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$Unique_ID{bob00402}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Nepal
Chapter 2A.   Historical Setting}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{George L. Harris}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{nepal
political
century
nepalese
valley
king
india
moroccan
students
union}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Title:       Nepal
Book:        Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, An Area Study: Nepal
Author:      George L. Harris
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1973

Chapter 2A.   Historical Setting

     For all but the last several centuries there is an absence of reliable
information on the history of the area now known as Nepal. Although there are
ancient monuments, coins and other cultural artifacts and archeological
remains which have survived as objects of study, they are isolated pieces of
evidence which are of little assistance in penetrating the obscurity of the
country's past and constructing a continuous narrative of the experience of
its people from earliest times. Written materials date only from the fifth
century A.D., and even though historical sources gradually increase in volume
after that time, they fail to provide a basis for anything more than a vague
and fragmentary description of the country's history.

     An accurate and detailed account of Nepalese history does not become
possible until the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the nation
became unified under the King of the Gorkhas. The great body of the country's
history before that time consists of folklore and legend-handed down through
the centuries-in which gods and demons mingle with authentic persons and myths
and miracles merge with real events. About the sixteenth century these
legendary accounts, sometimes extending back to many centuries earlier, began
to be committed to writing in documents known as vamsavalis. These are
essentially genealogical chronicles of the kings and dynasties of Nepal,
recounting the achievements, real or imaginary, of its monarchs and glorifying
their reigns. Despite the fact that what little verifiable data they contain
have become heavily encrusted with the accumulated fantasies of centuries of
storytellers, the vamsavalis are the single most important category of source
material on most of the country's history and the only source for the period
before the fifth century A.D.

     Corroboration for some of the details of the vamsavalis is found in the
testimony of foreign writers. There are references to Nepal in the Buddhist
literature of India and China, Vedic and Hindu religious and philosophical
works-the Puranas, the Mahabharata, and Kautilya's Arthashastra-in the
observations of travelers, pilgrims, and traders from China and India and in
dynastic histories of China. Nevertheless, because of their inconsistencies,
the clarification they provide is only partial.

     Such information as is available on Nepalese history pertains almost
exclusively to the Katmandu Valley; it deals very little, if at all, with all
of that part of the Himalayan area which now forms the State of Nepal. The
legendary dawn of Nepalese life opens with the story of the supernatural
creation of the Valley, and from that time to the present it has been the
focal point of the country's history. It has long been the largest population
center, the site of a vigorous culture, a major trading entrepot and one of
the strongest military and political areas in the central Himalayas.

     Lying athwart the main Himalayan routes, Nepal's development has been
profoundly influenced by its relations with India, Tibet and, to a lesser
extent, China. Indian culture manifested through centuries of war, trade,
migration and religious pilgrimage has had the greatest impact. However,
Nepal has not been simply a passive receiver of the cultural radiations of
others, but has played an important role in transmitting elements of the
cultures of India, China and Tibet to each of the others. Although it has
developed in the process a unique civilization of its own, the dominant
theme of Nepalese history is the strong and enduring effects of its relations
with other nations.

Early History

     According to the vamsavalis, the Katmandu Valley was once a lake, a
contention supported by geological evidence. In the middle of this lake grew
a lotus containing a jewel whose brilliance attracted a number of gods to
the Valley. One of them, the deity Manjusri, is said to have opened a passage
to drain the waters by striking the mountain range to the south of the Valley
with a single blow of his sword.

     The origin and character of the earliest inhabitants of the Katmandu
Valley are unknown. Whatever the aboriginal population, however, it was
succeeded by a group of people known as the Kiratas who migrated to the
Valley from northeastern India in three major waves ending in the seventh
century B.C. Racially Indo-Mongoloid and speaking a Tibeto-Burman language,
the Kiratas lived under a system of tribal government and appear to have
remained undisturbed in the Valley for a period of 700 years. Gautama
Buddha was born about 563 B.C. in Lumbini, which is now the Nepalese village
of Rummin-dei (Lumbini) in the Tarai, and by the end of the Kirata period
Buddhism had become the common faith of the people of the Valley, who in the
course of time became the Newar.

     About the first century A.D., immigrants from India, the Lichavis,
established themselves as the rulers of the Kiratas, and from then until the
present time all the ruling dynasties of Nepal have been drawn from the
plains of northern India. The Lichavis ruled the Valley with brief
interruptions from the first to the ninth centuries, and during that period
the Indian impact on Nepal was in one of its most extensive and significant
phases. Powerful monarchs of India-initially the Kushans and after the fourth
century, the Guptas-exercised considerable influence over Nepal without
extinguishing its independence. The Guptas, for example, were responsible for
the establishment of a monarchical system of government in the Valley,
replacing the "republican tribal democracy" which had existed up to that
time. Another result of this relationship was the introduction of Hinduism
into Nepal. It gained its initial foothold through the conversion of the
ruling class about the fourth century and later received acceptance from
many of the people. The growth of Hinduism did not result in the displacement
of Buddhism, but led to the fusion of the two religions (see ch. 9, Religion).

     Throughout the latter part of the Lichavi period, Tibet was becoming
increasingly powerful and, under the great king Srong btsan sgam po, it
eventually came to dominate large areas of China, Central Asia and the
Himalayas. For more than a hundred years, between the seventh and the
ninth centuries, Tibet held Nepal in vassalage, and for several centuries
the influence of Tibet rather than that of India was paramount in Nepal. At
this time Buddhists were migrating northward out of India and Nepal mediated
much of the transfer of Buddhist culture from India to Tibet; Mahayana
Buddhism, the Guptan script, and Sanskrit literature, as well as Nepalese
artistic and architectural forms, entered Tibet from Nepal with lasting
effect. The seventh and eighth centuries also marked the beginning of fairly
frequent contacts not only between Nepal and Tibet but also between Nepal
and China.

     Near the end of the ninth century the Lichavis were replaced by the
Thakuri dynasty, which held control of the Valley intermittently for the
next several centuries. During the latter part of their reign the Valley
was under repeated invasion not only from Indian states to the south but
also from the mountain kingdoms to the west.

     In the thirteenth century yet another dynasty of Indian origin, the
Malla, was established in Nepal. Under the Mallas, the Newar culture of
the Valley flourished, orthodox Hinduism was strengthened by the introduction
of the caste system, and the power of Nepalese kings was extended far beyond
its previous limits. The domain of the Mallas reached its greatest extent
under Yaksha Malla in the middle of the fifteenth century. Upon his death,
however, the kingdom was divided among his descendants and quickly fell into
a state of anarchy.

Forging the Modern State of Nepal

     During the sixteenth century the territory now contained within the
boundaries of Nepal was fragmented into scores of minor principalities
which were gathered into four major groupings. In the east were the various
tribal states of the Kiratas; in the Katmandu Valley were the three Newar
kingdoms ruled by the Mallas; to the west of the Valley lay a group of
petty lordships known as the Chaubisi Rajas; and on the far west was a
similar set of states, the Baisi Rajas. Although many of the states of
these four groupings nominally recognized the supremacy of several of the
more powerful among them or, in the case of the Baisi and Chaubisi Rajas,
of the Mogul emperor in Delhi, they were virtually independent and engaged
in continual warfare. The absence of any political system embracing these
states and the turbulence of their relations made possible the rise of the
Gorkhas and; ultimately, the formation of the State of Nepal.

     In 1559, Drabya Shah, the younger son of the Raja of the Chaubisi
Kingdom of Lamjung, brought Gorkha-a small, adjacent principality west of
the Katmandu Valley-under his dominion and established the line of kings
which later became the monarchs of Nepal. During the next two centuries
the position of the dynasty was consolidated by Drabya Shah's successors,
and the territory of the kingdom was extended to include most of the area
between the Marsyandi and the Trisuli Rivers.

     The main thrust of Gorkha expansion, however, did not occur until the
middle of the eighteenth century with the accession to the throne of the
tenth in the Shah line, Prithvi Narayan (r. 1742-75). Extolled as a fierce
and resourceful warrior king even among a people renowned for their
martial qualities, Prithvi's overriding aim was the conquest of vast areas
of the Himalayas and their incorporation into the territories of the House
of Gorkha. In the second year of his reign he embarked upon a relentless
campaign for the systematic subjugation of the surrounding kingdoms which
lasted until his death and, continued by his successors, did not come to a
complete halt until almost three-quarters of a century later.

     The first and most critical phase of this undertaking was the conquest
of the Katmandu Valley, a task which required 25 years to accomplish.
Katmandu was not taken until 1768, Patan and Bhadgaon fell the following
year, and by the end of 1769 the whole of the Valley was under the control
of the Kingdom of Gorkha. Moving his capital to Katmandu, Prithvi Narayan
established a policy which strictly excluded Europeans from the
country, reformed the systems of land tenure and taxation, and executed
large numbers of people whom he felt might constitute a potential threat to
his position as the first king of Nepal. Domestic affairs occupied his
attention only briefly, however, and the Gorkha advance was soon resumed.
Meeting only slight opposition, Prithvi's armies subjugated the entire
Kirata area to the east and by the time of his death in 1775 were in
possession of territory as far east as Darjeeling (now a part of India).

     The conquests of the Gorkhas continued under the leadership of Prithvi
Narayan's descendants, most notably his younger son, Bahadur Shah, who acted
as regent for his nephew from 1786 to 1795. The Gorkhas turned west and
overran the Chaubisi and Baisi Rajas and, even farther to the west, Kumaon
and Garhwal. Most areas were brought by conquest under the direct control of
Katmandu. However, to avoid conflict with a few particularly strong
adversaries, treaties of subsidiary alliance were concluded which often
granted them a large measure of autonomy. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth
century the territory of the Kingdom of Nepal extended from the southern
frontier of present-day Kashmir all along the arc of the Himalayas to the
heart of Sikkim.

     While these conquests were being made in the west, Nepal became engaged
in a quarrel with Tibet over a number of questions-primarily the circulation
of Nepalese coinage in Tibet and the taxation of goods traveling between
India and Tibet-which eventually involved Nepal in war with China. Nepalese
invasions of Tibet in 1788 and 1791 challenged the suzerainty which the
Chinese Empire, then at the zentith of its power under the Manchu dynasty,
had established over the domains of the Dalai Lama during the preceding
century and a half. In 1791 a Chinese ultimatum demanded the withdrawal
of Nepalese troops. When it was rejected a Chinese army said to number
70,000 entered Tibet, put the Nepalese to flight and then-culminating a
campaign regarded as even more extraordinary than Hannibal's crossing of
the Alps-passed through the Himalayas and approached withing a day's march
of the Nepalese capital. Forced to terms in 1792, Nepal agreed to return
territory earlier taken from Tibet and to send a tribute mission to Peking
every 5 years, thereby assuming the nebulous tributary relationship to the
Manchu Emperor which China had already established over Tibet and such other
countries as Siam, Korea and Burma.

     After this encounter with China, Nepal's expansionist energies, blocked
in all other directions, turned toward the south. At the same time, however,
the British in India were moving northward. They had arrived in India in the
late sixteenth century and by the latter part of the eighteenth century the
territory under their control extended up through the area of what is now
East Pakistan and the Indian provinces of Bihar and Bengal to the lower
reaches of Nepal. During this period their primary interest in the Himalayas
lay in exploiting the commercial potential of the mountain states and in
acquiring trade routes through them into Tibet and thence, it was hoped, to
China. Although the British had been hostile toward Prithvi Narayan, fearing
that the extension of his power throughout the Himalayas would jeopardize
their plans, by the time of the Sino-Nepalese war they were seeking to put
their dealings with Nepal on a more amicable footing. However, treaties of
1792 and 1801 between Great Britain and Nepal providing for the establishment
of diplomatic and commercial relations were subsequently nullified by the
opposition of ruling circles in Nepal. By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, therefore, relations between Nepal and Great Britain were distant
and unsettled.

     After continued acquisitions by the British East India Company made
its territories contiguous with the southern frontier of Nepal in 1801,
Nepalese depredations on British possessions across the frontier caused
relations between the two countries to deteriorate still further. Turmoil
along the frontier continued for more than a decade and by 1814 it, along with
the persistent refusal of Nepal to enter into trade and diplomatic relations,
had become intolerable to the British. When Nepal rejected a British proposal
that a joint boundary commission be established to recommend a settlement for
the disputed territories and ignored an ultimatum which followed, Great
Britain sent troops to occupy the contested areas and declared war against
Nepal in November 1814.

     The confrontation with British power decisively brought the course of the
Nepalese expansion to an end. Resisting until British troops menaced the
Katmandu Valley, Nepal capitulated in 1816 and met Great Britain's demands in
 a settlement known as the Treaty of Sagauli. The territorial provisions of
the agreement greatly reduced the area of Nepal and established the general
outline of its present boundaries. Nepal was stripped of all its conquests
west of the Kali and east of the Mechi Rivers, as well as large portions of
the Tarai. In addition, the treaty gave Great Britain several means of making
its influence felt in Nepalese affairs; Nepal was not to employ any European
or American nor any British subject, without the consent of the British
Government, which was also given the right to mediate any dispute arising
between Nepal and Sikkim. Moreover, it was agreed that there would be an
exchange of diplomatic representatives between Great Britain and Nepal.

Struggle for Domestic Supremacy

     After 1816 the militancy of the Nepalese expressed itself primarily in a
factional struggle for interes the PPS has generally followed the Soviet line. It
has openly and vigorously attacked government policies in the parliament,
in local councils, and in its press organs. Except for brief periods
when its newspaper was suppressed, the PPS has escaped repression by
refraining from criticism of the monarchy and by firmly supporting the king
on the Western Sahara. As a member of the National Security Council, Yata
joined other party leaders on missions abroad to explain the country's
position on the Western Sahara; Yata visited capitals in Eastern Europe.

     Several clandestine fringe groups of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist
inspiration had been only partially suppressed by arrests during the
mid-1970s, allegedly for plotting to form a so-called Red Army and forcibly
replace the monarchy with a socialist "people's democratic republic." They
also advocated self-determination for the Saharawis and condemned Moroccan
military operations there. One of these groups, Ilal-Amam (Forward), has
split off from the PPS. Its leader, Abraham Serfaty, remained in jail,
although others had been released. A companion organization, the 3 March
Group, which had split off from the UNFP, had splintered into two factions in
1978-79, one joining the USFP and the other remaining outlawed because of its
antigovernment position on the Western Sahara. A new leftist party, the
Organization of People's Democratic Action (Organisation de l'Action
Democratique Populaire-OADP) was formed by Mohamed Bensaid, a political exile
who took advantage of a royal amnesty to return to Morocco in 1981. The OADP
was said to be composed mainly of former partisans of the 3 March Group. It
did not nominate candidates in the 1983 communal elections, advising its
followers to vote for the USFP or the PPS. Bensaid was the only OADP member to
be elected to the parliament in 1984.

Interest Groups

     In his article "Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical
Dominance," political scientist Mark Tessler describes the political elites of
Morocco in terms of a series of concentric circles. The monarchy is at the
center. An inner core of somewhat over 200 individuals is composed of party
and union leaders and senior ministry officials. A broader general elite of
600 to 700 individuals includes persons of rural origin who have achieved
prominence at the national level, senior army officers, leaders of private
associations and religious institutions, and others who are outside the formal
political system. The outermost circle consists of the local and rural
subelites-qaids, pashas, shaykhs, local council leaders, party officials, and
parliamentary deputies with only local influence-perhaps 5,000 Moroccans in
all.

     In addition to these elite groupings and to the formal party structures
are various organizations that serve to articulate the political strivings of
identifiable groups in the society. Channels for the expression of interests
by these groups are not well defined. Those that have been most successful in
influencing the political authorities have generally done so through the
personal ties their senior members have established at higher political
echelons. In some cases these members are themselves part of the governing
elite. The business associations tend to be well connected to the leadership
ranks, as is the largest labor federation. Student organizations and groups
associated with the Islamic revival have been among the primary centers of
dissent, denouncing the elite establishment, the social inequities, the
bureaucratic mismanagement, and the materialism that they find in the existing
order. The army, with its history of intervention and its more recent
expansion to prosecute the war in the Western Sahara, remains in the
background of civilian politics, latently powerful yet enigmatic.

Labor and Employer Organizations

     The Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail-UMT) was created in
1955 in close association with the Istiqlal. When the leftists abandoned
the Istiqlal in 1959 to form the UNFP, the UMT became allied with the latter
party. The Istiqlal subsequently formed a new labor confederation, the
General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Generale des Travailleurs
Marocains-UGTM), to replace the UMT. In 1978 a third union organization, the
Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confederation Democratique du Travail-CDT)
was established under the auspices of the USFP.

     The UMT was the largest of the three federations, enrolling over 60
percent of Morocco's 1 million organized workers, mainly from the industrial
and commercial sectors. The UMT has been among the largest and strongest trade
union bodies of the Middle East and North Africa; it represents Moroccan
workers annually at the International Labour Organisation. The UGTM and its
federations, representing teachers, hotel and restaurant employees, and
railroad and municipal workers, upholds Istiqlal policies, stressing
pro-Islamic and pro-Arab elements in its program. CDT affiliates include many
public employee unions as well as phosphate miners and farm laborers.

     The UMT has always been cautious regarding strike actions, especially a
strike for political purposes. High unemployment and slender union resources,
coupled with a government unsympathetic to extended strikes, have limited the
bargaining power of the unions. The UMT and, to an even greater extent, the
UGTM have concentrated on jobs, wages, and benefits, rarely intruding on
broader political matters.

     The CDT adopted a more militant approach than did its two predecessors.
It has been willing to confront the government over broad social issues,
embroiling itself in periodic conflict with the authorities. It was blamed for
the riots and subsequent police repression that followed its call for a
general strike to protest food price rises in June 1981. The government
retaliated by detaining all members of the CDT central bureau and many other
unionists. The CDT offices were closed down for a 10-month period. The King's
rapprochement with the USFP was followed by amnesties for the imprisoned
leaders of the CDT. The CDT was subsequently successful in regaining its
standing as the second-ranking federation as a result of victories in plant
delegate elections.

     The unions were not involved in the 1984 demonstrations, fearing official
retribution and reluctant to antagonize the king when national elections were
pending. The trade union movement nonetheless retained a measure of
independence and could find itself in contention with the government again if
the austerity program imposed an unacceptable economic burden on working
people.

     Corresponding to the union federations have been a group of associations
representing the interests of businessmen and manufacturers by communicating
the concerns and objectives of employers to the political authorities. These
bodies may be influential in particular areas of activity but are thought to
have little effect on overall economic policies, in view of the centralized
management of major sectors and foreign trade. Individuals connected with
them, however, have held strategic official positions and often carry weight
in the king's economic councils. The General Moroccan Economic Confederation
is made up of member organizations representing various industrial and
commercial interests. Chambers of commerce and industry in Moroccan cities are
member bodies of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce. Many
operators of large and medium-sized farms belong to the Moroccan Farmers'
Association.

Students

     Education is perhaps the most politicized and radicalized of the social
sectors. Alienated by the manifestations of corruption and venality in
political life and confronted by declining job prospects after graduation,
students have been recruited to leftist causes, often rejecting the USFP and
the PPS for illegal and more radical Marxist-Leninist groups. Since the early
1980s many students attracted by religious fundamentalists and disenchanted by
the left, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have deserted
the Marxist movements. The appeal of militant Muslim sects has been greatest
among students of modest means and social background, often from the science
and engineering faculties.

     The concentration of students in Rabat and other centers of power has
helped to dramatize their protests. Acting with a strong sense of idealism
and less vulnerable to government coercion, the students are among the most
politically sensitive forces in society because of their greater means to
disrupt the normal course of government. Studies of student attitudes have
revealed a cynicism about the possibility of influencing official behavior
through legal channels. In the mid-1980s a very small percentage of students
were members of political parties, and few acknowledged attending political
rallies. Only half as many students troubled themselves to vote as did the
general population.

     The National Union of Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Etudiants
Marocains-UNEM) has been in the forefront of student activism since its
formation by Mehdi Ben Barka in 1956. Although successful in mobilizing
students on behalf of left-wing campaigns, the domination of the movement by
radical factions beyond the fringes of national politics, coupled with the
government's stern restraints, has prevented the UNEM from extending its
influence.

     As a result of discontent over social and educational conditions,
university strikes became endemic in the period 1970-73, and extreme leftists
gained control of the UNEM. The union was officially banned in 1973, and many
of the student leaders were given long jail sentences. The government's harsh
reaction provided the students with new grievances. Reforms were announced in
1976 to meet many of the demands of students and teachers. The Moroccanization
of secondary schools by replacing foreign teachers (mainly French) was to be
accelerated, teachers' wages and working conditions were to be upgraded, and
the universities were to be democratized by giving them autonomy with respect
to their management, curricula, and budgets. In 1978 the ban on the UNEM was
lifted after the government took measures to ensure that it would be under the
control of "responsible" members of the USFP and the PPS. Student unrest broke
out again in early 1981 in protest against overcrowding, inadequate
accommodations, and the low level of subsistence grants. The students also
opposed government plans for selective enrollment, insisting that the
baccalaureat (high school diploma) remain the sole qualification for
university entrance.

     As a result of determined efforts by the Marxist extremists, the far left
swept the elections to union bodies on the main campuses. The internal
struggle reached a climax at the UNEM's congress in September 1981, when the
six USFP members on the UNEM executive commission withdrew, leaving two PPS
members and three from outlawed leftist factions. After a strike in December
that paralyzed the main campuses, three members of the executive commission
and many other students were jailed.

     Less militant and politicized student groups were associated with other
political parties. Accordingly, the General Union of Moroccan Students aligned
itself with the Istiqlal, the People's Movement of Moroccan Students with the
MP, and the Democratic Union of Moroccan Students with the PND.

Women

     Despite having the constitutional right to vote, Moroccan women in 1985
had yet to become an overt, distinct political force. Political parties and
labor unions, however, usually had women's branches. The overall management of
such women's political auxiliary groups was generally left to a male member of
the parent body. Political activity by women has been encouraged by the king
and other leaders, although the king continued to observe the traditional
Muslim prohibition against allowing a man's wife to be seen in public. The
minister of interior attributed the negligible role of women to "shyness" and
rural tradition. Throughout society, however, the persistence of male and
female subcultures meant that only the most exceptional women were ready to
defy the traditions of their communities (see The Individual, the Family, and
the Sexes, ch. 2).

     Where Berber influences were strong, rural women have taken a somewhat
more active political role than have their urban counterparts. No woman has
ever held a cabinet position in Morocco, nor have there been any women in
parliament. Sixteen women are unsuccessful candidates for the Chamber of
Representatives in 1984; eight had run in 1977. A considerable increase in the
number of female candidates for local office did occur in 1983. Some were
elected to communal councils in 1976 and 1983 and to the Consultative Council
on the Sahara in the Western Sahara in 1981.

The Jewish Community

     The Jewish community in Morocco in some 2,000 years old. It has always
enjoyed a special relationship with the royal dynasty. At the time of Moroccan
independence a small group of Jewish activists who had worked with the
Istiqlal encouraged Jews to join all parties and to participate in politics.
For the most part, however, Jews preferred to remain in the background of
politics. Jewish participation in patronage networks required a Muslim patron
at some point; their highest patron was the sultan, later the king. Their
loyalty to the king was cemented by their fears of any alternative situation
without him. In 1984 a Jewish candidate of the UC party, Joseph Ohana, was
elected to parliament. Ohana was the first Jewish deputy since Moroccan
independence.

     The size of the Jewish community declined from over 200,000 in 1948 to
11,000 to 14,000 in the mid-1980s. The decline resulted from emigration after
the creation of the state of Israel and after such events as the Arab-Israeli
wars and the 1971 coup attempt. In 1976 Jewish emigres were officially invited
to return. Although few Jews took advantage of the offer, the invitation did
reassure the resident Jewish population.

     Hassan's positive relationship with his country's Jewish community was
underscored by his backing of a congress of the Jewish Communities Council in
Morocco held in Rabat in 1984. Drawing Jews of Moroccan origin from all parts
of the world, it was attended by 40 representatives of Moroccan Jewish
settlers in Israel, including 11 members of the Israeli parliament, the
Knesset. Both the Moroccan prime minister and the crown prince participated in
the event, and many private discussions were reportedly held about negotiating
Arab-Israeli differences, Hassan's interest in the Jewish community and its
expatriates in Israel, combined with his moderate stance on Arab-Israeli
issues, has had significant ramifications for Morocco's foreign policy (see
Other Arab Countries, this ch.).

The Armed Forces

     Until 1971 the Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royales-FAR), or, more
specifically, the senior military officers, were the source of the monarchy's
staunchest support. These officers, generally of wealthy, rural Berber
families, could be unquestionably relied upon by the king. They were regarded
as an important counterweight to the modern elites of the cities and the
ambitions of the Istiqlal. The assumptions of political neutrality and
unbounded loyalty to the king had to be cast aside, however, when the 1971 and
1972 coup attempts destroyed the special relationship between Hassan and the
armed forces. Trials and purges eliminated the immediate problem for the king,
although the many executions and the abasement of the army may have resulted
in a permanent sense of alienation among officers innocent of complicity in
plots against the king (see Loyalty, Deceit, and Royal Control, ch. 5).

     The warfare in the Western Sahara has focused favorable national
attention on the FAR. Benefits and pay supplements granted to enlisted
personnel mitigated the boredom and harshness of the desert campaign. Therenal supremacy. The major contestants in this
internal competition were two major families of the nobility, the Thapas
and the Pandes. Their bitter animosities had resulted in conflict and
bloodshed for generations, and their rivalry was directed toward possession
of the prime-ministership, a position which had grown increasingly powerful
since the days of Prithvi Narayan because of the incompetence or extreme youth
of a succession of monarchs.

     However, the antagonism between the two families involved much more than
simply the question of who was to hold the office of prime minister. It also
concerned a major issue of foreign policy. The Thapas, responsible for
concluding the peace with Great Britain in 1816, had become identified with a
comparatively moderate and cautious, though not entirely pacific, foreign
policy, while the Pandes were vehemently anti-British and sought a resumption
of the wars of conquest to the south. To forestall a demand for more strenuous
measures, the Thapa prime minister, Bhim Sen Thapa, who maintained the
ascendancy of his family while holding office from 1804 to 1837, pursued a
policy of slow, piecemeal encroachment on the south designed to sate the
bellicosity of the Pandes and of the army without being excessively
provocative to Great Britain.

     Concern for the security of its frontier in northern India therefore
caused Great Britain to take a large interest in Nepalese internal affairs
and, through the British Resident in Katmandu, to intervene frequently in
Nepalese politics. British recruitment of Gurkha troops also began at this
time. Impressed with the martial qualities of the Gurkhas during the war of
1814-16, Great Britain hoped that by providing employment for the otherwise
idle troops the belligerence of Nepal's policy might be reduced and another
serious conflict avoided.

     The internal struggle also came to involve the question of who was
actually to wield the authority of the throne, enervated though it had become.
A single monarch, Rajendra Bikram Shah, reigned from 1816 to 1846 but because
of his impotence, initially the result of his youth and later of his
passivity, he seldom actually ruled. Consequently, there were continual
machinations within the royal family to fill the vacuum around the throne. The
conflicts which arose within the royal family became interlocked with the
feud between the Thapas and the Pandes, and in the fluid tactical alliances
which resulted the Pandes were usually found supporting the king or his
legitimate heirs while the Thapas aligned themselves with other members of the
royal family. Earlier it was the judicious disposition of the power of the
throne which had preserved a semblance of equilibrium between the Thapas and
the Pandes and prevented either from dominating the king completely. When the
influence of the royal family was dissipated by the widening of the rifts
within it, however, these divisions were exploited by a collateral member of
the Thapa family to eradicate all remaining vestiges of monarchical power
and establish himself as ruler of Nepal.

     The primacy of the Thapas came to an end in 1837 when Bhim Sen Thapa was
toppled from power, and there followed a chaotic decade, punctuated frequently
by assassinations, unrest and foreign difficulties, in which the internal
struggle for supremacy moved toward a final resolution. It culminated in a
bloody slaughter in 1846 when the younger wife of King Rajendra, Queen
Lakshmi Devi, gathered the nobles and ministers of the court at the Kot (Royal
Court of Assembly) to determine who was responsible for the murder of her
lover, a contender for the prime-ministership. Jang Bahadur, nephew of Bhim
Sen Thapa and commander of a quarter of the armed forces, seized the
opportunity to establish his own predominance. Troops under his command
exterminated all those unable to escape the Kot, destroying virtually all of
the Nepalese Government, and during the massacre he managed to have the queen
appoint him prime minister and commander in chief of the army. Thereafter,
with the full backing of the army, he expelled from the country all those
from whom he could not expect complete loyalty, confiscated their lands,
filled the government with members of his family and conferred on them and on
himself the honorific name "Rana." Forcing the king and queen into exile
in India, he kept the heir apparent, Prince Surendra, a prisoner in Katmandu
to confer the legitimacy of the throne on his thorough and comprehensive
control of the government.