Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0034/00346.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00346}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Japan
Chapter 7B.   Organization, Training, and Equipment}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{defense
training
air
agency
aircraft
staff
sdf
command
three
officer
see
pictures
see
figures
}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Title:       Japan
Book:        Japan, A Country Study
Author:      Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 7B.   Organization, Training, and Equipment

     Set up under the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the nation's defense
establishment was organized to ensure civilian control of the armed forces.
The result has been a military system unique in the world. All members have
been technically civilians: uniformed SDF personnel have been classed as
special civil servants and have been subordinate to the ordinary civil
servants who ran the Defense Agency, to which the SDF was responsible.
Offenses committed by military personnel-whether on base or off base, on duty
or off duty, military or nonmilitary in nature-have been adjudicated under
normal procedures by civil courts in appropriate jurisdictions. In order to
guarantee civilian oversight of the military, there has been no military
secrets law: a retired general and two officers accused of spying for the
Soviet Union in 1980 could be charged only with violations of SDF regulations
and common theft.

The Defense Agency

     In 1981 the Defense Agency was an agency of the Office of the Prime
Minister and, as required by Article 66 of the Constitution, was completely
subordinate to civilian authority. Its head, the director general, had the
rank of minister of state. He was assisted by two vice-directors general
(vice-ministers)-one parliamentary and one administrative. The highest echelon
in the command structure was the prime minister who was responsible directly
to the Diet. In a national emergency he was authorized to order the various
subordinate self-defense forces into action, subject to the consent of the
Diet. In time of extreme emergency he might obtain that approval after the
fact.

     Two advisory bodies assisted the prime minister in setting defense
policies. The more authoritative of the two was the Ministerial Council on
Overall Security Problems, which was established by Prime Minister Suzuki and
met for the first time in December 1980. The body was formed to study and
analyze a wide range of problems covering diplomacy and resources and was not
limited to defense in the narrow sense of the word. In 1981 it was chaired by
the chief cabinet secretary and comprised the ministers of finance; foreign
affairs; international trade and industry; agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries; and transport in addition to the directors general from the Defense
Agency, the Science and Technology Agency, and the Economic Planning Agency
(EPA). The new body was originally intended to replace the National Defense
Council, which has acted as an advisory group on purely defense-related
matters since 1956. Because of legislative difficulties involved in abolishing
it, however, the National Defense Council has remained in place but
subordinate to the new ministerial group. It is composed of the prime
minister, deputy prime minister, foreign minister, director general of the
Defense Agency, and the director general of the EPA.

     Basic policies and procedures governing the activities of the SDF were
prepared by a number of internal bureaus. Organized under a secretariat, their
personnel were civilian. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency provided
support for both Japanese and United States military installations. A number
of auxiliary organs were attached to the Defense Agency, including the
National Defense College (equivalent to the United States National War
College), the Defense Academy, which offered advanced education to prospective
officers following graduation from their respective officer candidate schools,
and the National Defense Medical College. The Technical Research and
Development Institute was concerned with such matters as the modification of
foreign equipment and the development of new weapons. The Central Procurement
Office and the Placement Screening Committee for SDF Retired Personnel
performed self-evident tasks.

     Although it had begun to exert its influence on government policies,
budget appropriations, and public opinion, the Defense Agency in 1981 remained
only partially effective in realizing its goals in the political process. This
was owed in part to legal requirements that senior bureaucrats be drawn from
among ten "counsellors" attached to the agency but on loan from other
ministries. This circumstance sometimes led to a low degree of loyalty and a
lack of consistency in policies-conditions that hurt the defense establishment
in competition for funds and helped to compromise its institutional interests.
Below the civilian component was the uniformed SDF. In 1981 the senior officer
was the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, a body that included the chiefs
of staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. Its principal
functions were to advice the director general and to plan and execute joint
exercises. The three branches also maintained staff offices that managed
operations in their branches. While rank differentiations established echelons
of command within the SDF, all three branches were immediately responsible to
the director general and were coequal bodies with the Joint Staff Council and
the three staff offices.

     The structure precluded the concentration of power that occurred with the
general staffs of the past, but it tended to impede inter-service
coordination, and there were very few formal exchanges between commanders in
each branch. Moreover some dissatisfaction was reported by high ranking
officers who felt they had little power vis-a-vis younger civilian officials,
who most often had no military experience. To rectify this situation and to
increase input by the SDF in policy matters, in 1981 the Joint Staff Council
was enlarged to create better lines of communication between the internal
bureaus and the three staff offices, and officials actively lobbied for an
increase in the council's decisionmaking authority. Plans were under way to
establish with the aid of computers a centralized command and control system
to enable the three branches of the SDF to harmonize their operations,
especially in the event of an emergency.

     In 1981 efforts were also under way to facilitate a clear and efficient
command policy in the event of a crisis. The government stood by its precept
that exercise of military power to counter an armed attack was permitted only
under civilian control, but in recognition that delay for consultation might
prove dangerous, ships of the MSDF began to be armed with live torpedoes, and
fighter-interceptors were allowed to carry missiles at all times. Although
aircraft have long been allowed to force down intruders without waiting for
specific permission from the prime minister, ships have still been required to
receive specific orders before interdicting invading vessels. The Defense
Agency has recommended drawing up more complete guidelines to clear up what
SDF combat units could do to meet emergencies.

     Cooperation between the SDF and other civilian agencies in the form of
contingency planning has been limited. No plans have existed to ensure the
support of civilian aircraft and merchant fleets in times of crisis, even
though the SDF's transportation capabilities generally have been judged
inadequate. Despite the scale of joint exercises-one in mid-1981 involved
11,000 men and concerned repelling an invasion of Hokkaido and seizing the
Tsushima Strait-Defense Agency and other civilian officials did not
participate. Calls for legislation to provide for special measures in the
event of national emergencies have evoked memories of the powerful position of
the military before and during World War II and have met with disfavor.

     Training in the SDF has included instruction in the philosophy of
national service in Japan and has stressed that members serve the people.
Personnel have been taught to avoid political activity, be constant in
training and resolve, develop a sense of mission, and take pride in their
roles. Public school curriculum, however, has not been designed to instill
patriotism or love of country. Military instructors sometimes have complained
of the difficulty in instilling pride in roles and a sense of mission in young
soldiers raised in these conditions and have claimed that recruits suffered
from an "employee mentality."

     Modern equipment has gradually been replacing obsolescent material in the
SDF, but logistic support has remained a serious weakness, and budget
constraints have made correcting deficiencies a long-term proposition. In 1981
the Defense Agency was replacing its communications system (formerly it relied
on phone lines of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company) with a microwave
network. The program began in 1977 and was scheduled to be completed in 1983.
In all branches stockpiles of munitions were so low that combat sustainability
was adversely affected; some analysts estimated that existing supplies would
last only three to ten days. Plans called for greatly increasing stocks during
the 1980-84 period, but in 1981 funding for meeting this target had not been
appropriated.

The Ground Self-Defense Force

     The largest of the three services, the GSDF, has operated under the
command of the chief of the ground staff. Although allotted 186,000 slots for
uniformed personnel, in 1981 the force was maintained at about 86 percent of
that level or approximately 155,000 because of funding constraints. It
consisted of one armored division, twelve infantry divisions, one artillery
brigade, two antiaircraft artillery brigades, one airborne brigade, two
composite brigades, one signal brigade, five engineer brigades, eight
surface-to-air missile groups, and one helicopter brigade (see table 26,
Appendix).

     In 1981 the GSDF was divided into five regional armies each of which
contained two to four divisions, and engineering brigade, antiaircraft
artillery units, and support units (see fig. 15). The largest, the Northern
Army, was headquartered on Hokkaido, where population and geographic
constraints were less limiting than in the rest of the nation. It had four
divisions, including the only armored division, plus tank and artillery
brigades. The Northeastern and Eastern armies headquartered in Sendai and
Ichikawa respectively, each had two divisions, and the Central Army,
headquartered in Itami, had three divisions in addition to a composite brigade
located on Shikoku. The Western Army, with two divisions, was headquartered at
Kengun and maintained a composite brigade on Okinawa.

     Intended to deter attack, repulse a small invasion, or provide a holding
action until reinforced by United States forces, the ground element has been
neither equipped nor staffed to offer independently more than a show of
conventional defense. According to the Defense Agency's 1980 white paper,
ground force equipment was significantly out-of-date, stockpiles of ammunition
were very low, and mobility was limited. Problems in air defense, antitank
capability, telecommunications, and minelaying were also identified. The
number of uniformed personnel was insufficient to enable an immediate shift
onto emergency footing. Instead the ratio of officers to enlisted men was
high-one to six-requiring fleshing out of units with reserves or volunteers in
times of crisis. In late 1981, however, GSDF reserve personnel, numbering
42,000, had received little professional training.

     In 1981 basic training for junior and senior high school graduates began
in training brigades and lasted twenty to twenty-four weeks. Specialized
enlisted and noncommissioned officer (NCO) candidate courses were available in
branch schools, and qualified NCOs could enter an eight-to-twelve-week second
lieutenant candidate program. Senior NCOs and graduates of an eighty-week NCO
pilot course were eligible to enter officer candidate schools as were
graduates of the Defense Academy and four-year universities. Advanced
technical, flight, medical, and command staff officer courses were also run by
the ground component. Like the maritime and air forces, the GSDF ran a youth
cadet program offering technical training to middle school graduates below
military age in return for a promise of enlistment.

     Because of population density on the Japanese islands, only limited space
has been available for large-scale training and, even in these areas, noise
restrictions have presented problems. The GSDF has tried to adapt to these
conditions by conducting command post exercises and map maneuvers and by using
simulators and other training devices. In live firing, training propellants
have been reduced to shorten shell ranges. Such restrictions have resulted in
insufficient combat training and have adversely affected the standards of
troop training and morale.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force

     The MSDF in 1981 had an authorized strength of 44,558, operated some 140
major vessels with an aggregate displacement of over 200,000 tons, and flew
some 130 aircraft and seventy-six helicopters. Commanded by the chief of the
maritime staff, the only full admiral in the force, the MSDF was equipped with
fourteen submarines, forty-eight destroyers and frigates, forty-six mine
warfare vessels, twenty-one patrol craft, and eight landing ships. The
majority of craft flown by the air arm were used in antisubmarine and mine
warfare operations.

     The force included the maritime staff office, the self-defense fleet,
five regional district commands, the air training squadron, and various
support units (hospitals, schools, etc.). The maritime staff office, located
in Tokyo, served the chief of staff as an organ for command and supervision of
the MSDF. The self-defense fleet headquartered at Yokosuka was charged with
defense of all the waters around the Japanese archipelago. It contained the
fleet escort force (four escort flotillas and other units), the fleet air
force (headquarters at Atsugi), two submarine flotillas, two minesweeping
flotillas, and the fleet training command.

     Five district units acted in concert with the fleet to guard the waters
of their respective jurisdictions and support the rear areas. Operations in
each district were controlled by headquarters within the regions located in
Ominato, Maizuru, Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo.

     Recruits in the MSDF received three months of basic training followed by
courses in patrol, gunnery, minesweeping, convoy operations, or maritime
transportation. Flight students, all high school graduates, entered a two-year
course. Officer candidate schools offered six-month courses to qualified
enlisted men and those who had completed flight school. Graduates of four-year
universities, the four-year Self-Defense Forces Defense Academy, and
particularly outstanding enlisted personnel underwent a one-year officer
candidate course at Eta Jima (site of the former Imperial Navy Academy).
Special advanced courses for officers were also available in such fields as
submarine duty and flight training. The MSDF operated its own Staff College in
Tokyo for senior officers.

     The large volume of commercial fishing and maritime traffic limited
in-service sea training, especially in relatively shallow waters required for
minelaying, minesweeping, and submarine rescue practice. Training days were
scheduled around the fishermen's slack seasons in winter and summer-providing
about ten days during the year. The MSDF maintained two oceangoing training
ships and each year conducted long-distance on-the-job training for graduates
of the one-year officer candidate school.

     The naval force's capacity to perform its defense-oriented missions
varied according to task. Existing vessels and aircraft provided excellent
minesweeping capability as a result of considerable practical experience in
clearing live mines laid in World War II-some still present in 1981. In
addition to the obvious danger mines presented to the nation's foreign trade
(99.5 percent of which was carried by sea), the relatively low cost of a
minesweeper and its clearly defensive operations made investments in
minesweeping ships and helicopters comparatively easy to secure.

     By contrast the MSDF also possessed striking weaknesses. Of particular
concern to Defense Agency officials in 1980 was anti-submarine warfare
capability. While the nation's defense planners believed the most effective
approach to combating submarines entailed mobilizing all available weapons,
including surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters, these
weapons were available in barely adequate numbers, all were expensive, and
almost all were equipped with obsolescent torpedoes.

     Moreover a critical weakness was perceived in the ability to defend such
weapons against air attack. Because most of the MSDF's air arm was detailed to
antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF had to be relied upon to provide air cover, an
operation which competed unsuccessfully with the ASDF's primary mission of air
defense of the home islands. Extended patrols over sea lanes were also beyond
the ASDF's capabilities. The fleet's capacity to provide ship-based anti-air
protection was limited by the absence of any aircraft carriers, the small
numbers of escorts equipped with long-range surface-to-air missiles, and the
lack of suitable close-range weapons on almost all ships. The fleet was also
short of underway replenishment vessels and was seriously deficient in all
areas of logistic support. The weaknesses seriously compromised the ability of
the MSDF to fulfill its mission and to operate independently of the United
States Air Force and Seventh Fleet.

     Although aware of the MSDF's shortcomings, Defense Agency officials had
to pursue a gradual course to improve the situation owing to both political
and financial constraints. In 1981 planned procurement promised to modernize
but not expand existing forces. All destroyers commissioned after 1980 were to
be fitted with surface-to-air missiles, and two older vessels were to be
modified to include them. Modern torpedoes, United States-designed P-3C Orion
antisubmarine aircraft made under license agreements in Japan, and
surface-to-surface missiles were also scheduled to be procured. If aging ships
were retired after reaching twenty-five years, however, and ship construction
continued at the planned level, compared to 1981 levels, by 1985 the nation's
fleet would have shrunk by nine escort ships and one large patrol craft,
gaining only two submarines and two frigates.

The Air Self-Defense Force

     The ASDF provided the major aviation arm of the SDF. It had an authorized
strength of 46,523 for 1981 and flew approximately 370 combat aircraft.
Front-line formations included three ground attack squadrons, ten fighter
squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and three transport squadrons.

     The ASDF comprised the Air Defense Command, Flying Training Wing,
Tactical Air Lift Wing, Technical Training Command, and three independent
wings for rescue, aircraft testing, and air traffic control and weather
operations. Support units included supply depots, schools, and hospitals. The
Air Defense Command was divided into three regional air commands-the Northern,
Central, and Western-in addition to the Southwestern Composite Air Wing based
at Naha on Okinawa. All four regional headquarters had control over
surface-to-air missile units of both the ASDF and the GSDF located in their
respective areas (see fig. 16).

     To secure the air defense of the nation, the ASDF in 1981 maintained an
integrated network of twenty-eight radar installations and air defense
direction centers known as the Basic Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE)
system. Following the 1976 MiG-25 incident in which a defecting Soviet pilot
flying over Japan eluded interceptors for twenty minutes while the craft was
lost from view of radar, the system was beefed up with supplemental mobile
reconnaissance units in areas receiving particularly poor coverage. In 1981
coverage provided by the warning network continued to be limited and promised
to become increasingly so since complex computers in the F-15 Eagle (scheduled
to become the nation's next mainstay fighter) demanded a more sophisticated
system. Early warning aircraft of the E-2C type were scheduled to be delivered
to the ASDF in 1984 to supplement ground installations until such time as the
entire system could be replaced-estimated to take until after 1985.

     The nation has relied on fighter-interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air
missiles to accomplish its mission of intercepting hostile aircraft. In 1981
both systems were aging but undergoing improvement. Outmoded aircraft were
slowly being replaced with more sophisticated models, and some missiles were
being upgraded. Essentially, however, the nation relied on United States
forces to provide interceptor capability: one commentator stated that the ASDF
aimed at intercepting only 15 percent of invading planes.

     The ASDF was also assigned to provide air support for ground and sea
operations of the GSDF and the MSDF and air defense for bases of all the
forces. While support fighter squadrons were fairly modern in 1981, they
lacked precision-guided weapons to facilitate support of ground operations and
attacks on hostile ships, and ASDF pilots received little flight training over
oceans to prepare for maritime operations. The ASDF maintained a poor base
defense capability, which consisted mainly of outmoded antiaircraft guns and
portable shelters to house aircraft. Plans were under way in 1981 to upgrade
base defense through purchase and installation of surface-to-air missiles,
modern antiaircraft artillery, and fixed and mobile aircraft shelters, but it
was unclear when these goals would be accomplished and to what extent budget
considerations would constrain their ultimate effectiveness.

     Upon passing an entrance examination, recruits could enter several
training programs. Middle school graduates were eligible to enter the MSDF's
four-year youth cadet program to earn high school equivalency and NCO status,
or they could undergo twelve-week recruit training courses followed by
technical training lasting from five to fifty weeks. High school graduates
could also enter either two-year NCO or four-year flight courses. Specialized
training was available for all NCOs as were opportunities to enroll in officer
and flight officer candidate courses. Graduates of the four-year Defense
Academy or four-year universities received thirty to forty weeks of
instruction in officer candidate schools. Advanced technical, flight, and
command staff officer programs were available for officers.