Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0034/00347.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00347}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Japan
Chapter 7C.   Manpower: Source and Quality}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{defense
united
states
japan
military
percent
forces
security
personnel
sdf
see
pictures
see
figures
}
$Date{1981}
$Log{See Minegumo-Class Destroyer*0034701.scf
}
Title:       Japan
Book:        Japan, A Country Study
Author:      Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 7C.   Manpower: Source and Quality

     The total authorized strength in all three branches of the SDF was
approximately 271,000 in 1981. This amounted to less than 1 percent of the
roughly 33 million men of military age (eighteen to forty-five years). In
addition the SDF maintained a total of about 43,000 men in reserve formations
attached to the three services. Even when Japan's active and reserve
components were combined, however, it maintained a lower ratio of soldiers to
its population than did any member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact. Of the major Asian nations, only India
and Indonesia kept a lower ratio of men in arms.

     The SDF were all volunteer forces. Conscription per se was not forbidden
by law, but many citizens considered Article 18 of the Constitution, which
proscribed involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime, as a legal
prohibition of any form of conscription. Even in the absence of so strict an
interpretation, however, a military draft appeared politically impossible.

     In the face of public apathy or antipathy toward the armed services, the
SDF in 1981 faced problems in recruiting personnel. Public relations campaigns
cast the SDF in the most favorable light possible with such slogans as
"Volunteer and learn a skill" and "Volunteer and grow physically fit." The
forces had to compete with well-paying industries for qualified personnel,
however, and most enlistees were "persuaded" volunteers who signed up after
solicitation from recruiters.

     Predominantly rural prefectures supplied military enlistees far beyond
the proportion of their population. In areas such as southern Kyushu and
Hokkaido, where employment opportunities were limited, recruiters were
welcomed and supported by the citizens. By contrast little success or
cooperation was encountered in urban centers such as Tokyo and Osaka.

     Because the forces were all-volunteer and legally civilian, members could
resign at any time, making retention a problem. Many were lured away by the
prospects of highly paying civilian jobs, and Defense Agency officials
complained of private industries looting their personnel. The agency attempted
to stop these practices by threats of sanctions to offending firms that held
defense contracts and by private agreements with major industrial firms. Given
the nation's labor shortage, however, the problem promised to continue.

     Though some older officers considered the members of the modern forces
unequal to personnel of the former Imperial Army and Navy, the SDF were
generally regarded as professional and able. In comparison with other nations,
members of the SDF were remarkably well educated and in good physical
condition. Literacy was universal, and institutional training was extensive.
Personnel were trained in judo and kendo, and physical standards were strict.
Compared to other institutions within Japan, the SDF probably did not attract
the same high level of personnel. It was rare for graduates of the top
universities to enter the forces, and applicants to the Defense Academy were
judged to be on a level of those who applied to second rank local
universities.

Defense Spending

     According to official Japanese security policy, maintenance of a military
establishment was only one tool-and by no means the best-with which to achieve
national security: diplomacy, economic aid and development, and a close
relationship with the United States under the terms of the 1960 security
treaty were all considered more important. The low priority accorded to
defense was reflected in the share of the budget assigned to defense
expenditures. In FY 1981 the 2.4 trillion yen (for value of the yen-see
Glossary) allotted the Defense Agency was 5.13 percent of the general budget,
a disproportionate amount compared with that of the great powers and all other
Asian nations (see table 27, Appendix).

     Official statements after the mid-1970s suggesting a new "comprehensive
security" approach that entailed a defense buildup did not appear to produce a
change in those priorities (see Recent Formulation, ch. 7). The military in
1981 received the lowest share of budget expenditures in over twenty-five
years. Defense spending had increased steadily in the 1970s (except for 1974
after the oil embargo). From 1972 to 1979 the rate of increase in such
spending, however, fell consistently below that of general expenditures (which
excluded debt servicing and transfers to local government-see Fiscal Policy,
ch. 4).

     Although this trend appeared to be changing-in 1980 and 1981 rates of
growth for the first time exceeded rates of growth in general expenditures-the
change in shares of allocations was too small to produce a substantial change
in the Defense Agency's share of the budget. The 7.5 percent raise in military
allocations requested for 1982 would perpetuate the military's low priority.

     In addition to annual budgets, beginning in 1957 the Defense Agency
prepared a series of cabinet-approved build-up plans that set goals for
specific task capabilities and established procurement targets to achieve
them. Under the first three plans (1958-60, 1962-66, 1967-71) funding
priorities were allocated to establish an ability to cope with limited
aggression. Economic difficulties following the 1973 oil crisis, however,
caused major problems in achieving the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (1972-76)
and forced the level of funding to be cut back, raising questions about basic
concepts underlying defense policies.

     In 1976, given the straitened circumstances of the nation's post-oil
crisis economy, the difficulties in recruiting youths into the SDF, and the
soaring prices of land in the country, the government recognized that
substantial increases in spending, personnel, and bases would be virtually
impossible. Instead a "standard defense concept" was suggested, which would
stress qualitative improvements in the SDF rather than quantitative expansion.
It was decided that defense spending would focus on achieving a basic level of
defense as set forth in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).
Thereafter the government ceased to map out build-up plans that alarmed the
public by their seeming open-ended nature and switched to reliance on single
fiscal year formulas that offered explicit attainable goals. The Defense
Agency continued to chart its course with an unofficial five-year Mid-Term
Program Estimate, however, for which cabinet approval was not sought.

     In spite of regular increases in defense spending (even discounting for
inflation, growth was almost 4 percent in real terms in 1981 and almost 200
percent in the 1970-81 period), defense expenditures were not large enough to
finance substantial improvements in the armed forces. Technological advances
in weaponry made replacement of outmoded equipment very expensive, and
policies calling for local production of most arms raised prices higher
because the limited demand generated by the SDF made it impossible to take
advantage of economies of scale. Moreover up until 1980 personnel and
facilities maintenance costs took over 80 percent of all funds, and weapons
procurement under 20 percent. At most the military was able to maintain a
limited self-defense capability by using any budget increases to finance
weapons modernization, and many commentators questioned its ability even to do
that.

     In mid-1981 the government announced its decision to begin drafting a new
five-year Medium-Term Defense Program to cover fiscal years 1983-87. The
program was to stipulate main projects and their estimated costs and aim at
achieving the defense capabilities listed in the 1976 outline. Cabinet
approval would be sought for the plan, which would enable defense contractors
to make longer term estimates of their operations than possible under the
one-year budgeting process. No details were available as of late 1981 on the
levels of spending that would be proposed by the five-year plan.

     At the time the NDPO was prepared, the government decided that given
residual antimilitarism and the current economic outlook, it was necessary to
set a tentative ceiling on annual defense expenditures. Accordingly a
cabinet-level decision was made to limit defense budgets for the time being to
not more than 1 percent of the estimated gross national product (GNP-see
Glossary) for the year. No fixed time limit was set for the ceiling to last,
and Defense Agency officials later noted that the decision could be subject to
reconsideration should domestic and international conditions warrant. In 1980
Prime Minister Suzuki expressed his intention to adhere to the set limit, but
agreed that the policy could change.

     While the 1 percent limit served internal political purposes and became a
focal point for United States pressures on Japan to increase its defenses, the
figure was of questionable significance in and of itself. By NATO calculations
(which included some personnel costs not contained in the Japanese budget) the
figure was about 1.2 percent. Moreover, while in 1981 the nation's defense
budget was only .91 percent of its GNP-the lowest level spent on defense by
any Asian nation or any major industrial power-at the same time considering
Japan's large GNP, even that small share translated into the world's eighth
largest defense budget.

     Barring unforeseen changes in the domestic or international scene,
defense expenditures were unlikely to rise above 1 percent of GNP. The
Japanese government in 1981 placed primary importance on reducing its
deficits. Moreover it was believed that if growth in defense expenditures were
financed by tax increases, a backlash would develop which would threaten the
effort to build a public consensus on the need to improve the nation's
military capabilities. Available budget projections from the Defense Agency
and the Ministry of Finance forecast increases in defense spending in 1982-84,
but even if higher Defense Agency estimates prevailed, the country's nominal
GNP was expected to grow faster than defense expenditures, resulting in a
reduction of the percentage of GNP allotted to defense.

     The nation's government contributed to salaries of Japanese employed by
United States forces in Japan and financed the maintenance of some United
States facilities. Officials resisted pressure from the United States to reach
a formal agreement binding Japan to increased contributions, claiming that
such a move would require revision of current agreements between the two
nations. The contribution slated for 1982, however, was 35.6 billion yen, a 29
percent increase over the 1981 figure.

Defense Industry

     Dismantled by occupation authorities after World War II, armaments
production resumed in 1953 when the nation's manufacturers began repairing and
maintaining equipment for United States forces operating in Asia. Individual
producers emerged as affiliates of larger industrial conglomerates including
the prewar zaibatsu (see Glossary) of Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. After 1954 the
defense industry began to be involved in arming the SDF, at first making only
slight improvements on United States-designed equipment manufactured for local
use. By the late 1970s indigenous suppliers had developed and produced an
almost complete range of modern equipment including aircraft, tanks,
artillery, and major surface and underwater vessels. Certain types of highly
sophisticated weaponry, including F-15 fighters, P3C Orion antisubmarine
aircraft, and 8-inch howitzers, were license produced. Except for very complex
and costly items such as the E-2C airborne early-warning aircraft, very little
was purchased complete from foreign suppliers.

     The nation supported no substantial military-industrial complex. Defense
work accounted for less than one-half of 1 percent of the country's total
industrial output, and only about 3 percent of ships built in Japan were
military. In 1979 the biggest producers were among the nation's top industrial
firms, but while the top ten contractors received over two-thirds of all
Defense Agency orders, only one, Shin Meiwa, relied on defense work for more
than 10 percent of its sales.

     Although official policy was to buy Japanese or, if necessary, have a
Japanese company enter into licensing agreements with other countries and
produce armaments locally, the scope of defense work was limited in 1981.
Budget constraints of the Defense Agency held orders down, and the small
amounts required to equip the SDF often resulted in underutilized facilities.
Nor was defense work particularly profitable. Profit ratios were around 3
percent in 1980. The Defense Agency only partially funded private research and
development, leaving pilot model construction and testing to private industry.
Given these limits contractors were motivated by patriotism to remain in the
armaments production business: they were generally big enough to afford to and
in long-range terms, if foreign competition continued to be kept at bay, the
market would remain stable and perhaps even grow.

     Armaments production was also held low by the government's strict
controls over arms exports. Under the "three basic principles for weapons
export" in force since 1967, Japan was forbidden to export arms to communist
countries, to countries belligerent in an international conflict, or to
countries subject to UN export boycotts. In 1976 Prime Minister Miki Takeo
declared that the nation should also refrain from exporting arms even to
nations not specified under the three basic principles. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) drew up and administered export
guidelines for all the country's industries.

     In 1981 the outlook for the continuance of the ban was uncertain. On one
hand, a revelation in the press that one company had engaged in the illegal
export of gun barrels to South Korea sparked public and industry  outrage and
forced the government to reiterate its policies. On the other hand, in
mid-1981 the government was considering cooperating in the development of
defense-related technology with the United States as part of its contribution
to national security under the terms of the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement. Although officially classed as an "exceptional case" the transfer
would represent a loosening of the stringently applied ban on weapons exports.
Commentators noted an element of hypocrisy in the ban. Controls did not affect
products which although not clearly military, such as microchips, were
transshipped for military use. In 1978 a giant commercial repair dock exported
to the Soviet Union ended up servicing the Soviet Minsk aircraft carrier.

     The Defense Production Committee of the Federation of Economic
Organizations (commonly known as Keidanren) was an important element in the
conduct of defense production. It acted as a negotiating body with the Defense
Agency and coordinated activities among defense firms. It disseminated
defense information and informally limited competition by promoting
agreements between companies. Competition for contracts nonetheless
intensified after 1980, however, as larger portions of the defense budget were
allotted to procurement.

     Development of technologically sophisticated weapons was hampered for
many years by the allocation of only 1 percent of the Defense Agency's budget
to research and development. As the nation made remarkable gains in
technological sophistication, however, it became apparent that some technology
developed for civilian use, especially in the microelectronics and
communications fields, had valuable applications in defense uses. For instance
the Technical Research and Development Institute of the Defense Agency
designed its own advanced microchip allowing it to build a computer able to
withstand neutron bombardments of atomic blasts. Important strides were also
achieved in radar and in image homing used in precision-guided munitions in
1981.

[See Minegumo-Class Destroyer: Minegumo-class Destroyer. Courtesy Embassy of
Japan.]

Conditions of Service

     In 1981 the general conditions of military life were not of a sufficient
quality to make a career in the SDF an attractive alternative to occupations
in private industry or the bureaucracy. The conditions of service provided a
lower standard of dignity, prestige, and comfort than they had before World
War II, and for most members of the defense establishment, military life
offered less status than did a civilian occupation. Those who entered the SDF
were often unfairly perceived as unable to find a better job. Nonetheless in
1979 almost 75 percent of 6,000 active duty members polled responded that they
were satisfied with their careers.

     In 1981 personnel were classified as "special civil servants" and were
paid on civilian pay scales that did not always reward rank differentiations.
At times the salaries were greater for subordinates than for commanding
officers; higher ranking sergeants with long periods of service could earn
more than newly promoted colonels. Pay raises were not included in Defense
Agency budgets and could not be targeted by military planners. The retirement
age was fifty for personnel below the rank of colonel and fifty-four for
higher ranking officers. Limits were sometimes extended to counteract
personnel shortages.

     Benefits were not on the scale provided to active duty personnel in other
major industrialized nations. Health care was available only for military
personnel injured in the course of duty, and there were no commissary or
exchange privileges. Housing was often substandard, and military
appropriations for facilities maintenance  often focused on efforts to appease
civilian communities near a base rather than on improving on-base facilities.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

     In 1981 uniforms in all three branches were similar in style to those
worn by United States forces. GSDF uniforms were grey-blue; MSDF wore
traditional blue dress, white service, and khaki work uniforms; and the ASDF
was attired in the lighter shade of blue worn by the United States and British
air forces. The arm of service to which members of the ground force were
attached was indicated by piping of distinctive colors: infantry, red;
artillery, yellow; armor, orange; engineers, violet; ordinance, light green;
medical, green; army aviation, light blue; signals, blue; quarter-master,
brown; transportation, dark violet; airborne, white; and others, dark blue.
The cap badge insignia displayed a dove of peace. Insignia also resembled
those worn by United States forces (see fig. 17).

     There were nine officer ranks in the SDF, three warrant officer ranks,
four NCO ranks, and three enlisted ranks. The highest NCO rank, chief master
sergeant (or chief petty officer in the MSDF), was created in 1980 to open up
more opportunities for promotion and shorter terms of service as master
sergeant or petty officer first class. Under the earlier system the average
NCO was promoted only two times in approximately thirty years of service and
remained at the top rank for almost ten years. Addition of a fourth rank was
thought to be a positive step in raising morale and in giving recognition for
the increasingly complicated and responsible positions required by modern
service.

Military Relations with the United States

     The 1952 security treaty provided the initial basis for the nation's
security relations with the United States (see Occupation and Reform
[1945-52], ch. 1; Relations with the United States, ch. 7). The treaty was
replaced in 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which
declares that both nations would maintain and develop their capacities to
resist armed attack in common and that each recognizes that an armed attack on
either one in territories under the administration of Japan would be
considered dangerous to the safety of the other. A minute to the treaty
prescribes that the government of Japan must be consulted prior to major
changes in deployment of United States forces into Japan or to the use of
their bases for combat operations other than in defense of Japan itself. In
1981 Japan expressed its intention to continue to rely on the treaty's
arrangements to guarantee the national security.

     Another minute to the 1960 treaty contains a status-of-forces agreement
(SOFA) detailing matters pertaining to the stationing of United States forces
in the nation, among which are the provision of facilities and areas for use
by the United States forces and the administration of Japanese employed on
those facilities. Also covered are the limits of the respective jurisdictions
of both countries over crimes committed in Japan by United States military
personnel.

     The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 initially involved a
military aid program that provided for acquisition by Japan of funds,
materiel, and services to assist in carrying out the nation's essential
defense. While by the 1960s the nation no longer received any aid from the
United States, the agreement continued to serve as the basis for purchase and
license agreements assuring interoperability of weapons between the forces of
the two nations and providing for the release of classified data to Japan,
including both international intelligence reports and classified technology.
In 1980 Japan was the second largest purchaser (behind Israel) of commercial
exports licensed under the United States Arms Export Control Act, buying over
US$260 million worth of weaponry. The 1954 agreement also enables Japan to
contract for training programs in the United States. These include dispatching
missile crews to New Mexico for firing practice and sending officers to the
United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania.

     A major early issue affecting military relations between the two nations
was resolved in 1972 when the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, reverted to
Japanese control, and the provisions of the 1960 security treaty were extended
to cover them. The United States retained the right to station forces on the
Ryukyus.

     Military relations between the two nations grew closer after the
mid-1970s. In the early 1960s a Security Consultative Committee with
representatives from both countries was set up under the 1960 security treaty
to discuss and coordinate security matters concerning both nations. In 1976 a
subcommittee of that body prepared the Guidelines for Japan-United States
Defense Cooperation that were approved by the full committee in 1978 and were
later submitted to and approved by the National Defense Council and the
cabinet. The guidelines authorized unprecedented studies and other activities
relating to joint defense planning in matters such as postures for deterring
aggression, actions in response to an armed attack on Japan, and cooperation
on situations in the Far East that could affect the security of Japan.

     Under the framework of the guidelines, the Japanese Joint Staff Council
and the Commander of United States Forces, Japan, drew up a long-range program
for joint exercises, eventually to encompass all three services of both
nations. In 1978 the ASDF participated for the first time in jet fighter
tactical training with the United States Air Force and by 1981 had drilled
with United States carrier-based planes. Although the MSDF had participated in
exercises with the United States Navy since 1955, Japan, in an unprecedented
move in 1980, permitted a task force of ships and aircraft to train with other
nations in a comprehensive naval exercise, which included the United States,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. This exercise was scheduled to be repeated
in 1982. Officers of the GSDF initiated training with the United States Army
in Hawaii in 1981.

     Approximately 45,000 members of the United States Armed Forces were
stationed in Japan in 1980, including almost 22,000 marines, 14,000 air force
personnel, 6,500 members of the navy, and 2,500 from the army. They were
deployed at several locations on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa. These numbers
represented a substantial reduction in the number of foreign troops maintained
on Japanese soil-20,000 fewer than in 1972 when Okinawa reverted to Japanese
control.

Public Order and Internal Security

     Conditions of public order in 1981 compared favorably with those in other
industrial countries. The overall crime rate was low by both American and West
European standards and, proportionate to the population, had shown a general
decline since the mid-1960s. The incidence of violent crime was especially
low, owing in part to effective enforcement of stringent firearms control
laws. Problems of particular concern were those associated with modernization
and urbanization, including juvenile delinquency, traffic control, and
white-collar crime.

     Civil disorders occurred from the early 1950s chiefly in Tokyo but did
not seriously threaten the internal security of the state. Far less frequent
after the early 1970s, they were in all cases effectively countered by
efficient and well-trained police units employing the latest and most
sophisticated techniques of riot control.

     In 1981 the police were an apolitical body under the general supervision
of independent agencies, free of direct central government executive control.
They were checked by an independent judiciary and monitored by a free and
active press. The police were generally well respected and could rely on
considerable public cooperation in their work.

     Officials involved in the criminal justice system were usually highly
trained professionals interested in preventing crime and rehabilitating
offenders. They were allowed considerable discretion in dealing with legal
infractions and in 1981 appeared to deserve the trust and respect accorded to
them by the general public. Criminal procedures respected the rights of
defendants and guaranteed such provisions as the issuance of writs of habeas
corpus, protection against self-incrimination, and in the inadmissibility of
confessions obtained under duress.

     In 1981 the prison system was generally modern and conducted from the
viewpoint of resocialization. Prisoners were treated on an individualized
basis, and education was emphasized. Special attention was given to juvenile
offenders who were normally housed separately from adult prisoners. A
well-organized parole and probation program employed numerous citizen
volunteers.

Civil Disturbances

     The public and government appeared to tolerate certain forms of public
disorder as inherent in a properly functioning democracy, and public
demonstrations at times involved thousands of police and protestors. Police
estimated, for example, that in 1979 leftists mobilized an aggregate of 5
million persons in mass activities to protest, among other things, the Tokyo
summit, pollution by thermal and nuclear power plants, and the opening of the
new Narita International Airport near Tokyo (see Political Extremists, ch. 6).
Rightists, though less numerous, used similar tactics to express their
positions. Annual spring "Labor Offensives" involved thousands, as did
labor-organized demonstrations such as those held in the autumn of 1979 to
protest high prices and employment conditions. Work stoppages, such as those
by train engineers in 1980 in protest of Japan's first participation in a
multinational Pacific naval exercise, could also adversely affect public
order.

     Demonstrations usually have followed established forms. Groups have
received legal permits and have kept to assigned routes and areas. Placards
and bullhorns have been used to express positions. Traffic has been disrupted,
and occasional shoving battles between police and protesters have resulted.
Arrests have been made rarely and in general only in cases involving violence.

     While violence has been normally held to "acceptable" levels with both
sides sustaining only minor injuries, some demonstrations have erupted into
riots where death and major injury occurred. In these, masses of people were
united in human battering rams to break police cordons; moistened towels were
worn to combat tear gas; and clubs, stakes, shields and Molotov cocktails
have been carried. In 1979 police arrested nearly 600 persons for throwing
gasoline bombs during mass demonstrations.

     Riots were not nearly so numerous or widespread in the early 1980s as
they had been a decade earlier. After students began to carry homemade guns in
1970, and three policemen were murdered in the Narita airport struggles in
1971, tolerable levels of violence appeared to have been breached. In addition
the government's commitment to exercise minimum force in quelling
disturbances-riot police have carried no firearms-also has worked to turn
public sympathy to police and government efforts to compel order.

     Political extremists have not hesitated to use violence, however, in
promoting some of the same issues and were held responsible for bombings
occurring in connection with popular causes. In 1979 they have been believed
to number around 35,000 and to be organized into over 300 groups. While this
number represents only a minute portion of the population and has presented no
serious threat to the government, authorities have been concerned about the
example of violence in a relatively nonviolent society. Violent protest by
radicals also has occurred in causes apparently isolated from public
sentiments. Clashes between leftist factions and between leftists and
rightists have accounted for injuries of both participants and bystanders.

     In the 1970s the most notorious group of extremists was the Red Army
Faction, a Marxist terrorist group. The group was responsible for an attack on
Lod Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, in support of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine in 1972. It participated in an attack on a Shell Oil
refinery in Singapore in 1974, seized the French embassy in The Hague that
same year, and the United States and Swedish embassies in Kuala Lumpur in
1975. In 1977 the Red Army Faction hijacked a Japan Airlines jet over India in
a successful bid for US$6 million ransom and the release of six inmates in
Japanese prisons. Following heavy criticism at home and abroad for the
government's "caving in" to terrorists demands, the authorities announced
their intentions to recall and reissue approximately 5.6 million valid
Japanese passports in order to make hijacking activity more difficult. A
special police unit was formed to keep track of the group, and tight airport
security measures were instigated. Despite issuing regular threats, the Red
Army Faction was relatively inactive in the early 1980s. In 1981 its members
were reported to be in North Korea and Beirut undergoing further training and
"up for hire" to promote any political cause.