became
the overriding concern.

     Several of the President's advisers pursued a covert action to support
the Contras in disregard of the Boland Amendment and of several statutes and
Executive orders requiring Congressional notification.  Several of these same
advisers lied, shredded documents, and covered up their actions. These facts
have been on the public record for months.  The actions of those individuals
do not comport with the notion of a country guided by the rule of law.  But
the President has yet to condemn their conduct.

     The President himself told the public that the U.S. Government had no
connection to the Hasenfus airplane.  He told the public that early reports of
arms sales for hostages had "no foundation."  He told the public that the
United States had not traded arms for hostages.  He told the public that the
United States had not condoned the arms sales by Israel to Iran, when in fact
he had approved them and signed a Finding, later destroyed by Poindexter,
recording his approval.  All of these statements by the President were wrong.

     Thus, the question whether the President knew of the diversion is not
conclusive on the issue of his responsibility.  The President created or at
least tolerated an environment where those who did know of the diversion
believed with certainty that they were carrying out the President's policies.

     This same environment enabled a secretary who shredded, smuggled, and
altered documents to tell the Committees that "sometimes you have to go above
the written law;" and it enabled Admiral Poindexter to testify that "frankly,
we were willing to take some risks with the law."  It was in such an
environment that former officials of the NSC staff and their private agents
could lecture the Committees that a "rightful cause" justifies any means, that
lying to Congress and other officials in the executive branch itself is
acceptable when the ends are just, and that Congress is to blame for passing
laws that run counter to Administration policy.  What may aptly be called the
"cabal of the zealots" was in charge.

     In a Constitutional democracy, it is not true, as one official
maintained, that "when you take the King's shilling, you do the King's
bidding."  The idea of monarchy was rejected here 200 years ago and since
then, the law - not any official or ideology - has been paramount.  For not
instilling this precept in his staff, for failing to take care that the law
reigned supreme, the President bears the responsibility.

     Fifty years ago Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis observed:  "Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the
Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law, it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy."

     The Iran-Contra Affair resulted from a failure to heed this message.